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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Eric J Vonderheide v. Carrie J Vonderheide

Indiana Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25A-DC-01943
• Panel: Paul D. Mathias, Nancy H. Vaidik
• Judges: Vaidik, Mathias, Pyle III

• Disposition: Dismissed

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (27.5K)

• PDF

Disposition

Dismissed

Combined Opinion

                        by [Paul D. Mathias](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7268/paul-d-mathias/)

IN THE

Court of Appeals of Indiana
Eric Vonderheide, FILED
Appellant-Respondent Mar 26 2026, 8:52 am

CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
v. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

Carrie Weisman-Vonderheide,
Appellee-Petitioner

March 26, 2026
Court of Appeals Case No.
25A-DC-1943
Appeal from the Dubois Superior Court
The Honorable Anthony D. Quinn, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
19D01-1710-DC-607

Opinion by Judge Mathias
Judge Pyle concurs.
Judge Vaidik dissents with a separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 1 of 15
Mathias, Judge.

[1] Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A)(1) permits interlocutory appeals as a matter of

right over orders for “the payment of money.” The exact parameters of such

orders have caused confusion among practitioners and panels of our Court

alike. We therefore clarify that, to secure appellate jurisdiction under Rule

14(A)(1), what matters is less about the specific wording of the order and more

about what the order does: if the order demands a party to surrender money

without determining the entire controversy, a party may seek interlocutory

review of that order under Rule 14(A)(1). As the order in this appeal simply

identifies a debt one party owes to the other and does not demand that the

debtor pay that debt prior to the entry of final judgment, we dismiss this appeal

without prejudice.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] Husband and Wife married in 1996 and have three children. When Wife filed a

petition for dissolution of the marriage in 2017, Husband was still actively

employed with the United States Army. Prior to the final hearing, the parties

entered into a settlement agreement, which provided in relevant part that Wife

would receive “1/2 of [Husband’s] U.S. Army retirement pension upon the

time of his taking of such benefit.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 18. The trial

court adopted the settlement agreement and incorporated it into the final

decree, which the court issued in January 2020.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 2 of 15
[3] In June 2023, Husband retired from the Army. Wife had attempted to file the

necessary paperwork with the Defense Finance Accounting Service (“DFAS”)

to set up direct payments of one-half of Husband’s retirement benefits directly

to her, to no avail. And Husband refused to pay Wife one-half of the payments

he received.

[4] Accordingly, Wife sought to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement and to

hold Husband in contempt. Specifically, Wife filed a “Motion to Enforce Order

on Dissolution Agreement and Rule to Show Cause.” Appellee’s App. Vol. 2,

p. 2 (some capitalization removed). The trial court bifurcated its consideration

of Wife’s motion. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 10. Thus, following an initial

hearing, the trial court found that, “beginning in June 2023, [Wife] should have

received monthly benefits from [Husband’s] retirement pension in the amount

of $1,619.50. As of 7/1/25, [Husband] is in arrears in the amount of

$40,487.50.” Id. at 14 (“the Arrearage Order”). The court then set a future

hearing date, which has yet to be held, to discern if Husband should be held in

contempt, apparently for his nonpayment of the arrearage.

[5] This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision
[6] As three Justices of our Supreme Court have recently reminded us, we have a

continuing obligation to determine, sua sponte if necessary, whether the parties

before us have properly secured our jurisdiction. See Allen v. Anonymous

Physician, ___ N.E.3d ___, 2026 WL 504121, at *1 (Slaughter, J., reluctantly

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 3 of 15
concurring in the denial of transfer “despite the lack of jurisdiction” under our

Appellate Rules); id. at *6-7 (Molter, J., concurring in the denial of transfer,

with Rush, C.J., joining, noting that “it appears” the appeal was without

“appellate jurisdiction”). We are obliged to do so in this case.

[7] Our Supreme Court has explained:

Absent certain exceptions, the Court of Appeals may exercise
jurisdiction only over final judgments and certain interlocutory
orders. Chitwood v. Guadagnoli, 230 N.E.3d 932, 939 n.4 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2024) (citing App. R. 5). A final appealable order is one
that disposes of “all issues as to all parties, ending the particular
case and leaving nothing for future determination.” Ramsey v.
Moore, 959 N.E.2d 246, 251 (Ind. 2012). An “interlocutory
order,” by contrast, refers to a judgment “made before a final
hearing on the merits” and which “requires something to be done
or observed but does not determine the entire controversy.” Bacon
v. Bacon, 877 N.E.2d 801, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.
A party may appeal certain interlocutory orders (e.g., for the
payment of money) as a matter of right. App. R. 14(A). All other
interlocutory orders require trial-court certification to authorize
the appeal and acceptance by the Court of Appeals. App. R.
14(B). However, even “non-appealable interlocutory rulings
merge into the final judgment and are subject to appellate review
through an appeal from the final judgment.” Matter of Adoption of
A.E., 191 N.E.3d 952, 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied.

O’Connell v. Clay, 267 N.E.3d 994, 999-1000 (Ind. 2025).

[8] In his notice of appeal, Husband alleged that the Arrearage Order was a final

judgment. It was not. Wife filed a singular motion to enforce the dissolution

agreement and to show cause against Husband. The trial court bifurcated its

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 4 of 15
consideration of Wife’s motion. In particular, the court first held an evidentiary

hearing to determine if Husband owed an arrearage to Wife under the

dissolution agreement. That hearing resulted in the Arrearage Order. The court

then set a separate hearing, which has yet to be held, to determine if Husband

should be held in contempt for the arrearage. Thus, the component of Wife’s

motion in which she requested to hold Husband in contempt remains pending

in the trial court, and Husband’s statement in his notice of appeal that he is

appealing from a final judgment is incorrect. 1

[9] We thus turn to whether the Arrearage Order might be an appealable

interlocutory order. The shift away from a final judgment to an interlocutory

order is significant. As we have explained:

Our scope of review in interlocutory appeals is limited to the
interlocutory order on appeal. As our Supreme Court has said,
“an interlocutory appeal raises every issue presented by the order
that is the subject of the appeal.” Tom-Wat, Inc. v. Fink, 741
N.E.2d 343, 346 (Ind. 2001) (emphasis added). Such appeals are
not vehicles through which one may attack the trial court

1
The dissent emphasizes that the Arrearage Order also ordered the parties to pay their own attorneys’ fees,
and the dissent concludes that no issues remain pending before the trial court because, by implication from its
order on the fees, the trial court must have found Husband to not be in contempt. However, the Arrearage
Order itself does not dispose of the still-pending contempt issue; to the contrary, the order expressly sets the
Show Cause hearing for a future, and still-pending, date. We accept the trial court’s chosen language at face
value rather than imply that the bifurcated future hearing date must be for some reason other than to consider
the merits of Wife’s Show Cause request. Moreover, even if we thought this case to be a close call under
Appellate Rule 14(A)(1), we would still conclude dismissal without prejudice to be the most prudent course
given the requirement that we strictly apply our jurisdictional exceptions to trial court finality. Our sua sponte
consideration of whether we have jurisdiction is far from “unnecessary”; it is required by established
precedent of our Supreme Court. See, e.g., Allen, ___ N.E.3d at ___ (Slaughter, J., and Molter, J., with Rush,
C.J., joining, writing separately with respect to the denial of transfer).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 5 of 15
proceedings as a whole and without regard to the order on
appeal. See id.

DuSablon v. Jackson Cnty. Bank, 132 N.E.3d 69, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans.

denied. Thus, our consideration of our possible jurisdiction over the Arrearage

Order is limited to the face of the order itself. See id.

[10] There is no question that Husband has not secured our jurisdiction under

Indiana Appellate Rule 14(B). We therefore consider whether the Arrearage

Order might be appealable as a matter of right under Rule 14(A). Appellate

Rule 14(A) provides:

Appeals from the following interlocutory orders are taken as a
matter of right by filing a Notice of Appeal with the Clerk within
thirty (30) days after the notation of the interlocutory order in the
Chronological Case Summary:

(1) For the payment of money;

(2) To compel the execution of any document;

(3) To compel the delivery or assignment of any securities,
evidence of debt, documents or things in action;

(4) For the sale or delivery of the possession of real property;

(5) Granting or refusing to grant, dissolving, or refusing to
dissolve a preliminary injunction;

(6) Appointing or refusing to appoint a receiver, or revoking or
refusing to revoke the appointment of a receiver;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 6 of 15
(7) For a writ of habeas corpus not otherwise authorized to be
taken directly to the Supreme Court;

(8) Transferring or refusing to transfer a case under Trial Rule 75;
and

(9) Issued by an Administrative Agency that by statute is
expressly required to be appealed as a mandatory interlocutory
appeal.

[11] As we have long recognized, Appellate Rule 14(A) is an extraordinary and

limited exception to the general rule that requires complete finality in the trial

court in order to secure appellate jurisdiction. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Scroghan,

801 N.E.2d 191, 193 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citation omitted), trans. denied. As an

exception to our general rule of jurisdiction, our authority to hear interlocutory

appeals under Rule 14(A) is to be “strictly construed, and any attempt to perfect

an appeal without such authorization warrants a dismissal.” Id.

[12] Judge Vaidik’s opinion for a unanimous panel of our Court in Scroghan is a

helpful example of how to understand Rule 14(A). As she explained:

Because [the appellant] will be forced to expend money to
comply [with the order on appeal], it claims that the order
actually is one for the payment of money [under Rule 14(A)(1)].
We disagree. If we were to accept [that] argument, then
any . . . order which would require a party to expend money for
compliance—basically, all orders—would qualify for an
interlocutory appeal as of right. This could not have been the
intent of the rule.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 7 of 15
[The appellant] also claims that it may appeal as a matter of right
under Rule 14(A)(3) because the trial court’s order compels the
delivery of documents [in discovery]. This is a misreading of the
rule. Rule 14(A)(3) pertains to the delivery of documents where
“‘delivery imports a surrender.’” Cua v. Morrison, 600 N.E.2d
951, 955 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (Sullivan, J. concurring) (quoting
W. Union Tel. Co. v. Locke, 107 Ind. 9, 7 N.E. 579, 582 (1886)),
trans. denied. Surrender may occur with such items as securities,
receipts, deeds, leases, or promissory notes. See, e.g., Koch v.
James, 616 N.E.2d 759, 760-61 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (delivery of
stocks), reh’g denied, trans. denied; see also W. Union Tel., 7 N.E. at
582. “‘It is easy to see that the administration of justice might be
seriously embarrassed, and vexatious delays secured, if appeals
could be taken in every case where a written instrument is
ordered to be produced for use as evidence on the trial of the
cause.’” Cua, 600 N.E.2d at 953 (quoting W. Union Tel., 7 N.E. at
582). Thus, in order to seek an interlocutory appeal as of right for
the delivery of a document under Rule 14(A)(3), we find that the
delivery of the document must import a surrender of the document.
Such is not the case here, where the documents sought by [the
appellee] in discovery are a means to prosecuting the
litigation. . . .

Id. at 194 (emphasis added). In other words, Rule 14(A), as its list of applicable

circumstances demonstrates, enables interlocutory review as a matter of right

where the order, if erroneous and left undisturbed, would work an affirmative

and substantial harm on the appealing party if appellate review were to wait

until the entry of final judgment. See id.

[13] Of the various provisions under Rule 14(A), the only possibly applicable

provision here is that the Arrearage Order is an order for the payment of money

under Rule 14(A)(1). In State v. Hogan, our Supreme Court stated that an

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 8 of 15
interlocutory appeal for the “payment of money” means “trial court orders

which carry financial and legal consequences akin to those more typically found in final

judgments.” 582 N.E.2d 824, 825 (Ind. 1991) (emphasis added). Thus, in Mosser

v. Mosser, Judge Najam explained:

A provisional order for the payment of attorney’s fees is not a
money judgment. A provisional order is made before the final
hearing on the merits. A final money judgment, on the other
hand, represents the ultimate determination of the court on the
matter.

A money judgment is entered on the judgment docket and
constitutes a lien on the judgment debtor’s property. For a money
judgment to constitute a lien, it must ordinarily be a final
judgment for the payment of a definite and certain amount of
money. . . . A provisional order for the payment of money is
unliquidated and unenforceable by execution. Stated otherwise, a
provisional order for the payment of attorney’s fees is in fieri and
neither a debt . . . nor a money judgment.

729 N.E.2d 197, 200-01 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis added; citations and

footnote omitted); see also Scroghan, 801 N.E.2d at 194 (recognizing that

interlocutory orders that simply carry financial consequences are insufficient to

invoke our jurisdiction under Rule 14(A)(1)).

[14] One example of an interlocutory order for the payment of money is an order

that requires a party to deposit a bond with the trial court clerk. In Ferguson v.

Estate of Ferguson, we had “little trouble concluding” that such an order

“carrie[d] legal and financial consequences akin to a final judgment,” as the

bond order required one of the parties to be “compelled to part with money”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 9 of 15
pending litigation, even if that party might eventually get some or all of that

money back. 40 N.E.3d 881, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). Another example of an

interlocutory order for the payment of money is a provisional child support

order. Lamon v. Lamon, 611 N.E.2d 154, 155 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (stating

that our jurisdiction over a provisional child support order was secured under

the predecessor to Appellate Rule 14(A)(1)). Such orders typically continue

until finalized into liquid obligations in a final decree of dissolution. See, e.g.,

Mosser, 729 N.E.2d at 200-01.

[15] In 2010, a panel of our Court held that an interlocutory order did not meet the

requirements of Rule 14(A)(1) because the order “did not require [the appellant]

to pay a specific amount at a specific time . . . .” Huber v. Montgomery Cnty.

Sheriff, 940 N.E.2d 1182, 1184-85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). Later, another panel of

our Court held that our jurisdiction under Rule 14(A)(1) was secured by an

order that required the appellant “to pay a specific sum of money by a date

certain.” DuSablon, 132 N.E.3d at 76. 2 But Huber and DuSablon do not say the

same thing. Huber says certain language is required to secure our jurisdiction;

DuSablon says certain language is sufficient.

[16] That distinction has created a lack of clarity. In particular, in Gerth v. Estate of

Bloemer, a panel of our Court distinguished DuSablon and concluded that Rule

14(A)(1) “contains no ‘date certain’ requirement.” 240 N.E.3d 702, 706 n.1

2
The DuSablon panel nonetheless dismissed the appeal as the appellant’s arguments did not pertain to the
order for the payment of money. 132 N.E.3d at 76.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 10 of 15
(Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. not sought. The Gerth panel did not mention Huber,

and it then concluded that, because the order on appeal carried financial

consequences, it was properly before us under Rule 14(A)(1). Id. at 705-06.

[17] We decline to follow the foggy road of Huber and Gerth. We conclude that no

magic language is required under Rule 14(A)(1) to secure our jurisdiction, and

insofar as Huber suggests otherwise, we disagree. However, we also conclude

that, Gerth aside, our case law is best understood as requiring more than

financial consequences to secure our jurisdiction under Rule 14(A)(1). To

secure our jurisdiction under that rule, the interlocutory order must import a

surrender of money akin to a final judgment, and that surrender must be at a

time prior to the entry of final judgment to justify our prompt review. See

Scroghan, 801 N.E.2d at 194; see also Hogan, 582 N.E.2d at 825; Mosser, 729

N.E.2d at 200-01.

[18] The Arrearage Order here causes no such surrender by Husband to Wife. The

order simply identifies a debt that Husband owes to Wife both with respect to

monthly accruals and total arrearage. The order on its face does not demand

Husband begin any payments to Wife prior to finality of the trial court

proceedings, although Husband perhaps has done so for his own reasons.

Finally, we remind judges and attorneys that Appellate Rule 14(B) permits

discretionary interlocutory appeals and requires both permission from the trial

court and approval of the Court of Appeals, a rather rare combination of events.

Accordingly, and strictly applying the jurisdictional exception of Rule 14(A)(1),

we conclude that this appeal should be dismissed.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 11 of 15
[19] Dismissed without prejudice.

Pyle, J., concurs.
Vaidik, J., dissents with a separate opinion.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
John E. Birk
Huntingburg, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Patrick J. Smith
Smith Law Office
Bedford, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 12 of 15
Vaidik, Judge, dissenting.

[20] I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s threshold conclusion that

the order being appealed was interlocutory rather than final.

[21] The original Order on Dissolution Agreement provided that Wife would receive

half of Husband’s Army pension. The order didn’t specify how Wife was to

receive those funds, but when Husband retired in June 2023, Wife initially tried

to get the Department of Defense to pay her directly. When that failed, and

Husband failed to pay on his own, Wife filed a combined “Motion to Enforce

Order on Dissolution Agreement and Rule to Show Cause.” Appellee’s App.

Vol. 2 pp. 2-4. She asked the trial court to order Husband to (1) pay the amount

contemplated by the Order on Dissolution Agreement (including a large

arrearage) and (2) pay the attorney’s fees Wife incurred in bringing the motion

to enforce. The trial court held a hearing on the motion and then, on July 15,

2025, ruled as follows:

Pursuant to the original agreement and beginning in June 2023,
[Wife] should have received monthly benefits from [Husband’s]
retirement pension in the amount of $1,619.50. As of 7/1/25,
[Husband] is in arrears in the amount of $40,487.50. The Court
finds that both parties are to be held responsible for their own
attorney fees. Furthermore, the Court now sets this matter for a
Show Cause hearing on 11/21/2025 at 1:00 p.m.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 14.

[22] Husband appealed, but the majority now dismisses his appeal. My colleagues

conclude that the trial court “bifurcated its consideration of Wife’s motion,”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 13 of 15
that it has ruled on the “Motion to Enforce” part of the motion but not the

“Rule to Show Cause” part of the motion, and that as a result there is no final

judgment. Slip op. ¶¶ 4, 8. That’s not how I read the order. The trial court had

two issues before it. First, when the Department of Defense failed to pay Wife

directly, was Husband required to pay Wife her share? And second, if Husband

was required to pay Wife her share, should he be held in contempt and ordered

to pay Wife’s attorney’s fees? In its order, the court ruled on both questions. On

the first, the court held that Wife should have been receiving $1,619.50 per

month since June 2023 and that Husband is $40,487.50 in arrears. On the

second, the court held that Wife was responsible for her own attorney’s fees,

i.e., that Husband wasn’t in contempt for failing to pay Wife her share of the

pension. This split ruling can be explained by the fact that the original Order on

Dissolution Agreement didn’t expressly require Husband to pay Wife her share,

and all involved seemed to agree that Wife needed to work with the

Department of Defense to get her share. In other words, while the trial court

concluded that Husband should have paid Wife when the Department of

Defense didn’t, it apparently believed that his noncompliance didn’t rise to the

level of contempt of court.

[23] The majority, without acknowledging the denial of Wife’s request for attorney’s

fees, holds that the trial court hasn’t decided whether Husband was in

contempt. But if that were true, the court wouldn’t have denied Wife’s request

for attorney’s fees. After all, the only relief Wife sought in the “Rule to Show

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-DC-1943 | March 26, 2026 Page 14 of 15
Cause” part of her motion was an award of the attorney’s fees she incurred in

bringing the motion.

[24] So why did the trial court schedule a future “Show Cause hearing”? The order

doesn’t make that clear, but presumably the court set the hearing as a

placeholder to check in on Husband’s compliance with its new enforcement

order. That would explain why the court set the hearing more than four months

out rather than finding an earlier date.

[25] Wife must agree, because she doesn’t argue that the trial court’s order wasn’t

final or that we lack jurisdiction or that the appeal should be dismissed. The

majority is correct that we must ensure our own jurisdiction even if the parties

don’t raise the issue. But here, the majority looks for a jurisdictional problem

that doesn’t exist. And having done so, it embarks on an unnecessary

examination of interlocutory appeals under Appellate Rule 14(A)(1)—a topic

that hasn’t been briefed by the parties. For the reasons stated above, I would

find that we have final-judgment jurisdiction under Appellate Rule 5(A), and I

would address the merits of Husband’s appeal.

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