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Feb. 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Marcus Hilliard v. Loyola University of Chicago

District Court, N.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:20-cv-01144

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (27)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.5K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

MARCUS HILLIARD,

         Plaintiff,                                                 
                                  Case No. 20-cv-01144              
    v.                                                              
                                  Judge John Robert Blakey          

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,

         Defendant.                                                 

         MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER                               

Plaintiff Marcus Hilliard sues Defendant Loyola University of Chicago under
Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12182 et seq.; 28
C.F.R. § et seq., alleging it violated the ADA by failing to accommodate Plaintiff’s
disability and dismissing him as a student at Stritch School of Medicine. [113].1

Following discovery, Defendant moved for summary judgment, [142], and moved to
exclude Plaintiff’s expert witness Jon D. Sand, [165]. For the reasons explained
below, the Court grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and denies
Defendant's motion to exclude as moot.

1 Plaintiff initially filed suit against the National Board of Medical Examiners but dropped his claim
following a settlement agreement with that party and proceeds against Loyola University of Chicago
alone. See [110]; [112].

I. Background2

Since a young age, Plaintiff has had a learning disability and specifically
received diagnoses of dyslexia, DSM V 315 (a specific learning disorder, with

impairment in reading), and DSM V 315.20 (a specific learning disorder, with
impairment in written expression). [164] ¶ 1. Plaintiff enrolled at Loyola University
Chicago Stritch School of Medicine (“Loyola” or “Stritch”) in 2015 and requested
accommodations for his disability prior to his matriculation. [153] ¶¶ 2, 11. The
Technical Standards Committee (“TSC”) approved Plaintiff’s request for separate
space and time-and-a-half on exams. Id. ¶ 12. TSC later granted Plaintiff double

time on exams after he provided a psychologist report recommending that
accommodation. Id. ¶ 13.

The Academic Center for Excellence and Accessibility (“ACE”) operates as a
dedicated resource for medical students to receive additional support, including
implementing accommodations for students with disabilities. Id. ¶ 6. Stritch
additionally approved the following accommodation requests from Plaintiff: prior
access to small group question sets, delayed clerkship exam schedules, and additional

time for clinical presentations, patient notes, and record review within the limits of
the learning environment. Id. ¶ 56. Plaintiff admits that he had extensive

2 The Court draws these facts from Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts 145,
Plaintiff’s Rule 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts 154, and the responses thereto
[153], [164], where supported by the record. To the extent Defendant challenges Plaintiff's response
and additional facts, the Court has discretion to apply the 56.1 rules “strictly or to overlook any
transgression.” Waldrige v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 923 (7th Cir. 1994).

2

communication with Loyola about his reasonable accommodations, as summarized in
a 74-page chart he produced of those communications. Id. ¶ 54.

Plaintiff states that he did not always receive the small group questions in

advance and TCS denied the following requested accommodations: additional time to
see patients, temporal separation between clinical responsibilities and clerkship
examinations, scratch paper during PCMR2 Standard Patient Exam,

accommodations regarding a decelerated schedule, materials for a particular course,
accommodation during a standard patient exam, meetings with attendings for
clerkships, and accommodations during clerkships. Id. ¶ 56. TSC initially denied

Plaintiff’s request for temporal separation between his clinical responsibilities and
clerkship exams because it would fundamentally alter the learning experience. Id.
¶ 58. After meeting with Dean Sonntag to discuss a proposed schedule and going
“back and forth” to develop an appropriate schedule, TCS granted Plaintiff’s
accommodation request. Id. ¶¶ 59, 60.

On Wednesday, February 1, 2017, a proctor did not provide Plaintiff with his
accommodation of double time for a portion of an OSCE exam. Id. ¶ 72. Stritch gave

Plaintiff the option of retaking the full exam or picking up where he left off with
additional time, and Plaintiff retook the exam. Id.

In Plaintiff’s first year at Stritch, he failed one course, Host Defense, but
successfully remediated the exam. Id. ¶ 14. Plaintiff failed another course his second
year, did not successfully remediate the exam, and later successfully re-took the class.

                          3                                         

Id. ¶ 15. Also, during his second year, Plaintiff received an “Unsatisfactory” grade
for Mechanisms Human Disease II based upon concerns regarding his medical
knowledge, interpersonal and communication skills, and professionalism, though

Plaintiff successfully remediated this class, too. Id. ¶¶ 16, 17. In his third year,
Plaintiff received “Unsatisfactory” grades in his Family Medicine and Psychiatry
Clerkships, and his evaluations noted concerns regarding Plaintiff’s medical
knowledge, patient care, and professionalism. Id. ¶¶ 23, 24.

Plaintiff’s instructors also noted several important concerns regarding his
professionalism during his time at Stritch. One competency performance report

noted “Marcus showed poor judgment and professionalism in the presence of his
colleagues and course administrators with an outburst during a small group
representative meeting,” id. ¶ 34, and another noted similar professionalism
concerns, id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff admitted on two occasions he falsely signed an attendance
sheet for classes that he failed, in fact, to attend, [145-3] at 50–51 (Ex. 3, 193:6–9, 24–
194:4), and the Course Director, Dr. Theresa Kristopaitis, filed a professionalism
report about the incident. [153] ¶ 35.

In early 2017, Plaintiff recorded an encounter with a patient without asking
for permission, id. ¶ 36, and recorded MHD small group class sessions, also without
permission. Id. ¶ 37. After Plaintiff received feedback from his instructor, Dr.
Kumar, that he did not meet expectations in his participation during small group
sessions, Plaintiff sent an email to his classmates stating: “So I wanted to reach out

                          4                                         

to y’all to see if you remember a time when you ever felt intimidated, humiliated or
made to feel stupid by Dr. Kumar.” Id. ¶ 39. Dr. Kristopaitis filed a professionalism
report regarding Plaintiff’s email. Id. In a conversation with Medical Education

Coordinator Ms. Caterina Goslawski, Plaintiff said he did not want Dr. Kristopaitis
to come down on her “like a vampire.” Id. ¶ 40. Ms. Goslawski reported the incident
to Dr. Clipstone, who submitted a Professionalism Report on her behalf. Id. Plaintiff
claims the term is “a very common colloquialism in Texas” and meant he did not want
Ms. Goslawski “to get in trouble for giving Hilliard something without approval or
come down on her like a pile of rocks for not getting preapproval.” Id. Due to these

professionalism concerns connected to his MHD small group class, Plaintiff completed
additional coaching sessions to address his professionalism issues. Id. ¶ 41.

Plaintiff’s conduct in clinical clerkships also raised professionalism concerns.

In August 2018, Plaintiff communicated with a female patient he previously met
during his pediatric clerkship via text. Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff texted with the patient for
about 20 minutes and offered to help her with chemistry. Id. Plaintiff believed he
could respond to the patient’s text messages without consulting his course director

because he was simply “being polite.” Id. When Plaintiff mentioned this conversation
to his course director, Dr. Shahid, he told Plaintiff “NOT” to communicate with the
patient via text and filed a professionalism report. Id. Also, during a clerkship,
Plaintiff tried to take a picture “inside the live EPIC environment,” the system
containing patient information. Id. ¶ 43. The doctor instructed Plaintiff not to take

                          5                                         

a picture, and Plaintiff put his phone away. Id. Plaintiff also sent a screenshot of
EPIC in an email with unredacted patient information, which he purportedly thought
was okay because a different doctor had previously emailed him a screenshot. Id.

Another doctor on one of Plaintiff’s clerkships filed another professional report
raising several concerns regarding Plaintiff’s conduct, though Plaintiff largely
disputes the contents of the report. Id. ¶ 44.3 Plaintiff admits, however, that Dr.
Peter Angelos, the Director of the MacLean Center for Clinical Medical Ethics at the
University of Chicago, concluded that Plaintiff’s conduct raised serious concerns from
an ethics and professional perspective regarding Plaintiff’s fitness to practice

medicine. Id. ¶ 45.

Among its requirements, Loyola’s Academic Policy Manual sets forth
standards for professionalism and requires medical students to pass within three
attempts, Step 1 of the United States Medical Licensing Exam (“Step 1”), a test
administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9, 10; [145-2] at
31. Plaintiff sat for Step 1 in June 2018, November 2018, and August 2019 and failed
each time. [153] ¶¶ 21, 22, 27. On September 25, 2019, Plaintiff received a letter

dismissing him from Stritch based upon his failure to pass Step 1 within three tries.

Id. ¶ 27; [145-5], Ex. T. Plaintiff appealed his dismissal, which the Student Appeal
Board (“SAB”) denied. [153] ¶ 28. Dean Mendez sent Plaintiff a letter stating that
the decision was based upon Plaintiff’s overall medical school performance, his lack

3 This dispute remains immaterial given the other undisputed facts detailing concerns regarding
Plaintiff’s professionalism.

6

of self-awareness regarding how his decisions and actions led to his dismissal, and
his failure to articulate a realistic plan to pass Step 1 on a fourth attempt. Id. ¶ 30.

Plaintiff appealed SAB’s decision to Dean Callahan, who affirmed the dismissal. Id.

¶ 31. Plaintiff filed a complaint with the Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) alleging that
Loyola discriminated against him based on his disability by dismissing him and
preventing him to sit for Step 1 a fourth time. Id. ¶ 32. OCR found Plaintiff’s claim
contained “insufficient evidence” that Loyola discriminated against Plaintiff based on
his disability. Id.

II. Motion to Exclude [165]

The Court first addresses Defendant’s motion to exclude Plaintiff’s expert Dr.
Jon Sand. [165]. Plaintiff relies on Dr. Sand’s testimony for the opinions: “Mr.
Hilliard was qualified,”4 “Stritch failed to provide reasonable accommodations to Mr.
Hilliard,” “Stritch denied Mr. Hilliard the opportunity to participate in or benefit,
benefit from and otherwise discriminated against Mr. Hilliard by reason of his
disability,” and “Stritch’s accommodation process was not always interactive.” [154]
¶ 10. These assertions, however, constitute legal conclusions, which the Court can

disregard, as such testimony remains inadmissible. Good Shepherd Manor Found.,
Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 564 (7th Cir. 2003).

4 Loyola does not dispute that Plaintiff is an individual with a disability, [164] ¶ 1, but disputes that
Plaintiff was “a qualified individual with a disability”—a legal conclusion—for the purposes of his
failure to accommodate claim, described infra. Id. ¶ 10.

7

Putting aside these legal conclusions, Dr. Sand’s remaining testimony fails to
create a genuine dispute of material fact, as his remaining testimony does not change
the motion for summary judgment analysis detailed below. Therefore, Defendant’s

motion to exclude [165] is granted in part, and denied in part as moot.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment [142]

A party seeking summary judgment must show that there exists no “genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgement as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

A genuine dispute as to a material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable

jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of
establishing that there remains no genuine dispute as to any material fact. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court
must “construe all facts and reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the
nonmoving party,” Daza v. Indiana, 941 F.3d 303, 308 (7th Cir. 2019), but a mere
“scintilla of evidence” supporting the non-movant’s position does not suffice,

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251. Instead, “there must be evidence on which the jury could
reasonably find” for the non-moving party. Id. at 252.

A. Reasonable Accommodations

To prove a failure to accommodate claim, Plaintiff must show: (1) he is a
qualified individual with a disability; (2) Defendant was aware of his disability; and

                          8                                         

(3) Defendant failed to reasonably accommodate the disability. See Bunn v. Khoury
Enters., Inc., 753 F.3d 676, 682 (7th Cir. 2014). The parties agree that Plaintiff has
a disability, and that Defendant knew of his disability, thus, this Court focuses upon

the third element of the claim.

A request for reasonable accommodation “requires a great deal of
communication” between the parties. Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Schs., 100
F.3d 1281, 1285 (7th Cir. 1996). While parties should work together in this
“interactive process,” see Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th
Cir. 1996), “the interactive process is not an end in itself”; therefore, “it is not

sufficient” for a plaintiff “to show that” a defendant “failed to engage in an interactive
process or that it caused the interactive process to break down.” Bunn, 753 F.3d at
683 (quotation omitted).

First, Plaintiff fails to provide a legal or factual basis for his claim that Stritch
failed to provide him with reasonable accommodations. See [152] at 2–5. Plaintiff
merely cites the parties’ statements of facts and the legal conclusions in his expert’s
report which, as already discussed, the Court disregards. Id.; supra section II. Since

Plaintiff fails to develop argument, the Court considers this claim waived. Braun v.
Vill. of Palatine, 56 F.4th 542, 553 (7th Cir. 2022) (“A litigant ‘waives an argument
by failing to make it before the district court.’ This rule applies when ‘a party fails to
develop arguments related to a discrete issue’ . . . .”) (first quoting Alioto v. Town of
Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 2011); and then citing Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d

                          9 602,  614  (7th  Cir.  2005)  (finding  waiver  because  party  “did  not  present  legal 

arguments or cite relevant authority to substantiate that claim”)); see also U.S. v.
Useni, 516 F.3d 634, 658 (7th Cir. 2008) (“It is not the obligation of this court to

research and construct the legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are
represented by counsel.”) (quoting Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 703 (7th Cir.
1986)).

Even if Plaintiff did not waive the issue, Plaintiff’s claim would nevertheless
fail based upon the undisputed portions of the record. Plaintiff admits that Loyola
granted several accommodation requests: double time on written exams, extended

time on clinical exams, separate testing space for written exams, prior access to small
group question sets, delayed clerkship exam schedules, and additional time for
clinical presentations, patient notes, and record review within the limits of the
learning environment. [153] ¶ 56. Plaintiff further admits that Defendant did
participate in communications with Plaintiff regarding his disability and reasonable
accommodations. When Plaintiff had difficulty in a course, he could “go ask about
that difficulty and then an accommodation would be made or suggested or offered,”

id. ¶ 50, he met with a number of individuals on multiple occasions to discuss
accommodations or preparation for class or exams, and he met with Dr. Hopps and
Dean Sonntag regularly in preparation for his first attempt at Step 1. Id. ¶¶ 52–53.

The record thus confirms that Loyola, in fact, participated in good faith to help

                         10                                         

Plaintiff determine appropriate accommodations to support him in the program, and
provided such accommodations.

Despite such efforts to accommodate, Plaintiff argues that Loyola’s failure to

provide additional accommodation requests violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act.
See [152] at 15. Under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, however, Loyola has no
obligation to grant all accommodation requests, only “reasonable modifications” that
do not “fundamentally alter” its program. 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (a)(2)(A)(ii). Here, Loyola
did, in fact, grant some of the accommodations Plaintiff asserts were denied, once
Plaintiff provided further information about the requested accommodation. In at

least one instance, if Loyola mistakenly failed to provide Plaintiff’s approved
accommodation, the school rectified the mistake by offering Plaintiff another
opportunity for the task. As to the other denied accommodations (including denying
Plaintiff the opportunity to sit for Step 1 a fourth time), Plaintiff offers no argument
or explanation that his requested accommodations were reasonable or would not
“fundamentally alter” the medical school program. Since the “plaintiff bears the
initial burden of showing that” the requested accommodation “is reasonable on its

face,” this lack of evidence and argument dooms his claim. Williams v. Bd. of Educ.
of City of Chi., 982 F.3d 495, 507 n.28 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Majors v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 714 F.3d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 2013)).

Plaintiff may wish that Stritch did more to accommodate his disability and
engage in the interactive process, but Loyola only needed “to participate in good faith”

                         11                                         

and “make reasonable efforts to help the other party determine what specific
accommodations are necessary.” Beck, 75 F.3d at 1135. In short, the undisputed
facts show that Loyola did make reasonable efforts to communicate with Plaintiff and

provided reasonable accommodations in good faith, as required by law. As the “put
up or shut up” moment, the summary judgment stage requires a plaintiff to “show
what evidence it has that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of events.”

Wade v. Ramos, 26 F.4th 440, 446 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Schacht v. Wis. Dep’t of
Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 504 (7th Cir. 1999)). If the plaintiff’s claims are “backed up by a
measure of plausible evidence,” that “might well merit a trial”; alternatively, if “there

is not enough support” for “a factfinder to rule in their favor,” summary judgment is
appropriate. Id. Here, Plaintiff fails to provide such sufficient evidence, and thus his
claim must fail.5

B. Dismissal from Stritch

Plaintiff claims that Loyola discriminated against him when Loyola dismissed
him from Stritch in 2019. [113] ¶¶ 52, 53. Such a discrimination claim requires proof
that: (1) Plaintiff “suffers from a disability as defined in the statutes”; (2) he is

“qualified to participate in the program in question”; and (3) he was “either excluded
from participating in or denied the benefit of that program based on his disability.”

5 Even if Loyola failed to provide reasonable accommodations, Plaintiff cannot show he was a “qualified
individual with a disability,” or in this context, a “person who meets the academic and technical
standards requisite to admission or participation” in the school’s “education program or activity.”
Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 482 (7th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted). The Court
discusses whether Plaintiff was a “qualified individual” infra.

12

Novak v. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ., 777 F.3d 966, 974 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Jackson
v. City of Chicago, 414 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2005)).

Following the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc.,

courts utilize a holistic approach which supplements, rather than alters, the burden-
shifting framework for discrimination claims that the Supreme Court created in
McDonnell Douglas Corp v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Davis v. Bd. of Trs. of
Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017) (discussing Ortiz’s impact
on methods of proof in discrimination cases). Under this approach, Plaintiff must
show “evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that” Defendant “treated

him differently because of” his disability. Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 719–20 (7th
Cir. 2019) (citing Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016)).

Courts consider such evidence “as a whole, rather than asking whether any particular
piece of evidence proves the case by itself—or whether just the ‘direct’ evidence does
so, or the ‘indirect’ evidence.” Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765. But the core question on
summary judgment remains, “has the non-moving party produced sufficient evidence
to support a jury verdict of intentional discrimination?” David v. Bd. of Trs. Of Cmty.

Coll. Dist. No. 508, 846 F.3d 216, 224 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Morgan v. SVT, LLC, 724
F.3d 990, 997 (7th Cir. 2013)). Courts still conduct the McDonnell Douglas analysis,
however, if the parties present arguments “in those terms,” but still assess the
plaintiff’s evidence “cumulatively” under Ortiz. See id. Here, the parties organize their arguments utilizing the McDonnell Douglas

                         13                                         

framework; therefore, the Court will assess the evidence in accordance with the
McDonnell Douglas framework and additionally review the record holistically,
analyzing whether it permits a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Defendant

dismissed Plaintiff based upon his disability. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765.

McDonnell Douglas requires a plaintiff to state a prima facie case of
discrimination by showing that: “(1) he is disabled, (2) he is qualified to participate
in the program, (3) he suffered an adverse action, and (4) nondisabled students were
treated more favorably.” Novak, 777 F.3d at 974. Once a plaintiff establishes a prima
facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer “a legitimate, non-

discriminatory reason for any alleged adverse action toward the plaintiff.” Id. If the
defendant does so, the employer merits summary judgment unless the plaintiff
presents evidence that the proffered reasons exist merely as pretexts for
discrimination. Id. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff suffers from a disability
nor that he suffered an adverse action in his dismissal from Loyola. The Court thus
focuses on the issues in dispute: whether Plaintiff qualifies under the statute and
whether his dismissal was based on his disability.

       i.  Plaintiff’s Qualification for Stritch                    

Loyola requires its medical students to pass Step 1 within three attempts.

[153] ¶¶ 9, 10. While Plaintiff acknowledges he failed to meet this requirement, he
argues that Loyola should have granted his request to remain enrolled at Stritch for
a fourth attempt. For its part, Loyola contends that Plaintiff was not qualified to

                         14                                         

remain a student for additional reasons, and the additional deficiencies in his
performance, together with his failure to pass Step 1 after three attempts, supported
the decision to uphold Plaintiff’s dismissal.

In the context of postsecondary education, a student is qualified if they can
meet “the academic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation
in the [school's] education program or activity,” where “‘technical standards’ means
‘all nonacademic admissions criteria that are essential to participation in the
program in question.’” Knapp, 101 F.3d at 482 (first citing 34 C.F.R. § 104.3 (l)(3);
then citing 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A, subpt. A(5); and then citing 45 C.F.R. pt. 84,

app. A, subpt. A(5)) (alteration in original); see also Gilfillan v. Bradley Univ., 854
Fed. App’x 729, 732 (7th Cir. 2021) (“A person is qualified for a program if she can
meet its requirements, as reflected in the program’s standards and the judgment of
the faculty, with or without reasonable accommodations.”). The Seventh Circuit has
recognized that passing an exam required for licensure can determine whether an
individual with a disability is “qualified.” Rodrigo v. Carle Found. Hosp., 879 F.3d
236, 242 (7th Cir. 2018) (citing Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 153 F.3d 805, 808 (7th

Cir. 1998)). Though courts should not apply a “separate and more lenient” standard
for academic decisions concerning a student’s qualification, “when assessing the
evidence in such cases, courts must understand the nature and mission of the
institutions and evaluate the evidence accordingly.” Novak, 777 F.3d at 976.

                         15                                         

The undisputed facts show that Plaintiff could not meet Stritch’s requirements
for its medical school program. First, Plaintiff failed to pass Step 1 in three attempts,
as required by the Loyola student handbook. See Rodrigo, 879 F.3d at 242. While

some students were allowed to continue at Stritch after failing three times, the
students that Plaintiff identifies were initially dismissed and then, in practice,
successfully petitioned for their reinstatement, or an exception to the policy. See [164]
¶ 19. Therefore, passing Step 1 within three attempts functions as a requirement for
qualification. See Rodrigo, 879 F.3d at 242.

Likewise, at Stritch, professionalism “is considered in determining satisfactory

academic progress,” and failure to meet those expectations “is grounds for
consideration of dismissal.” [153] ¶ 7; [145-2] at 41. Loyola mandates professional
conduct and behavior in educational and clinical environments, including the practice
of academic honesty, being “punctual and reliable in meeting obligations for courses
and clerkships,” using “the highest standards of professional ethical, and moral
conduct” and conscientiously caring for patients, behaving “in a collegial way that
enhances the ability of others to learn or care for patients,” and refraining “from any

action or conduct that may be considered unprofessional or unethical.” [153] ¶ 7;
[145-2] at 41–42.

In this case, Plaintiff does not dispute the occurrence of numerous incidents
that raised concerns regarding his professionalism, namely, improper communication
with a pediatric patient, inappropriate interactions with classmates and staff, and

                         16                                         

conduct during clinics that went against confidentiality policies. Rather than dispute
these facts, Plaintiff claims that these complaints “do not relate to bad treatment of
others, but to him learning about the bounds of confidentiality.” [152] at 8. Even if

these incidents were the result of “learning experiences,” a school may properly
determine that such “learning experiences” remain inappropriate within the course
of the program and reflect a lack of qualification. Indeed, Loyola’s student handbook
demands professional behavior, [153] ¶ 7; [145-2] at 41, and notes that understanding
professional conduct and behavior functions as a “prerequisite skill” for continued
qualification in the program. See Rodrigo, 879 F.3d at 242 (“Prerequisites might

include an appropriate educational background, employment experience, particular
skills and licenses.”). Therefore, while Plaintiff may dispute the context of these
incidents, the undisputed facts underlying the incidents and expressed concerns
about professionalism by several clinical supervisors and professors remain sufficient
to prove that Plaintiff’s professionalism, a requirement for qualification, was
deficient.

Finally, the undisputed facts showed that Plaintiff struggled academically,

received several failing grades (some of which he remediated), and also received
concerning reports from professors. This academic performance, together with his
inability to pass Step 1, and concerns regarding his professionalism suffice to support
Defendant’s decision that Plaintiff was not qualified to remain in Stritch. Therefore,

                         17                                         

Plaintiff fails to prove that he meets the second requirement of the McDonnell
Douglas test that he be qualified to participate in the program.

ii. Different Treatment of Non-disabled Students

To show that nondisabled students were treated more favorably, Plaintiff must
present a comparator, or a nondisabled student who experienced different treatment
and “must be directly comparable to the plaintiff in all material respects,” determined
by “a common-sense, flexible analysis of relevant factors.” Cung Hnin v. TOA (USA),
LLC, 751 F.3d 499, 504 (7th Cir. 2014); see also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ.
of Ill. at Chi., No. 12-cv-9463, 2013 WL 1751519, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2013). While

the inquiry “is not a mechanical comparison, it requires enough common factors to
determine if intentional discrimination was at play.” Cung Hnin, 751 F.3d at 504;
see also Alexander v. Casino Queen, Inc., 739 F.3d 972, 981 (7th Cir. 2014) (stating
the analysis does not require “near one-to-one mapping between” comparators);
Barricks v. Eli Lilly & Co., 481 F.3d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 2007) (requiring “enough
common factors . . . to allow for a meaningful comparison”).

Plaintiff argues that since Stritch allowed other students to take the Step 1

exam a fourth time, he has presented sufficient evidence that nondisabled students
were treated differently. [152] at 8. Plaintiff, however, fails to explain (and the record
offers no support about) how these other students are materially similar to Plaintiff,
other than failing Step 1 three times. By failing to develop a proper comparator,
Plaintiff thus waives this issue. Braun, 56 F.4th at 553; see Useni, 516 F.3d at 658.

                         18                                         

Even if Plaintiff did not waive the issue, the record also provides no indication
that the other students (who received permission to take Step 1 a fourth time while
enrolled at Stritch) function as appropriate comparators for Plaintiff. See [154-19].

The record does not demonstrate (and Plaintiff does not develop facts showing)
whether these other students performed poorly academically, received concerning
reports regarding their professionalism, or shared any other characteristics material
to Plaintiff’s situation. The record merely shows that such students existed, without
any further details. Therefore, Plaintiff fails to carry his burden on the fourth
requirement of the McDonnell Douglas framework and fails to prove a discrimination

claim based upon his disability.

iii. Ortiz Holistic Approach

Plaintiff’s claim also fails under Ortiz. Plaintiff does not provide evidence
showing that his dismissal from Stritch was the result of intentional discrimination
based upon his disability. Despite the reasonable accommodations provided by
Loyola, discussed supra, the record shows Plaintiff “was not qualified for the program
when” he “was dismissed.” Gilfillan, 854 Fed. App’x at 732. Loyola’s decision to

dismiss Plaintiff relied on several non-discriminatory factors: his failure to pass Step
1 within three attempts, his academic performance, his concerning conduct in the
classroom and clinics, and an administrative lack of confidence that Plaintiff could
pass Step 1 on a fourth attempt. The record does not lead to any reasonable inference
that Defendant’s decision was based upon discrimination toward Plaintiff due to his

                         19                                         

disability. See Ortiz, 834 F.3d at 765 (stating the standard “is simply whether the
evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiffs”
disability “caused the discharge’).
Finally, the record does not offer any suggestion of pretext, or that Loyola’s
decision to dismiss Plaintiff based upon his failure to pass Step 1 within three
attempts, professionalism concerns, and academic performance was just a pretense
to dismiss Plaintiff due to his disability. Without any evidence supporting such an
inference, the Court appropriately grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
as to Plaintiff's claim regarding his dismissal from Stritch.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, this Court grants Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment, [142], and denies Defendant’s motion to exclude, [165], as moot.
The Court directs the Clerk to enter judgment in favor of Defendant. All dates and
deadlines are stricken. Civil case terminated.

Date: February 24, 2026
ENTERED:

                                    John Robert Zn 
                                    United States District Judge 

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