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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Williams v. Mid-Ohio Coal Co.

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 1245
• Docket Number: 25 CA 000032

• Judges: Gormley

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.7K)

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Syllabus

An indexing error in the county recorder's office in 1891 caused a break in the chain of title for certain underground-mineral rights and spawned a legal dispute over ownership of those rights. The dispute is resolved under the claim-preclusion doctrine in favor of property owners whose predecessors in interest had filed a quiet-title action in 1954 and, relying on the erroneous index, had served the complaint on the 1891 owner of the mineral rights.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as Williams v. Mid-Ohio Coal Co., 2026-Ohio-1245.]

COURT OF APPEALS
GUERNSEY COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DORIS E. WILLIAMS, et al., Case No. 25 CA 000032

Plaintiffs - Appellants Opinion & Judgment Entry

-vs- Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas
of Guernsey County, Case No. 23 CV 363
MID-OHIO COAL COMPANY, et al.
Judgment: Reversed and Remanded
Defendants - Appellees
Date of Judgment: April 6, 2026

BEFORE: William B. Hoffman, Andrew J. King, and David M. Gormley, Judges

APPEARANCES: Daniel P. Corcoran (Theisen Brock), Marietta, Ohio, for Plaintiffs-
Appellants Doris E. Williams and Robert W. Williams; J. Alex Quay, Joshua E. O’Farrell,
and Erin L. Dickinson (Buckingham, Doolittle & Burroughs, LLC), Akron, Ohio, for
Defendant-Appellee Mid-Ohio Coal Company.

Gormley, J.

{¶1} Plaintiffs Doris and Robert Williams argue in this appeal that the trial court

erred when it found that Mid-Ohio Coal Company is the rightful owner of the minerals

beneath a 35-acre tract of land owned by the Williamses. According to the Williamses,

Mid-Ohio Coal is barred from asserting any interest in the subsurface rights because of a

1954 default-judgment decision that quieted title to the entire property — including the

underground minerals — in favor of the Williamses’ predecessors in title. Mid-Ohio Coal

counters by pointing out that it was not named as a party in that lawsuit despite having

acquired its interest in the underground commodities more than a decade before the

quiet-title judgment was issued.

{¶2} Because Mid-Ohio Coal acquired its interest in the minerals in 1940 through

a chain of title stretching back to the 1880s, and because the first corporate entity that
acquired the mineral rights back then still appeared — due to an indexing error made by

the county recorder’s office in Guernsey County in 1891 — to be the owner of record of the

mineral rights in 1954 when that entity was served with the quiet-title complaint and a

default judgment was issued against it, Mid-Ohio Coal is bound by that valid judgment

against its predecessor in interest. Mid-Ohio’s ownership interest in the underground

minerals has therefore been extinguished. We reverse the trial court’s judgment that

reached a different conclusion, and we remand the case so that the trial court can issue a

final judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

The Key Facts

{¶3} The dispute in this case arises from a lengthy and complicated history of

property conveyances that date back to the early 1880s. All parties agree that the

Williamses are the rightful owners of a particular 35-acre tract of land. The parties

disagree, though, about the rightful owner of the underground commodities beneath that

land.

{¶4} In the 1880s, John and Mary Leeper were the owners of the full fee-simple

interest in approximately 50 acres of land in Guernsey County. By 1899, the property had

been divided into separate 35-acre and 15-acre tracts, with ownership of the two tracts

sometimes in the hands of the same owner or owners and other times not. Today,

plaintiffs Doris and Robert Williams own the surface rights in both tracts.

{¶5} Ownership of the mineral rights beneath the land is a more complicated

story. Ownership of the surface rights was severed from ownership of the underground

minerals beneath the entire 50-acre property starting in 1884, when the mineral rights

were conveyed to the Wheeling & Lake Erie Coal Company (Wheeling Coal).
{¶6} Wheeling Coal in the early 1890s sought and received a court order in

Lorain County changing Wheeling Coal’s name to Cambridge & Elyria Coal Company.

Unfortunately, that name change was indexed improperly in 1891 in the county recorder’s

office in Guernsey County, where the court order approving the name change was indexed

under “Court Common Pleas Lorain Co.” rather than “Wheeling & Lake Erie Coal

Company.”

{¶7} The Cambridge & Elyria Coal Company soon thereafter conveyed its interest

in the underground minerals to the Consolidated Cambridge Coal Company. The deed

for that conveyance was properly listed in the direct index in the recorder’s office in

Guernsey County under “Cambridge and Elyria Coal Co.,” and the recorder’s reverse

index listed the deed under the name “The Consolidated Cambridge Coal Co.” Though

the 1891 deed itself stated that the Cambridge & Elyria Coal Company was a successor to

Wheeling Coal, a title examiner searching for the name “Wheeling and Lake Erie Coal

Company” in either the direct or reverse index would not — due to the 1891 indexing error

— have discovered Wheeling Coal’s name-change decree, and therefore a title examiner

relying solely on the index would not have linked the 1891 conveyance of the mineral

rights by Cambridge and Elyria Coal Company on the one hand with the earlier

acquisition of those mineral rights by Wheeling Coal on the other.

{¶8} After a series of subsequent conveyances and name changes, ownership of

the underground minerals passed from Consolidated Cambridge Coal Company to an

entity called the Cambridge Collieries Company. Then in 1940, foreclosure proceedings

against the Cambridge Collieries Company resulted in the mineral rights being conveyed

to Mid-Ohio Coal through a deed from a court-appointed special master. Under the terms

of that deed, Mid-Ohio received “all the certain lands, coal, mining rights and privileges
acquired by the Company under the following deeds . . . John Leeper and wife to The

Wheeling & Lake Erie Coal Company.”

{¶9} In 1943, the surface rights to the full 50 acres of land were conveyed to Carl

A. Williams and Fannie R. Williams. Then, in 1954, those joint owners filed a quiet-title

action in Guernsey County to clear up any uncertainty about ownership of the minerals

under their property. A title search conducted by Carl and Fannie Williams for that

litigation evidently failed — presumably because of the indexing error dating back to 1891

— to uncover the fact that Mid-Ohio Coal was the then-current owner of the minerals

beneath the Williamses’ land.

{¶10} The attorney for Carl and Fannie Williams in the 1954 lawsuit filed with the

trial court at that time an affidavit claiming that Wheeling Coal, which had acquired the

mineral rights in 1884 (and, in light of what we now know was an indexing error, still

appeared in 1954 to be the owner of those rights), was apparently in 1954 a defunct

corporation with no agents or officers appointed to receive service and no known address.

Wheeling Coal was then served notice of the quiet-title lawsuit by publication. After that

notice circulated for six weeks with no response from Wheeling Coal, the court quieted

title to the full fee-simple estate — both the surface rights and the underground-mineral

rights — in favor of Carl and Fannie Williams.

{¶11} Doris and Robert Williams — the plaintiffs in this case — received their

property interest through an April 2023 survivorship deed. That same year, Doris and

Robert filed this new action to again quiet title to the mineral estate beneath the 35-acre

tract, naming Mid-Ohio Coal and Columbia Gas as defendants in the action. (Columbia

Gas soon renounced any interest in the property.)
{¶12} The Williamses and Mid-Ohio Coal filed competing motions for summary

judgment in the trial court. Doris and Robert argued in part that Mid-Ohio was bound by

the 1954 default judgment against Wheeling Coal under the doctrine of claim preclusion.

Mid-Ohio argued in response that it was not bound by that judgment because Mid-Ohio

had not been named as a party in the 1954 quiet-title suit.

{¶13} The trial court granted Mid-Ohio’s summary-judgment motion in the 2023

quiet-title case after finding that there was “no privity of interest” between Wheeling Coal

and Mid-Ohio and that Mid-Ohio remained the owner of the underground minerals by

virtue of the 1940 deed from the special master. The Williamses now appeal.

Standard of Review

{¶14} An appellate court reviews with fresh eyes a lower court’s decision granting

a motion for summary judgment. McCord v. Ron Laymon Trucking Co., 2005-Ohio-

4399, ¶ 19 (5th Dist.). Summary judgment should be granted only if it appears from the

pleadings and other evidence in the case that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it

appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and

that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment

is made. Id. at ¶ 22; Civ.R. 56(C).

A Diligent Examination of the Index of Recorded Instruments in Guernsey
County in 1954 Would Not Have Indicated that Mid-Ohio Coal Was the
Owner of the Mineral Rights That Were Conveyed to Wheeling Coal in 1884

{¶15} Mid-Ohio Coal argues here that the failure of the 1954 plaintiffs to name

Mid-Ohio as a party to the quiet-title action that year prevents Mid-Ohio from being

bound by that judgment now. According to Mid-Ohio, it acquired the mineral rights
through the 1940 deed from the special master, and that ownership interest, Mid-Ohio

tells us, should have been recognized in the 1954 action.

{¶16} A chain of title to real estate is composed of a series of linked time periods,

with one link between each owner and the next. 14 Powell, Real Property, § 82.03(2)(a)

(Wolf Rev. 2026). By connecting each of those links, the chain of title “produces a

chronological succession of conveyances, all interconnected, that link the current

titleholder to the original conveyance from the sovereign.” Id.

{¶17} Under the grantor-grantee indexing system — the type that is used in

Guernsey County — an instrument is indexed in two places: in one place, all the grantors

for a particular time period are listed, and in the other place, all the grantees are similarly

listed. 1 Thomas Sherman, Ohio Residential Real Estate, § 4.06 (2025). To construct a

chain of title under this indexing system, a title abstractor first locates a prospective seller

in the grantee index. Id. The abstractor then goes further back in the grantee index until

he finds the name of the individual or entity listed as the grantor in the deed to the

prospective seller. Id. That process is repeated until the relevant length of the chain of

title is established.

{¶18} In this case, an 1891 indexing mistake made by the county recorder in

Guernsey County caused a break in the chain of title for the underground minerals in

question. The mineral rights were first severed from the surface rights in 1884 when the

Leepers — as grantors — conveyed the mineral rights to Wheeling Coal. Wheeling Coal —

while it was still the owner of the mineral rights — changed its name to the Cambridge &

Elyria Coal Company. The name-change decree, though, was not indexed using any

language that would have allowed an examiner to discover that document when searching

in the index for an entity with the name “Wheeling and Lake Erie Coal Company.”
{¶19} Because of that name change, the next conveyance of the mineral rights was

made by Wheeling Coal’s successor — the Cambridge & Elyria Coal Company — rather

than by Wheeling Coal. A search of the grantor-grantee index, though, provided any

diligent title examiner with no link between Wheeling Coal and that successor, and so

such a title examiner could not discover that the interest formerly held by Wheeling Coal

had been conveyed numerous times beginning in 1891 and continuing until 1940, when

Mid-Ohio Coal acquired the mineral rights through the special master’s deed. Though

the deed under which Mid-Ohio received its interest was recorded in Guernsey County,

that 1940 deed was not within or connected to the chain of title beginning with the

Leepers’ 1884 conveyance to Wheeling Coal.

{¶20} A person dealing with land is “chargeable with constructive notice of

properly recorded instruments in the chain of title.” Ford v. Baska, 2017-Ohio-4424, ¶

13 (7th Dist.) (emphasis added), quoting Ferguson v. Zimmerman, 1986 Ohio App.

LEXIS 5343, *14 (2d Dist. Jan. 16, 1986). And constructive notice is “imputed notice”

that “exists by reason of the proper filing and recording of a conveying instrument.” In re

Geraci, 507 B.R. 224, 230 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 2014), citing Columbus Gas Transm. Corp.

v. Bennett, 71 Ohio App.3d 307, 315 (2d Dist. 1990).

{¶21} “An instrument which is recorded, but which cannot be traced back to the

original grant because some previous instrument connecting it to the chain of title is

unrecorded, lies outside the chain of title.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Corzin, 2010 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 8755, *15 (N.D.Ohio Feb. 2, 2010). See also Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. at 315

(“a document erroneously recorded . . . is not within the chain of title and does not provide

constructive notice to subsequent bona fide purchasers”).
{¶22} For a recorded instrument to be effective against subsequent purchasers, “it

must operate to give notice to those looking through the grantor-grantee index.” Corzin

at *15. Imputing constructive notice of an instrument that lies outside the chain of title

merely because it was recorded “‘is wholly inconsistent with equitable principles.”

Columbia Gas Transm. Corp. at 315, quoting 66 Am.Jur.2d, Records and Recording Acts,

§ 114, at 410 (1973).

{¶23} The Supreme Court of Ohio has explained that “[t]he only fair rule is to hold

that the record of an instrument will not afford constructive notice, if it is outside the

chain under which a purchaser or incumbrancer claims title or lien. To hold otherwise

would be to impose upon such parties the duty of making a general search of every

instrument filed for record, without according facilities therefor.” Spring Lakes, Ltd. v.

O.F.M. Co., 12 Ohio St.3d 333, 337 (1984), quoting 1 Patton, Land Titles, § 69, at 231-232

(2d Ed. 1957). See also Jenning’s Lessee v. Wood, 20 Ohio 261, 267 (1851) (where the

county recorder makes a mistake that prevents a recorded instrument from being located,

that instrument cannot serve as constructive notice to others about the interest’s

existence).

{¶24} Mid-Ohio Coal claims that it is the holder of the underground-mineral

rights that were first conveyed to Wheeling Coal in 1884 and then — through a series of

corporate name changes and conveyances — ended up being conveyed to Mid-Ohio in

1940 via a deed from a court-appointed special master. Yet a diligent title search in

Guernsey County in 1954 would have indicated that Wheeling Coal was still the owner of

the underground minerals then, and no title examiner using the index in the county

recorder’s office could have connected Wheeling Coal to the Cambridge & Elyria Coal

Company and then from there to later grantees, including Mid-Ohio Coal.
{¶25} In support of its position that only had it been named as a defendant in the

1954 quiet-title suit could Mid-Ohio Coal be bound by the judgment in favor of Carl and

Fannie Williams in that case, Mid-Ohio directs our attention to a 2015 decision from our

court. In that case — Mid-Ohio v. Brown, 2015-Ohio-5111 (5th Dist.) — we determined

that Mid-Ohio was not bound by a 1993 default-judgment entry that was issued in a quiet-

title action in which Mid-Ohio itself had not been sued. Id. at ¶ 2 and ¶ 27. Our court

concluded that Mid-Ohio should have been named as a defendant in that 1993 quiet-title

action because Mid-Ohio “was the record holder of the subsurface rights via the 1940

Special Master’s Deed” and because Mid-Ohio “was within the line of title” via two

properly recorded instruments. Id. at ¶ 27.

{¶26} Today’s case is different. As explained above, the 1891 decree that changed

Wheeling Coal’s name to Cambridge & Elyria Coal Company was not indexed in a manner

that would have enabled the Williamses in the 1954 quiet-title case to discover that

Wheeling Coal’s interest had been the subject of a series of conveyances and corporate

name changes between 1891 and 1940. And while Mid-Ohio argues that Wheeling Coal’s

status as a defunct entity should have prompted a deeper inquiry by the 1954 plaintiffs,

Mid-Ohio does not propose any action that could have been taken in 1954 that would have

led to the discovery of Mid-Ohio’s claimed interest.

{¶27} Because the recorded and indexed chain of title pointed to Wheeling Coal

as the owner of the underground-mineral rights in question from 1891 until 1954, the 1954

plaintiffs cannot be faulted for failing to name Mid-Ohio as a party to their lawsuit.

The 1954 Default-Judgment Entry is Binding on Mid-Ohio Coal

{¶28} Doris and Robert Williams argue that the doctrine of claim preclusion bars

Mid-Ohio Coal from asserting any interest in the underground minerals because the 1954
default-judgment entry awarded ownership of the full fee-simple estate to the Williamses’

predecessors in interest, Carl and Fannie Williams. We agree.

{¶29} The doctrine of res judicata or claim preclusion provides that “a final

judgment or decree rendered on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is a

complete bar to any subsequent action on the same claim between the same parties or

those in privity with them.” Brooks v. Kelly, 2015-Ohio-2805, ¶ 7.

{¶30} Claim preclusion is marked by four key elements: “‘(1) a prior final, valid

decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving

the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were

or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the

transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.’” Lycan v.

Cleveland, 2022-Ohio-4676, ¶ 23, quoting Hapgood v. Warren, 127 F.3d 490, 493 (6th

Cir. 1997).

{¶31} The first required element — whether there is a prior final and valid decision

on the merits — is met in this case. The trial court in Guernsey County issued in 1954 a

journal entry accepting as true all of the allegations in Carl and Fannie Williamses’

petition to quiet title to the property. In its entry, that court found that Carl and Fannie

were the fee-simple owners of the property and that the two of them were in actual

possession of the property. Though the 1954 decision was rendered upon default

judgment, “[e]ven in default, a trial court is required to consider the issues and therefore

a determination on such is a decision on the merits.” Martel v. Am. Family Ins. Co., 2012-

Ohio-1486, ¶ 45 (5th Dist.)

{¶32} We jump next to the third Lycan factor, which calls for us to examine

whether the second action — this case — raises claims that were or could have been
litigated in the first action. In this declaratory-judgment and quiet-title action, Doris and

Robert Williams in 2023 asked the trial court to find that they are the rightful owners of

the mineral rights beneath the 35-acre tract. In the first action — the 1954 lawsuit — Carl

and Fannie Williams had also asked the trial court to quiet title to the property, including

the mineral rights, in their favor. Because ownership of the mineral rights was decided

by the trial court in 1954, and because that same issue is being litigated by the parties in

this case now, we find that the third element of claim preclusion is met.

{¶33} The fourth Lycan factor focuses on whether the second action arose out of

the same transaction or occurrence as the previous lawsuit. Carl and Fannie Williams

sought in the 1954 lawsuit a declaration that they were the owners of the full fee-simple

estate of roughly 50 acres of land in Guernsey County, including the mineral rights that

appeared at that time to be owned by Wheeling Coal. Now in this lawsuit — the second

action — Doris and Robert Williams seek a declaration that they are the rightful owners

of the underground minerals beneath the same land that was the subject of the 1954

lawsuit. Because both lawsuits revolve around the ownership of the same property

interest that was formerly held by Wheeling Coal, we find that the two lawsuits share the

same “common nucleus of operative facts,” and so the fourth claim-preclusion element is

met. See U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. v. Watson, 2020-Ohio-3412, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.) (“[f]or

purposes of claim preclusion, a ‘transaction’ has been defined as a ‘common nucleus of

operative facts’”).

{¶34} We turn now to the second claim-preclusion element identified in the

Supreme Court’s four-part Lycan framework described above in paragraph 30:

whether the two actions — that is, the 1954 case and the current one — involve the same

parties or their privies. The plaintiffs’ side of the case is easy: The parties here all agree
that Robert and Doris Williams are in privity with the 1954 plaintiffs through successive

property ownership. The issue of privity on the defense side of the case is where the

parties’ views diverge.

{¶35} “As a general matter, privity ‘is merely a word used to say that the

relationship between the one who is a party on the record and another is close enough to

include that other within the res judicata.’” Thompson v. Wing, 70 Ohio St.3d 176, 184

(1994), quoting Burszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419, 423 (3d Cir. 1950). One is

generally found to be in privity with another “if he succeeds to an estate or an interest

formerly held by the other . . . because privity is a succession of interest or relationship to

the same thing.” Columbus v. Union Cemetery Assn., 45 Ohio St.2d 47, 51 (1976). See

also Wright v. Heller, 2018-Ohio-149, ¶ 32 (1st Dist.) (“In this case, privity . . . is

established because the Hellers are succeeding owners of the same property”); Union

Cemetery Assn. at 51 (“successive ownership interests in the same property are sufficient

to sustain the flow of privity”).

{¶36} Mid-Ohio Coal argues here that it cannot be in privity with Wheeling Coal

for purposes of claim preclusion because Mid-Ohio had acquired its interest in the

underground minerals in 1940 before the 1954 default-judgment decision was rendered

by the trial court. As explained above, though, a search of the land records in 1954 would

not have revealed Mid-Ohio as the owner then of the mineral rights. A title examination

would have indicated instead that Wheeling Coal was the owner, and Wheeling Coal was

duly named as a defendant in the 1954 lawsuit as a result.

{¶37} In Winland v. Christman, the Seventh District concluded that, despite not

being named as parties in a prior quiet-title action, the Christman appellants were bound

by a prior default judgment in that earlier case because they were in privity — through
successive ownership interests — with the parties who had been named in that lawsuit.

Winland v. Christman, 2019-Ohio-2408, ¶ 54-55 (7th Dist.) (“Any interest Nova acquired

came by way of the Auditor’s Deed referencing the Scarborough Heirs and specifically

Watson’s and Bentley’s interest. Thus, Nova was in privity with Watson and Bentley.

When Nova died, his property . . . passed to appellants . . . . Therefore, appellants were in

privity with the named parties in the 2000 ODMA lawsuit”).

{¶38} Just as in our case, the appellants in Winland had acquired their interest in

some underground-mineral rights (in that case in 1992) before the default judgment was

issued (in that case in February 2001), but a defect in the chain of title prevented any

diligent title examiner from identifying those appellants as the current owners of the oil

and gas rights in question when the lawsuit was filed in 2000. Id. at ¶ 23 (“the Auditor’s

Deed is not contained in the Grantor/Grantee Index of the county recorder’s office when

conducting a search for Maggie, Harlan, Edith, Watson, Bentley, or the ‘Scarborough

Heirs.’ Instead, the Grantor/Grantee Index only lists the Auditor’s Deed under Nova

Christman and the Monroe County Auditor”). Despite the appellants not being named in

the lawsuit, the Seventh District in Winland concluded that the appellants could still be

bound by the judgment under claim preclusion because they were in privity with the

parties who had been named in the action. Id. at ¶ 49 (because “the parties [were] not

identical to the parties in the 2000 ODMA Lawsuit,” in order for res judicata to apply, the

“appellants must be in privity with Watson and Bentley or their heirs, devisees, or

legatees”).

{¶39} After examining the documents filed in the trial court by the parties in our

case, we find that Mid-Ohio’s interest in the mineral rights can be traced back to Wheeling

Coal’s interest as follows: John and Mary A. Leeper conveyed the mineral rights to
Wheeling Coal in 1884; Wheeling Coal in 1891 changed its name to Cambridge and Elyria

Coal Company; Cambridge and Elyria Coal Company conveyed its rights in the mineral

estate in 1891 to the Consolidated Cambridge Coal Company; Consolidated Cambridge

Coal Company changed its name in 1895 to the Cambridge Consolidated Coal Company;

Cambridge Consolidated Coal Company conveyed its interest in the mineral estate to the

Cambridge and Muskingum Valley Coal Company in 1906; Cambridge and Muskingum

Valley Coal Company in 1907 changed its name to the Cambridge Collieries Company;

and finally, in 1940, the underground-mineral rights held by the Cambridge Collieries

Company was transferred to Mid-Ohio Coal by a Special Master’s deed.

{¶40} In light of the above, we find that the second Lycan element is met here.

Mid-Ohio is in privity with Wheeling Coal — the party named in the 1954 lawsuit — by

succeeding to the mineral-estate interest formerly held by Wheeling Coal. And though

Mid-Ohio may have acquired its interest in 1940, Wheeling Coal still appeared to be the

entity that held – according to the grantor-grantee index in the county recorder’s office –

the underground-mineral rights in 1954 when the first quiet-title suit was filed.

{¶41} Having found that all of the required claim-preclusion elements are met in

this case, we conclude that Mid-Ohio Coal is barred from asserting any interest in the

mineral rights underlying the 35-acre tract. We therefore need not address the parties’

additional arguments about the meaning and effect of the conveyance language contained

in the 1940 Special Master’s deed.
{¶42} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Guernsey County is

reversed, and the case is remanded to that court with instructions to enter a final

judgment in favor of plaintiffs Doris and Robert Williams. Costs are to be paid by

defendant Mid-Ohio Coal Company.

By: Gormley, J.;

King, P.J. and

Hoffman, J. concur.