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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re R.C.

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 1244
• Docket Number: 14-25-40; 14-25-41

• Judges: Zimmerman

• Opinion

• Authorities (18)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (66.6K)

• PDF

Syllabus

Suppression; Miranda; Custodial Interrogation; Voluntary Statement. The trial court did not err by denying R.G's and R.C.'s motions to suppress statements made to law enforcement because Miranda warnings were unnecessary and their statements were voluntary.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as In re R.C., 2026-Ohio-1244.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY

IN RE: CASE NO. 14-25-40

R.C.,

ADJUDGED JUVENILE TRAFFIC OPINION AND
OFFENDER.
JUDGMENT ENTRY

IN RE: CASE NO. 14-25-41

R.G.,

ADJUDGED JUVENILE TRAFFIC OPINION AND
OFFENDER.
JUDGMENT ENTRY

Appeals from Union County Common Pleas Court
Juvenile Division
Trial Court Nos. 2025JB045 and 2025JB043

Judgments Affirmed

Date of Decision: April 6, 2026

APPEARANCES:

G.Q. Buck Vaile for Appellants

Brian C. Cook for Appellee
Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

ZIMMERMAN, P.J.

{¶1} Adjudicated juvenile traffic offender-appellants, R.G. and R.C., appeal

the September 24, 2025 judgment entries of disposition of the Union County Court

of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} On March 11, 2025, complaints were filed against the juveniles. Both

R.C. and R.G. were charged with reckless operation of a motor vehicle in violation

of R.C. 4511.20, a minor misdemeanor if committed by an adult. R.C. was

additionally charged with driving under financial responsibility law suspension or

cancellation in violation of R.C. 4510.16, an unclassified misdemeanor if committed

by an adult, and operating a motor vehicle with no temporary permit or without an

adult present in violation R.C. 4507.05(F)(1), a minor misdemeanor if committed

by an adult. R.C. and R.G. appeared in court on April 8 and April 14, 2025,

respectively, and denied the charges in the complaints.

{¶3} In May 2025, R.G. and R.C. filed motions to suppress the statements

they made to Corporal Morgan, which the State opposed. The cases proceeded to a

consolidated suppression hearing on September 23, 2025. At the suppression

hearing, Corporal Michael Morgan (“Corporal Morgan”) of the Marysville Police

Department testified that he initiated an investigation after receiving a bystander’s

video showing a black Honda Civic and a white Honda Accord street racing in

Marysville. Corporal Morgan’s investigation led him to an Express Lube, where he

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

located a black Honda Civic matching one of the vehicles in the footage. Corporal

Morgan testified that, upon entering the business, he asked if the owner of the black

Honda was present. R.G., an employee, indicated that the vehicle belonged to him.

Corporal Morgan then asked R.G. to “step outside” to the parking lot to speak with

him. (Sept. 23, 2025 Tr. at 54). The body camera footage—introduced as State’s

Exhibit 2—captures the interaction once they were outside. Corporal Morgan

showed R.G. the bystander’s video and asked if he was driving the black Honda

during the incident, which R.G. then admitted. Likewise, during the video, Corporal

Morgan can be heard telling R.G. that he “appreciate[s his] honesty” and that

“[h]onesty goes a long way with him.” (Id. at 35). Furthermore, during his

questioning of R.G. outside of the business, two additional officers can be seen

approaching while Corporal Morgan continued talking to R.G. Corporal Morgan

and the other two officers were dressed in their police uniforms.

{¶4} Upon re-entering the business, Corporal Morgan asked, “Who drives a

white car that was racing him earlier?” (Id. at 39). R.C. responded that he was the

driver and admitted he had been “testing” the vehicle. (Id.). During this exchange,

R.C. also admitted he was driving with an expired temporary permit and without a

supervising adult.

{¶5} Corporal Morgan further testified that he did not read either juvenile

their Miranda rights prior to questioning. When asked why, Morgan responded that

he was “not investigating a criminal offense,” he was “investigating a traffic

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

violation.” (Id. at 57). He testified that, during questioning, the juveniles were free

to leave because he “was still investigating the case” and that they were able to go

back to work after he finished. (Id.). Following the consolidated suppression

hearing, the trial court denied R.G.’s and R.C.’s motions to suppress.

{¶6} Thereafter, the trial court adjudicated R.G. and R.C. as juvenile traffic

offenders, finding that both violated R.C. 4511.20 and that R.C. additionally

violated R.C. 4507.05(F)(1). In dispositional entries filed on September 24, 2025,

the trial court suspended R.G.’s and R.C.’s probationary driver’s licenses and

ordered them to pay court costs, fees, and a $50.00 fine for each charge.

{¶7} R.G. and R.C.filed their notices of appeal on October 16, 2025. They

raise one assignment of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The Union County Juvenile Court erred in not suppressing the
statements made by the appellants when they were questioned by
Officer Morgan without the benefit of having first been given a
Miranda warnitg [sic].

{¶8} In their sole assignment of error, R.G. and R.C. argue that the trial court

erred by denying their motions to suppress statements that they made to law

enforcement. Specifically, they contend that they were deprived of their freedom

of action in a significant way, rendering the encounter a custodial interrogation that

required Miranda warnings prior to being questioned by Corporal Morgan. They

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

argue in the alternative that their statements were involuntarily induced because the

police-dominated atmosphere overbore their wills.

Standard of Review

{¶9} Our review of a juvenile court’s denial of a motion to suppress involves

mixed questions of law and fact. State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8; In re A.P.,

2018-Ohio-3423, ¶ 26 (12th Dist.). At a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes

the role of trier of fact and, as such, is in the best position to evaluate the evidence

and the credibility of witnesses. Burnside at ¶ 8. See also State v. Carter, 72 Ohio

St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, “an

appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if they are supported by

competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8. With respect to the trial court’s

conclusions of law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must

independently determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id.

Analysis

{¶10} “The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article

I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution ensure that no person shall be forced to be a

witness against himself in a criminal proceeding.” In re A.S., 2020-Ohio-5490, ¶ 20

(10th Dist.). “In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that to protect

against the inherent risk of coercion during a custodial interrogation, procedural

safeguards are needed to ensure the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.”

Id., citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). “‘“Juveniles are entitled

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

both to protection against compulsory self-incrimination under the Fifth

Amendment and to Miranda warnings where applicable.”’” In re J.S., 2016-Ohio-

255, ¶ 10 (3d Dist.), quoting In re K.W., 2009-Ohio-3152, ¶ 12 (3d Dist.), quoting

State v. Thompson, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 269, *8 (7th Dist. Jan 24, 2001).

{¶11} “‘[W]hen an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of

his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning,

the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized.’” Id. at ¶ 11, quoting

Miranda at 478. “‘[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory

or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it

demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege

against self-incrimination.’” Id., quoting Miranda at 444. “‘Police are not required

to administer Miranda warnings to every person they question.’” Id., quoting In re

R.S., 2014-Ohio-3543, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.). “Rather, a police officer is required to

administer Miranda warnings only where the individual questioned is subject to

‘custodial interrogation.’” Id., quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 16.

{¶12} “A custodial interrogation is defined as ‘“questioning initiated by law

enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise

deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.”’” In re A.S. at ¶ 20,

quoting In re D.B., 2018-Ohio-1247, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.), quoting Miranda at 444.

“Accordingly, ‘[a] suspect in police custody “must be warned prior to any

questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney,

and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any

questioning if he so desires.”’” Id., quoting State v. Lather, 2006-Ohio-4477, ¶ 6,

quoting Miranda at 479.

{¶13} “‘[T]o determine whether a person is in custody for purposes of

receiving Miranda warnings, courts must first inquire into the circumstances

surrounding the questioning and, second, given those circumstances, determine

whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was not at liberty to

terminate the interview and leave.’” Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Hoffner, 2004-

Ohio-3430, ¶ 27. “‘The first inquiry is distinctly factual.’” In re J.S. at ¶ 12, quoting

In re R.S. at ¶ 17. “‘Once the factual circumstances surrounding the interrogation

are reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve “the ultimate

inquiry” of whether there was a “‘formal arrest or restraint on freedom of

movement’ of the degree associated with a formal arrest.”’” Id., quoting Hoffner at

¶ 27, quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983), quoting Oregon v.

Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). Generally, “‘[t]he subjective views harbored

by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned are of no

consequence in the Miranda analysis.’” Id., quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 17. See also In

re S.W., 2022-Ohio-854, ¶ 23 (1st Dist.) (“Although a police officer’s intent may be

relevant, the ultimate inquiry is whether the officer should have known that the

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

suspect ‘would suddenly be moved to make a self-incriminating response.’”),

quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980).

{¶14} To determine whether a reasonable person would have believed they

were free to leave, this court has previously found the following factors relevant:

(1) the location of the questioning, and whether it occurred in a comfortable, familiar

environment rather than a restrictive one; (2) whether the defendant was a suspect

when the interview began, though Miranda is not required simply because an

investigation has focused on the individual; (3) whether the defendant’s freedom to

leave was restricted in any way; (4) whether the defendant was handcuffed or told

they were under arrest; (5) whether threats were made during the interrogation; (6)

whether the defendant was physically intimidated; (7) whether the police verbally

dominated the interrogation; (8) the defendant’s purpose for being at the location,

such as whether they were there independently or brought there by police; (9)

whether neutral parties were present during the questioning; and (10) whether police

took any action to overpower, trick, or coerce the defendant into making a statement.

State v. Carter, 2010-Ohio-5189, ¶ 23 (3d Dist.).

{¶15} Moreover, “‘the United States Supreme Court held that a juvenile’s

age may be considered in the Miranda analysis, so long as the juvenile’s age was

known to the officer at the time of questioning or would have been objectively

apparent to a reasonable officer.’” In re J.S. at ¶ 13, quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 18, citing

J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 271-272 (2011). “‘While a juvenile’s age

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

may be considered in the Miranda custody analysis, the Supreme Court cautioned

that “this does not mean that a child’s age will be a determinative, or even a

significant, factor in every case . . . .”’” Id., quoting In re R.S. at ¶ 18, citing J.D.B.

at syllabus.

{¶16} “An individual temporarily detained as part of a routine traffic or

investigatory stop ordinarily is not ‘in custody’ and is not, therefore, entitled to

Miranda warnings.” State v. Hambrick, 2016-Ohio-3395, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.), quoting

State v. Farris, 2006-Ohio-3255, ¶ 13, citing Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,

439-440 (1984). “Thus, ‘most traffic stops and accompanying investigatory

questioning do not constitute custodial interrogations warranting the right to

Miranda warnings.’” Id., quoting State v. Brocker, 2015-Ohio-3412, ¶ 17 (11th

Dist.). “However, during a traffic or investigative stop circumstances may change

and render an individual ‘in custody’ for practical purposes and, thus, ‘“entitled to

the full panoply of protections prescribed by Miranda.”’” Id., quoting Farris at ¶

13, quoting Berkemer at 440.

{¶17} “‘Separate from the issue of compliance with Miranda in custodial

interrogations is the voluntariness of the pretrial statement.’” In re J.S. at ¶ 14,

quoting In re R.L., 2014-Ohio-5065, ¶ 21 (2d Dist.). “‘Even where Miranda

warnings are not required, “a confession may [still] be involuntary [and excludable]

if on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s will was overcome by the

circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession.”’” Id., quoting In re

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25- 41

N.J.M., 2010 -Ohio-5526, ¶ 18 (12th Dist.), quoting State v. Fille, 2002-Ohio-3879,

¶ 15 (12th Dist.).

{¶18} When assessing whether a juvenile’s pretrial statement was

“involuntarily induced, a court must look at the totality of circumstances, which

include, ‘the age, mentality, and prior criminal experience of the accused; the length,

intensity, and frequency of interrogation; the existence of physical deprivation or

mistreatment; and the existence of threat or inducement.’” In re N.J.M. at ¶ 19,

quoting State v. Frazier, 2007-Ohio-5048, ¶ 112. “Also, juvenile courts must be

aware that ‘special caution’ should be given to a review of a juvenile’s pretrial

statement, admission or confession.” Id., quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45 (1967).

“Although arguably subsumed within the totality of circumstances analysis, a

prerequisite to a finding of involuntariness is the presence of coercive police

activity.” Id. at ¶ 20. “Coercive law enforcement tactics may include, but are not

limited to, physical abuse, threats, deprivation of food, medical treatment or sleep,

use of certain psychological techniques, exertion of improper influences or direct or

implied promises, and deceit.” Id.

{¶19} In this case, the trial court denied R.G.’s and R.C.’s motions to

suppress after determining that their encounters with law enforcement were not

custodial interrogations. In particular, the trial court concluded that, because the

questioning was brief, unrestrained, and occurred in the juveniles’ workplace,

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

Miranda warnings were unnecessary and R.G.’s and R.C.’s statements were

voluntary.

{¶20} On appeal, R.G. and R.C. challenge the trial court’s denial of their

motions to suppress, arguing that their respective encounters with law enforcement

escalated into custodial interrogations. Specifically, the juveniles contend that they

were deprived of their freedom of action in a significant way when Corporal Morgan

isolated R.G. in the parking lot to confront him with video evidence, and

subsequently surrounded R.C. inside the business with two additional uniformed

officers to ask an inherently accusatory question. R.G. and R.C. contend that, given

the totality of these circumstances and accounting for their ages as juveniles, a

reasonable child would not have felt at liberty to terminate the interviews or leave

the premises. Consequently, they assert that the failure to provide Miranda

warnings renders their subsequent admissions inadmissible. Alternatively, R.G. and

R.C. argue that, even if the encounters are deemed non-custodial, their statements

must still be suppressed as involuntarily induced. They contend that the totality of

the circumstances—particularly the coercive effect of the police-dominated

atmosphere and their vulnerability as minors—overbore their wills.

{¶21} Based on our review of the record, we conclude that Corporal

Morgan’s questioning of R.G. and R.C. did not constitute a custodial interrogation.

Critically, a review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounters

reflects that they did not take place in an environment which restricted their freedom

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

to depart. Specifically, the questioning occurred in a familiar place—the juveniles’

place of employment. See State v. Smith, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 2426, *6 (10th

Dist. Jun. 3, 1997) (concluding that questioning a suspect at their place of

employment is generally not tantamount to a custodial interrogation because it lacks

the inherently coercive nature of a police station).

{¶22} Furthermore, the duration of the questioning was exceedingly brief

and lacked the physical restraints traditionally associated with a formal arrest.

Indeed, Corporal Morgan did not draw his weapon, place R.G. or R.C. in handcuffs,

or secure them in the back of a police cruiser. While we recognize that the presence

of three uniformed officers and the targeted nature of Corporal Morgan’s questions

weigh slightly in favor of custody, these factors alone do not transform an

investigatory encounter into a custodial interrogation. See United States v. Saylor,

705 Fed.Appx. 369, 375 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting that a noncustodial conversation is

not transformed into a custodial interrogation simply because law enforcement

confronted a suspect with evidence of their guilt); Hambrick, 2016-Ohio-3395, at ¶

17 (4th Dist.) (explaining that an officer’s subjective suspicion or unarticulated plan

to investigate a specific offense has no bearing on whether a suspect is objectively

in custody and does not automatically trigger Miranda).

{¶23} Importantly, the record contains no evidence that the officers

physically blocked the juveniles’ paths to exit, utilized deceptive interrogation

tactics, or subjected them to any threats or physical deprivation. See In re J.S., 2016-

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

Ohio-255, at ¶ 31 (3d Dist.) (“Aside from telling J.S. that they wanted the truth,

Graff and the fire investigators did not threaten or coerce J.S.”). Moreover, instead

of a prolonged or coercive interrogation, the juveniles made their incriminating

statements within the first few moments of the encounters in response to brief,

investigatory questions. Finally, while R.G. and R.C. were 16 and 17 years old,

their ages are not determinative of an unusual vulnerability to police questioning, as

both were gainfully employed and entrusted to manage a commercial business

without on-site supervision. Accordingly, we conclude that R.G. and R.C. were not

subjected to a custodial interrogation, and law enforcement was not required to

administer Miranda warnings prior to questioning them.

{¶24} Having determined that the encounters were non-custodial, we now

turn to R.G. and R.C.’s alternative argument that their statements were nonetheless

involuntarily induced. Applying the requisite “special caution” to our review of the

juveniles’ statements, we conclude that the record does not support the contention

that their wills were overborne by the circumstances surrounding their confessions.

{¶25} Decisively, the record is devoid of any coercive police activity. As we

previously addressed, Corporal Morgan and the assisting officers did not engage in

physical abuse or threats, nor did they subject the juveniles to any physical

deprivation of food, medical treatment, or sleep. Moreover, straightforward

investigatory questioning—such as confronting R.G. with the bystander video,

asking R.C. who drove the white Honda, and generally encouraging honesty—does

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

not amount to psychological manipulation, deceit, or an improper implied promise

of leniency. See In re N.J.M., 2010-Ohio-5526, at ¶ 24 (12th Dist.) (noting that

general promises to help a defendant if they talk are not improper inducements so

long as no specific promises are made).

{¶26} Furthermore, the remaining factors under the totality of the

circumstances test weigh heavily in favor of voluntariness. The length and intensity

of the questioning were minimal, the encounters took place in the familiar

surroundings of the juveniles’ own workplace, and their ages and mentality did not

suggest an unusual vulnerability to police questioning. Therefore, given the brevity

of the encounters, the familiar setting, the maturity level of the juveniles, and the

complete absence of coercive law enforcement tactics, R.G.’s and R.C.’s pretrial

statements were voluntary.

{¶27} Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err by denying

R.G.’s and R.C.’s motions to suppress.

{¶28} R.G. and R.C.’s assignment of error is overruled.

{¶29} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Judgments Affirmed

WILLAMOWSKI and WALDICK, J.J., concur.

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Case Nos. 14-25-40, 14-25-41

JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgments of the

trial court are affirmed with costs assessed to Appellants for which judgment is

hereby rendered. The causes are hereby remanded to the trial court for execution

of the judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

DATED:
/hls

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