Gabriel Jose Carreno-Mendez v. Kristi Noem - Habeas Petition Denied

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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Gabriel Jose Carreno-Mendez v. Kristi Noem, DHS Secretary, et al.

District Court, S.D. Florida

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:26-cv-20329

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 26-cv-20329-JB

GABRIEL JOSE CARRENO-
MENDEZ,

Petitioner,

v.

KRISTI NOEM, DHS SECRETARY,
et al.,

Respondents.
__________________________________________/

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court upon Petitioner Gabriel Jose Carreno-
Mendez’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”). ECF No. [1].
Respondents1 filed a Return opposing the Petition and Petitioner filed a Reply. ECF
Nos. [12], [13]. On March 26, 2026, the Court held a hearing on the Petition. ECF

1 Petitioner originally included the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); the
Secretary of DHS Kristi Noem; United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE); the Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Director, Toddy Lyons; and
ICE Field Office Director for the Miami Field Office, Garrett J. Ripa. ECF No. [1].
CITE. Respondent opposed and stated that several of the named respondents were
improperly included in this habeas action because Petitioner’s immediate custodian
was Assistant Field Office Director Charles Parra. ECF No. [12] at 3, n. 1. Therefore,
Respondent states that the other respondents should be dismissed. Id. Petitioner
now acknowledges that ICE Field Office Director for the Miami Field Office, Garret
J. Ripa, was his immediate custodian and requests the dismissal of the remaining
Respondents. ECF No. [13] at 2. Therefore, the Court finds that ICE Field Office
Director for the Miami Field Office, Garret J. Ripa is the proper Respondent and
dismisses all others.
No. [18]. Upon due consideration of the parties’ submissions, the pertinent portions
of the record, and the applicable law, for the reasons explained below, the Petition is
DENIED.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Petitioner is a Venezuelan citizen who has resided in the United States since
June 2022. ECF Nos. [1] ¶¶ 4, 6, [12] at 2, [12-1]. Petitioner has no criminal history.
ECF No. [12-1] at 2. On or about June 27, 2022, the time of his initial encounter with
Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), CBP determined that Petitioner was not in
possession of valid documents to enter or reside in the United States and was present
in violation of section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(7)(A)(i)(I). ECF No. [12-3] ¶10. CBP released
Petitioner on parole on the same day, pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the INA.2 ECF
Nos. [12-2], [12-3] ¶11. Petitioner’s parole expired on August 26, 2022, and on
December 30, 2025, ICE ERO encountered and apprehended Petitioner. ECF Nos.
[12-1] at 2, [12-2], [12-3] ¶12.
On December 30, 2025, as Petitioner was reporting to the Alternative to

Detention Unit, he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)
and taken into custody. ECF No. [12-3] ¶ 14. He was subsequently issued a Notice
and Order of Expedited Removal. ECF Nos. [12-3] ¶16, [12-4]. Petitioner is currently

2 In his Petition, Petitioner alleges two separate parole dates. ECF No. [1] ¶ ¶ 7, 15.
Specifically, Petitioner lists August 26, 2022, and August 26, 2023. Id. However, the
parole document attached to the Petition lists the parole date as June 27, 2022, and
an expiration date of August 26, 2022. Id. at 7. There is no dispute that his parole
expired on August 26, 2022.
being held by ICE at the Florence Service Processing Center in Florence, Arizona.3
ECF No. [12-3] ¶ 17.
Petitioner’s designation for expedited removal is reflected in two documents

that CBP issued on December 30, 2025. In particular, CBP issued a Record of
Deportable/Inadmissible Alien charging Petitioner under Section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of
the INA with being an “immigrant without an immigrant visa” and reflecting his
“disposition” as “Expediated Removal.” ECF No. [12-1] at 2. Similarly, on December
30, 2025, CBP issued a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal “pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225 (b)(1).” ECF No. [12-4] at 1.

II. THIS ACTION
On January 17, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition in which he raises
three claims. ECF No. [1]. Count I alleges that Respondents’ attempt to subject
Petitioner to expedited removal is unlawful. Id ¶ 14−16. Count II alleges that
Petitioner’s removal without a hearing before an immigration judge violates
Petitioner’s statutory right to seek asylum. Id. ¶¶ 17–19. Count III alleges that
Petitioner’s removal without notice, hearing, and judicial review violates

fundamental due process protections. Id. ¶¶ 20–21. Petitioner requests that the

3 Petitioner represents that when he filed this petition on January 17, 2026, he was
physically detained at the Krome Detention Center in Miami, Florida. ECF No. [1] ¶
2. Because Petitioner initially filed his petition in the district in which he was
detained, the Court has jurisdiction despite his subsequent transfer to a facility in
Arizona. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004) (“[W]hen the Government
moves a habeas petitioner after he properly files a petition naming his immediate
custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any
respondent within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner's
release.”).
Court require Respondents to cease expedited removal proceedings, and place him in
INA § 240 removal proceedings before an Immigration Judge. Id. at 4.
III. ANALYSIS

District courts have the authority to grant writs of habeas corpus. See 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (a). Habeas corpus is fundamentally “a remedy for unlawful executive
detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008) (citation omitted). A writ may
be issued to a petitioner who shows that he is being held in custody in violation of the
Constitution or federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c)(3). The Court’s jurisdiction
extends to challenges involving immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, [533

U.S. 678, 687](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1269289/zadvydas-v-davis/#687) (2001).
Here, however, Petitioner does not contest his detention. ECF No. [1]. Instead,
Petitioner contests whether he is subject to expedited removal. Id. Specifically,
Petitioner alleges that the December 30, 2025, expedited removal order issued for
him under the expedited removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b), was unlawful. ECF
No. [1] ¶¶14−16. Citing § 1225 (b)(1)(A)(iii)(II), Petitioner argues that he was
ineligible for expedited removal because he was paroled into the United States and

has been continuously present in the United States for more than two years. Id. ¶ 14.
In his reply, Petitioner similarly claims that he is not eligible for expedited removal
because 1) he has been continuously present in the United States for more than two
years, 2) he was paroled into the United States as a matter of law, and 3) he was
served a Notice and Order of Expedited Removal and Determination of
Inadmissibility more than three years after being released into the country. ECF No.
[13] at 4. Petitioner therefore seeks this Court’s review of the Immigration
authorities’ determinations as to each of these issues.
At its core, the Petition is challenging his final order of removal. See ECF No.

[1]. Moreover, judicial review of Petitioner’s expedited removal order issued under §
1225(b)(1) is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. See Diaz Del Cid v. Barr, 394 F. Supp. 3d
1342, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Castro v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d
422, 426 (3d Cir. 2016) (“This statute narrowly circumscribes judicial review for
expedited removal orders issued pursuant to § 1225(b)(1).”)). Under § 1252(a)(2)(A):
[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or
nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas
corpus provision...no court shall have jurisdiction to review—

(i) except as provided in subsection (e), any individual determination or
to entertain any other cause or claim arising from or relating to the
implementation or operation of an order of removal pursuant to section
1225(b)(1) of this title.

The plain language of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i)
precludes this Court’s review of Petitioner’s habeas petition to the extent that he
seeks review of the expedited removal order.
Similarly, because Petitioner’s detention arises from and is related to the
expedited removal order, review of his challenge to his detention is also limited by §
1252(a) and (e)’s limiting provisions. See Osorio-Martinez v. Att'y Gen. United States
of Am., 893 F.3d 153, 165 (3d Cir. 2018) (“ ‘Relating to’ is typically construed as having
a broad, expansive meaning, including in the immigration context.”) (citing Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992) (“The ordinary meaning of
these words [‘relating to’] is a broad one.”); Aguilar v. U.S. Immigration. & Customs
Enf't Div. of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 510 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2007) (suggesting that,
for purposes of a different provision of § 1252, “relating to” could be used to mean “to

sweep within its scope claims with only a remote or attenuated connection” to the
underlying removal)). Simply because Petitioner was released on parole when he
entered the United States in June 2022 does not change this conclusion. Duran
Orozco v. U.S. Att. Gen., 1:26-cv-20553 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 4, 2026) (finding that the
petitioner’s initial release on parole did not change his initial status).
Moreover, the matter is not subject to review under habeas review. As noted

above, subsection (e) permits review through habeas corpus proceedings, however,
that is limited to determinations of – “(A) whether the petitioner is an alien, (B)
whether the petitioner was ordered removed under § 1225(b), and (C) whether the
petitioner can prove, by a preponderance of the evidence that he is an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence. . . or has been granted asylum under section 1158
of this title.” § 1252(e)(2)(A) −(C). Petitioner’s claims do not challenge any of these
determinations. Indeed, Petitioner does not challenge (nor could he) the

determination of whether he is an alien, whether he was ordered removed, or whether
he can prove he is an alien who was lawfully admitted for permanent residence or
has been granted asylum. See Torrez v. Swacina, No. 20-20650-CIV-Altonaga, 2020
WL 13551822, at *3–4 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 17, 2020) (finding court lacked jurisdiction to
review petitioner's habeas challenge to expedited removal proceedings based on
challenge to determination of whether he had previously been removed); Diaz Del
Cid, 394 F. Supp. 3d at 1345 (finding challenge to timing of credible fear interview
foreclosed by Section 1252(e)).
Accordingly, this Court agrees with Respondent that the Court does not have
jurisdiction to review the Petition.
A. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, itis hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as
follows:
1. Petitioner Gabriel Jose Carreno-Mendez’s Verified Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, ECF No. [1], is DENIED.
2. The Clerk is directed to CLOSE this case.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida this 6th day of
April, 2026.
Sp BECERRA
UNITEDATATES DISTRICT JUDGE