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Deshawn Hagler v. City of Harvey and Ingalls Memorial Hospital

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Filed February 24th, 2026
Detected March 15th, 2026
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Summary

The Northern District of Illinois granted a motion to dismiss in the case of Deshawn Hagler v. City of Harvey and Ingalls Memorial Hospital. The plaintiff has been granted leave to amend their complaint.

What changed

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois has granted a motion to dismiss in the case of Deshawn Hagler v. City of Harvey, Unknown Harvey Police Officers, Ingalls Memorial Hospital, and Unknown Ingalls Memorial Hospital Security Officers. The plaintiff, DeShawn Hagler, alleged he was accosted and assaulted by hospital security guards and subsequently arrested by police officers after visiting the emergency room. The court's order indicates that the initial complaint was dismissed.

Plaintiff Hagler has been granted leave to amend their complaint by March 25, 2026. This means the plaintiff has an opportunity to revise and refile their claims by the specified deadline. Compliance officers should note that this is a procedural update in an ongoing legal matter, and no immediate compliance actions are required based on this order, other than awareness of the case's progression.

What to do next

  1. Note the plaintiff's deadline to amend the complaint by March 25, 2026.

Source document (simplified)

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Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

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Feb. 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Deshawn Hagler v. City of Harvey, Unknown Harvey Police Officers in their individual capacities, Ingalls Memorial Hospital, and Unknown Ingalls Memorial Hospital Security Officers in their individual capacities

District Court, N.D. Illinois

Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

DESHAWN HAGLER, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

v. ) No. 22 C 03128

)

CITY OF HARVEY, ) Judge John J. Tharp, Jr.

UNKNOWN HARVEY POLICE )

OFFICERS in their individual )

capacities, INGALLS MEMORIAL )

HOSPITAL, and UNKNOWN )

INGALLS MEMORAL HOSPITAL )

SECURITY OFFICERS in their )

individual capacities, )

 Defendants.                                                     
                    ORDER                                        

For the reasons set forth in the Statement below, the motion to dismiss [13] is granted.
Plaintiff is granted leave to amend by March 25, 2026.

STATEMENT

Background

Plaintiff DeShawn Hagler visited the emergency room at Ingalls Memorial Hospital on
June 14, 2020 to receive care for an unspecified ailment. Hagler claims that, as he was being
discharged, several hospital security guards violently accosted him without explanation. He alleges
that they placed him in handcuffs and proceeded to punch him, choke him, and threaten further
physical violence. At some point during the altercation, police officers for the City of Harvey
arrived on the scene. They arrested Hagler and charged him with assault, battery, and criminal
trespass. The charges have since been dismissed. Hagler contends that the City refuses to
investigate the incident because it is covering up for the hospital.

On June 14, 2022, Hagler commenced this action against the City, Ingalls Memorial
Hospital, unnamed defendant police officers, and unnamed defendant security guards. His
complaint sets forth eight theories of liability: Counts I-III seek to hold the defendant police
officers liable in their individual capacities for violations of Hagler’s Fourth Amendment rights;
Count IV seeks to hold the City liable for those violations; and Counts V-VIII seek to hold all
defendants liable for various state law torts.1 The City now moves to dismiss.

Discussion

Hagler and the City appear to agree that Counts I-III and V-VIII are time-barred. 2 Thus,
Counts I-III are dismissed with prejudice, as are Counts V-VIII with respect to the City and
defendant police officers. Hagler and the City disagree, however, as to (1) the timeliness of
Hagler’s Monell claim, and (2) whether Hagler has plausibly alleged the existence of a municipal
policy or custom.

I. Statute of Limitations

When adjudicating a § 1983 claim, a federal court applies the statute of limitations period
for personal injury actions in the state in which it sits. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67 (1985). In Illinois, that period is two-years. 723 ILCS § 5/13-202. Thus, assuming that Hagler’s
claim against the City accrued on the date of the underlying incident (June 14, 2020), Hagler was
required to commence his action by June 14, 2022. He filed suit on that very date. The City
acknowledges as much but nevertheless insists that Hagler’s Monell claim is time-barred. It
contends that, because Hagler cannot pursue his claims against the defendant officers in their
individual capacities, he cannot state a claim against the City itself.

That argument has no foundation in the law. The parties correctly recognize that Hagler’s
claims against the individual officers must be dismissed because the officers remain unidentified,
and any amendment supplying their identity would not relate back to the original complaint under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(3). See Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir.
1997) (explaining that anonymous placeholders “do not open the door to relation back under [Rule
15]”); Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 596 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It is the plaintiff's
responsibility to determine the proper party to sue and to do so before the statute of limitations
expires. A plaintiff's ignorance or misunderstanding about who is liable for his injury is not a
‘mistake’ as to the defendant's ‘identity.’”). That said, the fact that any such amendment would be
time-barred does not affect Hagler’s claim against the City. As the Seventh Circuit has explained,
“individual liability is not a prerequisite for a Monell claim.” Burton v. Ghosh, 961 F.3d 960, 972 (7th Cir. 2020). Indeed, a plaintiff may bring a Monell claim without suing any individual
defendant at all. Here, it is undisputed that Hagler filed his claim against the City within the
applicable statute of limitations period. Thus, the claim is timely.

1 Count IX (“Indemnification Pursuant to 745 ILCS 10/9-102”) is not a legal theory of
recovery, but rather a restatement of Illinois law. To the extent that Hagler presents Count IX as a
distinct theory, it is dismissed with prejudice.

2 The applicable statutes of limitations are two years for claims brought pursuant to § 1983
(Count I) and § 1985(3) (Count II), see Wilson v. Giesen, 956 F.2d 738, 741 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1992),
and one year for claims brought pursuant to § 1986 (Count III). The statute of limitations for tort
claims against local government entities and employees in Illinois is one year (Counts V-VIII).
See 745 ILCS 10/8-101.

II. Municipal Action
The Court now considers whether Hagler has plausibly alleged conduct that is “properly
attributable to the municipality itself.” See First Midwest Bank vy. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978,
986
(7th Cir. 2021). Municipal action is a critical element of any Monell claim because § 1983
does not impose respondeat superior liability on municipalities. A plaintiff seeking to establish
municipal liability must show that his constitutional injury was caused by “(1) an express
municipal policy; (2) a widespread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a decision by a
municipal agent with final policymaking authority.” Milestone v. City of Monroe, Wis., 665 F.3d
774, 780
(7th Cir. 2011).
Hagler has failed to make that showing. Hagler does not allege that the City has an express
policy of using excessive force, or a policy that derives from a decision by a municipal official
with final policymaking authority. He asserts instead that the City has a well-known “culture of
corruption” and that the police department has an “implied policy and/or custom of [using]
extraordinary, unjustified excessive force in any area in which a local mistake had to be covered
up.” See Compl. 44 74-75. These kinds of “factually-unsupported, boilerplate allegation[s]” are
routinely dismissed by courts in this district. See Maglaya v. Kuminga, No. 14 C 3619, 2015 WL
4624884, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 3, 2015) (collecting cases). What’s more, Hagler offers no facts to
support this claim beyond his own incident. “While it is not impossible for a plaintiff to
demonstrate a widespread practice or custom with evidence limited to personal experience, it is
necessarily more difficult ... because what is needed is evidence that there is a true municipal
policy at issue, not a random event.” Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 426 (7th Cir. 2020) (cleaned
up). Dismissal is proper here.
HI. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion to dismiss [13] is granted. Plaintiff may file an
amended complaint by March 25, 2026. Failure to timely amend will result in dismissal of this
case.

                                      \      \        /  \ ] 

Date: February 24, 2026 John J. Tharp,

United States District Judge

Source

Analysis generated by AI. Source diff and links are from the original.

Classification

Agency
NDIL
Filed
February 24th, 2026
Compliance deadline
March 25th, 2026 (10 days)
Instrument
Enforcement
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Minor

Who this affects

Applies to
Healthcare providers Law enforcement
Geographic scope
National (US)

Taxonomy

Primary area
Judicial Administration
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Civil Rights Healthcare

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