Walls v. Prince George's County - Regulatory Taking Claim Affirmed

UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF AP PEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 25 - 1121 GARNELL WAL LS, Plaintiff – App ellant, v. PRINCE GE ORGE ’ S COUNTY; MELINDA BO LLING, i ndividual ly and i n and her official capacity, Defend ants – Appellees. Appeal from the United States District C ourt for the District of Mary land, at Greenbelt. Deborah L. Bo ardman, District Judge. (8:23 - cv - 01359 - DLB) Argued: December 10, 2025 Decided: February 23, 2026 Before WILKINSON and WYN N, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judg e. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. ARGUED: Jordan David Howlette, JUSTLY PRUDENT, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Andrew Jens en Murra y, PRINCE GEO RGE’S COU NTY OFFICE OF LAW, Largo, Maryland, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Shelle y L. Johnson, Act ing County Attorney, PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY OFFICE OF LAW, Largo, Maryland, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding p recedent in this circuit.

2 PER CURIAM: Garnell Walls brought this action against Prince George’s Cou nty, Maryland (the County), and Melinda Bolling, ind ividually and in her official capacity as th e former Director of Permitting, Inspections, and Enforcement (DPIE) (collectively, the defendants), after DPIE allegedly denied Walls’ application for a waiv er that would have permitted him to build an interim well and septic system on his property. Walls asserts that DPIE’s actions constituted a regulatory taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and he now appeals from the district court’s dismissal of his claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 1 After reviewing the record, we con clude that Walls’ claim is not ripe for review, because he has not plausibly alleged that th e County reached a final decision whether he can build an interim well and septic system o n his property. We therefore affirm the district court’s d ismissal of his case. I. We review de novo the district co urt’s ruling granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In applying th is standard, we accept as true the factual allegations set forth 1 The district court did not engage in a Rule 12(b)(1) analysis because the requirements for ripeness in the con text of regulatory takings do not implicate th e court’s subject matter jurisdiction. See Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 72 4 F.3d 533, 545 (4t h Cir. 2013) (explaining that ripeness in th e context of a regulatory taking is “pru dential rather than…jurisdictional”). We observe that neither party has challenged this aspect of the district court’s decision, and we agree with the court’s application of the Rule 12(b)(6) standard in this case. See N. Mill St., LLC v. City of Aspen, 6 F.4th 1216, 1230 (10t h Cir. 2021) (holding that ripeness in the context of a regulatory taking “is prop erly analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6) rather than Rule 12(b)(1)”).

3 in the complaint and draw all reason able inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See DePa ola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 4 84 (4th Cir. 2018). With these principles in mind, we state the facts as alleged by Walls in the com plaint. In 1978, Walls purchased an undeveloped parcel of land at 13501 South Hill Road, Brandywine, Maryland (the Brandyw ine lot) with the intent of building a single - family home. In starting the project many years later in 2019, he planned to install an interim well and septic system on the Brandywine lot for use until development in the County brought the public water and sewer lines clo ser to his property. According to W alls, the present cost of connecting the Brandywine lot to the nearest public water and sewer lines was prohibitively expensive. 2 In August 2021, however, Walls learned that installation o f an interim well and septic system was prohibited by Prince George’s County ’s 2018 Water & Sewer Plan (the Plan), and that he would need to obtain a waiver from DPIE to install such a system. Wall s alleges that he applied for the req uired waiver. Shirley Branch, DPIE’s Water & Sew er Coordinator, later informed Walls that the agency would not approve the use of an in terim well or septic system on the Brandywine lot. Branch also told Walls on several occasion s that Melinda Bolling, the Director of D PIE, “did not have the legal authority to approve the [waiver]…given the implementation of the [Plan].” J.A. 62. 2 Walls alleges that the estimated total cost o f connecting the Brandywine lot to existing water and sewer lines ranged from about $2,124,000 to $2,478,000.

4 In February 2022, Walls received a letter from Bolling stat ing that, based on DP IE’s research, the Brandywine lot did not meet the criteria for a waiver under th e Plan (the 2022 letter). However, in the 2022 letter, Bollin g also informed Walls that he cou ld pursue use of an interim well or septic system through a “water and sew er category amendment.” J.A. 79. This process initially would require Walls to seek a “Legislative Amendmen t” from the County Council and, next, to obtain an “Administrative Amendment” approved by DPIE. J.A. 23 – 24, 27. 3 Bolling attached the relevant application, instructions, and fee schedule to complete this process. Additio nally, Bolling informed Walls that there was a residential subdivision plann ed near the Brandywine lot. She stated that the “project is under review for extending water and sewer lines,” and suggested that Walls might be able to connect to the lines for that subdiv ision once the subdivision was constructed. J.A. 79. Walls did not seek a “water an d sewer category amendment” through th e legislative amendment process. He alleges that Branch told him “on several different occasions that the County Council would not suppo rt or approve any effort…to use the legislati ve ame ndment process to reclassify th e Brandywine lot.” J.A. 65. Walls further alleg es that 3 We take judicial notice of the Plan, which is a public record available on Prince George’s County’s website. Adopted 2018 Water & Sewer Plan, Ch. 6, Prince George’s Cnty. (Feb. 9, 2024), https://perma.cc/P3VN - 26GS; see Hall v. Virginia, 3 85 F.3d 421, 4 24 & n.3 (4t h Cir. 200 4) (taking judicial notice of publicly available information on state government’s website). We therefore can consid er the Plan in evaluating the sufficiency of Walls’ complaint. See Just Puppies, Inc. v. Brown, 123 F.4t h 652, 66 0 (4th Ci r. 2024) (“In evaluating a complaint’s sufficiency…we may consider documents incorporated into the complaint by reference and matters of which a court may take judicial no tice.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

5 when he contacted the developers o f the proposed subdivision to discuss the f easibility of connecting the Brandywine lot to the proposed subdivision’s water and sewer lin es, the developer informed him that the subdivision was at least four to five years aw ay from beginning construction and that a conn ection to the lines was “not feasible.” J.A. 64. In May 2023, Walls filed the present actio n under 18 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleges th at the County and Bolling violated the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment 4 by depriving him of the “beneficial use and economic value” of the Brandy wine lot without compensation, because he was prevented from installing an interim well and septic system on his property. 5 J.A. 65. The district court gran ted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding that Walls’ claim was not rip e for review. Walls now app eals from the district court’s dismissal of his case. II. A property owner has an actionab le claim under the takings clause of the F ifth Amendment when “a law or regulation [goes] too far in burdening [his or her] property.” Palazzol o v. Rhode I sland, 533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001). However, such a claim “is not ripe 4 T he takings clause prohibits the go vernment from taking private property “for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. Const. amend. V, cl. 4. 5 Walls also asserted two other claims, which the district court dismissed, that are not part of this appeal. The first claim, brought against the County and Bolling, was a regulatory taking claim asserted under A rticle 24 of the Maryland Declaration o f Ri ghts and Article III, § 40 o f the Maryland Constitution. The second clai m was brought against the Count y u nder 18 U.S.C. § 1983 and stated a cla im for failure to train B olling and Branch.

6 until the government entity charged w ith implementing the regulations has reached a fin al decision regarding the application of th e regulations to the property at issue.” Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 1 72, 186 (198 5), overrule d on other g rounds by Kni ck v. Twp. of Scott, 588 U.S. 180 (20 19) (citation omitted). To satisfy this finality requirement, the plaintiff mu st obtain a definitive decision from the re gulator y body re garding the propose d develo pment. See Suit um v. Ta hoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 734 (1997). If a plaintiff does no t obtain a definitive decision, his claim is not ripe, and the court w ill not consider it. See Williamson, 473 U.S. at 186. Walls contends that the district court erred in concluding that his claim was no t ripe. He first argues that the 2022 letter was an effective denial of his request for a waiver to build an interim well and septic system. Walls asserts that this letter constituted a final decision from the County, satisfying th e finality requirement for ripeness in federal cou rt. Alternatively, Walls contends that even if the 2022 letter did not constitute a final decision on his request to install an interim well and septic system, he was not requ ired to pursue a “water and sewer categ ory amendment” through the County’s legislativ e amendment process. Relying in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Pakdel v. City and Cnty. o f San Franci sco, 594 U.S. 474 (2 021), Walls argues that requiring him to do so before seeking relief in federal cou rt impermissibly would require him first to e xhaust state administrative remedies. Finally, Walls con tends that even if he were required to seek a “water and sewer category amendment” before bringing his claim in federal cou rt, his claim is ripe, because any attempt to complete the legislative amendment process would have been futile. We disagree with Walls’ arguments.

7 Initially, we hold that DPIE’s denial of Walls’ waiver requ est was not a “conclusive determination” from the County on the proposed use of Walls’ prop erty, because the County could have approved the proposed development through a “water and sewer category amendment.” 6 A determination is conclusive w hen the “government is committed to a position” on the use of the plaintiff’s property and no “avenues…remain for the government to clarify or c hange its decision.” Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 479. Here, the 2022 letter makes clear that the County had not committed to a final position on Walls’ request for an interim well and septic system. Althou gh Bolling stated in that letter that “the [Brandywine lot] does not m eet the criteria for a waiver,” she also stated: “should you seek to further construct on this property, you will need to apply for water and sewer category amendments.” J.A. 7 8 – 79. And the Plan makes clear that the legislative amendment process required to obtain a water and sewer category amendmen t does not serve as a review of a DPIE waiver decision. R ather, it is a separate procedure in which the County Council conducts its o wn evaluation of the p roperty and has plenary authority to deny or grant the requested relief. This legislative amendment process is not a “repetitive or un fair land - use procedure[]” designed to avoid a final decision. See Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 621. To th e 6 The d istrict court held that the 2022 letter was not a denial of Walls’ waiver request. We conclude that it is unnecessary to address this question because, regardless of the status of Walls’ waiver request to DPIE, the Cou nty could not have reached a fi nal decision on Walls’ property until h e sought a “water and sewer category amend ment.” In affirming the holding of the district court, “[w]e are n ot limited to evaluation of the grounds offered by the district court to suppo rt its decision but may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record.” United States v. Smith, 395 F.3d 516, 51 9 (4th Ci r. 2005).

8 contrary, the Plan plainly sets forth the process for applying for a leg islative amendment, the evaluation criteria, and the timeline for obtaining a decision from the County Council. The Plan also requires the County to hear applications for legislative a mendments four times a year. This is a classic type of “ordin ary process[]” required to satisfy the finality requirement for Walls’ takin gs claim. See id. Through this legislative process, the County still could grant Walls permission to move forward with his project. Thu s, because there is still an opportunity for th e County to change its position on Walls’ use of his property, the County has not issued a final decision. See Chosen Consulting, LLC v. Town Council of H ighland, 148 F.4t h 451, 4 59 (7th Cir. 2025) (explaining that the finality requirement was not satisfied wh en the municipality could still issue a decision requested by the plaintiff). Our conclusion is not altered by Walls’ reliance on the decision in Pakdel, which was based on facts materially different from those before us. Th ere, petitioners sought an exemption from a San Francisco ordinance requiring them to execute a lifetime lease on their property as a condition for converting the property to condomin ium use. Pakdel, 594 U.S. at 476. The city refused th e property owner’s request for an ex emption and threatened to file an enforcement action against the property owner. Id. Alth ough the city’s position was “definitive,” the Ninth Circuit held that the decision did not satisfy t he finality requirement because the petitioners’ request for an exemption was not timely filed. Id. at 478. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “administrative missteps do not defeat ripeness once the government has adopted its final p osition.” Id. at 480.

9 Here, however, the County h as not reached a “definitive” position o n Walls’ property. As set forth above, the Coun ty still may permit Walls to install an interim well and septic system by gran ting him a “water and sewer catego ry amendment.” Therefore, th e decision in Pakdel is inapposite to the present case. Finally, we conclude that the record does not show that it wou ld be futile for Walls to pursue a “ water and sewer plan amendment ” through the legislative amendm ent process. Although federal ripeness rules do not require that a plaintiff submit futile applications, see Palazzo lo, 533 U.S. at 625, there is no indication in the present record that Walls’ pursuit of a legislative amendment would be a futile endeavor. The futility exception is narrow and applies on ly when an agency “has dug in its heels and made clear that all...applications will be denied.” Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d C ir. 2005). The present record shows o nly that Branch informed Walls that “the Cou nty Council would not…approve any effort…to use the legislative amendment process to reclassify the Brandywine Lot.” J.A. 65. There are no allegations, ho wever, that Branch had the authority to speak on behalf of the County Council or h ad any insight into that body’s view of the issue. No r are there any allegations that the C ounty Council had a practice of denying legislative amendments as a matter o f course. In the absence of these types of allegations, we cannot conclude that it would have been futile for Walls to pursue a legislative amendment from th e County Council. Accordingly, Walls canno t evade the finality requirement on this b asis.

10 III. In sum, we conclude that Walls has not received a final decision on the use of his property, because the County can still permit him to install an interim well and sep tic system through legislative enactment of a “w ater and sewer category amendment.” Accordingly, we affirm the district co urt’s order dismissing Walls’ clai m without prejudice. AFFIRMED