CBP Has Not Evaluated Security Risks of Interview-Waived Visa Holders

OIG-25-50 FINAL REPORT

CBP Has Not Evaluated the Security Risks of Interview-Waived Nonimmigrant U.S. Visa Holders (REDACTED)

WARNING: This document is Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES). Do not distribute or copy this report without the expressed written consent of the Office of Inspector General.

Washington, DC 20528 |

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Rodney S. Scott Commissioner U.S. Customs and Border Protection

JOSEPH V FROM: Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D. Digitally signed by JOSEPH V CUFFARI Inspector General CUFFARI Date: 2025.09.30 16:14:48 -04'00'CBP Has Not Evaluated the Security Risks of Interview-Waived SUBJECT:

Nonimmigrant U.S. Visa Holders – Law Enforcement Sensitive CBP Has Not Evaluated the Security Risks of Attached for your action is our final report, Interview-Waived Nonimmigrant U.S. Visa Holders L aw Enforcement Sensitive . We – incorporated the formal comments provided by your office. The report contains one recommendation aimed at improving security risks for interview-waived nonimmigrant U.S. visa holders. Your office concurred with the recommendation. Based on information provided in your response to the draft report, we consider the recommendation open and resolved. Once your office has fully implemented the recommendation, please submit a formal closeout letter to us within 30 days so that we may close the recommendation. The memorandum should be accompanied by evidence of completion of agreed-upon corrective actions. Please send your response or closure request to OIGAuditsFollowup@oig.dhs.gov. Inspector G eneral ActConsistent with our responsibility under the , we will provide copies of our report to congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post a redacted version of the report on our website for public dissemination. Please contact me with any questions, or your staff may contact Craig Adelman, Deputy Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 981-6000. Attachment

OIG Project No. 24-011-AUD-CBP

DHS OIG HIGHLIGHTS

CBP Has Not Evaluated the Security Risks of Interview-Waived Nonimmigrant U.S. Visa Holders

What We Found Why We Did This Between March 2020 and March 2024, the Department of State (DoS) issued more than 12 million nonimmigrant U.S. visas without Audit conducting in-person interviews or collecting fingerprints. At the time, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) frontline officers at Between 2020 and early 2025, DoS U.S. ports of entry conducting inspections were unaware that some waived in-person interviews and foreign nationals had not been fully screened by DoS, thereby missing did not collect fingerprints for an opportunity to conduct enhanced screening and inspection prior millions of foreign nationals to admission to the United States. applying for nonimmigrant visas. While DoS grants visas to foreign Four years after the program began, DoS in March 2024 began nationals, CBP determines providing CBP’s system with an “ ” to flag admissibility of individuals persons for increased inspection. CBP did not make the arriving at U.S. ports of entry. available to officers conducting despite agreement between the Department of Homeland Security and DoS We conducted this audit to to do so. According to CBP officials, doing so would determine (1) the extent to which . CBP instead limited the to officers performing CBP was aware that DoS was , which accounted for of encounters granting certain categories of visas in fiscal year 2024. We find that CBP’s approach accepted without in-person interviews or unnecessary risk. Withholding the from fingerprints; and (2) the extent to officers at prevented them from making fully which CBP can identify and fully informed admissibility decisions. screen visa holders with waivers upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry. Although DoS ended the expanded interview waiver program in early 2025, CBP has not conducted comprehensive risk assessments on What We persons admitted to the United States under the expanded interview waiver program, which precludes CBP from knowing whether persons Recommend were accurately identified and fully screened prior to admission. Some visa categories included in the interview waiver program are valid for 5 years and can be extended for up to 10 years, meaning a We made one recommendation to person can continue to travel to and present themselves for CBP to identify risks posed by admission to the United States through early 2035. individuals who were admitted CBP Response with fingerprint waivers and share those results with appropriate CBP concurred with our recommendation, which we consider open partners.and resolved. For Further Information: Contact OIG Public Affairs at (202) 981-6000 or

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DHS-OIG.OfficePublicAffairs@oig.dhs.gov.

Background

Each year, millions of foreign visitors come to the United States on a temporary basis for tourism, medical treatment, business, temporary work, study, or other reasons. To enter the United States, foreign visitors apply for visas from the Department of State (DoS). In fiscal year 2024, DoS issued over 10.9 million nonimmigrant visas to foreign nationals allowing them to lawfully travel to the United States for a specific length of time or for a specific purpose.

Department of State Screening and Vetting of Visa Applicants

DoS is responsible for issuing visas to foreign nationals seeking to enter the country. Its Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) screens and vets foreign nationals before issuing visas, which permits travel to a U.S. port of entry and allows the traveler to request permission to enter the country. When a foreign national (applicant) applies for a nonimmigrant visa, a consular officer at a U.S. 1 embassy or consulate outside the United States determines whether the applicant is eligible, under all applicable U.S. laws, to receive the visa for which he or she has applied. During the application process, the foreign national/applicant submits biographic (such as name and date of birth) and biometric (such as fingerprints and photographs) data for review by a consular officer. 2 Immigration and Nationality Act According to the (INA), as amended, nonimmigrant visa applicants aged 14 through 79 generally must be interviewed by a consular officer. However, the Secretary of 3 State may waive this requirement for travelers in certain visa categories or if the Secretary deems such waivers to be in the national interest or necessary because of unusual or emergent circumstances. 4

Department of Homeland Security Screening and Vetting of Visa Holders

DHS is responsible for a broad range of homeland security functions including border and immigration enforcement. DHS’ U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is charged with facilitating lawful trade and travel, and protecting the country against illegal entry, illicit activity, Immigration and Nationality Act The classes of nonimmigrant visas are generally defined in Section 101(a)(15) of the 1

(INA), 8 United States Code (U.S.C.) §1101(a)(15). The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 , Pub. L. No. 107-173 (Section 303 codified at 8 U.S.C. 2 §1732(b)(1)), requires the issuance of only machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents that use biometric identifiers. It also requires the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to jointly establish document authentication standards and biometric identifier standards to be employed on such visas and other travel and entry documents. Biometric identifiers are not exclusively fingerprints as they may include other physical characteristics of the visa applicant. Visa issuance authority was transferred from the Department of See Homeland Security Justice/Attorney General with the abolishment of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Act of 2002 , Pub. L. No. 107-296, §§ 101, 428, 441, 471, 1502. see also 8 U.S.C. §1202(h)(1), INA §222(h)(1); 22 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) §41.102. 3 See 8 U.S.C. §§1202(h)(1)(A)-(C) and 22 C.F.R. §§41.102(b)-(d). 4 OIG-25-50

and other threats, to include terrorism and transnational organized crime. On a typical day, CBP encounters more than 1 million passengers and pedestrians at U.S. ports of entry, including U.S. citizens and foreign travelers, some of whom hold a nonimmigrant visa issued by DoS. Holding a visa does not guarantee admission to the United States; CBP inspects and examines travelers, to include visa holders, and deems them admissible or inadmissible. CBP’s Office of Field Operations (OFO) is responsible for verifying identification documents, collecting biometrics, and confirming biographic information of travelers arriving at U.S. ports of entry. CBP OFO officers use these data elements, as well as a traveler’s criminal and immigration 5 history, to determine admissibility into the United States. CBP OFO’s screening process is multi-layered, consisting of and .

• At , a CBP OFO officer reviews identity documents that may include, but
  are not limited to, passports, visas, and driver’s licenses; accesses law enforcement information; and asks general questions about the purpose of the individual’s visit. The officer may also review other relevant information about the traveler including pertinent law enforcement information. If the officer determines that further inspection is warranted, the officer refers the traveler for a more in-de pth .

• At , CBP OFO officers conduct further assessments to resolve the
  reason(s) for the referral, which can include possible customs and agricultural violations, document discrepancies, or suspicious behavior during questioning at At , the CBP OFO officer can access other information systems (including those used by DoS) that are not available in to verify the traveler’s identity, background, and intent.

Recurring Reviews of Visa Issuance Guidance

Although the INA grants the Secretary of State the authority to waive in-person visa interviews for Homeland Security Act of 2002certain foreign nationals applying for nonimmigrant visas, the , 6 Section 428 (Visa Issuance), divides visa issuance responsibilities between DoS and DHS. On 7

8 C.F.R. §235.1(f)(1), “Each alien seeking admission at a United States port-of-entry must present whatever documents 5 are required and must establish to the satisfaction of the inspecting officer that the alien is not subject to removal under the immigration laws, Executive Orders, or Presidential Proclamations, and is entitled, under all of the applicable See also idprovisions of the immigration laws and this chapter, to enter the United States.” , . at (f)(1)(ii) (establishes that DHS may require any alien, other than those exempted, “to provide fingerprints, photograph(s) or other specified biometric identifiers, documentation of his or her immigration status in the United States, and such other evidence as may be requested to determine the alien's identity and whether he or she has properly maintained his or her status while in the United States and/or whether he or she is admissible”). See 8 U.S.C. §§1202(h)(1)(A)-(B) (generally, consular interviews may be waived for applicants for A visas (diplomatic 6 visas), G visas (employees of international organizations), NATO visas (employees of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), C-3 (transit visas), or granted diplomatic or official-type visas; and applicants who previously held a visa in the same category that expired less than 12 months prior to the new application). See Homeland Security Act of 2002 , Pub. L. No. 107-296, §428 (codified at 6 U.S.C. §236). 7 OIG-25-50

September 28, 2003, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell and then-Secretary of Homeland Security Thomas Ridge signed a memorandum of understanding implementing Section 428. The memorandum describes each department's responsibilities with respect to visa issuance. Among its major elements, and with certain exceptions, the memorandum states that:

• “DoS may propose and issue visa regulations subject to DHS consultation and final
  approval.”

• “DHS and DoS will provide notice to the other when either determines that serious
  consideration should be given to development of new visa guidance.”

• “DHS and DoS will each offer the other the opportunity to consult regarding security, legal,
  operational, resource, or foreign policy or foreign relations issues associated with such guidance.”

• “The Secretary of Homeland Security will have final responsibility over visa guidance
  prescribing when a consular officer may waive a visa applicant’s personal appearance, except that the Secretary of State will have final responsibility over guidance applicable to aliens applying for visas for diplomatic and official purposes.” In 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and to address staffing limitations and visa backlogs, DoS sought DHS concurrence to waive requirements to conduct in-person interviews and collect fingerprints for applicants seeking certain limited types of nonimmigrant visas. See Appendix C for 8 visa categories and waivers by calendar year. For example, DoS proposed:

• waiving interviews for student and exchange visitor visa (F, M, J) applicants; and

• eliminating the fingerprint requirement for certain first-time and returning agriculture,
  construction, forestry, landscaping, and hospitality workers visa (H-2) applicants. DHS agreed to these waivers for these classes of nonimmigrant visa applicants for DoS to maintain visa processing with limited staffing during the COVID-19 pandemic. These waivers were set to expire on December 31, 2023, and DoS would no longer be able to waive interviews for those nonimmigrant visa categories after that date. See Appendix D for a timeline of the interview and fingerprint waiver program. From 2020 to 2023, according to DoS, it waived in-person consular interviews for about 7.1 million J visa applicants. DoS also did not collect fingerprints for an unknown number of visas during the same period.

Prior to 2020, DoS waived in-person interview requirements for individuals applying for a nonimmigrant visa in the 8 same visa categories, and only those applicants whose nonimmigrant visa expired within 12 months were eligible for an interview waiver. OIG-25-50

Although the World Health Organization and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ended the COVID-19 public health emergency on May 11,

Student and exchange visitor visas: 2023, the categories of visas eligible to receive in- for students pursuing full-time academic person interview and fingerprint waivers continued. • studies at an accredited U.S. college, university, On November 21, 2023, the National Security Council or English language institute. (NSC) Deputies Small Group convened, which for students pursuing non-academic or • included senior officials from DHS and DoS, among vocational studies or training. for individuals participating in exchange others, to discuss the visa categories eligible for • programs, including high school and university interview and fingerprint waivers. 9Visas Issued with In-Person Interview Waivers study, and other educational and cultural 2020–2023 exchange programs.

DoS Position

Visas requiring an employer/agent to file a petition with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to F visasDuring the NSC meeting, DoS officials presented their allow temporary workers for specific purposes:arguments for expanding the categories of for workers in “specialty occupations” • applicants eligible for an interview and fingerprint requiring a bachelor’s degree or equivalent, like M visas those in architecture, engineering, or medicine. waiver. Under the national interest authority of INA for individuals receiving training in fields • J visasSection 222(h)(1)(C)(i), DoS requested DHS other than graduate medical education, like concurrence to: commerce, agriculture, or government. for spouses and unmarried children • • under age 21 of H-1, H-2A, H-2B, and H-3 visa holders. for employees of international companies • being temporarily transferred to a U.S. parent, branch, or subsidiary. H-1 visas for individuals with extraordinary ability or • achievement in the sciences, arts, education, • business, or athletics, demonstrated by sustained H-3 visas national or international acclaim. for athletes, entertainers, and artists, and • their essential support personnel, who are coming H-4 visas to perform in the United States. for participants in international cultural • • exchange programs. L visas Visas with temporary legal work authorization in O visas agriculture, construction, forestry, landscaping, hospitality, and other industries: visas for temporary agricultural workers. • visas for temporary or seasonal non-• P visas agricultural workers.

Q visas Other members include the Office of the Vice President, the Office of the President and Chief of Staff, the Department 9 of Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Office of Management and Budget, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Domestic Policy Council, the National Economic Council, the Office of Science and Technology Policy.

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H-2B

DHS Position Officials from DHS’ Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (Office of Policy) represented the Department in discussions at the NSC. Prior to the meeting, Office of Policy officials obtained input from CBP, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services to present DHS’ position on the DoS interview and fingerprint waivers.

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NSC Agreement At the conclusion of those discussions, the NSC documented the agreement between DoS and DHS Interview Waiver Agreement for 2024in the . Among other determinations, the agreement noted:

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DoS fingerprint waivers for first-time H-2 visa applicants would no longer be granted beginning on January 1, 2024.

• DoS could expand the categories of visas and . • applicants whose consular interviews could be
  applying • waived. The decision would be effective on for any nonimmigrant visa who: January 1, 2024, without a sunset date, subject

• were previously issued a nonimmigrant to annual NSC-led reviews. According to the
  visa in any classification, unless the only NSC, the reviews would be supported by prior issued visa was a B [business / interagency assessment of the threat/risk tourism] visa; and environment and could warrant changes to the - are applying within 48 months of their

visa interview waiver policy. most recent nonimmigrant visa’s

• An would be made
  available to DHS (for CBP to know at that DoS waived the applicant’s in- person interview and to track trends in DHS systems for effective monitoring and evaluation.)

• DHS and DoS would identify and implement a solution for how fingerprints collected by CBP
  between 2020 to 2023 at ports of entry could be integrated into DoS’ system of record. These fingerprints were mainly for returning H-2A and H-2B visa holders with fingerprint waivers during this period, as well as travelers whose fingerprints were waived based on them being a Visa Waiver Program national. 13

CBP Has Limited Information to Assess Interview-In June 2024, we issued a management alert ( Waived Nonimmigrant Visa Holders, OIG-24-33) to the Department given our concern that CBP was not able to effectively evaluate holders of nonimmigrant visas who received interview waivers. We noted that:

• CBP officers received limited information on whether nonimmigrant visa holders had been
  interviewed; and OIG Management Alert

• CBP concurred with the recommendations to: (1) work with the National Targeting Center to In addition to prior categories, the NSC added establish other means to manage the risks associated with individuals who received these other categories of visas where in-person consular interview waivers, and (2) develop and implement a comprehensive plan to interviews could be waived, effective January 1,
  perform trend analyses to analyze risks posed by those waived interviews with data 2024:

captured at , and using the results, develop and implement mitigation First-time H-2 visa applicants Other nonimmigrant visa applicants

The Visa Waiver Program is administered by DHS in consultation with DoS; it allows citizens of 41 countries to travel 13 to the United States and remain for up to 90 days without a visa. OIG-25-50

plans. expiration date.

We conducted this audit to determine (1) the extent to which CBP officers were aware of DoS’ policy changes to grant certain categories of visas without in-person interviews and biometrics; and (2) the extent to which CBP can identify and fully screen visa holders with waivers upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry.

Results of Audit CBP Officers at Did Not Have Access to Information on Interview Waivers

Although CBP leadership officials at headquarters knew that DoS waived consular interviews and fingerprinting for an expanded number of nonimmigrant visa categories, not all CBP officers conducting were aware that some of the visa holders presenting themselves for admission at ports of entry were waived in-person interviews during the visa issuance process. OIG spoke with CBP OFO port directors at 16 land ports of entry, and they all reported that they were unaware that some visa holders had neither received consular interviews nor had their fingerprints collected before being issued their visas. Were Not Provided to Officers Conducting Even after having made known that some nonimmigrant visa holders were waived interviews by DoS, CBP OFO officers conducting still did not have access to information on whether the foreign nationals they encountered had received waivers. On March 29, 2024, DoS Interview Waiver provided CBP with the (as agreed in the NSC-brokered 14Agreement for 2024 ). CBP OFO alerted the directors at the ports of entry that the inspection information technology systems now include an “ ” as part of an individual’s record. Despite DHS officials during NSC negotiations requesting that the be available to CBP at and the NSC agreement making it an “implementation requirement,” CBP leadership made the available only to officers conducting and not to those conducting . Of note, only of the 420 million travelers (including visa holders who were waived consular interviews) processed at ports of entry in FY 2024 were referred to , according to CBP. Making the available only to CBP officers in undercut its utility and the NSC agreement. A CBP Executive told OIG that they did not want officers conducting to send all individuals whose consular interviews had been waived to because they felt it would process. He stated that CBP wanted time to assess the interview waiver information and determine the level of risk posed by the interview waiver program before making the available to , which it has not done as of August 2025.

DoS’ Consolidated Consular Database feeds into CBP’s Unified Secondary system, which would show an as the 14 i for someone interviewed. The would be blank for those that were waived interviews. OIG-25-50

In lieu of providing officers conducting with access to the interview waiver information, CBP OFO officials stated they would work with the National Targeting Center to to identify risks, if any, posed by visa holders who had their interviews waived. Although this proposed action differs from DHS’ assertion to the NSC and CBP’s prior statements before March 2024 that it needed the for its officers conducting , OIG encouraged CBP to use all available resources to evaluate risk. Because of the importance of this issue, and based on CBP’s input, our Management Alert included this recommendation to work with the National Targeting Center in establishing other means to manage risks. 15 In response to our recommendations, CBP stated that, “[a]s of April 2024, CBP integrated the … making it viewable to frontline CBP officers, and targeting personnel when is conducting traveler inspections or advance research of travelers seeking entry to the United States.” OIG finds CBP’s statement contrary to the intent of the recommendation. CBP’s own Strategic Plan describes all Customs and Border Protection officers as “frontline,” which 16 includes officers at , whereas CBP only made the viewable by its “frontline” officers at . CBP also stated that it “continue[s] to receive and integrate historical interview waiver data from DoS into CBP systems and continue[s] to develop data reporting on admissions and adverse actions for travelers that received an interview waiver during the visa issuance process, which will inform any further role for the interview waiver data in CBP inspections and targeting.” By acknowledging the need to conduct analysis to determine how best to use the for inspections and targeting, CBP is also acknowledging it does not know the extent of the risk posed and therefore cannot consider appropriate mitigation. Even without risk assessments, CBP leadership maintains that having the available to officers conducting is unnecessary. They stated, “the is additional information, and knowledge of which visa holder received an interview waiver does not change how CBP officers conduct inspections.” CBP officials emphasized, “the existing inspection process is sufficient to identify the highest risks and works as intended, and they trust the officers to use their training and instincts to conduct inspections.” CBP leadership’s assertion does not align with what OIG heard from port directors. Half of the port directors we interviewed said that knowing certain visa categories were exempt from interview and fingerprint requirements may have been beneficial in alerting CBP officers that an individual may require additional screening and vetting.

Shortly after issuance of OIG’s Management Alert, we learned that the National Targeting Center evaluates risk in an 15 air and sea environment, and automatically evaluates passenger manifests in real time to identify travelers or crewmembers who may pose a national security risk, which the land ports do not. Therefore, CBP still needs other means to manage risk for the land environment. U.S. Customs and Border Protection Strategy 2021-2026 , 16 https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2020-Dec/CBP-Strategy-2021-2026.pdf. OIG-25-50

CBP stated that they “weighed accepting the unknown risk against the risk of overwhelming the process with referrals from .” Despite knowing that DoS did not fully screen millions of visa holders, CBP officials stated that “they rely on DoS to do its due diligence when vetting and screening visa applicants and issuing visas.”

CBP Has Not Completed Risk Assessments of Interview or Fingerprint Waivers

CBP provided OIG with a summary report of nonimmigrant visa holders it encountered at all ports of entry (air, land, and sea) from April 1, 2024, to December 31, 2024. CBP attempted to demonstrate that those with interview waivers and those who were interviewed had similar rates of refusal for admittance to the United States, and no further risk mitigation was required. During our meeting to discuss the data, CBP provided a high-level overview of the data’s findings but did not include specifics on the methodology used in the analysis. Further, the data incorporated nonimmigrant visa holders at air and seaports of entry, which unlike land ports of entry, provide passenger manifest information 24 to 48 hours prior to arrival. Although not a substitute for conducting a consular interview during the visa application process that could elicit derogatory information or fraud, the air and sea manifest allows CBP to conduct vetting prior to the visa holder’s arrival in the United States. Once a visa holder obtains a visa, there may be a gap from the time the visa is issued and used for entry, sometimes even as long as 5 years. The land ports of entry do not have arrival manifests to vet prior to entry. As such, incorporating the data from all three types of ports of entry may distort the rates of refusal affected by the visas with interview waivers. On November 6, 2024, DoS also provided CBP with historical data on the visa interview waiver population from January 2020 to March 2024. Our analysis of the data shows that in that period, DoS issued more than 26 million nonimmigrant visas to about 15 million individual applicants (see Table 1). Of the approximately 15 million applicants who received visas, DoS waived interviews 17 and fingerprints for more than 8 million people (53 percent). DoS also reported 1,090 visas for which the interview status was unknown and CBP could not determine the status.

The difference between the total number of visas and the number of visa applicants could be due to an individual 17 having multiple visas during that period, or due to renewals of the same visa. OIG-25-50

Table 1. DoS Interview Waiver Data, January 2020 to March 2024 18

Interviewed 13,716,882 7,006,539 Not Interviewed 12,434,480 8,038,144 Unknown 1,090 1,083

Source: DHS OIG’s analysis of DoS data (transferred to CBP) on visa applicants who were waived interviews CBP officials stated that they intend to conduct more thorough assessments on the DoS data once it is integrated into their systems, but offered no timeframe on when they would complete that work. Although CBP’s data summary report focused solely on interview waivers, DHS completed the transfer of approximately 500,000 fingerprints into DoS’ systems as the NSC required in the

Interview Waiver Agreement for 2024 . CBP captured these fingerprints mostly from H-2A visa applicants and applicants from the Visa Waiver Program who entered the ports of entry between 2020 to 2023 and whose fingerprints were not previously captured by DoS during the visa application process. Neither DHS nor CBP has provided any additional information on the 500,000 fingerprints, including whether the visa holders associated with these fingerprints were denied or refused entry to the United States. Such analysis would have informed CBP whether individuals with fingerprint waivers posed a risk to the United States. Expanded Waiver Policy Change In November 2024, the NSC, DoS, DHS’ Office of Policy, and CBP officials met to discuss the interview and fingerprint waiver authorities and their application for 2025 and beyond. No decisions were made, in part, because DHS had not conducted an interagency risk assessment. To perform the risk assessment, CBP pulled data for nonimmigrant visa holders seeking entry at U.S. ports of entry in 2023 and 2024 and DHS was working on pulling interview waiver–specific data. DHS anticipated having the data ready for review and analysis on or about January 21, 2025. According to DHS’ Office of Policy, once DHS received the data analysis, the NSC would decide on the scope of the next waiver agreement. On February 18, 2025, DoS announced that “in line with Executive Order 14161, ‘Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,’ expanded nonimmigrant visa interview waiver authorities have been rescinded, effective

CBP provided data from DoS that included January and February 2020, 2 months prior to the expansion of the visa 18 waivers. We determined that these 2 months of data would not significantly skew the data. OIG-25-50 Visas Issued to Individual Interview Action Total Visas Issued Total 15,045,766 26,152,452 Applicants

immediately.” This meant that the interview and fingerprint waivers allowed between 2020 and 19 2023 (allowed in part, because of the COVID-19 pandemic), and the expanded categories agreed to in December 2023 (and applicable in 2024) could no longer continue. Rather, interviews can be waived for applicants who are:

• employees of a designated international organization or the North Atlantic Treaty
  Organization;

• foreign military personnel stationed in the United States;

• transiting through the United States;

• eligible for diplomatic- or official-type visas; and

• someone who previously held a visa in the same category that expired less than 12 months
  prior to the new application. We determined, in part due to this decision, that we would conclude our fieldwork for this audit. Nevertheless, there are extant security risks from the 5 years of operations under the expanded interview and fingerprint waiver program that have yet to be fully evaluated and addressed.

Conclusion

Although DoS’ expanded interview and fingerprint waiver policy is no longer in effect, the risks we noted in this report and in our earlier Management Alert remain largely unevaluated and unaddressed. Because DHS cannot yet determine whether the 8 million foreign nationals who were issued nonimmigrant visas (some of which are valid for 5 years, and that can be extended up to 10 years) without a DoS interview pose a risk to the Nation’s security, we continue to urge CBP to develop and implement a comprehensive plan to perform trend analyses that will identify and assess risks to inform CBP’s operational policy decisions.

Recommendation

Recommendation 1: We recommend the Commissioner of CBP: (1) conduct an analysis of the 500,000 fingerprints sent to DoS and include the findings in their risk assessments to further identify and mitigate any risks posed by individuals whose fingerprints were waived by the Department of State, and (2) share the results with the Department of State and other government partners, as appropriate, for any follow-up action.

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis

CBP provided written comments in response to the draft report. Appendix B contains CBP’s management comments in their entirety. We also received technical comments from CBP and revised the draft report as appropriate. CBP concurred with our recommendation. Based on the information received, we consider the recommendation open and resolved. A summary of CBP’s response and our analysis follows. BP stated that the report’s results are not sufficiently substantiated to support the conclusions made. CBP stated that DoS’ decision to waive a visa applicant’s interview or biometrics during the visa issuance process does not change how CBP officers conduct . The presence of an interview waiver is supplemental information but not critical to the environment. According to CBP officials, CBP officers are trained and experienced on how to inspect and target travelers applying for admission into the United States through the inspection process. Although CBP disagreed with the results presented in our report, CBP and DHS officials nevertheless expressed concerns with DoS’ waiving of consular interviews during the 2023 meeting with the NSC. Moreover, those concerns led the NSC agreement to require “an would be made available to DHS (for CBP to know at that DoS waived the applicant’s in-person interview and to track trends in DHS systems for effective monitoring and evaluation.)” Our report shows that this did not occur. CBP’s Response to Recommendation 1: Concur. CBP’s OFO will conduct an analysis of the approximately 500,000 fingerprints and share results with DoS and other government partners, as appropriate, based on any relevant findings. Estimated completion date: August 31, 2026. OIG Analysis: CBP’s actions are responsive to the recommendation, which we consider open and resolved. We will close this recommendation when OFO provides us with the results of its analysis of the approximately 500,000 fingerprints and confirmation that the results have been shared with DoS and other government partners, as appropriate, based on any relevant findings.

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Appendix A: Objective, Scope, and Methodology

We conducted this audit to determine (1) the extent to which CBP was aware of DoS’ policy changes to grant certain categories of visas without in-person interviews and biometrics (fingerprinting); and (2) the extent to which CBP can identify and fully screen visa holders with waivers upon arrival at U.S. ports of entry. To answer our objective, we reviewed Federal laws related to immigration, homeland security, and DoS visa requirements. We reviewed CBP operational policies and procedures, directives, and training documents. We reviewed CBP passenger screening and inspection policies and processes. We reviewed correspondence relating to the interview and fingerprint waiver policy discussions between DHS, DoS, and CBP. We reviewed agreements and a memorandum between DoS and DHS over departmental roles in visa issuance and authorities. We interviewed CBP OFO Headquarters officials to determine their awareness and involvement in the DoS policy changes. We interviewed officials from CBP OFO’s Office of Admissibility and Passenger Programs to learn about CBP’s inspection process at ports of entry and communication between CBP Headquarters and CBP field offices and port of entry officers. We met with officials from CBP OFO’s National Targeting Center to discuss their plan to implement our Management Alert recommendations and CBP’s response. We worked with CBP Enterprise Services’ Office of Information Technology to obtain data that DoS sent to CBP on nonimmigrant visas issued between March 2020 and March 2024, and to discuss data analysis planning, strategy, and goals. We also interviewed officials from DHS’ Office of Policy to learn about its discussions with DoS on the interview waiver and fingerprint waiver authority and changes to policy. In our Management Alert, we stated that DoS, in concurrence with DHS, waived in-person interviews for approximately 7.1 million applicants for nonimmigrant visas from FY 2020 through FY 2023. The 7.1 million applicants were based on information DoS submitted to support its position on interview waivers and included nonimmigrant visa interview waivers issued in FY 2021, FY 2022, and year-to-date FY 2023. The information DoS submitted to the NSC Deputies Small Group did not specify the cutoff for the FY 2023 numbers. Subsequently, we received data from CBP, which it had received from DoS, that included all nonimmigrant visas issued from January 2020 to March 2024. This data included CBP-provided data from DoS that included January and February 2020, 2 months prior to the expansion of the visa waivers. We determined that these 2 months of data would not significantly skew the data. The data showed that in this period, DoS issued approximately 26 million nonimmigrant visas to about 15 million unique individuals (some persons were issued more than one visa). Of those populations, DoS issued approximately 12.4 million nonimmigrant visas to more than 8 million individuals under the interview waiver program.

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We analyzed the data CBP received from DoS to calculate the number of nonimmigrant visas issued in our scope period (with or without interviews). We determined the data was sufficiently complete and accurate for auditing purposes. We spoke with officials from CBP’s Office of Information Technology who explained the data request they made to DoS. The data was to include the total numbers of visas issued between January 2020 and March 2024. Because CBP has not provided us with its analysis of this data, we used the data solely to calculate approximate numbers. We identified the internal control components and underlying internal control principles that were significant to the audit objective. Specifically, we identified internal control deficiencies (i.e., Control Activities, Monitoring, Information and Communication, Risk Assessment, and Control Environment) in CBP’s ability to identify and screen nonimmigrants who were issued a visa interview waiver. However, because we limited our review to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that existed at the time of our audit. Inspector We conducted this audit from January 2024 through February 2025 pursuant to the General Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. §§ 401–424, and according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

DHS OIG’s Access to DHS Information

During this audit, CBP provided timely responses to our requests for information and did not delay or deny access to information we requested.

DHS OIG Coordination with DoS OIG

Our review was necessarily limited to the effects the interview and fingerprint waiver program had on DHS operations and maintaining national security and public safety. However, we wrote to the DoS OIG and encouraged it to join our audit effort so that DoS could be equally apprised of any problems stemming from the policy change. DoS OIG, however, did not respond to our invitation to perform a joint audit or review. Nevertheless, we are grateful for its assistance in coordinating with various DoS entities to help provide us with requested DoS documents and access to personnel.

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Appendix B: CBP Comments on the Draft Report

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Appendix C: DoS Visa Categories with Interview and Fingerprint Waivers by Calendar Year 20

Student Visa: University, College, High School, Private IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW X Elementary School, Seminary, Conservatory, Another Academic Institution Including Foreign X X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW X X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW X X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW Student Visa: Au Pair, EduCare, Camp Counselor, Government Visitor, Intern, International Visitor (DoS use), X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW Physician, Professor and Research Scholar, Short- Term Scholar, Specialist Student, College/University Student, Secondary, Summer X X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW Student Visa: X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW

Individual with Extraordinary Ability or X X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW

Individual or Team Athlete, or Member of X X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW Participant in International Cultural Exchange X X IW/FW IW/FW IW/FW

LEGEND: X - No Data IW - Interview Waiver FW - Fingerprint Waiver

Source:DoS All Diplomatic and Consular Posts issued from 2020 to 2024 *The interview and fingerprint waiver policy that was in place at the beginning of 2024 was rescinded by DoS on February 18, 2025. J

Other than the H-2A and H-2B visas, the fingerprint waivers were not available to first-time visa applicants. Only those 20 F with prior visas and/or fingerprints already captured were eligible for a fingerprint waiver. OIG-25-50 M O QP H-2B Non-Blanket L H-1B1 H-1B H-2A H-3 2024* Visa Type and Description Vocational or Other Nonacademic Institution Entertainment Group, Artist, Entrepreneur Temporary Non-Agricultural Worker Trainee or Special Education Visitor Free Trade Agreement Professional Person in Specialty Occupation Temporary Agricultural Worker Work Travel, Teacher, Trainee Intracompany Transferee Achievement Language Program

Appendix D: Timeline of Interview and Fingerprint Waiver Program

March 13, 2020 Declaration of a nationwide emergency due to COVID-19

during COVID-19” (20 STATE 32972)

Waiver” (21 STATE 127620) December 23, 2022 CA releases “Extension of Nonimmigrant Visa Interview Waiver Authorities” (22 STATE 138098)

declare an end to the COVID-19 public health emergency

December 1, 2023

applying who:

• were previously issued a nonimmigrant visa in any classification, unless the
  only prior issued visa was a B [business/tourism] visa; and

• are applying within 48 months of their most recent nonimmigrant visa’s
  Source: Public websites, DoS documents, and DoS All Diplomatic and Consular Posts issued from 2020 to 2024

January 1, 2024 DoS authority expanded to permit in-person interview and fingerprint waivers to all nonimmigrant visa applicants OIG-25-50 December 23, 2021 May 11, 2023 March 25, 2020 CA releases “Petition-Based Visa Processing and Other Expansions of Interview World Health Organization and U.S. Department of Health and Human Services DoS CA releases cable “H-2 Visa Processing and Expansion of Interview Waiver November 21, 2023 NSC convenes a Deputies Small Group on visa interview waiver authorities December 28, 2020 CA releases “H-2 Interview Waiver Authority Extended” (20 STATE 124536) January 27, 2021 CA releases “H-2 Interview Waiver Authority Extended” (21 STATE 6742) Date Event February 19, 2025 CA releases “Rescission of Expanded Interview Waiver Authorities” (25 STATE 14014) expiration date.

Appendix E: Report Distribution

Department of Homeland Security Secretary Deputy Secretary Chief of Staff Deputy Chiefs of Staff General Counsel Executive Secretary Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office Under Secretary, Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs DHS Component Liaison Office of Management and Budget Chief, Homeland Security Branch DHS OIG Budget Examiner Congress Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees External Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Screening and Vetting Enterprise, White House Homeland Security Council Department of State Department of State Office of Inspector General

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Additional Information

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DHS OIG Hotline

To report fraud, waste, abuse, or criminal misconduct involving U.S. Department of Homeland Security programs, personnel, and funds, please visit: www.oig.dhs.gov/hotline If you cannot access our website, please contact the hotline by phone or mail: Call: 1-800-323-8603 U.S. Mail: Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305 Attention: Hotline 245 Murray Drive SW Washington, DC 20528-0305