Burlington School District v. Monsanto Co. - Expert Testimony Motion Denied in PCB Contamination Case

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April 7, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Burlington School District v. Monsanto Co., Solutia, Inc., and Pharmacia LLC

District Court, D. Vermont

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:22-cv-00215

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (27.6K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE
DISTRICT OF VERMONT

BURLINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 2:22-cv-215
)
MONSANTO CO., SOLUTIA, INC., )
and PHARMACIA LLC, )
)
Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER

The Burlington School District (“BSD” or “Plaintiff”)
commenced this action after discovering polychlorinated
biphenyls (“PCBs”) at Burlington High School (“BHS”). Defendants
Monsanto Co., Solutia, Inc., and Pharmacia LLC (collectively
“Monsanto” or “Defendants”) are allegedly successors to the old
Monsanto company, which was the primary manufacturer of PCBs in
the United States for several decades. The Complaint asserts a
claim for damages resulting from PCB contamination at BHS.
Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to exclude
all testimony of Plaintiff’s experts Wendy Pearson and Robert
Wanat. For the reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
Background
The Complaint alleges that PCBs are toxic and dangerous
chemical compounds that were manufactured, marketed, and sold by
Monsanto in the United States from approximately 1929 to 1977.
BHS was constructed in the 1960s, and testing recently revealed
the presence of PCBs in its buildings. The BSD concluded that
because of PCB contamination, BHS had to be demolished.

Pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to exclude
the testimony of two experts: Wendy Pearson and Dr. Robert
Wanat. Ms. Pearson is a licensed engineer who has worked at
Matson & Associates for over 25 years. Plaintiff initially
retained Dr. Jack Matson to serve as an expert, but health
issues prevent him from doing so. Plaintiff reports that “Ms.
Pearson conducted extensive research and assisted directly in
the preparation and drafting of Dr. Matson’s expert report in
this case, and adopted the findings in his report as her own in
light of his health issues.” ECF No. 162 at 6. Ms. Pearson has
bachelor’s and master’s degrees in civil engineering and
environmental science and engineering. She has also conducted

peer-reviewed research relating to environmental contamination,
chemical manufacturing industry standards and practices, and
chemical releases from manufacturing and industrial facilities.
Her expected testimony will include analysis of the standards
and practices relevant to the manufacture and distribution of
PCBs, and to the chemical engineering analysis of polymers and
plasticizers.
Dr. Wanat holds an M.S. and a Ph.D. in chemistry from
Cornell University. He has more than 30 years’ experience
working for major chemical companies overseeing research and
development of various chemical products. Since 2018, he has
owned his own consulting company which specializes in the

development, manufacture, and application of polymers, plastics,
materials, and adhesives. Dr. Wanat is expected to testify about
Monsanto’s own documents, including past technical bulletins and
studies about products containing PCBs, and place them in
technical context.
Discussion
“Federal Rule of Evidence 702 imposes a special obligation
upon a trial judge to ensure that any and all [expert] testimony
. . . is not only relevant, but reliable.” Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Witnesses may testify as experts if they are
“qualified . . . by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education.” Fed. R. Evid. 702. The Rule provides that a witness
who is qualified may testify in the form of an opinion or
otherwise if the proponent demonstrates to the Court that it is
more likely than not that:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts
or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion
reflects a reliable application of the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702. “The proponent of the expert testimony bears
the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence
that the admissibility requirements of Rule 702 are satisfied.”
United States v. Pollok, 139 F.4th 126, 140 (2d Cir. 2025)

(internal quotation marks omitted).
I. Monsanto’s Knowledge
Defendants first argue that opinions about what Monsanto
should have known should be excluded. Their contention is that
these witnesses’ testimonies about the environmental impacts of
PCBs – based in part on information from Monsanto’s own archives
– are “mere pronouncements” based on “subjective or speculative
opinions,” ECF No. 142 at 9, and would constitute a subjective
interpretation “based on nothing more than a review of decades-
old documents,” id. at 10. Plaintiff submits that rather than
offering subjective statements or speculation about Monsanto’s

state of mind, these witnesses will assist the jury by placing
the documents in question into historical, technical, and
scientific contexts.
Dr. Matson’s report, which Ms. Pearson has adopted as her
own (ECF No. 142-2 at 3), reviews the state of the science
related to PCBs over several decades, beginning in the 1930s.
The report cites both Monsanto’s own records and studies
conducted by scientists outside of Monsanto. Dr. Matson also
explains the chemical nature of PCBs and what was known about
their dangers. To the extent the report offers any opinions
about Monsanto’s knowledge at a given time, those opinions are
substantially supported by the reviewed documentation. In other

words, Dr. Matson was not speculating about what Monsanto knew.
Dr. Matson does offer opinions about what Monsanto could
have done to expand its knowledge. Those opinions are based on
studies that were known in the scientific community and, in
certain instances, by Monsanto itself. Again, to the extent Dr.
Matson contends that Monsanto possessed certain knowledge, his
opinions are supported by documentary evidence. Insofar as Dr.
Matson opines on what Monsanto should have known, he explains
his conclusions with concrete examples of information available
to Monsanto at the time.
Defendants contend that Dr. Matson’s focus on Monsanto’s
testing of paint products is not relevant here, since

Plaintiff’s claims reportedly focus on other materials such as
building caulk. Dr. Matson provides historical evidence to
suggest that Monsanto was aware of dangers in those other
materials and could have conducted further testing based on that
knowledge. That evidence is complex, and Ms. Pearson’s expertise
will assist the jury in understanding how it fits into the
historical and scientific contexts.
In short, the Court finds that Dr. Matson’s conclusions,
and Ms. Pearson’s expected testimony, are not based on
speculation. Nor do they constitute merely subjective
narrations. Instead, they appear to be supported by a
substantial documentary record that provides a foundation for
their opinions. See Stults v. Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, Inc.,

No. C 11-4077-MWB, 2014 WL 12603223, at *3 (N.D. Iowa July 18,
2014) (“To the extent that an expert adequately demonstrates a
basis for an opinion about what the defendants knew or should
have known from such information that was within the defendants’
possession, then such an opinion may be admissible at trial, if
the proper foundation is laid.”); Goldberg v. 401 N. Wabash
Venture LLC, 755 F.3d 456, 461–62 (7th Cir. 2014) (without
directly addressing a real estate developer’s knowledge or state
of mind, “[a] business expert can however testify about the
state of knowledge prevalent in a business that he has
studied”); Gillis v. Cmty. Prods., LLC, No. 5:22-CV-00080-DAE, 2024 WL 3548775, at *11 (W.D. Tex. July 9, 2024) (“To offer
expert testimony on what Defendant either knew or should have
known, Plaintiffs will first need to lay an appropriate
foundation.”); see also City of Seattle v. Monsanto Co., 2023 WL
4014294, at *8-9 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 15, 2023).1

1 Defendants rely in part on the exclusion of Dr. Matson’s
testimony in Town of Westport v. Monsanto Co., No. CV 14-12041, 2017 WL 1347671, at *3 (D. Mass. Apr. 7, 2017), aff’d, 877 F.3d
58 (1st Cir. 2017). In that case, both the district court and
the First Circuit cited In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended
Acceleration Mktg., Sales Practices & Prods. Liab. Litig., 978
Dr. Wanat’s report is similarly supported. He will testify
about chemical evaporation generally, and with respect to PCBs
specifically. He will also reference Monsanto’s documents,

including patents and technical bulletins. As with any experts,
his trial testimony will need to be supported by a proper
foundation. See id. At this stage in the case, the Court will
not exclude the testimony of either Ms. Pearson or Dr. Wanat on
the question of what Monsanto should have known about PCBs
during the relevant time periods.
II. Standard of Care
Defendants next argue that Ms. Pearson’s and Dr. Wanat’s
opinions regarding industry standards cannot be admitted because
they are not supported by sufficient facts, are not based on any
methodology, and constitute improper legal conclusions.
Defendants characterize Ms. Pearson’s opinions as “subjective

speculation” based only on Monsanto’s “corporate position
statements” and “vague commentary from various associations and
organizations regarding ‘corporate social responsibility.’” ECF

F. Supp. 2d 1053, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 2013), which explained that
“[Defendant’s] knowledge (or lack thereof) is not a proper
subject for expert testimony, and it must be established (if at
all) by other evidence.” The Court agrees that any testimony
about Defendants’ knowledge must be supported by other evidence.
No. 142 at 12-13. Defendants submit that “Dr. Wanat grounds his
opinions on even less than Ms. Pearson.” Id. at 13.
Dr. Matson’s report cites several sources, including

industry groups and individual corporate leaders, espousing a
need for manufacturers to know whether their products are safe
and to safeguard public health. He also cites Monsanto’s own
statements about a duty to protect both its consumers and the
planet. Ms. Pearson intends to testify that Monsanto defined its
own standard of care and failed to live up to that standard. Dr.
Wanat’s report is more limited, citing Monsanto’s adherence to
American Conference of Government Hygienists thresholds.
The Court questions whether the materials cited by Dr.
Matson establish a standard of care, or whether they instead
constitute general statements of corporate responsibility.
Regardless of the distinction, the Court finds no reason at this

time to exclude the testimony of either Ms. Pearson or Dr.
Wanat, particular insofar as their testimonies are based on
Monsanto’s own statements about its responsibilities. Cf. A.O.A.
v. Rennert, No. 4:11 CV 44 CDP, 2025 WL 2606548, at *18 (E.D.
Mo. Sept. 9, 2025) (allowing Dr. Matson to testify about
corporate social responsibility to the extent his “opinion also
relate[s] to his standard-of-care opinion”). If Monsanto was
asserting a duty to take certain precautions, and did not adhere
to either its own standards or those within the industry, such
information may be considered by the finder of fact.
Defendants’ final argument is that testimony about the

standard of care consists of improper legal conclusions and
“stand[s] in the shoes of the jury.” ECF No. 142 at 14.
Defendants particularly object to any testimony offering
opinions on whether Monsanto violated a standard of care or
acted reasonably. “[A]lthough an expert may opine on an issue of
fact within the jury’s province, he may not give testimony
stating ultimate legal conclusions based on those facts.” United
States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1294 (2d Cir. 1991). “The
best way to determine whether opinion testimony contains legal
conclusions is to determine whether the terms used by the
witness have a separate, distinct and specialized meaning in the
law different from that present in the vernacular.” United
States v. Barile, 286 F.3d 749, 760 (4th Cir. 2002).

Courts have held that a witness may testify about a
defendants’ adherence to industry safety standards. See, e.g.,
Jay v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 608 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1261
(S.D. Fla. 2022) (holding that witness “may opine as to whether
Defendant violated its own safety standards and industry
standards, which are not legal conclusions and are beyond the
expertise of an average lay juror”); In re Juul Labs, Inc.
Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 19-MD-02913-WHO, 2022 WL 1814440, at *14 (N.D. Cal. June 2, 2022) (“That an
expert testifies that a defendant violated industry standards or
even identified regulations does not mean that the expert is

making an impermissible legal conclusion; admissibility depends
upon the context of the opinion (when it comes in and what it
comes in for) as well as the claims at issue in particular
cases.”).
Whether an expert may opine on conduct being “reasonable”
depends on context. If the term “reasonable” tracks an element
of a cause of action, it constitutes an impermissible legal
conclusion. See Barile, 286 F.3d at 760 (“To determine when a
question posed to an expert witness calls for an improper legal
conclusion, the district court should consider first whether the
question tracks the language of the legal principle at issue or
of the applicable statute, and second, whether any terms
employed have specialized legal meaning.”); see also Rutherford
v. City of Mount Vernon, 698 F. Supp. 3d 574, 611 (S.D.N.Y.

2023) (assessing whether expert’s expected testimony “track[s]
the elements of Plaintiff’s claim” to determine whether the
expert impermissibly opines on an ultimate legal issue). If not,
and if the testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702, such
testimony may be admitted. See, e.g., Neural Magic, Inc. v. Meta
Platforms, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 3d 138, 175 (D. Mass. 2023)
(allowing expert to opine as to the reasonableness of measures
taken to protect proprietary information, but not as to whether
those measures met statutory requirements).
Here, Plaintiff submits that Dr. Wanat will use the term

“reasonable” in its “ordinary, non-legal sense.” ECF No. 162 at
16. Defendants have not identified an element of a pending cause
action that would render the term “reasonable” an impermissible
legal conclusion. Consequently, based on the information and
briefing now before it, the Court declines to bar such
testimony.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ motion to
exclude the expert testimony of Wendy Pearson and Robert Wanat
(ECF No. 142) is denied.

DATED at Burlington, in the District of Vermont, this 7th

day of April 2026.
/s/ William K. Sessions III
Hon. William K. Sessions III
U.S. District Court Judge