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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kermit Lamark Copeland v. Allstate Insurance Company

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 373748

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (29.2K)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

KERMIT LAMARK COPELAND, FOR PUBLICATION
March 16, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 10:38 AM

v No. 373748
Wayne Circuit Court
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 23-004967-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and TREBILCOCK, JJ.

MALDONADO, P.J.

In this no-fault action to obtain personal injury protection (PIP) benefits from defendant,
Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate), the Michigan Automobile Insurance Placement Facility’s
(MAIPF) servicing insurer, plaintiff, Kermit Lamark Copeland, appeals by right the trial court’s
order granting defendant summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) (no genuine issue of
material fact). Plaintiff argues on appeal that the trial court erred when it resolved the factual
question of plaintiff’s domicile and concluded that defendant was not the highest priority insurer
responsible for paying plaintiff PIP benefits. We agree with plaintiff and reverse the trial court’s
order of dismissal.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is currently homeless and estimates that he has been for 10 to 15 years.
Approximately 17 years ago, plaintiff lived with his sister, L. Caver, and her husband, D. Caver,
for about three months. Plaintiff continues to use their address (the Judd address) for mail and for
his Michigan identification card “because it is the only stable and consistent address in [his]
immediate family,” and he trusts his sister. He does not live in the home or keep personal
belongings there. Plaintiff did not recall the last address that he resided at before he was homeless
at his deposition but later claimed in an affidavit that he lived in several places after his short stay
with his sister. Among the places he lived, plaintiff asserted that he lived with his mother for
several years at a specified address in Detroit, Michigan (the Seymour address).

In February 2021, plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle involved in a hit-and-run collision.
Plaintiff did not have automobile insurance, and neither did the driver. The police recorded the

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Judd address for plaintiff in their collision report. While plaintiff was recovering from his injuries,
he primarily lived at the Seymour address, although his medical records include the Judd address.

Plaintiff filed an application for PIP benefits through the Michigan Assigned Claims Plan
(MACP) using the Judd address. In an amended application, plaintiff added his sister, L. Caver,
as an individual living in his home at the time of the accident. He reported no person in the
household owned a motor vehicle, and there was no automobile insurance in the household.
However, the Cavers had several vehicles insured by Auto-Owners Insurance on the date of
plaintiff’s accident. Their policy lists D. Caver and L. Caver as covered drivers but does not
identify plaintiff as a member of the household.

Plaintiff filed this suit against MAIPF, MACP, and the “unnamed assignee of
MAIPF/MACP” in April 2023 to obtain PIP benefits under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL
500.3101 et seq., after the original defendants failed to assign plaintiff’s claim to a servicing insurer
as required by statute.1 In May 2023, the MAIPF assigned Allstate to service plaintiff’s claim, and
Allstate was substituted as defendant in July 2023.

In April 2024, defendant moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10),
alleging that plaintiff was domiciled with L. Caver on the date of the accident because he failed to
establish a new domicile after leaving the Judd address. As a result, his sister’s insurer, Auto-
Owners, was identifiable, applicable, and higher in priority than defendant to pay plaintiff’s no-
fault benefits. In response, plaintiff denied that he was domiciled at the Judd address at the time
of the accident, so the Auto-Owners policy was inapplicable. Plaintiff noted that defendant had
not introduced any evidence that plaintiff was ever domiciled at the Judd address. One week before
the motion hearing, plaintiff filed an affidavit listing several places that he lived after his brief stay
with his sister but before becoming homeless. Defendant contended these were merely residences,
distinct from an individual’s domicile, and plaintiff’s affidavit could not create a genuine issue of
fact precluding summary disposition because it contradicted his deposition testimony. Plaintiff
asserted that the affidavit added detail to previous testimony and did not contradict it.

At the hearing, the trial court asked plaintiff to provide an alternate domicile that could be
analyzed against the Judd address, but plaintiff argued that the critical fact is that plaintiff’s
domicile is not his sister’s house. The trial court found this narrow framing of the issue
unconvincing, noting: “There has to be a domicile.”

The trial court analyzed plaintiff’s alleged domicile under the Workman and Dairyland
framework. Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exchange, 404 Mich 477; 274 NW2d 373 (1979);
Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App 675; 333 NW2d 322 (1983). The court
determined that plaintiff’s relationship with his sibling, the lack of another place of lodging, and
his use of the Judd address for mail and on his Michigan identification card supported the
conclusion that plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address. The trial court noted, however, that
there was insufficient information in the affidavit to compare the Workman and Dairyland factors
to any other address. The Judd address was the only identifiable domicile, so the trial court felt it

1
Plaintiff refers to MCL 500.3171, MCL 500.3172, MCL 500.3173, MCL 500.3174, and MCL
500.3175 in his complaint.

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“ha[d] to deem that to be his domicile,” because it could not conclude that he had no domicile at
all under Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475; 835 NW2d 363 (2013).
Consequently, the trial court found there was no question of fact remaining on the issue of
plaintiff’s domicile and granted summary disposition to defendant.

This appeal followed.

II. DISCUSSION

The trial court erred when it concluded that plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address on
the relevant date and granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(10). The affidavit, which supplements rather than contradicts plaintiff’s deposition
testimony, raises a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s domicile, which should be
determined by a jury. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the trial court for further
consideration.

A trial court’s decision on a motion for summary disposition is reviewed de novo. El-
Khalil v Oakwood Healthcare, Inc, 504 Mich 152, 159; 934 NW2d 665 (2019). A motion made
under MCR 2.116(C)(10) “tests the factual sufficiency of a claim” and “may only be granted when
there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. at 160 (emphasis omitted). If “the pleadings,
affidavits, and other documentary evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the
nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact,” summary
disposition may be granted under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Barnes v 21st Century Premier Ins Co, 334
Mich App 531, 540; 965 NW2d 121 (2020), quoting Pioneer State Mut Ins for Publ’n Co v Dells,
301 Mich App 368, 377; 836 NW2d 257 (2013). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when
the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party, leaves open an issue upon
which reasonable minds might differ.” Barnes, 334 Mich App at 540, quoting West v Gen Motors
Corp, 469 Mich 177, 183; 665 NW2d 468 (2003). “A domicile determination is generally a
question of fact; however, where the underlying material facts are not in dispute, the determination
of domicile is a question of law for the circuit court.” Grange, 494 Mich at 490.

Under Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., “MCL 500.3114(1) generally
provides that a no-fault policy ‘applies to accidental bodily injury to the person named in the
policy, the person’s spouse, and a relative of either domiciled in the same household, if the injury
arises from a motor vehicle accident.’ ” Barnes, 334 Mich App at 534. “[T]he no-fault act does
not define the term ‘domiciled,’ ” but Michigan courts have historically defined the term as “ ‘the
place where a person has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to
which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning.’ ” Grange, 494 Mich App at 493,
quoting In re High, 2 Doug 515, 523 (Mich, 1847). In general, domicile involves residence and
intent to remain in a given place. Grange, 494 Mich at 495. It is well-settled “that every person
has a domicile, and that a person may have one—and only one—domicile.” Id. at 494.
Consequently, an individual’s domicile in a place continues until they acquire another, and by
doing so an individual terminates their preceding domicile. Id.

Michigan courts use the Workman and Dairyland multifactor frameworks to resolve
questions of fact regarding a person’s domicile. Grange, 494 Mich at 497 n 41. The Workman
factors to be considered are:

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(1) the subjective or declared intent of the person of remaining, either permanently
or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time, in the place he contends is his
“domicile” or “household”; (2) the formality or informality of the relationship
between the person and the members of the household; (3) whether the place where
the person lives is in the same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same
premises; (4) the existence of another place of lodging by the person alleging
“residence” or “domicile” in the household. . . . [Id. at 497, quoting Workman, 404
Mich at 496-497.]

The factors elucidated in Dairyland, 123 Mich App at 682, are more closely associated with young
people establishing domiciles outside of their parents’ homes, but may still be relevant
considerations in other contexts:

Other relevant indicia of domicile include such factors as whether the claimant
continues to use his parents’ home as his mailing address, whether he maintains
some possessions with his parents, whether he uses his parents’ address on his
driver’s license or other documents, whether a room is maintained for the claimant
at the parents’ home, and whether the claimant is dependent upon the parents for
support.

See also, Cervantes v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 272 Mich App 410, 415; 726 NW2d 73
(2006), citing Williams v State Farm Mutual Auto Ins Co, 202 Mich App 491, 494-495; 509 NW2d
821 (1993).

Turning to the instant case, the first Workman factor is “the subjective or declared intent of
the person of remaining, either permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time,” in
the place contended to be his domicile. 404 Mich at 496. Plaintiff never expressed an intent to
remain at his sister’s home. Rather, he indicated he had “no intention of living there.” Plaintiff
testified he used her address solely to receive mail and briefly stayed in her home 10 to 15 years
ago. He maintained he had been homeless for about the same amount of time and was homeless
at the time of the accident. L. Caver recalled that plaintiff “has not lived in [her] house in over 17
years; and at that time, he only lived in [her] house for about three months.” Similarly, D. Caver
stated: “I think he lived with us back when—before my son was born. That was 17 years ago. He
lived with us just before my son was born.” In the next 17 years, plaintiff did not return to live at
the Judd address, and neither witness mentioned plaintiff asking to return. Plaintiff’s short stay
and the considerable length of time he has been transient suggest he never intended to remain at
the Judd address and reflects his stated intent not to return. This factor weighs against a finding
plaintiff is domiciled at the Judd address.

Second, under Workman, courts must consider “the formality or informality of the
relationship between the person and the members of the household.” Id. Plaintiff’s relationship
with the Cavers is informal in that they are family, and there was no mention of a lease or
agreement dictating the terms of their living arrangement 17 years ago. L. Caver had not seen
plaintiff in over a year and believed him to be incarcerated, suggesting that she and plaintiff are
not close. She saw him at church at some point after his accident, but it is unclear when plaintiff
was last present at the Judd address. This informal and distant relationship weighs slightly against

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a finding plaintiff is domiciled with his sister, although the trial court came to the opposite
conclusion.

The third Workman factor evaluates “whether the place where the person lives is in the
same house, within the same curtilage or upon the same premises.” Id. It is undisputed plaintiff
does not reside in his sister’s home and has not for more than a decade. This factor favors a finding
that plaintiff was not domiciled with his sister.

Fourth, courts look to “the existence of another place of lodging by the person” allegedly
domiciled in the household. Id. at 497. At his deposition, plaintiff could not recall the last address
he lived at before he became homeless, but later submitted an affidavit listing other residences
after his brief stay with his sister. The affidavit indicates that plaintiff lived with his mother at the
Seymour address for several years and lived with others at multiple unspecified addresses after
leaving the Judd address but before becoming homeless. Plaintiff maintained that he was homeless
at the time of the accident, so on the relevant date he did not have any place of lodging, let alone
“another” one. Id. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the affidavit
suggests an alternative, subsequent domicile may have extinguished his previous one at the Judd
address, assuming plaintiff was ever domiciled there in the first place. Barnes, 334 Mich App at
540. Given the circumstances, this factor is neutral.

The first Dairyland factor is whether the claimant uses the alleged domicile address as his
mailing address. 123 Mich App at 682. In this case, there is no question that plaintiff used the
Judd address for mail because he lacked any other consistent address. Accordingly, this factor
suggests plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address at the time of the accident.

Next, Dairyland instructs courts to consider “whether [the claimant] maintains some
possessions” at the home alleged to be his domicile. Id. Plaintiff testified that he does not keep
any personal items at the Judd address. L. Caver and D. Caver confirmed in their depositions that
plaintiff does not have any possessions at their home. This factor, then, weighs against a finding
plaintiff was domiciled at his sister’s home.

The third Dairyland factor asks whether the person uses the address “on his driver’s license
or other documents.” Id. Plaintiff used the Judd address on his state identification card and his
medical documents. This is the address recorded in the police report and on plaintiff’s applications
for benefits. Plaintiff’s use of the Judd address weighs in favor of a finding he is domiciled at that
location.

Fourth, Dairyland asks “whether a room is maintained for the claimant” at the home. Id.
On the date of plaintiff’s accident, only L. Caver, D. Caver, and their children occupied the home.
D. Caver testified that plaintiff did not stay with them, even occasionally, suggesting that there
was no reason to maintain a bedroom for plaintiff. Although neither witness was expressly asked
about this factor, the testimony that plaintiff had no belongings at the home and never stayed with
them suggests that a room was not kept available for him. As such, this factor indicates that he
was not domiciled at the Judd address.

Finally, the fifth Dairyland factor asks if the claimant is dependent upon other residents of
the household for support. Id. There is no mention in the record of plaintiff receiving assistance

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or support of any kind from the Cavers, indicating that plaintiff is not domiciled with them at the
Judd address.

In sum, analysis under the Workman and Dairyland frameworks does not weigh in favor
of finding that plaintiff is domiciled with his sister at the Judd address. Two Workman factors,
intent and residence on the same premises, clearly weigh against a finding plaintiff is domiciled at
the Judd address, and the other two Workman factors, informality of relationship and existence of
another place of lodging, do not militate strongly in favor of either conclusion. The only Dairyland
factors favoring defendant’s position relate to plaintiff’s use of the address for mail, his
identification, and other important documents. At best, four of nine factors suggest plaintiff was
domiciled with his sister, but with two Workman factors being ambiguous, the total is perhaps
closer to only two of nine factors. Accordingly, a conclusion that plaintiff was domiciled at the
Judd address is not well-supported by the evidence and thus the trial court erred in concluding
plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address given the lack of an alternative.

Defendant contends plaintiff’s “contradictory affidavit” cannot create a genuine issue of
material fact precluding summary disposition. Defendant cites several cases to support its position
“that an affidavit cannot contain facts or testimony contrary to the person[’]s sworn deposition
testimony in order to create a question of fact in a summary disposition motion.” See, e.g.,
Kaufman & Payton, PC v Nikkila, 200 Mich App 250; 503 NW2d 728 (1993); Gamet v Jenks, 38
Mich App 719; 197 NW2d 160 (1972). In both cases, previous testimony directly contradicted
later-filed affidavits. But here, plaintiff argues: “The affidavit is not contrary to his prior
testimony. What he testified to was he couldn’t remember the other places he lived at [] that
point—at the point in time when they took his deposition, and he clarified that subsequently in the
affidavit.” The Cavers testified plaintiff lived with them over 17 years ago. Plaintiff estimated at
his deposition he has been homeless for about 10 to 15 years. The affidavit mentions plaintiff
lived with his mother at the Seymour address for several years between living at the Judd address
and becoming homeless. Plaintiff then lists three other places he lived, for “over a year, maybe
longer,” “a few years,” and “for approximately 1 year.” He then estimated, consistent with his
deposition testimony, that he has been homeless for approximately 10 years. It is entirely possible
that plaintiff has lived in four different places for “a year” or “several years” and been homeless
for 10 of the last 17 years. Consequently, the affidavit does not directly contradict plaintiff’s
testimony; rather, it adds detail to plaintiff’s previous testimony.

Viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, the affidavit presents alternative resolutions
to the factual question of plaintiff’s domicile, and summary disposition was inappropriate. If
plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address for a mere three months 17 years ago, the move to the
Seymour address may have extinguished that domicile and established a new one. Alternatively,
he may have never been domiciled at the Judd address given his stated intent never to remain there,
and the Seymour address may have been his last specified domicile before becoming homeless.
In general, domicile determinations are questions of fact for the jury, unless the underlying
material facts are not in dispute. Grange, 494 Mich at 490. The affidavit supplements plaintiff’s
testimony and creates a genuine issue of material fact regarding plaintiff’s domicile that should be
determined by a jury. Consequently, when viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
we conclude that the trial court erred when it found plaintiff was domiciled at the Judd address and
granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) in favor of defendant.

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We reverse and remand for further consideration. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado
/s/ Michael J. Kelly
/s/ Christopher M. Trebilcock

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Concurrence Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

KERMIT LAMARK COPELAND, FOR PUBLICATION
March 16, 2026
Plaintiff-Appellant, 10:38 AM

v No. 373748
Wayne Circuit Court
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, LC No. 23-004967-NF

Defendant-Appellee.

Before: MALDONADO, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and TREBILCOCK, JJ.

M. J. KELLY, J. (concurring).

I concur fully with the opinion and write separately to bring attention to what I view as a
significant error that has crept into our jurisprudence regarding the issue of domicile under the no-
fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq.

In Grange Ins Co of Mich v Lawrence, 494 Mich 475, 481; 835 NW2d 363 (2013), a child
of divorced parents was injured in a motor-vehicle crash and a dispute arose as to whether the child
was domiciled in the household of one or both of her parents. Our Supreme Court determined that
“a child of divorced parents has only one domicile at any given point in time.” Id. In doing so,
the Court held that, historically, the term “domicile” has been defined as “the place where a person
has his true, fixed, permanent home, and principal establishment, and to which, whenever he is
absent, he has the intention of returning.” Id. at 493 (quotation marks and citation omitted). It has
also been defined as “that place where a person has voluntarily fixed his abode not for a mere
special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his home, either
permanently or for an indefinite or unlimited length of time.” Id.

Relying upon caselaw specific to a person’s national domicile, see In re High, 2 Doug, 515
(1847),1 the Grange Court considered it as a settled maxim that every man must have such a
national domicile somewhere” and that it is “equally well settled that no person can have more

1
In re High, is a 179-year-old probate case where the court had to determine which nation a
decedent was domiciled in—Cuba or the United States. See In re High, 2 Doug at 525-526.

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than one such domicile, at one and the same time.” Id. at 493-494. Based upon that rationale, the
Grange Court concluded that “from the time of a person’s birth—from childhood through
adulthood—a person can only have a single domicile at any given point in time.” Id. at 494. The
Court further reasoned:

A man retains his domicile of origin [upon his birth] until he changes it, by
acquiring another; and so each successive domicile continues, until changed by
acquiring another. And it is equally obvious that the acquisition of a new domicile
does, at the same instant, terminate the preceding one.

Stated differently, the Grange Court concluded that, once established at a specific place, a person’s
domicile remains at that place until the person acquires a new domicile at some other place.

It is that last concept which the trial court considered decisive in this case; allowing the
notion that domicile must exist somewhere, even if it trumps the Workman-Dairyland2
multifactored framework. The trial court cannot be criticized too harshly for seemingly coming to
the conclusion that, even if a litigant comes up short on the majority of the factors outlined in
Workman and Dairyland, it must nevertheless find that the litigant has a domicile somewhere, and
that domicile defaults to the last place the litigant had permanently resided, irrespective of whether
the facts establish otherwise. Indeed, Grange supports such an interpretation.

However, I believe that the more relevant and significant holding from both High and
Grange is that, while an individual may have more than one residence, he or she can have only
one domicile. And Grange was clear in its holding: “we hold that a child, whose parents are
divorced and who has more than one legal residence, may have only a single domicile at any one
point in time that continues until the child acquires a different one.” Id at 496. The Grange facts
are a far cry from situations such as the present case, where an adult had not resided in the residence
of a sister since temporarily doing so some 15 years earlier.

The error in citing the High maxim is concluding that, just because a person may not have
more than one domicile, it follows that they must have a domicile. To the extent High stated
anything of the sort, it must be remembered that High said that “every man must have a national
domicile somewhere.” I contend that a person can be domiciled in a nation, but not domiciled
within that nation. They can be homeless or otherwise of no fixed abode. Take for example a
person legally evicted from his apartment with an order from a court of law prohibiting his return
to the apartment building. Where is his domicile? It cannot be at the location he lived in prior to
moving into the apartment because that domicile would have ended at the time that his domicile
became the apartment. But it seems clear that it also cannot remain at the apartment to which he
is now prohibited from returning to as a result of his eviction.

2
The Workman-Dairyland factors are derived from Workman v Detroit Auto Inter-Ins Exchange,
404 Mich 477; 274 NW2d 373 (1979) and Dairyland Ins Co v Auto Owners Ins Co, 123 Mich App
675; 333 NW2d 322 (1983).

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Consider also a person paroled after a long prison sentence. His last domicile was with his
parents 20 years earlier at the time of his incarceration. The parents died while he was in prison
and the former family home has been sold. One would not consider the prison to be his domicile
because it can be assumed that he did not have the intent to return to prison upon his release. But,
at the same time, it cannot be said to remain with his now-deceased parents in a house that has
since been sold to an unknown third party. The same would also be true in the case of a person
whose domicile burns to the ground or is otherwise destroyed in a natural disaster. Such a person
might temporarily reside with friends or relatives or even in a motel or shelter, but it cannot
reasonably be said that the residence of his or her family or friends or temporary hotel lodging
qualifies as a new domicile. And yet, concluding by default that the domicile must therefore be at
a place that no longer exists defies reality.

It remains a fact that there are many homeless people who sleep in tents or cardboard boxes
as shelter. They have no address and sleep in different locations—parks, under highway
overpasses, etc. every night. Do these people consider their succession of temporary camps their
“true, fixed, permanent home” with the intent to return there? I posit that they do not.

I reject the notion that, come what may, a person must be deemed to have a domicile. This
adage, based upon caselaw related to national domicile, simply leads to absurd results, particularly
in the case of homeless people who, practically by definition, lack a “true, fixed, permanent home”
and people whose domicile no longer exists.

/s/ Michael J. Kelly

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