B.B. v. Hochul - Minors' Rights to Family Integrity

23-7401- cv B. B. v. Hochul In the United States Court of Appea ls FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT A UGUST T ERM 2024 No. 23-7401- cv B.B., a minor, by his Next Fri end J OY R OSENTHA L, on behalf of themselves and all ot her similarly s ituate d youth, T.R., a minor, by his Next Frie nd C YNTHIA G ODSO E, on behalf of themselves and all other si milarly situat ed youth, M.P., a m inor, by hi s Next Friend A DIRA H U LKOWE R, on behalf of t hemselv es and a ll other s imila rly situated youth, Z.W. and D.W., minor s, by their Next Fri end J ENNIFER M ELNICK, on beha lf of themselve s and a ll other s imilar ly situat ed youth, C.W.C., a mi nor, by her Next Friend J OY R OSENT HAL, on behalf o f themse lves and a ll other s imila rly situa ted youth, J.R., a minor, b y his Nex t Friend A NNA R OBER TS, on behalf of t hemsel ves and all ot her si milarl y situated yo uth, J. S. and S. S., mino rs, by t heir Next Friend L ISA H O YES, on behalf of t hems elves and a ll other similar ly situ ated yout h, C.P., a minor, by his Ne xt Friend C YNTHIA G ODSOE, on behalf of the mselves and all other si milarly s ituat ed youth, C.C., a mi nor, by her Next Friend L ISA H O YES, on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated youth, E.R., A.R., and M.R., minors, b y their Next Friend P EGGY C OOPER D AVIS, on behalf of themse lves a nd all othe r similar ly sit uated yo uth, Plaintiffs - Appellant s, v. K ATHY H OCHUL, in her officia l capacity as Gov ernor of t he State of New York, S HEILA J. P OOLE, in her officia l capac ity as Co mmissioner of the New Y ork Sta te Offic e of Chil dren a nd Family Se rvice s, C ITY OF N EW Y O RK, Defendants -Appellees.

2 On Appeal from th e U.S. Distr ict C ourt for the Eastern Dis trict of New Y ork A RGUED: D ECEMB ER 13, 2024 D ECIDED: F EBRUA RY 2, 2026 Before: P ARK, M E NA SHI, and K AHN, Circuit Judge s. The plainti ffs are fourteen children who were removed from their bio logic al par ents by New Yor k Ci ty officials. Other relatives sough t cer tif icat ion s to foster or adopt the children but w ere denied the certifications because of a cri mina l his tory o r a report of child abuse or m is treat ment. The plaintif fs alleg ed that New York’s certification sche me violates the ir subst antive due pr ocess r ights to family integrity and to b e free from har m. They also al lege d that New York violate d the ir right to pr ocedural du e pr ocess by not affording them notice or an oppor tunity to c hallenge the denial o f a rel ative’s application. The district court dismissed the compla int for lack of standing and altern atively because the plaintiffs asser t ed only the rights of third - par ty relatives. We conclude that the p laintiffs have standing. The pla intif fs have suffered a real - world har m: They ha ve been denied a ce r tified placement with a relative foster paren t. The plain tiff s who did not receive any foster pl acement have a lso bee n denied the medical and social s erv ice s provided to children in foster care. T he plain tif fs wh o were plac ed in the foster care of non - rel atives have a lso been exposed to risks of psychological and e motional h arms. These are real - world injuries, traceab le to the defendants, and redre ssable by a fav orable

3 ruling. T he district court erred by ruling otherwise. The district court further erred by holding that the plain tiffs lack prudential sta nding. T he plaintif fs are asserting their own rights rather than those of their relatives. But some c laims are moot: T wo p laintiffs are now in the care of a relative fos ter parent and another has aged out of the foster system. O nly one plaintiff has standing to challenge New Yor k’s certification sche me for adopt ion. For these r easons, we reverse in part, affirm in part, an d remand for fur ther proceedings con sistent with this o pin ion. L ISA F REEMAN (Kathryn Wood and K imberly R. Schertz, on the brief), Lega l Aid Society, New York, N ew York, for Plaintiffs-Appellants. P HILIP J. L EVITZ (Barbara D. Underwood, Judith N. Vale, on the brief) for Letitia James, Attorney General of the State of New York, N ew York, New York, for State Defendants-Appellees. J AMISON D AVI E S (Richard Dearing, Claud e S. Platton, on the brief) for Sy lvia O. Hinds -Rad ix, Corporation C ounsel of the City of N ew York, Ne w York, New York, for Defendant-Appellee th e City of New Yor k. M ENASHI, Circuit Judge: When a child is removed from his or her biological parents, New York law req uires officials to n otify any re latives of the child who may be able to provide care. Th ose r elatives must apply for certification to s erve as a foster or adopt ive parent. A relative who applies for cert ification ma y be d isqua lif ie d on any of three gr ounds.

4 First, if the relati ve has been convict ed of certain cri mes, New York law requires that the applicat ion be denied. Second, if the relat ive has been convic t ed of or charge d with any ot he r cr ime, of ficia ls m ay deny the application after conduc ting an ass essment. Third, if evidence suggests that the rel ative abused or mist reated a child in the past, officials sim ilar ly ma y deny the application. The pla int iffs in this case are fourteen children w ho were removed from the ir parents by New Yor k City officials. A fter the removals, r elat ives s ou ght ce rt ifica tion s to serve as foster or adopt ive parents but were denied because of their crimi nal history or reports of child abuse or m is tr ea tmen t. The plain tiff s file d this lawsu it, alleg ing that N ew Y ork’ s cer tif icat ion s che me vio lates the ir substantive due proc ess rights to fami ly integrity and to be free from harm. They also al lege that New Yor k violate d t heir rig hts to procedural due pr ocess by not affording them notice or an opportunity to chal lenge the denia l of a relative’s appl ication. The district court dismissed the cas e for lack of standing and alterna tively because the plaint iffs assert ed only the r igh ts of t hir d - party relatives rather than their own rights. We conclude that the p laintiffs have standing. The pla intif fs have suffered a real - world har m: They ha ve been denied a ce r tified placement with a relative foster paren t. T he p lain tiff s who d id not receive any foster pl acement have a lso bee n denied the medical and social services pro vided to children in foster care. The plaint iff s in t he foster care of n on - relatives have also been exposed to the r isk s of psychological and e motional harms. The s e are real -world inj uries, traceable to the defen dants, and redres sable by a favorab le ruling. The distri ct court erred by ruling o therwise.

5 The distric t court fu rther er red by holding that the plaintiffs lack prudential standing. The plaintiffs are asserti ng their own rights rather than those of their relat ives. But some clai ms are moo t: T wo plaintiffs are now in the care of a rela tive foster parent and a nother has aged ou t of the foster sys tem. On ly one pla intiff has st anding to challenge New York ’s certification sch eme for adopt ion. For these reasons, we reverse in part, affirm in part, and r emand for f urther proceedings consistent with this opinion. BACKGROUND New York C ity’s Adm inistration for Children’s S ervices (“ACS”) removes tho usands of children from their pare nts each year because of abuse or ne glect. After doing so, AC S must notify “any relatives” of the child an d inform the re latives of the opportunity to care for the ch ild. N.Y. Fa m. Ct. Act § 101 7(1)(a). The statu t e defi nes a relative as “an y person wh o is related to the child b y blood, m arriage or adoption and wh o is not a parent, pu tative paren t or relative of a putative parent of the child. ” Id. § 1012(m). 1 The relati ve may seek certification to become a foster or adopt ive parent. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1017(1)(a); s ee also N.Y. Soc. S erv. Law § 376 (1). As par t of th e certification process, ACS gather s inf ormation for a criminal background c heck o f the app licant and a ny other adult who resides in the same household. ACS will also req uest any records from the New York St ate Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment (“SCR”). The SCR co mpiles information a bout reports of chi ld abuse and neglect. See N. Y. Soc. Se rv. Law § 424(2). 1 A putative parent is an “alleged or reputed” but not estab lished parent of a child. Father, Bla ck ’ s Law Di ction ary (12th ed. 2024).

6 R elatives who app ly to fos ter or adopt a ch ild ma y be disqualified on an y of three gro unds. Fir st, the re lative’s app lication “shall be den ied” if t he relative has “a fel ony conviction” invo lving “(i) child abuse or ne glect; (ii) spousal abuse; (iii) a crime against a child, including child pornography; or (iv) a c rime in volv ing v io lenc e, including rape, sex ual assault, or hom icide, other than a crime involving phys ical assault or bat tery.” Id. § 378-a(2)(e)(1)(A). Additionally, the application must be de nied for a felon y conviction “within the pas t five years” for “p hysical assaul t, battery, or a drug - related offense.” Id. § 378-a(2)(e)(1)(B). New York State’s Office of Children and Fa mily Services (“OCFS”) issues guid elin es that identify the specif ic offenses with in these general categories. The plaintiffs refer to the se provisions as the “ mandatory disqua lification system.” J. App’x 58. Federal law conditions fe deral fund ing fo r foster care and adoption assistance on the implement ation of this syste m. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a) (20)(A)(i)-(ii). Second, the re lative’s appl ication “ may be denied ” if the applicant or any adult residing in the ho useho ld has “a char ge or a conviction of any crime. ” N.Y. Soc. Se rv. L aw § 378-a(2)(e)(3)(B). When the criminal history shows a crim inal charge or conviction that does not requ ire man datory disqua lification, ACS must perfo rm “a safety assessment of the cond itions in th e household” and take “all appropriate steps to protect the health a nd safety” of the ch ild. Id. § 378-a(2)(h). OCFS publi shes guidance ab out how ACS must conduct th e safety assessment, includi ng a list of factors to consider. After conducting the assessment, ACS has the discretion to appr ove or deny the relative’s applicati on for c ertif ic ation as a foster or a doptive parent. Third, the re lative’s app lication ma y be d enied if the relative “is the subject of an indicated report” of child abus e or m is treatment in

7 the S CR. Id. § 424-a(2)(a). Before 2022, a report was “ind icated” if “some cred ible evidence” suppo rted an al legation of abuse or m is treatment. Id. § 412(7). Fro m 2022 on ward, an “indic ated” report must include an a lleg ation supported by “ a fair preponderance of the evidence.” I d. If a relative has an “in dicated” r eport of chi ld ab use or m is trea tmen t, OCF S’s guidelines di rect A CS to consider the “seriousness of the incident invol ved in the repor t; the relevan t circum stances surrounding t he report; the time el apsed since t he most recent incident; and informa tion regarding the applicant’s rehabilitation.” J. Ap p’x 62 (¶ 180). New York S tate must conduct these assessments of pot ential foster o r adoptive parents to receive federal funding. S ee 42 U.S.C. § 671 (a)(20)(A), (B)(i). New York pro vides various services an d support to fost er child ren and their foster parents. It issue s month ly payme nts to foster parents as reimbursement fo r care - related expenses, inc ludin g fun ds for “transportat ion, clothing allowan ce, school related expense s and miscellaneous expenses.” J. App’x 56 (¶ 161); see N.Y. S oc. Serv. L aw § 398- a. The benefits also “include coor dination and provision of services for the child’s med ical, mental h ealth, and sch olastic n eeds.” J. App’x 56 (¶ 161). Adopt ive parents rec eive an “adopt ion subsidy” and other “post - adop tion services” such as “counseling, caregiver training, clinica l and consultative services, and coor dinating ac cess to community suppor tive services.” Id. at 57 (¶ 163). Apart from fos ter care and adoption, N ew York offer s a temporary route for a r elative to care for a ch ild removed fro m his or her parents. W hi le a child’s final placement is pend ing, the fa mily court may “ temp ora rily p lac e the chil d with a r ela tive … during the pendency of the pr oceeding or until furth er order of the c ourt.” N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1017(2)(a)(ii). The pla intiffs re fer to this as a “direct placement.” J. App’x 19 (¶ 16). The pla int iffs allege that c hildren may

8 be directly placed with relatives ev en when those same relative s have been denied cert ification to foster or adopt. According to the plaintiffs, relatives who care for a child under a direct plac ement receive m ore limited benefit s than those who foste r or adopt. And, per the comp la int, a dire ct placement may last for years. ACS removed the pla intiff children from t heir parents. The comp lain t alle ges t hat e leven of the pl aintiffs live with a r elative through a direct place ment. Two others li ve in foster homes. The final plain tiff is over eighteen years old and no longer in state care. 2 E ach of the plaintiffs had a relat ive who sought certifi cation as a fos ter parent b ut was not a pproved. The pla intif fs filed th is law s uit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on behalf of thems elves and other chi ldren who were or will be r emoved from their parents and denied a foster or adoptive place ment with a relati ve. They allege that New York’s c ertification schem e for foster and adoptive par ents vio lates their sub stantive due pr ocess r ights to family in tegr ity and to be free from har m. The y also al lege th at the scheme vio late s the ir rights to procedural due pr ocess. They named as defendants the g overnor, the c ommissioner of the New Yor k State Office of Ch ildren a nd Family S ervices, and the C ity of New York. 3 The plainti ffs seek declarato ry and injunctive reli ef requiring New York to modify its sche me to pr ovide a more “ind ividualized evaluation” of prosp ective foster or adoptive parents. J. App’x 84. 2 Because this plaintiff, M.P., is an adult and has r emov ed himself fr om foste r car e, his c laims are moot. See N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1055(e) (“No placement may be made o r continued under t his section beyond the child’ s eighteen th birthd ay with out his or h er consen t.”). 3 The plaintiffs have not challenge d the dis missal by the district court of all claims ag ainst the g overnor.

9 On a motion fro m th e defendants, the district c ourt dis missed the case. See B.B. v. Hochul, No. 21- CV - 6229, 2023 WL 593580 3, at *13 (E.D.N.Y. Sep t. 12, 2023). W ith respe ct to the righ t t o fa mily in te grity, the district court hel d that most of the pl aintiffs have no cogn izable injury because they currentl y live with their rel atives. See i d. at *6. For those not liv ing with relatives, the dis tri ct court held that they could not trac e their separat ion from relat ives to the defendants. Se e i d. at *8-9. With res pect to the right to be free from harm, the distr ict cour t again held that the p laintiffs living with relative s had no cogn izable injury because they were not in the care of t he state. See i d. at *10. For the r ema inin g pla inti ffs, the district court held that the y did not allege cons titut iona lly inad eq uate tr eat ment but only sub opt imal t rea tmen t, which t he di st rict cour t co ncl ude d is not a cognizable injury. See i d. at *10-11. In the alterna tive, the distr ict cou rt held that the pru dential standing doctrine b arred the plaintiffs’ claim s. See i d. at * 11 -12. The plaintiffs now appe al. DISCUSSION In their complaint, t he plaintiffs raise two primary claims. F irs t, they argue that New Yo rk’s certification scheme violat es their substantiv e due process rights to family associ ation and to be free from harm. Second, the plaintiffs arg ue t hat the Due Pro cess Clause affords them the ri ght to recei ve notice o f a denied certif ication and to cha llen ge the decis ion of ACS no t to ce rtify their r elatives as fos ter or adoptive parents. The distr ict c our t dis mis sed th e p lain tiffs’ substantive due process cla ims bec ause th e plaintiffs lac ked standing. It did not addr ess the procedural due pro cess claims. In ad dition, the district c ourt he ld tha t the pla intiffs “ do not q ualify for prud ential standing” because they assert ed the righ ts of their relati ves rather than their own rights. Id. at * 11.

10 Generally, “ [w] e revi ew a distr ict court’s grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all factual claims in the complaint and drawing all reas onable inference s in the p laintiff’s favor.” Schiebel v. Schoharie Cent. Sch. Dist., 120 F.4th 1 082, 1092 (2d Cir. 2 024) (quotin g Henry v. County of N assau, 6 F.4 th 324, 3 28 (2d C ir. 2021)). But “[i]t is well se ttled that ‘where a di strict cou rt grants a defenda nt’s Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss, an appel late court w ill review the district court’s factual f indings for clear error and its legal conclus ions de novo.’” Miller v. Brightstar Asia, Ltd., 43 F.4th 112, 120 (2d C ir. 2022) (alteration omitted) (quoting Aurecchio ne v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., 426 F.3d 635, 638 (2d C ir. 2005)). T o the ext ent tha t the distr ict court “resolved dispu ted facts” in “aid of its de cision as to s tandin g,” we “ will accept the [district] court’s findings unless they are clearl y erroneous.” Carter v. HealthPort Techs., LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 57 (2d C ir. 2016) (internal qu otation marks o mitted). We hold that the plain tiffs have stan ding to raise their substantive and procedural due proce ss claims. The complaint plaus ibly a lle ges tha t New York’s cert ification scheme has deprived each plaintiff of a relative foster parent an d the psycholog ical and financial benefits tha t wou ld result fr om that r elationship. These are real - world in jurie s that a re tra ceable to th e actions of ACS and OCFS and tha t could be redressed by a judicia l decis ion in the p lai ntiffs ’ favor. In holding t ha t the p laint iffs lac k s ta nding, the distric t court erroneousl y conf lated the standin g requirements of A rtic le II I w ith the merits of the plaintiffs’ clai ms. We furthe r hold that the “prudential standing doctrine ” does not bar the plaintiffs’ claims. The plain tiffs have suffered ind ividualized ha rms, and their suit see ks to vindicate their own rights rather than the rig hts of their rel atives. W e reverse in pa rt, affirm in part, and remand for further pro ceedings consistent with this opinion.

11 I “Article III of the Constitution li mits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases ’ and ‘Controversies.’” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 56 (2024) (quoting U.S. C onst. art. III, § 2). “For a legal dis pute to qualify as a gen uine case or controver sy, at leas t one p laintiff mus t have standing to sue. ” Dep’t of Co mmerce v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 766 (2019). “ To e stab lish Art icle III sta ndin g, ” a plaintiff must allege “an injury [that is] concrete, par ticularized, an d actual or immine nt; fairly traceable to the chal lenged action; and r edressable by a fav orable rulin g.” Clapper v. A mnesty Int’l, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (internal quotation marks o mitted). The plain tif f mus t have “a personal stake in the outcome of the controve rsy.” Summers v. Earth Isl and Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009) (quoting Warth v. Seld in, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). The plaintiff “ must, in other words, be able to answer a basic q uestion: ‘What’s it to you?’” Bost v. Ill. State Bd. o f Elections, No. 24 - 568, 2026 WL 96707, at *3 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2026) (q uoting Ant onin Scali a, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Elem ent of the Separation of P owers, 17 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 881, 882 (19 83)). By limiting the jud icial power to cases or cont roversies, Article III “confines the fe deral courts to a prop erly j udic ial r ole.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robi ns, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016). T he plaintiffs “must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each for m of relief that they se ek.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 4 13, 431 (2021). The plaintiffs’ substantive claims challe nge three aspects of New York’s ce rtification sche me: (1) manda tory denia ls for conviction of certain crimes, (2) discreti onary d enia ls for charges or convictions of any crime, and (3) discretionary d en ials based on indicat ed SCR report s. The plaintiffs allege that these p olicies violate (1) the substant ive due proces s right t o family association an d

12 integri ty and (2) the right to be free from harm. We consider e ach of the three aspect s of New York’s certificat ion system in turn. A The plaintiffs all ege that New York’s mandatory disqualification ru le for approving f oster and ad optive par ents violates their substantive due process righ t s to family inte grity and to be free from ha rm. Under N ew York la w, a relative’s app lication to serve as a foster or adopti ve parent must be de nied if the relative has been convict ed of c ertain crim es. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. L aw § 378- a(2)(e)(1)(A)-(B). T he comp lain t explains that the rel atives of pl aintiffs B.B., J.R., E.R., A.R., and M.R. were denied certificati on at least i n part because of a cr iminal c on vict ion tha t res ulted i n mandatory disqu alif i cation. 4 These plaintiffs have s tanding to challenge New York’s mandatory disqualification laws fo r foster par ents. 1 First, they have suffe red a “concrete inju ry ”: the deprivation of a relativ e foster parent an d the benefits t hat would res ult from that relat ionsh ip. T ransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. That is “a factual sh owing of perceptible harm.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildl ife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992). Th e denial of a relative fos ter parent and the benefits associate d with that r elat ionsh ip are “tangible” harm s, T ransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425, 4 In its b rief, the City of Ne w York suggests that plaintiff C.C.’s r elative was also subject to mandat ory disqualification. See City o f New York Br. 30 n.5. Accord ing to the com plaint, however, C.C.’s relative was denied certification because of an S CR r e port and a “drug related conv iction” fr o m 1996. J. App’x 44 (¶ 116). While the r ecord is not entire ly clear on t his point, a drug convi ction over fi ve years old is generally not a ma ndatory disqualifier. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. L aw § 378- a(2)(e)(1)(A) - (B). Acco rding ly, we conside r C.C.’s claim s in relation to th e disc retionary cri teria.

13 that are “rea l, and no t abstract,” id. at 424 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340). And the harms are “part icularized” to these specific plaintiffs. Id. at 423. Even if we considere d the harm to be “intangible,” the plain tiffs still have est ab lished an Ar ticle III inju ry. “ Various intang ible harms can also be concrete. ” Id. at 425. Concret e intangible har ms include (1) “ injur ies w ith a clo se re lat ionsh ip to harms trad it ional ly recognized as pr oviding a basis for l awsuits in American c ourts, ” and (2) “ harms spe cifie d by th e Co nst itut ion itself.” Id. The injur ie s alleg ed here fall into both categories. The plaintiffs al lege that placement s with no n - relatives make chi ldren less lik ely to f ind permanent placement s and increase the risk of psycho logical and other harms. Such harm s ha ve been “ traditionally recogn ized as providing a bas is for lawsuits in A merican courts. ” Id.; s ee C arey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 24 7, 263 (1978) (not ing t hat “mental and e motional distress” is “a pers onal injury familiar to the law”); Gerber v. Herskovitz, 14 F.4 th 500, 506 (6th Cir. 2021) (e xpla inin g th at e mo tiona l distress “carries a close relationship to a traditiona l harm” an d “ has been part of our comm on - law tradition for cent uries”) (internal quotation marks om itted). 5 The p laintiffs also allege tha t they have suffer ed a “harm[] spec ified b y th e Co ns titut ion it se lf.” T ransUnion, 5 94 U.S. at 4 25. We have recognized that “the Constitut ion in at least some circ umstances protects fam ilial relations hips from unwarranted govern ment interferen ce.” Pa tel v. Searles, 3 05 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2002); se e also 5 The district court a ppeared to a gree. See B.B., 2023 WL 5935803, at *9 (“[T ]he Court joi ns its si ster courts in taking a b road view of the conc ept of harm atte ndant to the righ t to be free from un reasonab le intrus ions into a child’s emotional harm.”).

14 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (p lurality opinion) (“[T]he Constitution protects the sanct ity of the family pre cisely because the inst itution of the family is dee ply rooted in this Na tion’s history and traditi on.”). B ecause a person has an “interest in preserving the integrity and st ability of he r fam ily,” Riv era v. M arcus, 696 F.2d 1016, 1024 - 25 (2d C ir. 1982), interference with the relat ionsh ips that form a fa mily is a “harm[] spec ified by the Constitu tion,” Tra nsUnion, 59 4 U.S. at 42 5. Plaintiffs B.B., J.R., E.R., A.R., and M.R. have also alle ged an injury tha t implicate s the right to be free from harm. T he Supreme Court has r ecognized that “ the Const itution i mposes ” a “ d uty ” on states “to assume so me responsibility” fo r an individual’s “safety and general w ell - being” when the state takes the person into its custody. DeShaney v. Winneba go Cnty. Dep’t o f Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 18 9, 200 (1989). Th at r esp ons ibi lity in clu de s appropriate medical car e and services necessary to maintain the in div idual’s safe ty. See id. at 198. A t least one c ourt in this c ircuit has held that the r ight to be free from harm includes the r ight “to appropr iate condit ions and dura tion of foster care.” Ma risol A. v. Giuliani, 9 29 F. Supp. 66 2, 676 (S. D.N.Y. 1996). In th is case, t h e pla int iffs p laus i bly a llege that the denied certifications have force d them either to live with non - relative s or to live with rel atives who are not certified as fost er parents, depriving them of medica l and s ocial services an d placing them at a high er risk of never achieving a permanent placement. These are also “harms specified by the Con stitution.” Tra nsUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. In su m, the pla intif fs plaus ibly alle ge an Ar ticle III injur y. T he plain tiffs wan t to li v e with r ela tive foster parents but cannot do so. That is a ta ngib le ha rm. Bu t e ve n if it were inta ngib le, th e se are harms “traditionally recog nized as prov iding a basis for laws uits in American courts” and “specif ied by the Cons titution.” Id.

15 2 Second, th ese plaintiffs’ injuries a re fairly traceable to the defendants. See Carte r, 822 F.3d a t 55. The City of New York, a cting through ACS, r efused to certify the plaintiffs’ re latives as foster parents. These denia ls fol lowed the g uid eline s issu ed by OCFS that identify which crimes r equire mandatory disqual ification. OC FS also “ oversee[s] ACS and ensur[es] tha t ACS c ompl ies w ith al l applicable … state laws,” including th e ones chal lenged here. J. App’x 49 (¶ 134). 3 Third, a judic ial de ci sion in the plaintiffs’ favor could redress the ir injur ies. If New York’s rules requi ring mandatory disqu alification of t he plaintiffs’ relative s because of the criminal convictions were held to be unlawful, the defendants cou ld no longer apply those rules to deny certification to the relat ives seeking to foster B.B., J.R., E.R., A. R., and M. R. Th at would remo ve the only alleged barrier to certification with rel ative foster parent s and would p rovide the pla int iffs with th e in divid ual iz ed eva luations they seek. 6 6 O nly B.B. alleg es that his relatives seek to ad opt him but are unabl e to do so be cause of Ne w Yor k’s mandatory disqualification laws. S ee J. A pp’x 23 (¶ 36) (“Despite t heir hardship, Mr. an d Mrs. R. wo uld love to provide furthe r stabili ty and expres s their love for B.B. th rough adopti on. However, base d on the sta tute, Mr. a nd Mrs. R. are not eligible to be approved as adoptive parent s due to the same mandatory dis qualifying conv iction that barred th em from foste r parent c ertifica tion.”). For tha t reason, only B.B. has standing to challe nge the mandato ry disqualification rules as a pplied to adoption.

16 4 The defendants ar gue that whateve r harm t hese plaint iffs may have suffered is not traceable to the s tate or the ci ty because federal law requires N ew York to impose mand atory disqual ifications as a condition of recei ving federal funding for state a doption and foster services. Moreover, the defendants ins ist that any inj uries wo uld not be redressable bec ause the funds the plaintiffs seek co me fr om the federal g overnment, and if N ew York removed i ts man datory disqualification req uirements, the fede ral govern m ent would no longer pro vide those funds. The federal government, however, does not require New York to implement the mandatory disqualific ation laws. It ince ntiv izes states to do so. In response to that incentive, New York decided to implem ent the federal requirements to receive the federal funds. And that decision c aused an injury to thes e plaintiffs. The pla intiffs’ injuries are thus “f airly traceab le to the ch allenged action of the defendant[s], and no t the result of the inde pendent action of some third party not before the court.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (al terations omitted) (q uoting Si mon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 -42 (1976)). T he defendants arg ue that any injury to plainti ff J.R. is no t traceable to their actions b ecause J. R.’s grandmother independently chose to “r elinquish[] custody ” before ACS de nied certification. State Defendants Br. 37. According to a fa mily assessment and ser vice plan dated February 14, 2020, at some point in Februar y, J.R.’s grandmother aske d that J.R. be removed f rom her home because she could not “financially prov ide for [J.R. ] via medical insur ance.” Confidential App’x 1 7. A later asse ssment says that J.R. was r emoved on February 21 because the “ home was not approved to be cleared

17 and certified by OCFS guidel ines.” Id. at 29. The notes do not establish when J.R.’s grandm other was denied ce rtification and whet her she asked for J.R. to be r emoved before or aft er that denial. The distric t court did not make a finding on th is issue. See B.B., 2023 WL 593 5803, at *8-9. At the mo tion - to - dismiss stage, we dr aw all reasonab le inferences in favor of the plaintiffs, i ncluding with respect to facts relevant to standing. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 501 (“For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for want of s tanding, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept as tr ue all material a llegations of the complaint, and must construe the co mplaint i n favor of the complaining party.”). Even when a defe ndant offers extrinsic evidence to challeng e standing, “plaintiffs are e ntitled to rely on the allegations in the [p ]leading if the e vidence proffered by the defendant is imm aterial because it does not contradict pla usible allegations that are t hemselves sufficien t to show standing.” Carter, 822 F.3d at 57. In th is cas e, i t i s r easonable to infer that J.R.’s grandmother w as denied certificati on and asked that J.R. not be direct ly placed w ith her because of her inabi lity to car e for him w ith med ical insuranc e. T he complaint alleges that foster ch ildren “are automatica lly eligible for Medica id” when certification is granted. J. App’x 57 (¶ 162). Tha t suggests that J.R.’s gr andmother c ould ha ve been able to care for him if granted certification. T he Sup reme Court has reco gnized that a plain tiff may establish stan ding b y sho w ing “th at t hir d par ties will like ly rea ct in pr edic table wa ys.” Dep’t of Com mer ce, 588 U.S. at 768. While J.R.’s grand mother asked for him to b e removed, th e c omp laint suggests that the requ est was a predictab le effect of denying certification. In that way, it was tracea ble to the actions of the defendants. F urther evidence may show that J.R.’s r emoval w as not

18 fairly traceab le to the cer tification decisi on. 7 B ased on the r ecord at this stage, however, J.R. has standing t o raise h is substantive due process claim. B The plaintiffs argue that the New York law auth oriz ing ACS and other agencies to deny ce rtification ba sed on any crimina l h istor y violates their s ubstantive due process rights. Under New York law, a relative’s applicat ion to be a foster or adop tive parent “ may be denied ” if the applicant or an other adult in the ho useh old has “a charge or a con viction” for any cri me other than one r e quirin g mandatory disq ualification. N.Y. S oc. Serv. L aw § 378-a(2)(e) (3)(A)- (B). T he relatives of p laintiffs T.R., Z.W., D.W., J.S., S.S., C.P., and C.C. were denied certification un der this provision because of their crim inal h istor ie s. With two excep tions, these plaint iffs have standin g to raise their su bstantive due process ch allenges. 8 They have suffered an 7 See Luja n, 504 U.S. at 561 (explai ning that eac h elemen t of standin g “must be supp orted in the same way as an y other matter on wh ich the plai ntiff bears t he burden o f p roo f, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the su ccessive stages of the litiga tion”). 8 Since filing suit, a relative of plaintiffs Z.W. and D.W. was cert ified as a foster p arent, rendering thei r claim s moot. See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 (2013) (“It is not enough that a dispute wa s very much alive when [the ] suit w as filed; the parties mu st continu e to have a person al stake in the ultimate disposition of the law suit.”) (int ernal quotat ion marks and alterati on o mitted). The plaintiffs ask us to assess Z.W. ’s and D.W.’s injuries at the time of the fili ng of th e compla int, ar guing th at their inju ries “are inhere ntly transi tory.” Rob idoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d 931, 938 (2d Cir. 1993); see Appellants’ Reply Br. 36 -37. But the complain t does not plausibly allege that the plaint iffs are quickly put into f oster p lacem ents with relative s such that the allegedly illegal conduct of the defend ants is “capable of repetit ion,

19 injury: the deprivati on of a relative fos ter parent and the associated benefits that a ccompany tha t re lation ship. Th e in jur y is trace ab le to the defendants: ACS denied cer tification to the ir relatives, and OCFS oversees ACS ’s decisions and pub lishe s g uide lines that affec t how ACS exercise s its discretion to deny ce rtification on the ba sis of crim inal his tor y. And the injury is redress able: If a court agre ed that the law author izing discretion ary denials viola te s the p lain tiff s’ substantive due process righ ts, the co urt could enjoin th e legal obstacle to the pla int iffs ’ rela tion sh ip s w ith t heir relatives. The defendants arg ue that C.P. has no t suffered an injury because he wa s never in the care of a relative. After ACS removed C.P. from his mother, h e was taken in to ACS c ustody. C.P.’s uncle offered to become C.P.’s fo ster parent, but A CS denied his ap plication because of a con viction for driving under the influence. C.P. the n wa s placed i n the foster home of a non - re lative, and he ne ver spent any time livi ng with his uncle after being removed from his mother. That is st ill a c og niza ble in jur y. C.P. se ek s foster certific ation with his uncle, and ACS p revented and continues to deny such certification. C.P. c la ims that th e sta te h as thereby destab iliz ed his family rela tionsh ip. See Rivera, 696 F.2d at 1024 -25. T hat cognizable harm is traceable to th e defendants’ decis ion not to certify C.P.’ s uncle as a foster parent. I t may b e tha t the defe ndan ts are ul timate ly cor rect that the right to family association and integrity does n ot require the state to create new livi ng arrange ments and to afford those arrangemen ts legal p rote ction. See S tate Defen dants Br. 31 -40. B ut th at yet eva ding review.” Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110 n.11 (1975). T he direct placements may last f or years, providing t ime for judicial rev iew. See, e.g., J. App’x 21 (¶ 26). W e assess the injuries of the plain tiffs at the time of th e appeal; beca use Z.W. and D.W. liv e with a relative fost er parent, the ir claims are moot.

20 question addresses whether C.P. will succeed on the merits of his claim, no t whether h e has standing to r ais e it in the first place. 9 C The pla int iffs further argue that the New York la w autho riz ing ACS to deny certific ation based on an indicated SCR report v iolate s their su bstantive due process ri ghts. Under New York law, a relativ e’s application to be a fos ter or adoptive paren t may be den ied if the applicant “is the subject of an indica ted rep ort” of ch ild abuse or m is trea tmen t. N.Y. Soc. Ser v. L aw § 42 4-a(2)(a). The r elatives of plain tiffs T.R., C.W.C., J.S., S.S., C.C., E.R., A.R., and M.R. were deni ed certification at least in part be cause of an SCR report. 10 The plaintiffs have standing to cha llenge this aspect of the certification scheme. All of the pla intiffs wer e denied a relative foster parent at least in pa rt because of an SCR report. T hat is a concrete injury. It is traceable to the defendants: New York City, operating through ACS, denied the certifications pu rsuant to gu idelines issued by OCFS. And if the court agr eed w ith t he pla intif fs tha t t his la w 9 The named plaintiffs whose relativ es were denied certification under the discretionary criminal history pr ovision do not plausibly alle ge that their relatives intend t o adop t them. For th at reas on, the plaintif fs lack standing to cha lleng e these provisio ns as applie d to adopt ion. 10 The plaintiffs do not specifically allege that the relativ e of C.W.C. was denied because of an SCR r eport. But t he plaintiffs do allege that “ ACS reported that [the relative] could not be certified due to an incide nt that occurr ed in her hom e over five years earlie r whi le she was serving as a foster p arent. AC S condu cted an investigation when a child was injur ed in the hom e, alleged ly due to one you ng chil d hittin g a nother with a toy. The inves tigation wa s unfou nded bu t [the relative’s] home was close d.” J. App’x 33 -34 (¶ 78).

21 violates their substantive due proc ess rights, it cou ld enjoin th e barrier to a foster placement wit h their relatives. The defendants ar gue that the p laintiffs l ack standing b ecause of a recent change to New York law. Start ing in 2022, OCFS will not disclos e an ind icated SCR repor t about child m is treatment —as opposed to ab use — if the report occurre d more th an eight year s ago. See N.Y. Soc. Ser vs. Law § 424- a(1)(e)(i)(B)(II). Un der the s tatute, indicated reports of child mis treatment that are over eight years old “shall be deemed not relevant an d reasonably rel ated to emplo ymen t.” Id. § 424- a(1)(e)(iv)(B). And OC FS has issued an admin istra tive dir ec tive s pecif yin g th at AC S “ cannot consider the existence of such report[s] i n determining whether to … ap prove a prospective foster home [or] adop tive ho me.” J. App’x 232 (emphasis added). In o ther wor ds, going forward, a n indicated SCR rep ort for mis trea tmen t that is more than ei ght ye ars old cannot serve as the basis for denying a re lative’s application for cer tification. While the SCR reports used to di squalify the rel atives of these plaintiffs are a ll more than e ight ye ars old, for many p laintiffs it is unclear whether the SCR reports addressed m is treatment as opp osed to abuse. An d i t is un c lear whether the changes will aff ect the plain tiffs in any event. Th e ne w provisions, at least as presen ted on appeal, do not describe a procedure for re consideration of applications that were already denied or s pecify whether the provisions app ly retroactively. The complaint sugge sts that AC S may refuse to rec on sider a pr eviously denied applic ation. In C.W.C. ’s case, ACS refused to alter its ori ginal decision despit e learning from OCFS that the underlying incident in the re port was unfounded. See id. at 34 (¶ 79) (“ACS reported that … i t had attem pted to have [the re lative’s] previous foster c are deter mination over turned [b ut] ACS ’s efforts were unsuccessfu l.”) (intern al quotation marks and alter ation

22 omitted). On this recor d, we cannot s ay that ACS will reconsider its prior denials based on the update d statutory sche me. The distric t court may consider that issue on remand. 11 D In holding that the plaintiffs lac k standin g, the district court decided that the plaint iffs have not suffere d a cognizable injury because the substant ive due process right s to famil y inte gr ity and to be free from ha rm do not require th e state to plac e the plaintiffs in ideal foster settings or to promote specific types of fami ly arrangemen ts. See B.B., 2023 WL 5935803, at * 6-7, * 10 - 11. Tha t approach con flates the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims with whether the plaintiffs have standing to pursue the claim s. T he distri ct court held that s ome plaintiffs lack standing because the y currently resid e with a relativ e in a direct placement. “ [I] n th is contex t, ” the district court reasoned, “ the liberty i nterest in the right to fa mily associ ation is impl icated only where the government see ks to r emove a ch ild from their fa milial associa tion.” Id. at * 6. As a r esult, the distr ict cour t held that the plaint iffs “failed to plead an injury to their right to fami ly association and in tegrity.” Id. But the reasoning of the distr ict cour t addr essed the s cope of the right to family association and integ rity rath er than the e xistence of a n injury - in - fac t to the p laint iffs. To the exte nt tha t it fo cused on r eal - world harms, the dis trict court acknowle dged that the challenge d 11 As wi th the dis cretion ary crimin al his tory pr ovisions, none of the n amed plaintiffs whose relat ives were denied cert ification because of an SCR report have alleged t hat thei r relatives inten d to adopt them. For that reason, no ne of these plaintiffs have st anding to challenge t hese provisions as applied to adoption.

23 policies deprived the plaintiffs of the b enefits associated w ith a foster placement, “mak ing [the] children wor se off.” Id. a t *13. It m igh t u lti mate ly be true that the right to family associati on and int egrity does not require the government to provide legal support for foster relat ionships between relatives. But a plaintiff’s standing does not depend on the eventual success of his legal th eory. See Ariz. State Legisla ture v. Ariz. Ind ep. Redistricting Comm’n, 576 U.S. 787, 800 (2015). “Standing is about who may access the cour thouse, not about the merits of the claims to be heard once inside.” Soule v. Conn. Ass’n of Schs., 90 F. 4th 3 4, 45 (2d C ir. 2023). “The standing issue must t herefore be resolved ‘irrespecti ve of the meri ts of the substantive c laims.’” United Stat es v. Va zquez, 14 5 F.3d 7 4, 81 (2d C ir. 1998) (alteration omitted) (quo ting Bordel l v. Gen. El ec. Co., 92 2 F.2d 1057, 1060 (2d Cir. 1991)). “For the purpos es of the s tanding inq uiry,” a co urt mus t “ assume” that the plaintif fs “are correct” on their legal theory. Soule, 90 F.4th at 41; see id. at 48 (“In this procedural post ure, we must assume Plaint iffs are corre ct [on the merits] an d that [the p laintiffs] are therefore impact ed by an unlawful policy.”). Th e cou rt the n may evaluate whether the legal theory would allow the pla intiffs to obtain redress for a con crete injur y that the de fendants ca used. See id. at 41 (evaluating stan ding “[w]i th these ass umptions in mind”). The failure to credit the legal theory when ev aluating stan ding “confuse s weakness on the merits with absence of Article III standing.” Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 249 n.10 (2011). The decision of the district c ourt ref lected a similar confusion with the merits when it considered the plaintiffs’ claims that Ne w York violated the r ight to be fre e from har m. The dist rict court agree d with the pla intiffs th at there is a right to be free from h arm and a r ight

24 to “an appropriate duration of foster car e.” B.B., 2023 WL 5935 803, at *9. T he pla intiffs allege that pl acement with non - relatives makes childr en less likely to find a permanent placem ent a nd increases the risk s of psychological and other harms. One plaintiff, wh ile in the foster care of non -relative s, was d iagnosed with AD HD, a major depressive d isorder, a language disorde r, and PTSD. J. Ap p’x 37 (¶ 91). Another p la i ntiff, after placeme nt in a non - relative foster home, “reg ressed significantly — needin g diap ers, even though he has long been pot ty - traine d, and wetting t he bed” — and was “referred for individual therapy.” Id. at 43 (¶ 110). But t he dis trict co urt con clud ed that these harms “do [] not constitute an injury to [the p laintiffs’ ] right to be free from harm” because, “as a matter of law, the right to be free from harm doe s not require that the government prov [ide ] the least restrict ive, optimal placement, or optimal level of treatm ent. ” B.B., 2023 WL 5935803, at *10. The d istric t co urt migh t be c orrect th at the right to be free from harm does not entitle t he plaintiffs to the relief they seek. But th at would be a decision o n the merits of their claims. Whether the plaintiffs are legally entitled to reli ef does not affect whether th ey have standing to seek it. The plaintiffs allege t hat New York has de nied them a relat ive foster parent; h as denied the financial, m edical, and social services associated with th at rela tion sh ip; or has exposed the m to psychological harm and instability. Those are actual injurie s. Th e plain tiffs m ight not succeed on the merits. In other words, t he right s to fami ly integr ity or to be free from harm might not require New York to alter its certif ication sche me. But Article II I of the Constitut ion allows the p laintiffs t o obtain an a nswer to that quest ion from a cour t.

25 II In addi tion to th eir s ubs tant ive c laims, th e p laint iffs a lleg e tha t the defenda nts violated their p rocedural due process ri ghts. They argue that New York’s cer tification schem e fail s to pro vide them w ith notice that a r elative’s appl ication w as denied and wit h an opportunity to challenge that deni al. To be sure, thei r relatives often receive notice and limi ted o ppor tun ities to challe nge the d enia ls. See, e.g., J. App’x 38 (¶ 96). But th e ch ildre n d o not. The distric t co urt did not expressly address the plaintiffs’ pr ocedural due process claims, though we presum e that it dismissed those claims because of its decis ion that the plaintiffs l acked an in jury - in -fact and th erefor e standing to p ursue a ny claims. Because the plaintiffs have standing to pursue their substantiv e claims, the y may pur sue their procedural cla ims a s we ll. III After conducting its analys is under Article II I, the dis trict cour t additionally held that the plain tiffs lack ed “prudentia l stan ding.” B.B., 2023 WL 5935 803, at *12. Acco rdin g to the d istrict co urt, th e plaintiffs “assert[] th e legal rights and interests” of their r elatives, so the plainti ffs must show “that th ere is a hindrance or barrier for [thei r relatives] to assert their r ights in [c]ourt and to protect thei r own interest s.” Id. Artic le II I of the Con stitu tion limi ts the j ur isdict ion of a feder al court to “Cases” or “Contr oversies.” In addition to th is constitu tiona l requirement, the Supreme Court has “adverted to a ‘pr uden tial’ branch of standing,” which includes “the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising ano ther person’s legal rights.” Lex mark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Compo nents, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 126 (20 14) (quot ing Elk Grove Unified Sc h. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 1 2 (2004)). Thi s

26 “prudential standing rule requires that an individual ‘assert h is own legal rights and interests, an d cannot rest his c laim to rel ief on the legal rights or intere sts of third parties.’” United States v. Suar ez, 791 F.3d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 2015) (quot ing Rajamin v. Deutsche B ank Nat. Tr. Co., 757 F.3d 79, 86 (2 d Cir. 2014)). T he Supreme Co urt has recognized that a prudential s tanding requirement that exceeds the requirem ents of Article III “is in s ome tens ion ” with the Court’s “reaffir mation of the principle th at a federal court ’ s obligation to hear and decide case s wit hin its j uris dic tion is virtually unfl agging. ” Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 126 (in ternal q uotati on marks o mitte d). But the Court has also s ugge sted that “lim ita tion s on third - p arty stan ding” m ight properl y be class ified as c onstitutional rather than prudential. Id. at 1 27 n.3. 12 We accordingly contin ue to apply thos e l imita tio ns. The pl aintiffs in this case do not ass ert the righ ts of their relat ive s. T hey assert their own r ights to f amily association and to be free from ha rm. The denial of relative foster p lacements — and the associated benefits of those placemen ts — h arm the p lain tiff s. The complaint does n ot seek to redress harms to the relatives. The relat ive s have no t been denied a st able home that prevent s the m from achieving a permanent placemen t. The rel atives have not been denied 12 Justice Thomas ha s ex plained t hat “[t ]he Court ’ s prev ious stat ement s on the rule against th ird - p arty standin g have l ong su ggested that th e ‘ proper place ’ for that rule is in A rticle III ’ s case - or - cont rovers y requ irement.” J une Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 591 U.S. 299, 363 (2020) (Tho mas, J., disse nting). That is be cause “ [w] hen a pr ivate plaint iff seeks to vindicate someone else ’ s legal i njury, h e has no p rivate right of his own genu inely at s take in the litigatio n,” and a plaintiff cann ot “establi sh a case or controversy by asse rting the con stituti onal righ ts of oth ers.” Id. at 364-66.

27 medic al be nef its or b een exposed to the e motional and ps ychological harms of p lacement with non-relat ives. The p laintiff s also seek to vindicate the ir own interests in procedural due proc ess. New Yo rk law requi res that a relative w ho applies for certification must rec eive notice when that application is denied. See N.Y. S oc. Serv. L aw § 378 - a(2)(g); id. § 424 - a(2)(b)(i). The relative has a limite d oppor tunit y to ch alleng e the denial. See id. § 378-a(2)(g); id. § 42 4-a(2)(c). But the plai ntiffs did not rece ive noti ce when th eir relatives ’ applications w ere denied and were not given oppor tun ities to conte st the de nia ls. Th e plain tiffs c laim th at the Constitu tion entitles not only the rel atives but also the chil dren to notice and an opportunity t o be heard. There is no prudential or cons titut iona l reason to prevent that claim from being considered. IV T he defendants ar gue that we ma y affir m the judg ment of the district court on th e alternative gro und that, e ven thoug h the plaintiffs have stand ing, they fail to state a cla im on the merits. But “[w]e are ‘a court of r eview, not of first view.’” Havens v. Ja mes, 76 F.4th 103, 123 (2d C ir. 2023) (quot ing Decker v. Nw. E nv ’ t Def. C tr., 568 U.S. 597, 610 (201 3)). The district court dismissed the cas e for lack of subject matter ju ris dict ion. W h ile the distr ict cour t ef fective ly address ed the merits of the plaint iffs’ claims in the course of that dismissal, it did s o “bas ed on its erron eous conclusion that these [merit s] questions impli cated the subject ma tter jurisdictio n of the federal courts. We t herefore vacate the judgment an d remand for further proceedings not tainte d by that conclusion.” Baroni v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 161 F.4th 48, 60 (2d C ir. 2025).

28 CONCLUSION The plaintiffs suffered concrete i njuries - in - fact when they were denied plac ements with relative fos ter parents. The p lain tiff s directly placed with rel atives were denied the medical and soc ial ser vices available to foster children and the stab ility of a foster r elationship. T he plain tif fs in the car e of non - relatives have been expo sed to psychological harm and the risk of being denied a permanen t placement. But the claims of three plaintiffs ar e moot, and only B.B. has standing to challenge New York’s cert ification rules for adoptive parents. We therefore reverse the j udgment in p art, affirm in par t, and remand for furthe r proceedings cons istent with th is opinion.