Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke vs Controller Of Patent And Designs

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Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke vs Controller Of Patent And Designs on 9 March, 2026

Author: Bharati Dangre

Bench: Bharati Dangre

2026:BHC-OS:7027-DB

                                           1/49              901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

               IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY
                    ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
               COMMERCIAL APPEAL (L) NO. 13430 OF 2025
                               IN
            COMMERCIAL MISCELLANEOUS PETITION NO. 110 OF
                              2025

           Vishal Prafulsingh Solanke and anr         ..     Appellants
                                  Versus
           Controller of Patent and Designs and ors   ..     Respondents
                                            ...

          Mr. Pranshul Dube a/w Ms. Asma Nadaf, Ms. Maithri Porwal for the
          Appellants.
          Mr. Ashish Mehta a/w Mr. Ashutosh Mishra for Respondent No.1
          Mr. Venkatesh Dhond, Sr. Advocate- Amicus.

                                   CORAM: BHARATI DANGRE &
                                           MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, JJ.
                                   RESERVED ON : 13th FEBRUARY, 2026
                                   PRONOUNCED ON: 9th MARCH, 2026

          JUDGMENT (PER BHARATI DANGRE, J) : -

1. The Commercial Appeal filed by the Appellants raise a challenge to the impugned judgment/ order dated 27/03/2025 passed by the learned Single Judge, in Commercial Miscellaneous Petition (L) No. 25369 of 2023, being filed under Section 117A of the Patents Act, 1970, praying for quashing and setting aside of the order dated 14/06/2023, passed by the Assistant Controller of Patent and Designs refusing the Patent Application No. 879/MUM/2015. Since the impugned order dismissed the Petition, the present Appeal is filed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (for short referred to as "Act of 2015 or CCA").

Ashish

                                  2/49                   901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc 2.       As the Appeal came to be listed before the Division Bench

headed by Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 18/08/2025, the Division
Bench noted thus:-

"1. This appeal under Section 13 (1- A) of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of 2015") has been filed against
an order dated 27th March, 2025 passed in Misc. Appeal under Section
117-A of the Patents Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act of
1970").

1. For the facility of reference Section 117-A of the Act of 1970 and Section 13 of the Act of 2015 are extracted below:-

"117A. Appeals to High Court. -- (1) Save as otherwise expressly
provided in sub-section (2), no appeal shall lie from any decision, order
or direction made or issued under this Act by the Central Government, or
from any act or order of the Controller for the purpose of giving effect to
any such decision, order or direction.

(2) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from any decision, order or
direction of the Controller of Central Government under section 15, section 16, section 17, section 18, section 19, section 20, sub-section (4)
of section 25, section 28, section 51, section 54, section 57, section 60, section 61, section 63, section 66, sub-section (3) of section 69, section
78, sub-sections (1) to (5) of section 84, section 85, section 88, section 91, section 92 and section 94.

(3) Every appeal under this section shall be in the prescribed form
and shall be verified in such manner as may be prescribed and shall be
accompanied by a copy of the decision, order or direction appealed
against and by such fees as may be prescribed.

(4) Every appeal shall be made within three months from the date of
the decision, order or direction, as the case may be, of the Controller or
the Central Government or within such further time as the High Court
may, in accordance with the rules made by it, allow."

"13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and Commercial
Divisions.--(1) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a
Commercial Court below the level of a District Judge may appeal to the
Commercial Appellate Court within a period of sixty days from the date of
judgment or order.

(1-A) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a Commercial
Court at the level of District Judge exercising original civil jurisdiction
or, as the case may be, Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal
to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court within a period
of sixty days from the date of the judgment or order:

Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a
Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically

Ashish

3/49 901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) as amended by this Act and section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from
any order or decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
3. Thus, it is evident that Section 117-A of the Act of 1970 provides for
an appeal to the High Court. From close scrutiny of Section 13 of the Act
of 2015, prima facie, it appears that the same does not provide for an
appeal against an order passed under Section 117-A of the Act of 1970
before this Court in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction.

1. At this stage, learned counsel for the appellants prays for
   adjournment to enable him to examine the aforesaid aspect and to address
   the Court."

2.   On 25/08/2025, taking a prima facie view, it was noted thus:-
   

"1. This Appeal under Section 13 (1- A) of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 has been filed against an order which is passed in an Appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970.

1. The Appeal is a creature of a statute and the statute under which the Appeal is filed needs to provide a right to prefer an Appeal. In the instant case, prima facie, Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 does not permit an Appeal against an order passed in an Appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, 1970." The Court also appointed Mr. Venkatesh Dhond, learned Senior Advocate as Amicus and sought his assistance.

1.   In light of the aforesaid, we have heard learned counsel Mr.
   

   Pranshul Dube for the Appellants, Mr. Ashish Mehta for the
   Controller of Patent and Designs and we also received valuable
   assistance from learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Venkatesh Dhond, who
   has marked his appearance in the wake of the request of his
   assistance.

2.   The Petitioners before the learned Single Judge, preferred a
   

   Patent Application No. 879/mum/2015 on 17/03/2015 for invention

Ashish

                              4/49              901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

titled "THREAD TYPE TAMPER EVIDENT SECURITY SEAL"

which resulted in pre-grant opposition filed by the Respondent No.3,
and after following the necessary procedure for grant of Patent,
pursuant to the hearing being conducted, the Assistant Controller of
Patent and Designs was of the view that if certain amendments were
made in the Complete Specification as well as the claims, the patent
could be granted.

The Appellants agent filed amendment specification, in line
with the directions so issued. The parties were permitted to file their
written submissions, however on 14/06/2023, the impugned order
was passed by the Assistant Controller of Patent and Designs holding
that the opposition succeeds under Section 25 (1) (b) and 25 (1) (e) of
the Act, refused the Patent to the Appellants.
6. The order passed by the Controller of Patent and Designs was
challenged by the Appellants by filing Commercial Miscellaneous
Petition (L) No.25369 of 2023, praying for its quashment with
various contentions being raised and at this stage, we refrain to
examine the matter on merits, as we are restricting our ruling to the
maintainability of the Appeal and therefore, it is suffice to note that
the contest being raised by the counsel representing Respondent Nos.
1 and 2 and on consideration of the counter submissions, advanced
qua the impugned order, the learned Single Judge finding merit in the
submission advanced on behalf of the Respondents that it is only in
the event of Section 25(1) (b) not being satisfied, the finding under Section 25 (1) (e) of the Act deserves consideration, and finding no
merit in the submission advanced on behalf of the Appellants that
there are differences and advantages between the subject Patent

Ashish

                              5/49               901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

Application and cited documents and having only referred to the cited
documents under Section 14 and 15, decision of the Assistant
Controller of Patents and Designs, on consideration of detail entire
facts and material available on record, the impugned order was
passed dealing with each and every aspect and it being substantiated
with reasons, the Commercial Miscellaneous Petition was dismissed.

1. Being aggrieved by the impugned judgment, the present Commercial Appeal is filed, alleging that the impugned order is bad, void and suffers from apparent error and is not sustainable in the eyes of law and is therefore liable to be set aside.

Though the Appeal has raised various grounds on the merits,
while raising a challenge to the impugned judgment, we need not
refer to the same at this stage, as at present we are restricting ourself
to the maintainability of the Appeal being filed as Commercial
Appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

1. In the backdrop of the order dated 18/08/2025, the learned counsel Mr. Dube, would submit that the Appellants filed a Patent Application, which was refused and according to him, that prior to 2021, a remedy of Appeal to the Appellate Board established under Section 83 of the Trade marks Act, 1999 and under Section 116 of the Patents Act, 1970, was available. However, since the said provision was omitted by the Tribunal's Reform Act, 2021 with effect from 4/04/2021, the Appeal now lie before the High Court, as Section 117- A is a provision of Appeal, from any decision, or order or direction of the Controller of the Central Government passed under various provisions stipulated therein, provided that the Appeal is made within three months from the date of decision, order or direction or within

Ashish

                              6/49              901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

such further time as the High Court may, in accordance with the
Rules allow it to be made.

Mr. Dube, would submit that invoking the said provision,
being aggrieved by the order passed by the Controller of Patent and
Designs, Miscellaneous Petition is filed before the learned Single
Judge, who rejected the same by the impugned judgment by
exercising jurisdiction of a Commercial Division of High Court under
subsection 1-A of Section 13 of the Commercial Act, 2015 and
against the said decision an Appeal would lie to the Commercial
Appellate Division of the High Court, within a period of sixty days
from the date of passing of the judgment or order.

1. Inviting our attention to Section 13 (1- A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, it is his contention that any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a Commercial Division of High Court may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that Court and on plain reading of the said provision, present appeal is maintainable under Section 13 (1- A) of the Act of 2015.

The difficulty posed, on account of the proviso appended to the
said section, which provide that orders under Rule XLIII of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short referred to as CPC or Code of
1908) are only appealable, he would submit that the proviso applies
to 'orders', in a sense that 'order' is that which is not a 'decree', as
decree imply conclusive determination of rights of the parties.

In support of this submission, he would place reliance upon the
decision of the Bombay High Court in case of Resilient Innovations
Private Limited vs. PhonePe Private Limited, 1 and reliance is also
1 2022 SCC Online Bom 521

Ashish

                              7/49                901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

placed upon the decision of Delhi High Court in case of Promoshirt
SM SA Vs. Armassuisse and anr.2

     Mr. Dube, would submit that the judgment passed by the

learned Single Judge, is a 'Decree' as according to him Rule 835 read
along with Rule 987-A of the Bombay High Court Original Side
Rules, 1980, which make provision for 'Suits' under the Code of
Civil Procedure, applicable to all petitions filed on the Original Side
and hence the Miscellaneous Petition filed would take colour of a
'Suit' under CPC, and since the rights of the parties are 'conclusively
determined', by the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, it
ought to be considered as 'original decree' appealable under Section
13 (1- A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. He would further
submit that since the Patents Act provide for first forum of appeal
before the Single Judge to the High Court and do not provide for next
forum of appeal, it do not debar the Appeal being filed as a
Commercial Appeal, as it is filed in form of an original petition, in
view of the Rules of the Bombay High Court on Original Side.

According to the learned counsel if it is considered as an
original decree, it is appealable under Section 96 of CPC and since
the dispute is a commercial dispute, the Appeal would lie under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.

It is his specific contention that if a statute do not specifically
provide for a second appeal, the same would not specifically be
debarred.

2 2023 SCC Online Del 5531

Ashish

                              8/49             901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc 10.      Apprehending an objection being raised about the bar under [Section 100A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144428047/) of the CPC, which prohibits filing of second appeal in

certain cases, it is the submission of Mr. Dube, that in the current
case as the Appeal is filed under Section 13 (1- A) of the Commercial
Courts Act, and the bar would apply not only against an appeal from
an 'Order' or 'Decree', and as the Single Judge has not decided an
appeal from an 'Order or Decree', the bar cannot be invoked. He
would submit that 'Order' under the Code, is the one which is passed
by the Civil Court and definitely not by any Authority which is not a
Court. According to him, the bar of Section 100-A would apply
where a Single Judge has decided an appeal from an 'Order or
Decree' passed by a Civil Court and not an order of the Controller of
Patents, which is not a Court and therefore, the Appeal is not a
second appeal.

The reliance of the Respondents on Section 77 of Patents Act,
1970, where the Controller is given certain powers of a 'Court' and
therefore he is deemed to be a 'Court', it is the submission of Mr.
Dube that merely because the Controller of Patents is conferred with
certain powers of Civil Court, in respect of the matters specified
therein, it is not a 'Civil Court'. According to him, if the legislature
intended to make the Controller of Patents a Civil Court, it would
have specifically provided so and it would have also provided for a
mechanism to enforce the orders passed by it, as if it was a decree
made by a Court in a suit or by clearly indicating that all the
proceedings before the Controller of Patents shall be considered as
'judicial proceedings' under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Ashish

                              9/49                  901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc According to Mr. Dube, whenever the legislature intended that

the Tribunal shall have powers of a Civil Court, it has so provided
and he would invoke the example of Section 424 of the Companies
Act, 2013, which recognizes that 'all orders' may be enforced as if it
was a 'decree' made by a Court in a pending Suit as Section 424,
specify that any order made by the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal
may be enforced in the same manner, as if it was decree made by the
court in a suit pending, and it shall be lawful for the Tribunal or the
Appellate Tribunal to send the same for execution of its orders and
subsection (4) of Section 424 also prescribe that all proceedings
before the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal shall be deemed to be
judicial proceedings.

In contrast, the only provision in the Patents Act, which is
executable as a decree of civil court, is an order of cost as Section
77(2) reads thus:-

"(2) Any order for costs awarded by the Controller in exercise of the
powers conferred upon him under sub-section (1) shall be executable as a
decree of civil court."
11. Mr. Dube would place heavy reliance upon the decision of the
Delhi High Court in case of Promoshirt SM SA (supra) which had
drawn a distinction by observing that respondents reliance on the
judgment in Kamal Kumar Dutta v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. 3
where the company law board was the first forum that decided the
matter and since under Section 424 (3) 'any order' passed by the
Tribunal will be deemed to be a decree, the company law board
would be considered to be a 'Court' and therefore, the bar under

3 (2006) 7 SCC 613

Ashish

                              10/49                901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc [Section 100 A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/144428047/) of CPC was invoked. According to him, if the

Registrar is provided with powers of Civil Court only for limited
purpose, these powers cannot be extended in general and hence, the
Registrar cannot be considered to be a Court in general.

In short the submission made by Mr. Dube is threefold;

(a) The order passed by the learned Single Judge is an order
passed in exercise of the original jurisdiction conferred in him.

(b) The Appeal is maintainable under Section 13 (1- A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 as the judgment passed by the learned
Single Judge is a 'Decree'.

(c) The bar under Section 100 A of CPC do not apply because the
The Assistant Controller of Patents is not a Court.

1. Mr. Mehta, representing the Respondents, would raise a serious contest to the maintainability of the present appeal under Section 13, as it is his specific submission, that there is no provision for an intra- court appeal provided under the Patents Act, read along with the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. He would submit that Section 117-A of the Patents Act does not provide for any further appeal, or any intra-court appeal, against a judgment rendered by the High Court while exercising appellate jurisdiction and according to him the right of appeal is a creature of statute and it cannot be inferred or implied in absence of an express provision.

Though, he do not dispute that the patent disputes would fall
within the definition of 'commercial disputes' under Section 2(1)(c)
(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, according to him, mere
classification as a commercial dispute does not expand the appellate

Ashish

                                11/49              901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

structure provided under a special statute like the Patents Act.

1. Mr. Mehta has urged that Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act exhaustively govern the appeals from Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions, and under Section 13 (1-A) read with the proviso, appeals from the Commercial Division of the High Court shall lie only in respect of orders :

(a) Those enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil
Procedure;

(b) Under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
According to him the appeals under Section 117A of the
Patents Act do not fall in either of the category.

Further, relying upon sub-clause (2) of Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act, it is his submission that no appeal shall lie
under the Act otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the
Act and the said provision will prevail over the Letters Patent of the
High Court.

1. Reliance is placed by Mr. Mehta, upon the decision of the Madras High Court in case of ITALFARMACO SPA v. Deputy Controller of Patents & Designs,4 where it is expressed that permitting such an appeal would amount to an impermissible expansion of the appellate framework, contrary to the legislative intent.

Further reliance is also placed on another decision of Madras
High Court in case of Caleb Suresh Motupalli v. Controller of

Ashish

                              12/49               901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

Patents,5 where the Madras High Court has held that appellate
remedies under the Patents Act are exhaustive and strictly limited to
Section 117A and where the statute consciously excludes a category
of orders, no appeal can be entertained by implication.

Mr. Mehta has also invoked the ratio laid by the Apex Court in
case of Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd.6 holding that
Letters Patent jurisdiction of a High Court can be excluded, where a
special statute either expressly or by necessary implication bars
further appeals. It is therefore his contention that in absence of an
appellate provision in the statute it operates as a statutory bar by
necessary implication, as the only appellate remedy under the Patents
Act is under Section 117A.

1. In the wake of the rival contentions advanced before us, the learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Dhond, has advanced submissions on two points for consideration:

(a) Does an intra-court appeal lie from a decision of a Single Judge
of the Court deciding an appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents
Act, 1970.

(b) Whether Section 100-A of the Code which bar an appeal from
the judgment and decree of the Single Judge, read with a non-
obstante clause in sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act, creating an embargo.

Taking us through the schemes of the Commercial Courts Act,
2015, a statute providing for constitution of Commercial Division and

6 AIR 2011 SC 2649

Ashish

                              13/49             901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

Commercial Appellate Division in the High Courts for adjudicating
commercial disputes of specified value, in specific, Mr. Dhond has
invited our attention to Section 13 (1-A) along with the proviso
appended thereto as well as sub-section (2) thereof. He would also
invite our attention to Section 16 (1), which amends certain
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, in their application
to any 'Suit' in respect of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value
and according to him, by virtue of sub-section (2), the Commercial
Division shall follow the provisions under the Code, as amended by
the Act of 2015, in the trial of a Suit in respect of a commercial
dispute.

According to Mr. Dhond, the provisions of Commercial Courts
Act are indicative that the jurisdiction and powers of the
'Commercial Division in the High Court' is not confined to original
suits or applications that are instituted in the Commercial Division as
proceedings in first instance, but they also extend to appeals under
special statutes and that is how the Single Judge of the High Court
has exercised jurisdiction under Section 117-A of the Patents Act,
1970, in exercise of powers of a 'Commercial Division in a High
Court'. According to him, a direct, appellate entry into the
Commercial Division is not alien to the scheme of the Act of 2015,
as there is no embargo in Section 7, for a Commercial Division in
restricting the proceedings only to 'suits and applications' involving
commercial disputes, as by relying upon the provision in form of
Section 12, he would submit that the Act contemplates 'Appeals' as
well.

Ashish

                              14/49                901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc 16.      Analyzing the scope of [Section 13](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/44411053/), it is the submission of the

learned Amicus that Section 13 (1-A) read by itself permit appeals
against 'judgments' or 'orders' of a Commercial Division. However,
the proviso, restricts the applicability of 'orders' to those 'specifically
enumerated under order XLIII of the Code and Section 37 of
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

He would place reliance upon the latest decision of the Apex
Court in case of MITC Rolling Private Limited & Anr. v. Renuka
Realtors & Ors.7 His contention is, read by itself, Section 13 (1-A)
may not be an obstacle to the maintainability of the appeal, as the
decision under challenge finally disposed of an appeal filed under Section 117-A of the Patents Act, and therefore, it is 'judgment' and
not merely an 'order' and thus remain unaffected by anything in the
proviso appended to the Section 13 (1-A).

However, according to the learned Amicus, the interpretation
of sub-section (2) of Section 13 is crucial, as the Commercial Courts
Act, according to him, as a general matter do not exclude the
application of other laws to the proceedings involving commercial
disputes as Section 16 of the Act, has only introduced amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in its application to 'any suit in
respect of commercial dispute' and the amended code shall apply to
the 'trial of a suit' but in no way it contemplate that the provisions of
the Code shall not apply to proceedings other than 'Suit'. He would
also invoke Section 21 of the Act, which gives overriding effect to
anything 'inconsistent', with it contained in any other law for the
time being in force.

7 2025 SCC Online SC 2375

Ashish

                              15/49               901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc In the light of the aforesaid interpretation, according to

Mr. Dhond, Section 100-A of the Code is the 'other law' and since
the said provision imposes a bar on 'further' appeals from the
judgment and decree of a Single Judge, this bar would not permit
entertainment of the appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act. Mr. Dhond, has placed reliance upon the decision of the
Apex Court in case of Mohd. Saud & Anr. v. Shaik Mahfooz & Ors. 8
focusing upon the purpose of the provision in form of Section 100-A.

     Dealing with the contention advanced on behalf of the

Appellant, as regards its applicability, to the effect that it bars intra-
court appeals only where the appeal decided by the Single Judge
arises out of 'an original or appellate decree or order' passed by a
civil court and the Controller of Patents is an authority, which is not a
civil court and therefore the bar is inapplicable, is not a correct
interpretation, as well as application of the provision, according to
him.

He would place reliance upon two decisions of the Apex Court
holding that Section 100-A act as a bar to an intra-court appeal
against the decision of a Single Judge, even in case of a statutory
appeal from quasi judicial body or authority and he invoked the
principle of law laid down in:-

(i) Municipal Corporation of Brihanmumbai & Anr v. State Bank of
India,9 (ii) Kamal Kumar Dutta & Anr v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd.
& Anr. (Supra)

8 (2010) 13 SCC 517

9 (1999) 1 SCC 123

Ashish

                              16/49            901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

     Apart from this, he would also place reliance upon the Full

Bench decision of this Court in case of Gangawani and Co., Nagpur
v. Saraswati Banewar & Ors.;10 and Mohd. Riyazur Rehman
Siddhiqui v. Deputy Director of Health Services ;11 holding that
Section 100-A bars an intra-court appeal from the decision of a
Single Judge on a statutory appeal against the order of a body that is
either not a Court, or which does have the 'trappings of a Civil
Court'.

1.  According to Mr. Dhond, in the wake of Chapter XLV of the
   

   Original Sides Rules, and in specific Rule 835, which make the Code
   of Civil Procedure, applicable to all proceedings under the Patents
   Act, Section 100-A also become applicable, creating a bar for filing
   of the appeal and according to him, if the Patents Act itself was to
   provide a second appeal, the embargo would not have come into
   force.

2.  In the wake of the counter submissions advanced before us,
   

   where the facts involved have emerged before us with clarity, reveal
   that the appellant had filed an application for grant of Patent before
   the Assistant Controller of Patent and Designs, who by order dated
   14/06/2023, refused grant of the Patent Application. This constrained
   the appellant to file Commercial Miscellaneous Petition before the
   learned Single Judge, by invoking section 117-A of the Patents Act,
   1970, who dismissed the Petition, thereby upholding the order of the
   Assistant Controller of Patents.

10 (2001) 3 Mh.L.J. 6

11 (2008) 6 Mh.L.J. 941

Ashish

                              17/49                901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc The Appellant, has therefore, filed the present Commercial

Appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, where an
objection is raised as regards its maintainability.

1. In light of the exhaustive order raising the objection following points deserve determination:-

(a) Whether the present Appeal filed under Section 13 (1- A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, is maintainable or whether the proviso
to the said section, restrict the appeal only to the orders enumerated
under Order XLIII of the Code of 1908, and to the order under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, as the decision
under challenge is not an 'Order' but a 'Judgment /Decree'.

(b) When the Patent Act provides only for the first forum of
appeal, but do not create further bar for entertaining a further appeal,
whether the remedy of appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial
Courts Act is available.

(c) Whether the bar under Section 100-A of the Code of Civil
Procedure, would restrict the scope of the appeal under Section 13 of
the Commercial Courts Act.
20. The Commercial Courts Act, 2015, providing for constitution
of Commercial Courts, Commercial Appellate Courts, Commercial
Division and Commercial Appellate Division is a special statute
providing for a speedy disposal of high value commercial disputes
through an independent mechanism being prescribed for its early
resolution.

Commercial Appellate Courts are the courts designated under Section 3-A of the Act, whereas Section 4 provides for constitution of

Ashish

                               18/49                  901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

Commercial Division of the High Court and Section 5 is a provision
for Constitution of Commercial Appellate Division constituted for
the same for the purpose of exercising jurisdictions and powers
conferred on it by the Act.

The Commercial Court has jurisdiction to try all suits and
applications relating to a commercial dispute of a 'Specified Value',
arising out of the territory of the State and by virtue of Section 7, all
suits and applications relating to commercial disputes of a Specified
Value filed in a High Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction
shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of that
Court.

A specific meaning is assigned to the term 'commercial
disputes' which is the focal point of the Act, 2015 and there is no
contest between the parties that Intellectual Property Rights relating
to registered and unregistered Trade Marks, Copy Rights, Patent, etc.,
would fall within the ambit of 'commercial disputes'.

1. Chapter IV of the Commercial Courts Act, provide for appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and Commercial Divisions and for our purpose what is of relevance is Section 13 (1-A) to be read with the proviso and sub-section (2) of Section 13, which reads thus:-

"13 (1-A) Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of a
Commercial Court at the level of District Judge exercising original civil
jurisdiction or, as the case may be, Commercial Division of a High Court
may appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court
within a period of sixty days from the date of the judgment or order:

Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders passed by a
Commercial Division or a Commercial Court that are specifically
enumerated under Order XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 to
1908) as amended by this Act and section 37 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996).
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2 Nothwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from
any order or a decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act."

1. From plain reading of subsection (1-A), it is evident that a person aggrieved by the 'judgment or order' of a Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of a High Court may appeal to Commercial Appellate Division of that High Court. The above provision is appended with a proviso and the point for consideration is whether it restricts its scope to Orders under Rule XLIII of the Code and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

In MITC Rolling Mills (Supra), it is observed by the Apex
Court that Section 13 (1-A) is in two distinct parts; the main provision
contemplating appeals against 'Judgments' and 'Orders' in the
Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court and the proviso,
operating as an exception, must be construed harmoniously with the
main provision and not in derogation, and the same is interpreted in
the following words:-

"17.....Where the language of the main provision is plain and
unambiguous, the proviso cannot be invoked to curtail or whittle down the
scope of the principal enactment, save and except where such exclusion is
clearly and expressly contemplated. The proviso merely restricts appeals
against interlocutory orders to those specifically enumerated under Order
XLIII of CPC and Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,
1996. Consequently, only such interlocutory orders as are expressly
specified therein would be amenable to an appeal under the proviso;
orders not so enumerated would not fall within the restricted fold of the
proviso'.

In the facts of the case, which involved a challenge to an order
rejecting application(s) under Order VII Rule 10 and Order VII Rule
11 (d) of CPC, which orders are not enumerated under Order XLIII of

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20/49 901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc CPC, it was held that such orders would not be amenable to the
appeal under Section 13 (1- A) of the Act of 2015, and rather are
permitted to be challenged by filing revision or a petition/application
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.
23. In the case in hand, it is noted that the Appeal was filed by the
Appellant by invoking Section 117-A of the Patents Act, the Appeal
being preferred as a statutory appeal, but in the wake of a dispute
being a commercial dispute, it was entertained as a Miscellaneous
Petition by the High Court on its ordinary original jurisdiction by the
Commercial Division i.e., by the Single Judge.

We do not agree with the submission of Mr. Dube that the High
Court entertained the Appeal as a Court of first instance, as
admittedly, the proceedings before the Commercial Division gained
entry through Section 117-A, which permit Appeal to be filed from
any decision, order or direction made or issued under the Patents Act 1970 by the Central Government or from any act or order of the
Controller for the purpose of giving effect to such direction and in the
wake of sub-section (2), appeal shall lie to the High Court against the
decision, order, or direction of the Controller, under the sections
which are specifically enumerated. Therefore, according to us, the
decision rendered by the learned Single Judge as Commercial
Division of the Court is not entertained as proceedings of original
nature, but it was entertained as Appeal by the Commercial Division,
the dispute being of commercial nature of a Specified Value.

It is not correct to restrict the scope of the jurisdiction of
Commercial Divisions of High Court only to 'Suits and
Applications', as we find that Section 7 is not restrictive in

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                              21/49               901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

entertaining proceedings other than 'Suits and Applications'. Apart,
Section 12, which has set out the determination of Specified Value of
the subject matter of the commercial dispute also contain a reference
to Suit, Appeal or Application as Section 12 is a provision as to how
the Specified Value of the subject matter of a commercial dispute
either in Suit, Appeal or Application shall be determined and what is
relevant is reference to clause (b), (c) and (d), which refer to a relief
sought in 'Suit, Appeal or Application' relating to movable property
or immovable property or other intangible right, setting out the
manner in which the subject value shall be determined.

Thus, the scheme of the special statute of 2015, permit exercise
of jurisdiction by the Commercial Divisions of High Courts over
Suits and Applications relating to commercial disputes of a 'Specified
Value' and the determination of specified value in a Suit, Appeal or
Application is allowed to be determined by applying the formula
stated in Section 12, depending upon the nature of the proceedings.

It is clear from reading of Section 12, that when the Suit or
Application is for recovery of money, the point of entry can be by
way of proceedings of first instance, but in relation to the claim of
movable property/ immovable property or to a right therein, the
proceedings can be in form of a Suit or Appeal or Application and
therefore, the submission of Mr. Dube that the Single Judge of the
High Court had entertained the Miscellaneous Petition as a Court of
first instance is not correct, as we have noticed that Section 117-A of
the Patents Act, clearly provide for Appeals to the High Court
against the decision of the Controller and when such dispute falls
within the purview of 'commercial dispute' and is entertained by the

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Commercial Division of the High Court, then its scope is not only
restricted as proceedings of first instance, but it is accepted as in the
form in which it comes i.e. in form of an Appeal under Section 117-A of the Act of 1970.

1. As the learned Single Judge entertained the appeal as a Commercial Division, and adjudicated the lis finally, and delivered the judgment upholding the order passed by the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs, we have no difficulty in accepting the submission of Mr. Dube that the decision of the learned Single Judge does not amount to an 'Order' but it is a 'Judgment', as it would fall within the meaning of Section 2(9) of the CPC, which define 'Judgment' to mean "the statement given by the Judge on the grounds of a decree or order;".

A 'Decree' is defined by the Code, as the formal expression of
an adjudication which conclusively determines the rights of the
parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the
suit and a decree may be preliminary or final.

We, therefore, hold that the decision of the learned Single
Judge is the final determination between the parties, and as sub-
section (1-A) of Section 13 provides for an appeal to the Commercial
Appellate Division of the High Court from a 'Judgment' of the
Commercial Division of the High Court, and as the proviso does not
restrict the scope of the 'Judgment' under Section 13 (1A), we hold
that an appeal would lie from the decision of the learned Single Judge
to the Commercial Appellate Division, but within the bar projected
under Section 100-A of CPC.

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                              23/49               901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc 25.      Now we proceed to consider whether the bar as prescribed

under Section 100-A of the Code, restrict its scope and ambit.

The second limb of the point for consideration before us is
about the applicability of the provisions in the Code of 1908, to the
proceedings under the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, as Section 16 of
the Act set out the amendments to the Code in its application to
commercial disputes and those amendments are specified in the
schedule.

Sub-section (2) of Section 16 clearly stipulates that the
Commercial Division and Commercial Court shall follow the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as amended by the
Act, in the trial of a 'Suit' in respect of a commercial dispute of a
Specified Value.

Perusal of the Schedule appended to the Act, would reflect the
amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, in relation to trial of a
suits. A careful reading of the schedule would reveal that the
amendments in the Code are made applicable to the suits being tried
under the Act, 2015, cover its various stages and first schedule to the
Act, specifically dealing with various stages of trial.

It is worth to note that the amended provisions of the Code of
Civil Procedure, are only applicable to the trial of a 'suit' of a
commercial dispute of Specified Value but in no sense it convey that
the provisions of the Code are inapplicable in regards to appeals/
execution or as regards the supplementary proceedings which are
specifically provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure.

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                               24/49                   901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc Since, there is no express exclusion of other provisions of the

Code, except the one which are suggested in Section 16 of the
Commercial Courts Act, and this provision when read with Section
21 of the Act, which give it effect, notwithstanding anything
inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for time being in
force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any lawful time
being in force other than the said Act, it can be well inferred that the
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do apply.

1. We must also refer to another relevant provision under the Act in form of Sub-section (2) of Section 13 which read thus:-

"(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time
being in force or Letters Patent of a High Court, no appeal shall lie from
any order or decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of this Act."
From the above, it is evidently clear that an appeal from any
order or decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court shall
lie only in accordance with the provisions of the Act, notwithstanding
anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or
Letters Patent of a High Court.

Since, the Commercial Courts Act do not exclude the
application of other laws including the Code of Civil Procedure, for
proceedings involving 'commercial disputes', other than in the trial
of a commercial suit, Section 100-A, do not stand excluded in its
application to the Appeal under Section 13 (1-A).

The said provision creates an embargo from entertaining an
appeal from the judgment and decree of a Single Judge, who has
decided the Appeal arising from an Original or Appellate Decree or

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an Order.

Section 100-A overrides anything contained in Letters Patent
for any High Court or in any instrument having the force of law or in
'any other law for the time being in force' and it bars 'further'
appeals from the judgment and decree of a Single Judge, who has
pronounced upon an appeal from an original or appellate decree or
order.

1. The purpose behind introducing Section 100-A is highlighted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohd. Saud (supra) by adopting a purposive interpretation and the opinion expressed is worded thus:-

"15. To resolve this conflict we have to adopt a purposive
interpretation. The whole purpose of introducing Section 100-A was to
reduce the number of appeals as the public in India was being harassed
by the numerous appeals provided in the statute. If we look at the matter
from that angle it will immediately become apparent that the LPA in
question was not maintainable because if it is held to be maintainable
then the result will be that against an interlocutory order of the District
Judge there may be two appeals, first to the learned Single Judge and
then to the Division Bench of the High Court, but against a final judgment
of the District Judge there can be only one appeal. This in our opinion
would be strange, and against the very purpose of the object of Section
100-A, that is, to curtail the number of appeals."
28. Mr. Dube, has attempted to canvass before us that Section 100-
A is inapplicable in the present case, as the section bars an intra-court
appeal, when the appeal is decided by a Single Judge and it arises out
of an original or appellate 'Decree or Order' passed by a Civil Court
and the Controller of Patents is not a 'Civil Court' and therefore the
bar imposed for entertaining second appeal cannot be invoked.

In this regard, our attention is invited to the decision of the
Apex Court in [Municipal Corporation of Brihanmumbai and Anr v

Ashish](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/168800066/) 26/49 901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc State Bank of India (Supra) which involved the Bombay Municipal
Corporation Act, 1888 which is a complete code and Section 217 (1)
in the Act existed in form of a provision, where appeal against any
rateable value or tax fixed or charged under the Act was directed to
be heard and determined by the Chief Judge of the Small Cause
Court. Noting that the jurisdiction to be exercised by the Chief Judge
of the Small Cause Court is a appellate jurisdiction and when Section
218-D provided an appeal to the High Court, sub-section (2) thereof
providing that the Code of Civil Procedure, with respect to appeals
from original decrees shall, so far as they can be made applicable
apply to the appeals, the question arose whether Section 100-A of the
Code of Civil Procedure hit the entertainment of the appeal. In this
background, the Apex Court observed thus:-

"10. This section has been introduced to minimise the delay in the
finality of a decision. Prior to the enactment of the above provision, under
the letters patent, an appeal against the decision of a Single Judge in a
second appeal was, in certain cases, held competent, though under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, there was some inhibition
against interference with the findings of fact. The right of taking recourse
to such an appeal has now been taken away by Section 100-A of the Code
of Civil Procedure (supra). Since, an appeal under Section 217(1) of the
Act is a first appeal in a second forum/court and an appeal under Section
218-D of the Act is the second appeal in the third forum/court, no further
appeal would be competent before the fourth forum/court in view of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure (supra).

1. In the instant case, since an appeal from the appellate order was heard and decided by a learned Single Judge of the High Court, no further appeal was maintainable from the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge passed in that appeal. The view taken by the Division Bench of the High Court under the circumstances suffers from no error. This appeal has no merits and it is dismissed as such. No costs."
2. In Kamal Kumar Dutta and anr v. Ruby General Hospital (Supra), a decision again involving the amendment introduced in the Code of Civil Procedure in form of Section 100-A, in the background

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facts where the appeals were preferred against the order passed by the
Single Judge of the High Court in the matter under Sections 397 and Section 398 of the Companies Act, 1956, and the preliminary
objection was raised to the maintainability of the appeals on the
ground that the appellant had an alternative remedy of approaching
the Division Bench of the High Court under the Letters Patent of the
High Court, the Apex Court held that prior to the amendment of 1956
Act with effect from 31/05/1991, the power under Sections 397 and
398 was exercised by the Company Judge of the High Court and an
appeal against the order was provided under Section 483 before the
Division Bench of the High Court. However, after the amendment the
power under Section 397 and 398 is being exercised by the Company
Law Board under Section 10-E of the Act and the appeal against it lie
to the High Court under Section 10-F.

     Holding that the scheme contemplated as above was a

complete code and when the order passed by the board is appealable
under Section 10-F of the Act before the High Court with no further
provision of Appeal against the order of the Single Judge, it is held as
below:-

"23. Therefore, where appeal has been decided from an original order by
a Single Judge, no further appeal has been provided and that power
which used to be there under the Letters Patent of the High Court has
been subsequently withdrawn. The present order which has been passed
by the CLB and against that an appeal has been provided before the High
Court under Section 10-F of the Act, that is, an appeal from the original
order. Then in that case no further letters patent appeal shall lie to the
Division Bench of the same High Court...

.... The power of the High Court in exercising the letters patent in a
matter where a Single Judge hears an appeal from the original order, has
been taken away and it cannot be invoked in the present context. There
are no two opinions in the matter that when CLB exercises its power
under Section 397 and 398 of the Act, it exercised its quasi- judicial

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28/49 901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

power as original authority. It may not be a court but it has all the
trapping of a Court. Therefore, CLB while exercising its original
jurisdiction under Sections 397 and 398 of the Act passed the order and
against that order appeal lies to the learned Single Judge of the High
Court and therefore no further appeal could be filed."
30. The Apex Court also referred to the observation of the
Constitution Bench decision in case of P.S. Sathappan v. Andhra
Bank Ltd12. and it reproduced the relevant observation as below:-

" From Section 100-A CPC, as inserted in 1976, it can be seen that when
the legislature wanted to exclude a letters patent appeal it specifically did
so. Again from Section 100-A, as amended in 2002, it can be seen that the
legislature has provided for a specific exclusion. It must be stated that
now by virtue of Section 100-A no letters patent appeal would be
maintainable in the facts of the present case. However, it is an admitted
position that the law which would prevail would be the law at the relevant
time. At the relevant time neither Section 100-A nor Section 104(2) barred
a letters patent appeal. The words used in Section 100-A are not by way of
abundant caution. By the Amendment Acts of 1976 and 2002 a specific
exclusion is provided as the legislature knew that in the absence of such
words a letters patent appeal would not be barred. The legislature was
aware that it had incorporated the saving clause in Section 104(1) and
incorporated Section 4 CPC. Thus now a specific exclusion was
provided."
31. In paragraph 27 of the law report of Kamal Kumar Dutta (Supra) the Court has recorded thus:-

"27. Similarly, in Subal Paul v. Malina Paul their Lordships observed as
follows:

Whenever the statute provides such a bar, it is so expressly stated, as
would appear from Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure."
32. The submission is advanced by Mr. Dube that the Commercial
Courts Act has made the Code of Civil Procedure applicable in its
modified form in the wake of Section 16 read with the schedule, but
in our considered opinion, the amendment to the Code of Civil

12 (2004) 11 SCC 672

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Procedure, 1908 is qua the provisions as regards conduct of a trial of
a commercial suit but for all other purposes, which include the
provision for appeal, the Code of Civil Procedure operate with full
force.

1.  Another submission of Mr. Dube, that the bar under Section
   

   100-A operates only when the decision of the Single Judge of the
   High Court is on an appeal, which arises out of an 'original or
   appellate decree or order' and for attracting the said clause, the
   'decree' necessarily has to be adjudicated by the 'court' determining
   the rights of the parties and even an 'order' which is a formal
   expression of decision of a Civil Court, but which is not a decree
   necessarily imply that the decision must be of a Court and just
   because the Controller is clothed with certain powers of Civil Court
   for certain purposes necessarily is not a Court, also fail to appeal us.

2.  A Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Mohd. Riyazur
   

   Rehman Siddhiqui (supra) held that in absence of any specific
   provision creating a right in a party to file an appeal, such right can
   neither be assumed nor inferred in favour of the party. In connection
   with Section 173 of the Motors Vehicle Act, which provided an
   appeal against the award of the Claims Tribunal, it is held that when
   the statute do not contemplate any further appeal, on coming into
   force of Section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, the letters
   patent appeal or an appeal against the judgment of the Single Judge
   passed in exercise of appellate jurisdiction is held to be not
   appealable.

Dealing with the contention advanced that the Tribunal is not a
'Court' and therefore the embargo under Section 100-A is not

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attracted, the following observation of the full bench deserve
reproduction:-

"24. Further in the case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. vs.
P. N. Sharma and anr., reported in AIR 1965 SC 1595, it was stated by the
Supreme Court that the presence of some of the trappings may assist the
determination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the
authority which possesses the said trapping, is the judicial power of the
State or not, and the main and the basic test, however, is whether the
adjudicating power which is the particular authority is empowered to
exercise, has been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a
part of the State's inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial
functions. Applying this principle, it was held by the Supreme Court that
the Tribunal constituted under the Punjab Welfare Officers Recruitment
and Conditions of Service Rules, 1952 was a Tribunal having the
trappings of a Court.

1. More so, in the case of State of Haryana vs. Smt. Darshana Devi and ors., reported in (1979) 2 SCC 236, the Supreme Court, while dealing with a case under the provisions of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, stated that as under:-

The reasoning of the High Court in holding that Order XXXIII will
apply to the Tribunals which have the trappings of the Civil Court finds
our approval. We affirm the decision.

1. It is said that all Tribunals are not Courts, though all the Courts are Tribunals. The word "Courts" is used to designate those Tribunals which are set up in an organized State for the Administration of Justice. The Administration of Justice is meant to be the exercise of judicial power of the State to maintain and uphold rights and to punish "wrongs". Whenever there is an infringement of a right or an injury, the Courts are there to restore the vinculum juris, which is disturbed."

1. Reproducing the observation in Shah Babulal Khimji vs. Jayaben D. Kania and anr13 , where the Apex Court while explaining the ingredients of a judgment, had held that Section 104 read with Order XLIII of Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure is neither inconsistent, nor override, nor control clause 15 of the Letters Patent and the judgment was in relation to the orders passed by the learned Single Judge of the Court in exercise of its original jurisdiction.

13 (1981) 4 SCC 8

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                                31/49                   901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc As regards the applicability of Section 100-A, when the appeal

has been preferred against the judgment of the Single Judge passed in
exercise of appellate jurisdiction under Section 173 of the Motors
Vehicle Act, it is held thus:-

"60. The factual matrix of the case has already been stated by us
above. Suffice it to note that the present appeals have been filed after
coming into force a provision of section 100-A of the Code of Civil
Procedure (i.e. 1st July 2002). All these appeals have been preferred
against the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. The appeals before the learned Single Judge were
preferred in terms of section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act and were
accordingly decided by the learned Single Judge vide judgments dated
12th February, 2004 and 25th January, 2005. There is undoubtedly no
provision contained in the M.V. Act which gives right to appeal to any
dissatisfied litigant to prefer an appeal against the appellate judgment of
the learned Single Judge. In other words, special statute does not provide
any right of second appeal against the judgment of the appellate Court.
The Tribunal certainly has trappings of a Civil Court, may be, it is not a
Civil Court in stricto sensu. Once the special law and even the M.V. Act which is treated to be a self-contained Code, and which do not provide for
a grant of specific right of second appeal, the same cannot be made
available by a recourse to any general provision. It is an unquestionable
proposition of law that right of appeal is a statutory right and not a
general, natural, or a fundamental right. In the absence of any provision
granting such statutory right to prefer second appeal, the litigant cannot
be permitted to rely upon the general provisions, if at all there is any, to
prefer a second appeal. The award made by the Motor Accident Claims
Tribunal under section 168 of the Act even if it is treated as a decree and
so is the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in appeal, still the
Court would not be able to take recourse to general provision of the Code
and for that matter, it will hardly be of any consequence as to whether the
proceedings before the Tribunal are at parity with the Civil Court or
actual proceedings are before the Civil Court. Non availability of right of
appeal under the statute would be a complete answer to non-
maintainability of such an appeal.

1. Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act provides only for a restricted right of appeal and the same cannot be stretched by interpretative process to hold that even a second appeal or an appeal against the appellate jurisdiction of the Single Judge would be maintainable. This would obviously be an interpretation which would neither further the cause of the Legislation nor it will be true on the plain reading of the section." Ashish

                              32/49             901 COMAP L 13430-25.doc

1. Recording that the Tribunal has the trapping of a Civil Court and various procedural and effective provisions of the Code of Civil Court have been made applicable substantially to the proceedings before the Tribunal and when an award is passed by the Tribunal, an appeal under Section 173 is maintainable before the High Court and which exercises the appellate jurisdiction.

Highlighting the object underlining Section 100-A being to
curtail the right of second appeal and to attach finality to the
judgment of the first Appellate Court, the intention of the legislature
was discerned and it is held that Section 100-A must be given its
effective and natural meaning. In conclusion, the Full Bench held
thus:-

"The cumulative reading and analysis of various provisions in
consonance with the Rules of interpretation stated above, would lead
to a simple and one conclusion that the Letters Patent Appeal or an
appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge passed in
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction against the appellate judgment
passed by the Court subordinate to the High Court, would not be
appealable. Where Section 100-A constitutes a complete bar against
right to prefer an appeal against an appellate decision, there appeal
cannot be preferred with the aid of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent
against such judgment. Thus, either way, the obvious conclusion
would be that no intra-court appeal is maintainable in the High
Court against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in
exercise of its appellate powers in terms of Section 173 of the Motor
Vehicles Act"
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1. The full bench of the Bombay High Court had placed heavy reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (Supra) dealing with the provision of Section 397 and 398 of the Companies Act as well as the decision in case of P. S. Sathapan (supra) and also considered the decision of the Apex Court in case of Municipal Corporation of Brihanmumbai and ors v. State Bank of India (supra).

The reference on the issue was answered by the Full Bench as
below:-

"86. Thus, we proceed to record and answer propositions of law
formulated by us in paragraph 5 of the judgment as follows:

(a) Upon amendment of section 100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure by Amending Act of 2002 with effect from 1st July, 2002, no Letters Patent
Appeal would be maintainable against the judgment rendered by the
learned Single Judge of the High Court under the provision of section 173 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.

(b) Appeal against the judgment of the learned Single Judge in exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
1988 even with the aid of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent is not
maintainable, and in fact, in both these situations, the Appellate Court
would have no jurisdiction to entertain and decided such an appeal."
38. The thrust of the appellant's submission is that though Section
77 of the Patents Act, has conferred certain powers of the Civil Court
on the Controller, which include the specific power set out in sub-
section (1), that itself does not make it a 'Civil Court'.

We may agree with the said submission, but we are also
conscious of the fact that in the modern era, even the quasi judicial
authorities, like the Tribunals, Regulatory bodies as well as
Commissions, who are not a part of a formal judiciary but are called
upon to discharge functions similar to that of a Court and such bodies

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are designed to alleviate the burden on the traditional court system by
providing specialized, faster and cost effective Justice. In order to
enable them to function with authority, they are conferred with the
powers of Civil Court while trying a suit under the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 and this include various powers like;

(a) summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining
him on oath;

(b) requiring the discovery and production of any document;

(c) receiving evidence on affidavit;

(d) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses or documents;

(e) awarding cost etc.,

1. With the recognition of quasi-judicial authorities as competent in adjudicating upon the rights of the parties, and with a mandate to them to adhere to the principles of natural justice, such authorities are competent to interpret the law and make decisions in specific matters, their decisions being based on existing laws. Such quasi-judicial authority is thus vested with the attributes or trappings of judicial functions, though not in totality, and it is under an obligation to act judicially.

An administrative body is entitled to be characterized as quasi-
judicial, when it possess legal authority, the authority being vested
with the powers determining the question affecting the rights of the
subjects, and it is under a duty to act judicially.

The dividing line between the administrative power and a
quasi-judicial power is quite thin and is gradually obliterated, as in
the recent years, the concept of the quasi-judicial power has
undergone a radical change and in identifying whether a function

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discharged is quasi-judicial, or it is administrative, the true indicators
may be the nature of power conferred; the person on whom the power
is conferred, the framework of the law conferring such power; the
consequences ensuing from exercise of such power, and the manner
in which the power is expected to be exercised.

The real test what distinguishes a quasi-judicial act from an
administrative act, is the duty to act judicially and this duty may arise
widely in different circumstances and is incapable of being defined
exhaustively, where a statute itself prescribes the manner in which the
administrative authority shall act judicially. There is no doubt that if
given power, a quasi-judicial authority can determine the questions
affecting the rights of the parties before it.

1. In Indian Network for People living with HIV/AIDS vs. Union of India14, the Madras High Court has answered the question as to whether or not the proceedings before the Controller are quasi- judicial.

Holding that Controller of Patents is vested with powers of
Civil Court in matters of summoning the attendance of witnesses,
discovery and production of any documents, receiving evidence of
affidavits etc., it is held that the said provision will apply to 'any
proceedings' before the Controller and is not restricted to the pre-
grant opposition proceedings. Since the Controller before whom the
proceeding takes place is endowed with some of the powers of the
Civil Court and whose orders or costs are executable as a decree of
Civil Court, it is held that it has trappings of a 'Civil Court' and
proceedings before such an authority are obviously quasi-judicial

14 2009 (1) CTC 32

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proceedings and in a pre-grant stage, the Controller is deciding a
controversy, which is raised by the objector opposing the grant of
patent and the applicant for its grant. It therefore, held by the Madras
High Court that the Assistant Controller of Patents and Designs,
functions as a quasi-judicial Tribunal and has to decide the lis
namely, the right of the objector raised on a wider perspective as
against the claim of patent, by the private respondent.

1. The Calcutta High Court in Glorious Investment Limited v. Dunlop International Limited and anr,15 being confronted with the order passed by the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks in application for registration of a trade mark, dealt with an argument opposing the appeal directed against an order passed by the Single Judge sitting in Intellectual Property Rights Division of the High Court to set aside the order passed by the Deputy Registrar of Trademarks, the same being objected that it is a second appeal, which is prohibited by Section 100-A of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908. The opposition raised was specific, that where an appeal from an original or appellate decree or order had been heard and decided by a Single Judge of a High Court no further appeal could lay from the judgment and decree of a Single Judge. Reliance was placed upon the decision in case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) and also on the decision in case of P.S. Sathappan (supra).

On behalf of the appellant a similar objection is raised, almost
on same lines, which is advanced before us, namely that the
definition of Decree and Order in Section 2 (2) of the Code, viewed
in the backdrop of the bar in Section100-A of the Code, would only

15 (2025) SCC Online Cal 8647

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be confined to a Second Appeal preferred against a 'Judgment' and
'Decree' passed by the Single Judge while exercising appellate power
in respect of a 'decree or order' passed by a Civil Court under the
provisions of the Code. An identical contention was advanced that the
Registrar who had passed the impugned order which was taken in
appeal before the Single Judge, is not even akin to a 'Civil Court' and
therefore, the bar under Section 100-A is not attracted.

1. The Calcutta High Court invoked the principle laid down in the case of National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. V. James Chadwick & Bros. Ltd,16 dealing with the Trademark Act, 1940 and with reference to Section 76 (1) therein, which prescribed that an appeal shall lie, from any decision of the Registrar under the Act or the Rules to the High Court having jurisdiction.

In this background, it was held that the Trademarks Act does
not provide or lay down any procedure for future conduct or career of
that appeal in the High Court, though Section 77 of the Act provides
that the High Court can if it likes, make Rules in that matter and after
the appeal reach the High Court, it has to be determined according to
the rules of practice and procedure of that Court and in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter under which the Court is
constituted. Noting that the well settled Rule is, that when a statute
directs that an appeal shall lie to a Court already established, the
appeal must be regulated by the practice and procedure of that Court.

With reference to Section 91 of the Act of 1999 which
provided appeal to the High Court, being aggrieved by the decision of
the Registrar under the Act, or the rules made thereunder, it was

16 (1953) 1 SCC 794

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noted that at the relevant time when the National Sewing Thread Co.
Ltd. (Supra) was decided, Section 100-A was not there in the Code
and therefore, the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court deemed
it appropriate to determine whether insertion of the said provision
would affect the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction by the High
Court.

1. The Division Bench placed reliance in case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), which did not make reference to the earlier decision and the National Sewing Thread Co. Ltd. (supra), but since the decision was delivered, when Section 100-A of the Code was not in place, the Division Bench of Calcutta High Court record that the precedential flavour of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) remains intact.

With extensive reliance being placed upon the decision in Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), holding that the Company Law Board
was constituted for shouldering the same judicial business that the
Single Bench of the High Court did prior to the amendment to the Companies Act, 1956 and on the strength of provisions of Section
634A of the 1956 Act, any order made by the CLB could be enforced
by it in the same manner as it was a Decree made by a Civil Court, in
a suit it was held that the Company Law Board had all the trappings
of a Court.

What would amount to trappings of the Court was also
highlighted by placing reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court
in case of Associated Cement Companies Ltd. v. P.N. Sharma, 17 the
main and the basic test however, is as to whether the adjudicating
power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise, has
17 AIR 1965 SC 1595

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been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of
State's inherent power exercising its judicial functions. By placing
reliance upon the precedents in this regard, the Division Bench of the
Calcutta High Court proceeded to decide whether the Registrar under
Section 127 of 1999 Act has the trappings of the Civil Court and with
reference to Section 127 concluded thus:-

"28. Thus the Registrar has all powers including power to review
its decision and to impose costs that a Civil Court has for the purposes
mentioned in Section 127 of the 1999 Act. The order as to costs passed by
the Registrar has been made executable as a decree of Civil Court.
30 A holistic reading of the various provisions of the 1999 Act and the
Rules framed thereunder hardly leave any room for doubt that the
Registrar has almost all the trappings of a Court. We are conscious that
there is no provision in the 1999 Act whereby the proceedings before the
Registrar has been held to be judicial proceedings within the meaning of
the Code of Criminal Procedure or Indian Penal Code as was there in
respect of the erstwhile Intellectual Property Law Appellate Board under
the pre- amendment 1999 Act or the CLB under the 1956 Act but then that
by itself would not detract us from the conclusion that the Registrar has
all the trappings of a Civil Court for the purpose of deciding as to
whether a mark should be registered in favour of a person or not. A
decision to register makes the person concerned the exclusive owner of
the registered trademark in terms of Section 28 of the 1999 Act. Such
decision is taken on the basis of the evidence adduced by the person
concerned and upon considering the opposition to the application along
with the evidence in support of the opposition. The Registrar thus has a
duty to act judicially and fairly. Even if an opposition is not filed, the
Registrar has a duty to objectively scrutinise the application, examine the
facts in the light of the evidence adduced in order to determine if the
trademark meets the requirements for registration under the 1999 Act and
then take a decision. The same would have been a case for a Civil Court
as well where the defendant had not filed its written statement and the
case was proceeding ex-parte. The Court would also in such a case be
required to pass a judgment in favour of the plaintiff only upon the
plaintiff proving his case. The decision taken by the Registrar to either
accept the request for registration or to reject the same directly impacts
and determines the applicant's legal rights and liabilities and in a case of
an opposition the rights and liabilities of both the parties. This is an
essential characteristic of a judicial function."
44. The Calcutta High Court, with the above observation,
concluded that the 'Registrar' has the trappings of a Court and the

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ratio of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) can be effectively applied to the
facts of the case, thereby ousting any avenue for a Letters Patent
Appeal against an order passed under Section 91 of the 1999 Act.

1. Yet another reason to be found in the decision of the Calcutta High Court is the stark difference in the provisions of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and the Trademarks Act, 1999.

In 1958 Act, Section 109 provided for 'Appeals', and sub-
section (5) clearly contemplated that where appeal is heard by a
Single Judge, a further appeal shall lie to a Bench of the High Court,
thus, specifically providing a forum for second appeal. However,
upon the repeal of the 1958 Act, a similar provision was consciously
avoided by the legislature while creating an Appellate Board for
hearing Appeals under the 1999 Act. Focusing upon the intention of
the legislature in deleting such a provision, the Calcutta High Court
arrived at a conclusion that the appeal is not maintainable, as a
conclusion drawn is, that there is no reason not to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 100-A of the Code to appeals filed
under Section 91 of the 1991 Act.

1. Mr. Dube has placed heavy reliance upon the decision of Delhi High Court in case of Promoshirt SM SA (supra) and another decision of the Bombay High Court in case of Resilient Innovations Pvt Ltd (supra) and we find that Calcutta High Court distinguishing the said judgments by recording that the case arose out of Section 57 of the 1999 Act, which contemplated application for rectification filed before the Registrar or High Court, which was in original proceeding and not in appellate proceeding and the same would be outside the purview of provisions of Section 100-A of the Code and Letters

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Patent appeals thereagainst would be maintainable before the
Division Bench.

1. We have minutely perused the decision of the Division Bench of the of Delhi High Court in Promoshirt, which invoke the provisions of Trademarks Act, 1999, as the Letters Patent Appeals were preferred before the Division Bench assailing the judgment of the learned Single Judge rendered on appeals preferred against the order of the Deputy Registrar of the Trade Marks, when the notice of opposition was rejected and the applications for registration of Trademark as made by Promoshirt SM SA (supra) were directed to be accepted and process for registration. The jurisdiction of the learned Single Judge was invoked in terms of Section 91 of the 1999 TM Act, which provided a forum of the appeal to the High Court against the decision of the Registrar.

In the Letters Patent Appeal, the Respondent raised a
preliminary objection about its maintainability in light of Section
100-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and the precise
objection raised was that the Single Judge was exercising appellate
jurisdiction and therefore no further appeal would lie in the wake of
the unambiguous language of Section 100-A and particularly, in the
wake of its overriding effect, which was intended to bar further intra-
court appeals arising from orders/judgments rendered by a Single
Judge while exercising appellate jurisdiction.

Reliance was placed by the counsel for the Respondent on the
decision of the Supreme Court in case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra)
which was cited as a binding authority for the proposition that
Section 100-A of the Code takes away the right of any further appeal,

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even though the same may have earlier existed in terms of a Letters
Patent of a High Court.

Reliance was also placed upon the Full Bench decision of the
Andra Pradesh High Court in Gandla Pannaia Bhulaxmi vs.
Managing Director, APSRTC,18 which had considered the very same
issue; whether the right of appeal as available under the Letters
Patent Act would be taken away by virtue of Section 100-A of the
Code in respect of the matters arising out of special enactments.

It was urged that the view in Gandla Pannaia (supra) was
reiterated by Larger Bench of five Judges in United India Insurance
Co. Ltd., vs. Palmaner Branch, Tirupati v. S. Surya Prakash Reddy &
Ors19, where it is categorically held that language of Section 100-A
does not suggests that the exclusion of the right of the appeal
available under the Letters Patent is confined only to the matters
arising under the Code and not other enactments.

1. The counsel for the Respondent also relied upon the authoritative pronouncements of law in Mohd. Saud (supra) which reiterated the decision in Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra), where the purpose of introducing Section 100-A was set out, being to reduce the number of appeals as the public in India was being harassed by the numerous appeals provided in statute and looked at from this angle it was apparent that the LPA in question was not maintainable because, if it is held to be maintainable, then the result will be that against an interlocutory order of the District Judge there may be two appeals, first to the Single Judge and then to the Division Bench of 18 (2003) SCC Online AP 525

19 (2006) SCC Online AP 434

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the High Court, but against a final judgment, there will be only one
appeal.

1.  The Division Bench of Delhi High Court, proceeded, in the
   

   wake of the counter submissions to determine the issue, as to whether
   the bar created by Section 100-A would stand raised only where the
   Single Judge had exercised appellate jurisdiction in respect of a
   decree or order and what is the conspectus of two terms 'decree' and
   'order' whether it would take its colour from the definition under the
   Code as Section 2(14) of the Code has defined the word 'Order' to
   mean the formal expression of a decision of a Civil Court.

2.  The attention of the Bench was drawn to the decision in re
   

   National Carbon Co. Inc,20 where the Court held, that Controller of
   Patents is not technically a Court or tribunal exercising judicial
   functions and the bench referred to various decisions pronouncing
   upon 'Whether Tribunal is a Civil Court' and with reference to the
   said decisions, the argument advanced on behalf of the appellant, that
   the Registrar while acting and discharging functions under the 1999 Trade Marks Act cannot be possibly held to be a 'Court' came to be
   appreciated with reference to the definition of 'Decree' and 'Order' as
   defined in Sections 2(2), and 2(14) of the Code.

3.  On an exhaustive reference to the precedents, the position
   

   emerging was summarized thus:-

"68. The position may be summarized thus. From the various judgments
which have been cited for our consideration and have been noticed
hereinabove, those which had recognized Section 100-A of the Code as
baring the avenue of an appeal which may otherwise be available in terms
of the letters patent provisions, either originated fro orders or judgments
passed by the civil court or where it was the civil court which formed the

20 A.I.R. 1934 Cal. 725

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principal tier of adjudication although it may have been exercising
jurisdiction otherwise conferred by a special enactment."
52. The Division Bench further expressed that the decision cited
before it did not take note of the definition of the words 'Decree' or
'Order' as appearing in the code as 'decree' was defined to mean a
formal expression of an adjudication by a 'Court' which conclusively
determined the right of the parties, whereas the word 'order' was
defined to mean a formal expression of any decision of a Civil Court
which is not a decree and in this regard, the Court observed thus:-

"70.....Although, the phrase, "civil court" is not specifically defined, one
can safely discern the meaning liable to be ascribed to it from Section 2
(4) of the Code which while defining the word "district" refers to the local
limits of the jurisdiction of a principle civil court of original jurisdiction".

"71. Undoubtedly, therefore, the word 'order' wherever occurring in the
Code would have to be understood bearing in mind Section 2(14) of the
Code. Section 100-A of the Code prescribes the filing of a further appeal
from a decision rendered by a Single Judge of a High Court where such a
Single Judge was hearing an appeal form an original or appellate decree
or order. It would thus appear to mean that where a Single Judge of a
High Court has considered an appeal arising from an original or
appellate decree or order, no further appeal would lie. The restraint on a
further appeal being available to be preferred is to operate
notwithstanding anything contained in the Letters Patent of a High Court
or any other law for the time being in force.
53. The Division Bench in Promoshirt SM SA (supra), therefore
concluded that Registrar of Trade Marks is not a Civil Court,
although, some powers are available to it, the same would not make it
a Civil Court and even it would not qualify the test of 'trappings of a
court' in light of a decision in Anglo-French Drug. Co. and Khoday
Distilleris. The conclusion drawn is recorded in the following words:-

"74 ...Section 91 of 1999 TM Act does not prescribe the appellate remedy
to be governed by the provision of the Code. This as we have found above
is a departure from Section 76 of the 1940 TM Act and Section 109 of the
1958 TM Act as well as Section 299 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 on

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the basis of which the full bench came to rule and decide Avtar Narain
Behal. All the above would tend to indicate that LPA against an order
passed by the Single Judge while exercising the Section 91 power would
not be barred."
77. We would think that the intent of Section 100A would be confined to a
second appeal when preferred against a judgment of a Single Judge
exercising appellate powers provided it pertained to a decree or order as
defined by the Code. The bar would thus only operate where the decree or
order against which the appeal was preferred before the Single Judge was
of a civil court. We further note that Section 2(14) uses the expression
"civil court" and not "court". It would thus be doubtful whether the
"trappings of a court" test as generally formulated would have any
application. However, even if we were to proceed on the basis that such a
test could be justifiably invoked for the purposes of Section 100A, the
Registrar of Trademarks would not qualify the standards as enunciated.

1. In addition to the above, the LPA remedy would also not be available
   where the special statute subjects the appeal remedy to follow the rules
   applicable to appeals and embodied in the Code. Once the appeal is made
   subject to the rules incorporated in the Code, all restrictions to an appeal
   including Section 100A would get attracted and attached. This since the
   appeal provision in such a case would be deemed to have consciously
   adopted all restrictions as put in place under the Code and would
   override the letters patent provision. This would be in line with the ratio
   decidendi of Avtar Narain Behal."

2.  The reliance upon the judgment in [Promoshirt SM SA](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/114101077/) (supra)
   

   in our considered opinion is of no assistance in the facts before us, as
   we have noted that the decision was delivered in a Letters Patent
   Appeal, where the Respondents have taken a preliminary objection
   about its maintainability in the wake of Section 100-A of the Civil
   Procedure Code, 1908. The objection raised, specifically being that
   Section 100-A of the Code, in terms of its express language is
   ordained to override anything to the contrary contained in any Letters
   Patent appeal in the High Court and it would bar all further intra-
   court appeals arising from orders or judgments rendered by a Single
   Judge while exercising appellate jurisdiction. Reliance is placed upon
   the decision in case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) rendered in the

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context of appellate proceedings emanating from an order of
erstwhile Company Law Board and it was cited as a binding authority
for the proposition that Section 100-A of the Code take away right of
any further appeal even though the same existed earlier in terms of
Letters Patent of a High Court.

Per contra, it was urged on behalf of the appellants that right of
appeal is a substantive right and the same accrues to a party on the
date of starting of a lis and this right cannot be taken away.

The learned Single Judge referred to the authoritative
pronouncement cited and considered the contention advanced that the
expression 'Decree' and 'Order' have been defined in the Code and it
definitely connote formal expression of a decision of a Civil Court. In
the wake of the 1999 Trademarks Act, with regard to the power of the
Registrar, the learned Judge relied to the decision in case of Nahar
Industrial Enterprises Ltd. v. Hong kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation Ltd21 and concluded that merely because a Tribunal has
all the trappings of a Court it would not be a Court.

1. We are unable to express our concurrence with the above aforesaid view, in light of the reasons recorded by us in the aforesaid paragraph as the line between the judicial and quasi judicial authorities conferred with the powers of the Court is thin and slowly diminishing and since we find that the Assistant Controller under Section 77 of the Patents Act is clothed with the powers of Civil Court while trying a Suit under the Code of Civil Procedure, in the wake of the proceedings before him and by exercise of this power, the Controller is empowered to hear any parties to the proceedings or

21 (2009) 8 SCC 646

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to give any such party an opportunity to be heard in regards to the
application, which is filed for grant of patent or for amendment of a
specification before exercising the discretion adverse to the applicant.

Looking at the scheme of Chapter XV, including Section 77
read along with Section 79 and 80, the evidence before the Controller
is permitted to be given on affidavit, in absence of his directions to
the contrary but where the controller thinks it right so to do, he may
take oral evidence in lieu of, or in addition to, evidence by affidavit,
or may allow any party to be cross-examined from the contents of the
affidavit.

It is in light of the specific powers conferred on the Controller
General of Patents, Designs and Trademarks, appointed under Section
3 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, we are of the expressed view that the
decision given by him amounts to an 'order' from which an Appeal
lie to the High Court. Under the Patents Act, the Controller is the key
person, as whenever an application for patent is preferred and a
request for examination is made, it shall be referred at the earliest by
the Controller to an Examiner for making a report and the Controller,
under Section 14, on receipt of the said report, before proceeding to
dispose of the application is entitled to follow the procedure
prescribed, i.e., affording an opportunity to the applicant to be heard
if the report of examiner is adverse to the applicant or requires an
amendment.

Under Section 15 of the Patents Act, 1970, the Controller has
the Power to refuse the application or he may require the application,
specification or other documents, as the case may be to be amended
to his satisfaction.

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which includes the specific power in cases of anticipation as
contemplated in Section 18 as well as the power conferred on him in
case of potential infringement as well as the power to make orders
regarding substitution of the applicants, in our view the Controller of
Patents play a significant role and therefore, in the whole process of
grant or refusal of patent and he is conferred with the powers of the
Civil Court, as regards the application for grant of patent, he is
authority to take a decision, which is appealable before the High
Court. We therefore do not agree with the view expressed by the
Delhi High Court that qua the powers of a Registrar under the Trademarks Act, as it is held that Registrar of Trademarks is not a
Civil Court as we find that the powers conferred on the Registrar
under the Trademarks Act are not parallel to one exercised by the
Controller of Patents under the Patents Act, 1970, as we find that the
role of the Controller is of much more significance in the scheme of
the statute and distinct than the one discharged by Registrar of Trade
Marks, who has the trappings of a Court.

1. In light of the aforesaid discussion, and on threadbare analysis of the provisions of the Patents Act, 1970 and the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, though we find substance in the contention of Mr. Dube as regards the first point that the Single Judge of the High Court in entertaining the appeal under Section 117-A of the Patents Act has decided the proceedings on the commercial division but we record that the proceedings are entertained by way of an appeal. It is in this background, the bar under Section 100-A of the Civil Procedure Code debars the second appeal as the said provision prohibits an appeal

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from the Judgment and Decree of a Single Judge, the intention
underlying the said provision being not to encourage filing of second
appeal when the first appeal is decided by the High Court and in no
unequivocal terms, this principle has been reiterated in various
authoritative pronouncements, to which we have made reference.

It is on this count, in the wake of the bar of Section 100-A,
according to us, the present appeal filed under Section 13 of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015, is not maintainable and the same is
dismissed.

Easy on costs.

(MANJUSHA DESHPANDE, J.) (BHARATI DANGRE, J.)

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