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March 30, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In The Matter Of The Detention Of I.h.

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 87109-9

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (4.9K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Detention of:
No. 87109-9-I
I.H.
DIVISION ONE

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

BUI, J. — I.H. 1 appeals the trial court’s 14-day involuntary treatment order.

He claims for the first time on appeal that his appearance via video violates his

constitutional right to due process and that the trial court totally disregarded the

requirements of the “Involuntary Treatment Act” (ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. Even if

the error was of constitutional magnitude, the error was not manifest.

Accordingly, we affirm. 2

FACTS

A court evaluator at Fairfax Hospital filed a petition for a 14-day

involuntary treatment pursuant to the ITA, alleging that I.H. suffered from a

mental health disorder, and as a result, presented a likelihood of harm to self, to

others, and was gravely disabled. Subsequently, a probable cause hearing was

held to determine the merits of the petition. I.H., his attorney, and the State’s

The appellant’s brief refers to I.H. using “he/him” pronouns, while I.H. stated at
1

the probable cause hearing that they prefer “they/them” pronouns. We refer to I.H. by
“he/him” pronouns for clarity. We intend no disrespect.
2
Because an involuntary commitment order may have adverse collateral
consequences on future involuntary commitment determinations, this case is not moot
even though the commitment order has since expired. See In re Det. of M.K., 168 Wn.
App. 621, 629, 279 P.3d 897 (2012); RCW 71.05.245(3).
No. 87109-9-I/2

witness Anita Vallee, a Fairfax Hospital court evaluator, appeared from a hearing

room located at Fairfax Hospital. The court commissioner appeared from a

courtroom in King County Superior Court. The State’s other two witnesses, a

Washington State Patrol Trooper and a court evaluator for Evergreen Hospital,

Hyemin Song, appeared via video from locations not reflected in the record.

The State’s three witnesses testified in support of I.H.’s involuntary

commitment. The trooper described I.H.’s “overall nature,” as “out of normal”

when he contacted I.H. near a busy roadway. He observed I.H. not wearing

socks, shoes, or a shirt. The trooper noted I.H. made unusual statements, such

as asking why the trooper did not shoot him, and mentioning “being burned

because it would hurt more.” Court evaluator Song testified that during I.H.’s

evaluation, I.H. “focused on pinching himself to cause pain,” and he verbally

expressed “violent actions, such as punching people in the face.” Song also

stated I.H. was actively responding to internal stimuli that told him to hurt himself.

Court evaluator Vallee observed I.H. had poor hygiene and grooming. Vallee

described I.H.’s behavior as “erratic and aggressive,” and stated I.H. punched

medical staff in the face multiple times necessitating chemical restraints to be

administered.

During the proceeding, I.H. made numerous requests, objections, and

statements, including requests about vaping, for court recesses and attorney

consultations, and statements about the courtroom video and participants. I.H.

also objected during witness testimony and attorney arguments. The trial court

and I.H.’s attorney selectively addressed I.H.’s requests and objections. We

2
No. 87109-9-I/3

elaborate on the nature of I.H.’s requests, statements, and objections and the

trial court’s responses in the analysis set forth below.

The trial court concluded I.H. was gravely disabled, posed a serious risk of

harm to others, and ordered I.H. involuntarily committed for 14 days. I.H. timely

appealed.

ANALYSIS

The ITA provides the statutory framework for involuntary detention and

treatment of individuals who, as a result of their mental disorders, present an

imminent likelihood of serious harm or is in imminent danger because of being

gravely disabled. See generally RCW 71.05; RCW 71.05.230; RCW

71.05.020(18). Individuals may be detained at an evaluation and treatment

facility for up to 120 hours pending further evaluation for treatment. RCW

71.05.180. The individual is released after the initial 120 hours unless medical

professionals petition the court to involuntary hold the person for up to 14 days.

RCW 71.05.210; RCW 71.05.240(1). The petition must contain facts to support

that the person, as a result of the behavioral disorder, presents a likelihood of

serious harm to self or others, or is gravely disabled. RCW 71.05.230(4)(b).

The court conducts a hearing on the petition to determine if a 14-day

commitment will be ordered for additional treatment. RCW 71.05.240(1). When

construing the requirements of the ITA, courts must focus on the merits of the

petition with a presumption in favor of deciding petitions on their merits, except

where requirements have been totally disregarded. RCW 71.05.010(2).

The term “totally disregarded” is not statutorily defined. See generally

3
No. 87109-9-I/4

RCW 71.05.020. In In re Det. of D.H., 1 Wn.3d 764, 776-77, 533 P.3d 97 (2023),

the court discussed the definitions and reasoning in the civil commitment context.

The court in D.H. turned to the dictionary definitions to discern their meaning.

D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 777. The dictionary definition of “disregard” means “to treat

without fitting respect or attention,” “to treat as unworthy of regard or notice,” and

“to give no thought to: pay no attention.” D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 777 (quoting

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 655 (2002)). Whereas “totally”

means, “in a total manner: completely, wholly.” 3 D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 777 (quoting

WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2415 (2002)).

In its reliance on these definitions and analogous reasoning, the court

stated that total disregard is “not a mere oversight but amounts to a complete

failure to treat the ITA with respect or attention.” 4 D.H., 1 Wn.3d at 777. The

requirements of the ITA are not totally disregarded in every case where some

aspect of the act has been violated. In re Det. of A.C., 1 Wn.3d 731, 745, 533

P.3d 81 (2023).

I.H. claims his 14-day involuntary commitment order should be dismissed

because the trial court totally disregarded his requests for an in-person

proceeding. We disagree because I.H. did not make a clear request to appear in-

person.

Any motion for an in-person proceeding should be unequivocal and

supported by good cause. See, e.g., RCW 71.05.820 (the court, upon its own

3
Emphasis omitted.
4
Emphasis added.

4
No. 87109-9-I/5

motion or upon a motion for good cause by any party, may require all parties and

witnesses to participate in the hearing in person rather than by video); State v.

Curry, 191 Wn.2d 475, 480, 423 P.3d 179 (2018) (a defendant’s waiver of the

right to counsel and request to proceed pro se must be unequivocal). Whether a

statement is unequivocal is fact specific and highly contextual. See, e.g., Curry,

191 Wn.2d at 494 (“The record gives no indication that Curry’s request [to waive

his right to counsel] was inadvertent or accidental . . .”); see also State v.

Thompson, 169 Wn. App. 436, 451-53, 290 P.3d 996 (2012) (analyzed

appellant’s trial testimony in conjunction with his pro se motion to determine

whether his motion was unequivocal).

I.H. argues he requested to appear in person by making these statements

at various times during the hearing: “I’d . . . prefer[5] to be in the courtroom,” “I

wanted[6] to be in the courtroom to talk,” and “I would[7] rather be there in person.”

These were not clear requests because the use of “prefer” and “would rather be”

indicate I.H.’s preferences rather than his demands. His statement “I wanted to

be in the courtroom to talk” 8 is closer to a demand, but still is not clear, given his

other requests that do demonstrate his clear demands.

For example, throughout the proceedings, I.H. demanded a vape. He

stated, “I need a vape” 9 twice, “I wanted to vape the whole time,” 10 and “I have to

5
Emphasis added.
6
Emphasis added.
7
Emphasis added.
8
Emphasis added.
9
Emphasis added.
10
Emphasis added.

5
No. 87109-9-I/6

have a vape.”11 I.H.’s requests for a vape are unequivocal compared to all three

requests for an in-person proceeding. Additionally, there were other topics I.H.

was clear about, including requests to the trial court for recesses, for time to

speak to his attorney privately, and to use “they/them” pronouns when

addressing him.

Given I.H.’s unequivocal statements about other topics, it was not obvious

to the trial court that I.H. requested to appear in person for the proceeding.

We also look at how the trial court and I.H.’s attorney addressed the

requests and statements in the determination of whether the court “total[ly]

disregard[ed]” the ITA. The trial court appropriately addressed I.H.’s numerous

requests and interjections that were not substantively or procedurally relevant to

the ITA proceeding. In addition to the consistent vape demands, I.H. repeatedly

interjected during witness testimony and interrupted the State’s closing

argument. Some of these interjections include asking whether witness Song was

a “pizza delivery guy,” correcting testimony about medication history by stating, “I

have also taken Xanax, as prescribed. It was put into my macaroni and cheese

as a child,” and disagreeing with the State’s statement that he was unkempt, “I

keep my room clean.” In response, the trial court either thanked him, continued

with the proceeding, or reminded I.H. to wait for his turn to speak. The trial court,

on its own initiative, addressed I.H.’s interruptions by offering paper and pencil

for I.H. to write things he wished to discuss with his attorney.

The trial court was also attentive when I.H. made requests or statements

11
Emphasis added.

6
No. 87109-9-I/7

about matters relevant to the proceeding. For example, when I.H. requested a

bathroom recess, the trial court immediately granted the request. Moreover, after

I.H. stated he preferred “they/them” pronouns, the trial court referred to I.H. using

“they/them” pronouns and the honorific “Mx.” for the remainder of the proceeding.

The trial court also entertained I.H.’s attorney’s requests on behalf of I.H.

For instance, the trial court granted I.H.’s attorney’s request for I.H. to take a

second bathroom recess within 15 to 20 minutes of the first. Another recess was

granted after the trial court clarified with I.H. that his statement “So, I’m speaking

to my attorney privately” was a request to speak to his attorney.

In summary, the trial court addressed I.H.’s relevant, clear requests for

recesses and pronoun preferences, acknowledged his courtroom behavior, but

selectively did not address his superfluous objections and requests for a vape,

and responded to all his attorney’s requests. Given the trial court’s attention to

I.H. and his attorney during the proceeding, even if the court ignored the

requests, it was not to the level of total disregard required to demonstrate a

statutory violation.

Next, I.H. claims that holding the proceeding via video violated his due

process rights. We disagree.

An “appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not

raised in the trial court.” RAP 2.5(a). However, we may review an assignment of

error raised for the first time on appeal when the claimed error concerns a

“ ‘manifest error affecting a constitutional right.’ ” State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91,

98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009) (quoting RAP 2.5(a)(3)). To satisfy these requirements,

7
No. 87109-9-I/8

the appellant must demonstrate (1) the error is manifest, and (2) the error is truly

of constitutional dimension. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 98.

I.H. maintains that he had a federal due process right to be physically

present on request at his commitment hearing and that RCW 71.05.820

unconstitutionally abridges that right by conditioning an ITA respondent’s

physical presence at commitment hearing upon a showing of good cause. The

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution forbids the State from

“depriv[ing] any person of . . . liberty . . . without due process of law.” U.S. CONST.

amend. XIV. “[I]involuntary commitment to a mental hospital . . . is a deprivation

of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process of law.”

O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 45 L. Ed. 2d 396

(1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Thus, I.H. alleges an error affecting a

constitutional right.

Under RAP 2.5(a)(3), “manifest” “ ‘requires a showing of actual

prejudice,’ ” which means demonstrating a “ ‘plausible showing . . . that the

asserted error had practical and identifiable consequences’ ” in the proceeding.

O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99 -100 12 (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 935,

155 P.3d 125 (2007)). In determining “whether an error is practical and

identifiable, the appellate court must place itself in the shoes of the trial court to

ascertain whether, given what the trial court knew at that time, the court could

have corrected the error.” O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 100. “ ‘If the facts necessary to

adjudicate the claimed error are not in the record on appeal, no actual prejudice

12
Internal quotation marks omitted.

8
No. 87109-9-I/9

is shown and the error is not manifest.’ ” O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at 99 (quoting State

v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 333, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995)). I.H’s asserted error

does not satisfy the RAP 2.5(a)(3) requirements.

I.H. contends the following statements demonstrate he had difficulty

perceiving and participating in the proceeding: “I’m not in a . . . courtroom. . . . I’m

in a hospital, and I’m looking at a courtroom,” “My screen is a lot more buggy,

because I’m not actually in the courtroom. I’d . . . prefer to be in the courtroom,”

and “I can’t see my jury . . . .”

While I.H. may have expressed confusion about courtroom orientation and

the participants in the proceeding, the apparent confusion is neither related to his

mental illness nor the main symptoms therefrom. The ITA petition and witness

testimony primarily cited I.H.’s behavior issues. I.H. punched medical staff in the

face multiple times with a closed fist, struck fire personnel on the arm, presented

as disheveled and unable to care for himself, and made suicidal statements.

Additionally, medical professionals connected I.H.’s aggressive and assaultive

behavior to his response to internal stimuli, a symptom of his schizophrenia. The

stimuli reportedly told him to hurt others and himself. There is nothing in the

record that connects I.H.’s mental illness to interference with his perception or

interaction with technology.

In fact, even when appearing via video, I.H.’s behavior shows his mental

health struggles did not limit his courtroom participation. He was able to track and

listen to witnesses and both counsels, as evidenced by his timely objections and

corrections. For example, during the State’s closing argument, I.H. objected to

9
No. 87109-9-I/10

counsel’s statement that a “police officer” contacted him on the side of the road;

he insisted it was a “fire department person.” When I.H.’s attorney directed him to

remain silent, he responded, “if I object, she has to stop talking right?”

Additionally, I.H. objected to the trooper’s description of him wearing a “black t-

shirt with red lettering” by immediately correcting “It was gray.” The record does

not support that the video platform actually prejudiced I.H. Therefore, the claimed

due process error was not manifest. We decline to reach the merits of I.H.’s.

constitutional arguments.

We affirm.

WE CONCUR:

10