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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

2026 Ca Admin - Non-Confidential Opinion - 003

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-0080, 0083, 0084, 0086, 0087, 0088
• Judges: Caldwell

• Disposition: OPINION AFFIRMING

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (543)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION AFFIRMING

Combined Opinion

RENDERED: MARCH 13, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0080-ME

N.L. AND B.L. APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LAURA P. RUSSELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-J-503494-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES AND R.L., A
MINOR CHILD APPELLEES

AND

NO. 2025-CA-0083-ME

N.L. AND B.L. APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LAURA P. RUSSELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-J-503494-003

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES AND R.L., A
MINOR CHILD APPELLEES

AND

NO. 2025-CA-0084-ME

N.L. AND B.L. APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LAURA P. RUSSELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-J-503495-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES AND C.L., A
MINOR CHILD APPELLEES

AND

NO. 2025-CA-0086-ME

N.L. AND B.L. APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LAURA P. RUSSELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-J-503495-003

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES AND C.L., A
MINOR CHILD APPELLEES

-2-
AND

NO. 2025-CA-0087-ME

N.L. AND B.L. APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LAURA P. RUSSELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-J-503496-002

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES AND T.L., A
MINOR CHILD APPELLEES

AND

NO. 2025-CA-0088-ME

N.L. AND B.L. APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE LAURA P. RUSSELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 23-J-503496-003

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND
FAMILY SERVICES AND T.L., A
MINOR CHILD APPELLEES

-3-
OPINION
AFFIRMING

---

BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND MOYNAHAN, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: N.L. (“Father”) and B.L. (“Mother”) (collectively,

“Parents”) appeal from a family court’s finding that their minor children were

abused or neglected.1 We affirm.

FACTS

In August and September 2023, the Cabinet for Health and Family

Services (“the Cabinet”) filed two sets of petitions initiating dependency, neglect,

or abuse (“DNA”) proceedings regarding Parents’ four then-minor children.2 One

set of petitions (with trailer 002)3 alleged the oldest then-minor child had been

subjected to prolonged confinement in a locked closet and being forced to run

several miles on a treadmill as punishment. These 002 petitions also alleged

1
Since this is an appeal from findings of abuse or neglect, we do not refer to the individual
children or parents by name. Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 5(B)(2) (“Initials
or a descriptive term must be used instead of a name in cases involving juveniles, allegations of
abuse and neglect, termination of parental rights, mental health, and expungements.”).
2
Parents also had older children, who had already reached the age of majority, living in the
family home at that time.
3
This appeal is from the family court cases with trailers 002 and 003. No appeal from any case
regarding this family with 001 as the trailer is before us here. Moreover, the record from any
001 case (including any petition(s)) has not been provided to us.

-4-
Parents restricted the children’s access to food and forced the children to eat

cayenne pepper as a punishment. The second set of petitions at issue (those with

trailer 003) alleged educational neglect.

The oldest then-minor child (“Child 1”) reached the age of majority

before the DNA proceedings proceeded to adjudication or disposition.4 Parents do

not challenge the resolution of Child 1’s case.

The family court allowed the three youngest children to remain in

Parents’ custody at all times relevant to this appeal. However, it ordered Parents to

immediately enroll the three youngest children in public school in August 2023.

The DNA proceedings concerning the three youngest children

proceeded to adjudication and disposition. After hearing evidence, the family

court issued an adjudication order with findings of fact and conclusions of law in

the summer of 2024. The court found each of the three youngest children to be

abused or neglected. It found Parents had failed to provide the education necessary

for each child’s well-being. The court also found the three youngest children’s

welfare had been harmed by Parents’ inflicting emotional injury or allowing the

risk of emotional injury to be created.

4
Following adjudication and disposition and the filing of this appeal in January 2025, the oldest
of the three children at issue here turned eighteen in the spring of 2025, thus reaching the age of
majority. Nonetheless, all three children were still minors at the time of disposition.

-5-
Following another hearing, the family court issued an order marked as

“disposition” on December 19, 2024.5 The family court allowed the children to

remain in Parents’ custody. But it also ordered the Cabinet and Jefferson County

Public Schools (“JCPS”) to continue to monitor the family. The court also

required that Parents must cooperate with the Cabinet and JCPS and that the minor

children must attend in-person school daily.

Parents have not argued in their appellate briefs that the court erred in

ordering that the children must attend public school. However, they challenge the

family court’s finding that the three youngest children were abused or neglected.

They allege error in the family court’s resolution of issues about emotional injury

and educational neglect. Further facts will be set forth as needed in our analysis.

ANALYSIS

We review the family court’s determination that the children were

abused or neglected for abuse of discretion. B.B. v. Cabinet for Health and Family

Services, 635 S.W.3d 802, 807-08 (Ky. 2021). Similarly, we review its evidentiary

5
Despite any informality in the appearance of the December 2024 order and the lack of specific
recitation that the order is final and appealable, we accept that this is a disposition order which
made the adjudication of abuse or neglect final and appealable. See J.E. v. Cabinet for Health
and Family Services, 553 S.W.3d 850, 852 (Ky. App. 2018) (“[T]he Court holds that a
disposition order, not an adjudication order, is the final and appealable order with regard to a
decision of whether a child is dependent, neglected, or abused.”). Different judges presided over
the adjudication and disposition stages here—with the Hon. Gina Kay Calvert entering the
adjudication order and the Hon. Laura P. Russell entering the disposition order.

-6-
rulings for abuse of discretion. Id. at 807. We also consider whether the family

court’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence and whether the court

applied the correct law. Id. at 807-08. We review the family court’s resolution of

legal issues such as the interpretation of statutes de novo, meaning without

deference. Davis v. Davis, 720 S.W.3d 622, 628 (Ky. App. 2025). See also

T.C. v. M.E., 603 S.W.3d 663, 679 (Ky. App. 2020) (family court’s legal

conclusions are reviewed de novo).

With these parameters in mind, we consider the parties’ arguments.

Emotional Injury Issues

KRS6 620.100(3) states: “The adjudication shall determine the truth

or falsity of the allegations in the complaint. The burden of proof shall be upon the

complainant, and a determination of dependency, neglect, and abuse shall be made

by a preponderance of the evidence. The Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure shall

apply.”

Citing KRS 620.100(3), Mother and Father emphasize that

adjudication is for determining whether the allegations in DNA petitions are true.

They assert the petitions fail to allege emotional injury. They also contend the 002

trailer petitions do not contain “direct allegations of abuse or neglect specific to

these children.” (Appellant red brief, page 8). They admit the pleadings were

6
Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-7-
amended to include allegations of educational neglect through the filing of the 003

trailer petitions. However, they contend the pleadings were not amended to

include allegations of emotional injury.

Parents note the 002 trailer petitions contain many allegations

regarding Child 1. However, they assert the petitions fail to allege emotional

injury or creating a risk of such emotional harm to the three youngest children.

Thus, they contend the family court’s entry of findings of emotional injury to the

three youngest children exceeded the permissible scope of adjudication under KRS

620.100(3) and, in their view, amounted to fundamental procedural error.

Parents argue on appeal: “The failure to amend the pleadings or

introduce individualized allegations deprived the Appellants [Parents] of fair notice

and an opportunity to meaningfully contest the claims—both of which are essential

elements of due process in juvenile proceedings.” (Appellant red brief, page 8).

Parents’ initial appellant brief does not, however, provide a specific

reference to the record showing if or how they raised this issue to the family court.7

7
This Court has previously noted in another case that Parents’ counsel, Jason Bowman, failed to
comply with appellate briefing rules. See Williams v. Brown, No. 2023-CA-0635-MR, 2024 WL
4244466, at *6 (Ky. App. Sep. 20, 2024) (unpublished) (reviewing issue solely for palpable error
because appellant brief prepared by counsel failed to provide a preservation statement). We
strongly urge counsel to carefully review the Rules of Appellate Procedure and to make sure to
comply with these rules before filing any future appellate briefs. Though we decline to impose
additional sanctions at this juncture, we are not obliged to be so lenient in the future.

-8-
See RAP 32(A)(4).8 Moreover, though the Appellee brief pointed out the lack of a

proper preservation statement with specific references to the record in the

Appellant brief, Parents did not use their reply brief to correct this deficiency.

Since Parents do not cite to the record to show where this issue was preserved for

review, we may consider this issue unpreserved and review solely for palpable

error resulting in manifest injustice. Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155

(Ky. 2021); Progressive Direct Insurance Company v. Hartson, 661 S.W.3d 291,

298 n.9 (Ky. App. 2023); CR9 61.02. See also J.P.T. v. Cabinet for Health and

Family Services, 689 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Ky. App. 2024).

As the Cabinet points out, each petition alleges that the child at issue

was abused or neglected with citations to KRS Chapter 620 and to KRS

610.010(2)(d). Thus, the petitions provided notice of claims of dependency,

neglect, or abuse even if the petitions do not identify the specific statutory grounds

for asserting the children are abused or neglected. See generally KRS 600.020(1)

(defining the term abused or neglected child).

We recognize that the 002 trailer petitions do not explicitly use the

term emotional injury or explicitly refer to the creation of risks of such injury. See

8
We refer to the version of the Rules of Appellate Procedure in effect when the appellate briefs
were filed in 2025—rather than to the new version which takes effect April 1, 2026.
9
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

-9-
KRS 600.020(1)(a)1.-2. We also recognize that many of the allegations in these

petitions concern the treatment of Child 1. However, there is not a complete lack

of allegations specific to each younger child and the petitions are not identical. For

example, these petitions contain descriptions of these three children’s individual

descriptions of their perceptions of what was happening in the household.

Moreover, while the petitions did not explicitly refer to emotional

injury or the risk of such injury, they set forth factual allegations which, if proven,

could support a finding of emotional injury or at least a creation of a risk of

emotional injury. For example, the petitions alleged the younger children were

aware of the isolation, confinement, and forced physical exertion of their older

brother, Child 1, and at least one child reported they could be sent to Child 1’s

room for misbehaving. The petitions also alleged the children were only allowed

to eat bread and/or nuts if they failed to do their chores and were forced to eat

cayenne pepper as punishment.

Consistent with KRS 620.100(3), the family court heard evidence

about these allegations in the adjudication hearing and determined these allegations

were true in its adjudication order. Therefore, we discern no palpable error

resulting in manifest injustice from the family court’s making findings regarding

-10-
emotional injury despite the lack of more individualized allegations and the lack of

explicit reference to emotional injury or risk thereof in the petitions.10

We further reject Parents’ argument that the family court’s findings

regarding emotional injury were not supported by substantial evidence of

emotional injury as defined by Kentucky law. KRS 600.020(26) defines emotional

injury as:

an injury to the mental or psychological capacity or
emotional stability of a child as evidenced by a
substantial and observable impairment in the child’s
ability to function within a normal range of performance
and behavior with due regard to his or her age,
development, culture, and environment as testified to by
a qualified mental health professional[.]

Parents point out that the Cabinet did not present evidence of an

individualized assessment of each of the three youngest children. They contend

that the testimony of Dr. Melissa Currie is insufficient evidence to support a

finding of emotional injury.

10
Given the lack of preservation of this issue and the factual allegations in the petition, we
decline to reach the parties’ appellate arguments about the inter-relationship of KRS 620.100(3)
and CR 15.02 (regarding trying unpleaded issues by consent and amendments to conform to the
evidence). And in any event, we reject Parents’ argument that any lack of specificity or lack of
explicit reference to emotional injury or risks thereof in the petitions meant that the family court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the case. Subject matter jurisdiction means a court’s
authority to hear and rule on a certain kind of case. Nordike v. Nordike, 231 S.W.3d 733, 737
(Ky. 2007). The family court had subject matter jurisdiction here since it had authority to
resolve this type of case—alleging dependency, neglect, or abuse—pursuant to KRS
610.010(2)(d).

-11-
Dr. Currie performed an individual assessment of Child 1, but did not

individually meet with his younger siblings. She reviewed the forensic interviews

with the three youngest children. Based on these interviews, she determined these

three children were harmed by witnessing the treatment of Child 1 (including his

confinement, isolation, and forced physical exertion) and being led to believe such

treatment was normal and not a cause for concern.

Dr. Currie did not directly observe the three youngest children in

person but instead made observations after reviewing their forensic interviews.

Her opinion about harm being shown, due to the three youngest children making

statements indicating they regarded Child 1’s treatment as normal, may be

construed as a finding of substantial and observable impairment in the children’s

ability to function. Even though Dr. Currie evidently did not observe these three

children in person, the statutory definition of emotional injury does not specifically

require direct observation for a qualified medical professional to render an opinion

but simply refers to an “observable” impairment. Although findings of emotional

injury may be more typically made after direct observation and individualized

assessment,11 a qualified mental health professional might reasonably “observe” an

impairment in certain circumstances by reviewing statements made by the child in

question.

11
See, e.g., Cabinet for Health and Family Services v. L.G., 653 S.W.3d 93 (Ky. 2022).

-12-
In any event, even assuming arguendo that Dr. Currie’s testimony is

not sufficient to show an actual emotional injury as defined by statute, her

testimony coupled with other evidence in the record constitutes substantial

evidence supporting a finding of Parents’ allowing the creation of a risk of

emotional injury to the younger children.

The family court found that the evidence showed Parents either

inflicted an emotional injury or allowed the creation of a risk of emotional injury.

It quoted KRS 600.020(1)(a)2., which defines an abused or neglected child as one

threatened with harm by a parent’s creating or allowing “to be created a risk of

physical or emotional injury as defined in this section to the child by other than

accidental means[.]”

Noting Dr. Currie’s testimony, the family court found the younger

children suffered harm from witnessing Parents’ treatment of Child 1, which the

children viewed as normal. It also found that the children’s thinking that Parents’

locking Child 1 in a room “along with all the other behavior of the parents” was

normal showed an impairment to their development as well as a harmful belief

system. (Page 31 of Adjudication Order attached as Exhibit B to Appellant red

brief). The family court had earlier noted evidence of Parents’ behavior, including

putting cameras in every room of the house except bathrooms, giving the children

little privacy.

-13-
Immediately after its written finding of infliction of emotional injury

or allowing the creation of risk of emotional injury, the court also identified

Parents’ restricting the children’s access to food as another concern. Thus, we

cannot agree with the contention in the reply brief that witnessing Parents’

treatment of Child 1 was the only basis for the family court’s findings regarding

emotional injury.

In sum, the family court did not misapply the law, its findings of fact

are supported by substantial evidence, and we discern no abuse of discretion in the

court’s finding the children to be abused or neglected due to Parents’ creating a

risk of or inflicting emotional injury. See B.B., 635 S.W.3d at 807. Moreover, we

certainly discern no palpable error resulting in manifest injustice from the family

court’s resolution of emotional injury issues for which Parents do not provide

specific cites to the record to show preservation. Thus, we affirm the court’s

adjudicating the three youngest children to be abused or neglected based on

Parents’ inflicting an emotional injury or allowing the creation of a risk of such

injury. Next, we address the parties’ arguments about educational neglect.

Educational Neglect

KY. CONST.12 § 5 provides in pertinent part: “nor shall any man be

compelled to send his child to any school to which he may be conscientiously

12
Constitution of Kentucky.

-14-
opposed[.]” Nonetheless, KRS 620.010 states children have fundamental rights,

including “the right to educational instruction” and the right to develop to their

mental, emotional, and physical potential. Moreover, Kentucky law defines an

abused or neglected child as including a child who is harmed or threatened with

harm by his or her parents’ failure to provide adequate education despite the

parents’ having the financial or other means to provide such an education. KRS

600.020(1)(a)8.

No Kentucky statute specifically defines what an adequate education

is for purposes of DNA proceedings. Also, there is a dearth of binding prior

Kentucky precedent about determining issues of alleged educational neglect in a

homeschool setting.

Parents contend the family court erred in adjudicating the three

children to be abused or neglected based on educational neglect. They assert that

Kentucky law does not establish specific, clear requirements for what must be

taught and how in a homeschool setting to avoid a finding of educational neglect.

The Cabinet apparently admits that Parents’ educational neglect arguments were

raised to the family court and thus preserved for review.

Parents argue the family court erred in treating a homeschool

information packet provided by the Kentucky Department of Education as binding

authority. They point out this packet is neither a codified statute nor a promulgated

-15-
regulation and the Department of Education has no authority to certify

homeschools. While we ultimately conclude that the family court did not err in

finding educational neglect, we agree with Parents that the homeschool packet is

not itself a binding authority.

Parents also contend the family court erred in finding educational

neglect based on their not complying with the requirements of statutes which

parents assert do not apply to homeschools. Regarding the family court’s finding

that Parents failed to keep accurate attendance records, Parents assert that

homeschools are not private schools. Thus, they contend KRS 159.040’s

requirement that private schools maintain attendance registers does not apply to

homeschools.

Parents also contend that homeschools are not subject to the minimum

number of instructional hours and attendance days required by KRS 158.070(1)(f).

They assert KRS 158.070 only applies to common or public schools. See also

KRS 158.030 (defining common schools).

Parents also argue that KRS 158.080, which requires instruction in

core subjects required to be taught in public school, only applies to private schools

which elect to seek certification pursuant to KRS 156.160(2). KRS 158.080

expressly applies to “Private and parochial schools certified in accordance with

KRS 156.160(2)[.]” KRS 156.160(2) states: “Any private, parochial, or church

-16-
school may voluntarily comply with curriculum, certification, and textbook

standards established by the Kentucky Board of Education and be certified upon

application to the board by such schools.” Parents contend homeschools cannot

seek or obtain certification under KRS 156.060(2) so they assert that KRS

158.080’s requirements cannot apply to their homeschool.

However, regardless of whether the family court was correct in

determining that Parents violated the specific statutes cited in its adjudication

order,13 the family court also found a lack of any significant formal instruction

being provided by Parents via homeschooling. Kentucky law makes clear that

children are entitled to significant, formal educational instruction. It also holds

parents accountable for educational neglect if they fail to provide substantial

educational instruction to their children despite having the means to do so.

The family court specifically found Mother “admitted to laying out

the children’s work and providing little other instruction or any formal instruction

time or schedule.” (Page 26 of Adjudication Order) (emphasis added). The court

also noted Father’s testimony about his generating an attendance report, but not

13
Perhaps there is a lack of optimal clarity in some educational statutes about whether such
statutes apply to homeschools. It is not always clear whether the General Assembly intended to
refer to homeschools or only to schools outside one’s home when referring to private schools in
various statutes mentioned herein. Nonetheless, as we discuss in the body of this Opinion,
Kentucky law makes clear that children are entitled to some modicum of substantial, formal
educational instruction and the family court’s finding that the children did not receive such
education from Parents at home is supported by substantial evidence.

-17-
participating much in homeschooling. The court also found that Child 1 “reported

significant time periods with no education or instruction.” (Page 26 of

Adjudication Order) (emphasis added). Additionally, the court found Mother

admitted to ignoring the other children’s educational needs to focus on Child 1.

These findings are supported by substantial evidence based on our examination of

the record.

Even if the family court was not entirely correct in construing all

requirements of the aforementioned statutes as applying to homeschools, the

family court’s holding that homeschooling parents are not exempt from the duty to

provide an adequate education and can be held liable for educational neglect is still

correct. Moreover, we reject Parents’ reading of long-standing precedent to

convey a right to homeschool without any possible state intervention to make sure

children are receiving an adequate education.

Parents suggest they have a fundamental right to homeschool their

children in whatever manner they please pursuant to KY. CONST. § 5. Moreover,

they argue that a right to homeschool children was recognized in Kentucky State

Board for Elementary and Secondary Education v. Rudasill, 589 S.W.2d 877 (Ky.

1979) (hereinafter “Rudasill”). However, Rudasill did not directly address any

-18-
issues about homeschooling.14 Instead, Rudasill held that the Commonwealth

cannot validly require accreditation of private or parochial schools or the

certification of teachers in such schools nor can the Commonwealth prescribe

which textbooks must be taught in non-public schools. Id. at 883-84.

Nonetheless, Rudasill did not entirely exempt non-public schools

from governmental scrutiny to make sure that children were receiving an adequate

education. See id. at 884 (stating legislation may provide for monitoring whether

14
Portions of Rudasill could, however, be read as not supporting a right to homeschool, but
simply allowing a parent to decide whether to send his/her child to a public school or to any
private or parochial school outside the home. See id. at 881-82 (in discussing the adoption of
KY. CONST. ⸹ 5 and considerations of whether the legislature should be allowed to require
compulsory school attendance, noting: “The Knott amendment backers and their views that
parents should be able to educate their children at the hearthside did not prevail.”). See also id.
at 883 (“While the legislature could permit education in the home, it has not done so.”).
Nonetheless, precedent since Rudasill—albeit in cases involving child support issues
rather than allegations of abuse or neglect—recognizes that children may be provided an
adequate education at home despite not attending a school outside the home if the instruction
provided involves sufficient time, effort, and structure to support academic progress. See
Commonwealth ex rel. Francis v. Francis, 148 S.W.3d 805, 808 (Ky. App. 2004) (holding
student of an unaccredited homeschool program qualified as a high school student for child
support purposes because an inspector determined the student received appropriate instruction in
key subjects with a parent and stepparent “actively involved with lesson planning and the
scheduling of her workload” and based on student’s standardized tests and report cards); Smiley
v. Browning, 8 S.W.3d 887, 889 (Ky. App. 1999) (student taking accredited homeschool
correspondence course qualified as a high school student for child support purposes because
nothing in the record showed the correspondence course was “a sham operation, or that it does
not provide an adequate education to its students which is substantially equivalent to that which
might be obtained in a traditional Kentucky public school.”). See also Mix v. Petty, 465 S.W.3d
891 (Ky. App. 2015). Compare W.R. v. Cabinet for Health and Family Services, 2025 WL
1667777, at *8 (Ky. App. Jun. 13, 2025) (unpublished) (despite some evidence of the parents’
school-age children initially being homeschooled, evidence of lack of instruction at home or
elsewhere for years and of eight-year-old being unable to read or to spell more than two words
was sufficient to support a finding of educational neglect in a DNA proceeding).

-19-
students are receiving an adequate education at private or parochial schools

through standardized testing).

In discussing the history of the adoption of Section 5, the Rudasill

court made clear that the prevailing constitutional delegates intended for children

to receive substantive, structured instruction to prepare them to be responsible

voters and citizens. It concluded that the delegates who adopted Section 5

“intended to permit the Commonwealth to prepare its children to intelligently

exercise the right of suffrage by compelling attendance at a formal school, public

or private or parochial, for a legislatively determined period each year.” Id. at 883

(emphasis added). The court also discussed how the term school referred to a

place of systematic instruction. Id. at 882-83. And as the family court noted, our

Supreme Court recognized that instruction in “reading, writing, spelling, grammar,

history, mathematics and civics” was rationally related to preparing children for

responsible citizenship. Id. at 883 n.10.

In addition to concluding that Parents violated several specific

statutory requirements (some of which may not clearly apply to homeschools),15

the family court also essentially found that Parents failed to offer substantive,

formal structured educational instruction in the home. Its finding of a lack of

15
To the extent that the family court erred in applying specific requirements in KRS Chapter 158
or Chapter 159 to homeschools, any error was harmless, see CR 61.01, given the court’s well-
supported findings of lack of substantive, formal educational instruction.

-20-
substantive formal instruction is supported by substantial evidence and does not

reflect an abuse of discretion nor a misapplication of Kentucky law.

“One of the legislative purposes of the dependency, neglect, and abuse

statutes is to protect a child’s fundamental right to educational instruction.” M.C.

v. Commonwealth, 347 S.W.3d 471, 473 (Ky. App. 2011) (citing KRS 620.010).

The family court here noted evidence that the minor children occasionally received

worksheets to complete. However, as the family court’s findings indicate, the

evidence does not show that the children received formal, structured educational

instruction from Parents in the home. See id. (child’s excessive absences from

school meant child was unable to benefit from “the instruction, structure, and

socialization provided in a classroom setting”)

Moreover, we have recognized that a finding of educational neglect

may be supported by evidence of a child’s not receiving regular, recurrent

educational instruction. Id. (“[W]e conclude that providing an adequate education

for a child’s well-being necessarily requires a parent to ensure the child attends

school each day to participate in educational instruction.”). Evidence of substance

supports the family court’s finding that the minor children at issue here did not

receive regular, recurrent educational instruction in the hit-or-miss homeschool

environment provided by Parents. The lack of such regular instruction is further

supported by evidence of the children’s being several levels behind their expected

-21-
grade levels based on age—despite a lack of evidence of diagnoses of learning

disabilities or other special needs.

We do not necessarily disagree with Parents’ suggestion that a child’s

simply being behind the expected grade level for his/her age is not enough, by

itself, to show educational neglect. However, the evidence presented indicated the

children tested multiple levels behind expected grade levels. And Parents

presented no evidence of trying to obtain diagnoses or treatment for the three

youngest children despite referring to them as having special needs.

The family court also discussed evidence of other matters showing a

lack of significant time or attention to academic instruction in Parents’ home. As

the family court noted, the JCPS inspector/social worker/liaison testified to the

worksheets provided by Mother being for grade levels substantially lower than the

expected grade levels for the children’s respective ages. The family court also

found it significant that Mother testified to viewing any education beyond a sixth-

grade level as optional—even for high-school age children. It also paid heed to the

JCPS inspector’s testifying to Parents’ only coming forward with evidence of

about two weeks’ worth of schoolwork for the approximately two-year period in

which the family lived in Louisville. In short, ample evidence supported the

family court’s finding of a lack of the regular and recurrent formal educational

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instruction due children according to M.C. and Rudasill, so the family court’s

finding of educational neglect is well-supported.

Thus, we affirm the family court’s findings that the children were

abused or neglected. Further arguments raised in the parties’ briefs which are not

discussed herein have been determined to lack merit or relevancy to our resolution

of this appeal.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
COMMONWEALTH OF
Jason A. Bowman KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR
Louisville, Kentucky HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:

Michael J. O’Connell
Jefferson County Attorney

David A. Sexton
Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Louisville, Kentucky

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