Fredis Ortez Reyes v. USCIS - Immigration Jurisdiction

PUBLISHED UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH C IRCUIT No. 25-1391 FREDIS RUBEN ORT EZ REYES, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES; UR M. JADDOU, in her official capacity as Director of Unit ed States Citizen ship an d Immigration Services; TED H. KIM, in his official capacity as the Associate Director of Refugee, Asyl um, an d Int erna tiona l Ope rat ions Direc torat e of USC IS; KI MBER LY ZAN OTTI, in her official capacity as the Director of the U SCIS Washington Fiel d Office, Defendants – Appel lees. Appeal from the Unit ed States District Co urt for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Rossie David Alston, Jr., District Judge. (1: 24- cv -00711-RDA-IDD) Argued: December 11, 2025 Decided: March 5, 2026 Before GREGORY, QUATTLEB AUM, and BERNER, Circuit Judg es. Reversed and remande d by published opinion. Judge Gregory wr ote the opinion, in whic h Judge Quattlebaum and Judge Berner joine d. ARGUED: Joseph David Moravec, BL ESSINGER LEGAL, PLLC, Falls Church, Virginia, for Appellan t. Christian James Cooper, OF FICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexand ria, Virginia, for Appe llees. ON BRIEF: Eileen P. Bless inger, Jessica A. Dawgert, BLESSINGE R LEGAL, PLLC, Falls C hurch, Virginia, for Appellant.

2 Erik S. Siebert, Uni ted States Attorney, OFFICE OF TH E UNITED ST ATES ATTORNEY, Alexand ria, Virginia, for Ap pellees.

3 GREGORY, Circuit Ju dge: This case raises the j urisdictional question of whether courts hav e authority to review the decision of an immigration ju dge that is based exclus ively on a matter of statutory interpretation. This question is not new. In accordance with our past holdings and the holdings of the Supreme Court, we hol d that courts do retain t his authority. I. Plaintiff F redis Orte z Reyes is a nati ve of Ho nduras an d an asyle e in the United St ates. He is marr ied to G loria Maga ly Estrada Moren o (“Ms. E strada”) a nd has been married since January 28, 2005. Ms. Estrada had previo usly been removed f rom the United St ates when she was se ized after crossing t he border in 2014. In 2020, Ms. Es trada return ed to the United States with her husb and, who sought as ylum. M s. Estrada was ineli gible to seek asylum herself beca use of he r pr evious removal. She di d seek wit hholdi ng of re moval and protection under the C onvention Against Torture. In January 2020, an im migration judge gran ted Mr. Ortez asylu m but de nied Ms. Estrada’s request for withhold ing of re moval, w hich requi res the applica nt to m eet a hi gher burd en to s how a fea r of fut ure persec ution. Ms. E strada’s appeal of th at decisio n is now b efore the B oard of I mmigration Appeals. In the meantime, Ms. Estrada’s husband filed a Form I - 730 petition fo r Ms. Estrada to receive derivative asylee sta tus under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). On Jul y 25, 2023, United States Citiz enship and Im migration Services (“USCIS”) den ied the I - 73 0 petition on the basis that Sectio n 241(a)(5) of the I mmigration and Nation ality Act (“INA”), or 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (“ Section 1231(a)(5)”), bars any form of relief for noncitize ns who

4 have prior orders of removal, such as Ms. Es trada. The USCIS de cision treats Section 1231(a)(5) as the dispo sitive and exclusive reason for its denial o f the I-730 petition. Ms. Estrada’s husband challenged USC IS’s decision in federal distri ct court. He contends that the USCIS was incorrect to apply Section 1231(a)(5) when making its eligibility determinatio n on the I - 730 petition, which is governed se parately by 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A). The District Court did not reach the mer its of the complaint, i nstead dismissing it on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, the District Court recognized that the INA provides that “no court shall have jurisdiction to revie w” any “decision or action of the Attorne y General or the Secretary of Homeland Securit y the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion o f the Attorney Ge neral or the Secretary of Home land Security.” 8 U. S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii). Because the statutory lang uage governing I -730 petitions does give USCIS the discreti on to deny or approve such app lications, the District Court determine d that the USCI S’s I - 730 denia l was an exercise o f discretion which f ederal courts lack authority to review. Ms. Estrada’s husband now appeals the juris dictional issue. The q uestion before this Court is whether the USCIS’s dec ision to apply Section 1231(a)(5) to a petition raised under Section 1158(b)(3)(A) is an exercise of discretion that falls bey ond the review of the court. Per longstandin g precedent, it is not.

5 II. The INA strips federal courts of jurisdiction t o review “any jud gment regarding t he granting of relief under” an e numerated list of types of relie f. 8. U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). The Supreme Court has interpreted Se ction 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) to “preclude[] judicial review of factual findings tha t underlie a deni al of discretionary relief — including when t hose findings are ‘threshold requirements est ablished by Congress’ to access the relevant discretion.” Bo uarfa v. Mayorka s, 604 U.S. 6, 18 –19 (2024) (quo ting Patel v. Ga rland, 596 U.S. 328, 332 (2022)). We applied this reasoning in Shaiban v. Jaddo u to hold that Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), which strips fe deral courts of jurisdiction to review “any other decision or action ... the author ity for which is specified ... to be in the discretion of the Attorney General or the Secretary of Ho meland Security,” similar ly precludes judicial review of factual findings underlyi ng decisions to grant or deny dis cretionary relief. See 97 F.4th 263, 267 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1046 (202 5) (discussing Patel, 596 U.S. 328). We are now tasked with decidi ng whether Section 12 52(a)(2)(B)(ii) preclude s judicial review of a de cision to deny discretionary relief wh ere the decision was based solely on the USCIS’s i nterpretation of the INA. We hold tha t it does not. Pure dec isions of law, such as the one at issue here, fall outsid e of the scope of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)’s command. In determining whether jurisdiction properly lies, we must “look at the particular decision being made and [] ascertain whether that decision is one that Congress has designated to be discretionary.” Mejia Rodriguez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 562 F.3d

6 1137, 1143 (11th Cir. 2009). Althou gh Section 1158(b)(3)(A) confer s discretion to USCI S to approve or deny I - 73 0 petitions, see Lin v. H effron, No. 22 - 1380, 20 23 WL 566343 (4th Cir. Jan. 27, 2023), in this case the US CIS’s decision was not an exer cise of that discretion but exclusively a matt er of statutory interpr etation. There was no consideratio n of Ms. Estrada and her h usband’s unique circumst ances, nor the ap plication of the Section 1158(b)(3)(A) guidelines and standards. Rather, USCIS had determined, without discussion, that Section 1158(b)(3)(A) sho uld be interpreted to inco rporate the prohibition s of Section 1231(a)(5). For this reason alo ne, USCIS denied the I-730 petition. USCIS contends that t his case should be treat ed akin to Shaiban v. J addou, w here we held that a threshold eligibility d etermination was within the di scretionary authority conferred by Section 1159(b) and thus fell wi thin the scope of Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) jurisdiction stripping. 97 F.4th at 268. But Shaiban does not govern the question her e. In Shaiban, USCIS was d etermining whether the petitioner had enga ged in terrorist activit y as a threshold eligi bility issue for refugee st atus readjustment under Section 1159(b). Although this determin ation involved a question of law regard ing collateral estoppel, this was ultimately a factual inquiry made u nder the explicit discre tion that USCIS held to determine eligibility. I d. at 268 (“USCIS und er § 1159(b) applied a fact - bound estop pel determination, which was subject to the ove rarching discretionar y determination.”). As Shaiban recognized, such fact-bound inquiries are d istinct from inher ently legal questions about the applicability of statutes. See id. The issue here is a pure legal question of sta tutory construction: wh ether Section 1158(b)(3)(A) should b e interpreted to incor porate the prohibition s of Section 1231(a)(5).

7 In this way, Ms. Estra da’s husband does not challenge “ ho w the agency exercised its discretion” but rather USCIS’s interpretat ion of the INA itself. See Shaiban, 97 F.4th at 268 (citing Moore v. Frazier, 941 F. 3d 717, 724 n.6 (4th Cir. 2019)). Such a challenge to the agency’s statutory i nterpretation “is e ntirely separate from o ther discretionary decisio ns and involves a questio n of USCIS’s statutor y authority” that falls outside the scope o f Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i i) jurisdiction stripping. Id. (contras ting Mo ore, 941 F.3d 717); see Zad vydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 688 (2 001) (explaining that Section 125 2(a)(2)(B)(ii) strips courts of jurisdic tion only to review “th e Attorney General’s e xercise of discretio n” and not “the extent of the Attorney Ge neral’s authority” which “is not a matter of discretion”). We hold that the d istrict court had jurisdiction to review USCI S ’s decision to deny derivative asylum unde r Section 1158(b)(3)(A) because the agency’s decision was not an exercise of discretion but rather turned on a legal interpretation of the statute. As both parties requested at ora l argument, we remand this case to the District Court to address th e merits of that question. REVERSED AND REM ANDED