Valentine London Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing - CPR Service Requirements Judicial Review

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  Valentine London Ltd v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Anor [2026] EWHC 790 (Admin) (01 April 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2026/790.html
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[2026] EWHC 790 (Admin) | | |
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| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 790 (Admin) |
| | | Case Numbers: AC-2025-LON-002485
AC-2025-LON-002500 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
PLANNING COURT

| | | |
| | | 1 April 2026 |
B e f o r e :

FORDHAM J

| | VALENTINE LONDON LIMITED | Claimant |
| | - and ? | |
| | (1) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR HOUSING, COMMUNITIES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(2) SOUTH HAMS DISTRICT COUNCIL | Defendants |

**Andrew Manning-Smith (Director) appeared in person for the Claimant
Stephanie Hall (instructed by GLD) appeared for the First Defendant
The Second Defendant did not appear and was not represented

Hearing date: 3.3.26
Draft judgment: 25.3.26**

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

2. Note: this judgment was handed down electronically at 10am on 1.4.26, by circulation to the parties and uploading to the National Archives.
4. FORDHAM J
5. FORDHAM J:
6. Introduction
7. This case is about the consequences of failing to serve a sealed claim form in accordance with the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR), in a planning statutory review claim, within the prescribed 6 week time period. It is a case about "steps already taken" under CPR 6.15 and "all reasonable steps" under CPR 7.6(3). Those "steps" are things done by a claimant, although they have fallen short of serving the sealed claim form in accordance with the CPR. They are part of the criteria which the Court must apply when it decides whether (a) to retrospectively validate past steps as "good service" (CPR 6.15) or (b) to extend time for service (CPR 7.6(3)). In a planning statutory review claim, the CPR 7.6(3) criteria apply by analogy, when deciding whether to extend time under CPR 3.1(2)(a): see Rogers v Secretary of State for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities [2024] EWCA Civ 1554 [2025] 1 WLR 2759 at ??17, 38a, 38c; following R (Good Law Project Ltd) v Secretary of State for Health And Social Care [2022] EWCA Civ 355 [2022] 1 WLR 2339. Good Law was a procurement judicial review case, where retrospective validation (CPR 6.15) and extension of time (CPR 7.6(3)) both featured.
9. By an Order made on 17 November 2025, Deputy High Court Judge Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC decided, on the papers, to allow the Secretary of State's application to set aside the Claimant's claim for planning statutory review. The Judge found that the claim was not validly served within the time prescribed. He refused the Claimant's application for an extension of time for service. The Claimant has applied to discharge that Order at an oral hearing, seeking retrospective validation (CPR 6.15) and/or an extension of time (CPR 7.6(3)). The Secretary of State resists that application. I have had to consider all the issues afresh. I have benefited from focused written and oral submissions by Mr Manning-Smith (in person) for the Claimant, and by Stephanie Hall for the Secretary of State. The local planning authority (LPA) is Second Defendant to the claim and has not participated.
11. The Impugned Decision
12. On Monday 16 June 2025 the Secretary of State's planning inspector issued an appeal decision. It was adverse to the Claimant. It maintained a "principal home" planning condition, imposed by the LPA for four residential flats in Devon. The inspector's decision is available online: ref. APP/K1128/W/24/3355774. It was a decision challengeable by the Claimant, by a claim for planning statutory review pursuant to s.288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.
14. The 6 Week Deadline
15. By s.288(4B) of the 1990 Act, a claim for planning statutory review "must be made before the end of six weeks". By CPR PD54D ?4.2 the statutory review claim form (N208PC) must be "filed", and by CPR PD54D ?4.11 it must also be "served", within that same 6 week time limit. The statutory 6-week deadline for making the claim was considered in Croke v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2019] EWCA Civ 54 [2019] PTSR 1406. The 6 week period under the rules, for filing but also serving the claim, was described as "precise, unambiguous and unqualified" in Rogers at ?38d. In the present case, everyone agrees that the 6 weeks for filing and serving the claim for planning statutory review expired at midnight on Monday 28 July 2025.
17. Filing
18. In order to make a civil claim, a claimant must first "file" it. Under CPR 2.3(1), "filing" means delivering to the court office. A judicial review claim form must be "filed" promptly and within 3 months of the grounds arising (CPR 54.5(1)). A planning judicial review claim must be "filed" within 6 weeks (CPR 54.(5)). There are prescribed time limits for filing a procurement judicial review (CPR 54.5(6)), as seen in Good Law.
20. Issuing and Sealing
21. After a claim is filed, it will be "issued" by the court. Under CPR 7.2(1), it is when the court "issues" the claim form that the proceedings are started. The claim is "issued" on the date which the court enters on the claim form (CPR 7.2(2)). On "issue" of the claim, the court must "seal" the claim form, by placing the "seal" on the document (CPR 2.6(1)(2)). The White Book commentary at ?6.3.2 says this: "The seal is intended to give a clear message to the defendant that he or she is being served with originating process by authority of the court, and not being sent some informal demand". That description was recorded in Ideal Shopping Direct Ltd v Mastercard Inc [2022] EWCA Civ 14 [2022] 1 WLR 1541 at ?65. An unsealed claim form is not a "claim form" within the meaning of the CPR, and cannot be "served": see Ideal at ?144; and Rogers at ?10. In the present case, the Administrative Court Office (ACO) issued the Claimant's claim for planning statutory review on Monday 28 July 2025, emailing Mr Manning-Smith at 15:19 that day, attaching the claim form N208PC bearing the Court's seal. Mr Manning-Smith had until midnight that day to effect service, to comply with CPR PD54D ?4.11.
23. Service
24. The "service" of a claim form has been described as "the act by which the defendant is subjected to the court's jurisdiction": Good Law at ?41. Service will need to take place within a prescribed time-frame. But there are different ways in which these deadlines for service can arise. They may arise by statute, by rule or by order of the court. An ordinary claim form must be served by a deadline which starts from the date on which it was issued (CPR 7.5). This was the sort of service deadline which arose in Ideal Shopping, and in the earlier Supreme Court cases of Abela v Baadarani [2013] UKSC 44 [2013] 1 WLR 2043 (a fraud claim) and Barton v Wright Hassall LLP [2018] UKSC 12 [2018] 1 WLR 1119 (a professional negligence claim). A judicial review claim, planning judicial review claim, or procurement judicial review claim must all be served within 7 days of being issued (CPR 54.7). That was the service deadline which arose in Good Law. A planning statutory review claim must be served within the statutory 6 weeks for challenge (CPR PD54D ?4.11). That was the service deadline in Rogers, and in this case. It means planning statutory review claims must be "filed and served" within the statutory 6 weeks: see Croke at ?8; and Rogers at ??18, 38b.
26. In a planning statutory review claim, it is necessary to serve the claim on the relevant Minister or Government Department as defendant to the claim (CPR PD54D ??4.8-4.9). This must be done by serving the Government Legal Department (GLD): see CPR 6.10(b); CPR PD66 ?2.1 and Annex 2; CPR PD54A ?5.2(b). There can be service of the claim by first class post to GLD's postal address at 102 Petty France, London SW1H 9GL: see CPR PD66 Annex 2. I will call this "the GLD:Petty France postal address". Or there can be service of the claim by email, at the designated email address, because GLD accepts that method of service of new claims. This "new proceedings address" (Good Law at ?12i) is NewProceedings@governmentlegal.gov.uk. I will call it "the NP@GLD email address".
28. What must be "served" is the sealed claim form, not an unsealed version. This was decided in Ideal Shopping. In that case, the deadline for service was 17 July 2020. Two sealed claim forms in that case were served by midnight that day (?9). Two other unsealed claim forms were sent by email (?13), but there was no "service" because the unsealed claim forms were not "claim forms" under the rules (?144). Similarly, in Good Law, the deadline for service was 5 May 2021. The unsealed claim form had been sent on 27 April 2021 (?12(vii)), but this was not service (?33).
30. The "service" of a claim form involves taking a "step required", corresponding to the "method of service" (CPR 7.5(1)). For the method of service by first class post (CPR 6.3(1)(b)), the relevant step is "posting" (CPR 7.5(1)). That includes "placing the document in a post box" (CPR PD6A ?3.1(1)). For the method of service by email (CPR 6.3(1)(d)), the relevant step is "sending the email" (CPR 7.5(1)). For effective service of a claim form by email, the party served must have indicated in writing their willingness to be served by email, and service must be to the email address which they have specified (CPR PD6A ?4.1). In Barton, the claimant purported to serve a sealed claim form by email on the defendant's solicitors. But the solicitors had not given the necessary prior indication of willingness to be served by email, so service was ineffective. In Good Law, the sealed claim form was sent by email (see ?12x), on the deadline day for service. That was to the email address of the individual case-handler at GLD. But this was not the NP@GLD email address ? the "email address" which had been "designated for service" (see ?12i) ? so that was not "service" which was effective under the rules (see ?13).
32. A claimant is required to file a certificate of service in Form N215 (CPR 6.17). This must be accompanied by a statement of truth (CPR 22.1(d)). The Form N215 must certify the "method" of service that was used, and the date of any "posting" or "sending the email".
34. The relevant act must be in time
35. In the procurement judicial review case of Good Law, the Court said (at ?24) that what mattered, for the claimant to serve the claim ahead of the service deadline, was "actual service" and not "deemed service". There are rules about "deemed service" (CPR 6.14), under which service is deemed to take place two business days after the relevant step was taken "in accordance with" CPR 6. In the present case, the Secretary of State accepts ? in a post-hearing email dated 12 March 2026 ? that in-time service is when the relevant step (emailing or posting) was taken in time. There may be nobody in the office to read the email. There may be no postal worker to pick up the package. The idea is that the taking of the relevant step stops the clock for the claimant, while the distinct function of deemed service (CPR 6.14) starts the clock for next steps by a defendant. That idea is explained in Zuckerman on Civil Procedure at ??5.11, 5.12 and 5.77.
37. Alleviating non-compliance
38. There are at least five routes by which the High Court could decide that non-compliance by a claimant should not shut out their claim. Three of these are not in play in the present case. There is the general power in CPR 3.10 to remedy an error of procedure. It is not available to correct an error in service of a claim form: see Ideal Shopping at ??40, 146; and Good Law at ?7. Next, there is the power in CPR 6.16 to dispense with service. That requires exceptional circumstances: see Ideal Shopping at ??21, 38. Next, there is the duty under the Human Rights Act 1998 to ensure that the operation of rules does not "impair" the "very essence" of the right of access to the court. That arises only in very narrow circumstances: see Croke at ??20-22 and ?46. That leaves the two powers which are in play in the present case. One is the power in CPR 6.15, retrospectively to authorise steps as good service. That power was triggered in the claimant's favour in Abela, but not in Barton (by a majority 3-2); nor in Ideal Shopping; nor in Good Law. The other is the power to extend time for service, acting under CPR 3.1(2)(a), but applying the criteria within CPR 7.6. That power was not triggered in Good Law (by a majority 2-1) or Rogers.
40. CPR 6.15
41. CPR 6.15 provides as follows:
43. 6.15. (1) Where it appears to the court that there is a good reason to authorise service by a method or at a place not otherwise permitted by this Part, the court may make an order permitting service by an alternative method or at an alternative place. (2) On an application under this rule, the court may order that steps already taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant by an alternative method or at an alternative place is good service. (3) An application for an order under this rule ? (a) must be supported by evidence; and (b) may be made without notice. (4) An order under this rule must specify ? (a) the method or place of service; (b) the date on which the claim form is deemed served; and (c) the period for ? (i) filing an acknowledgment of service; (ii) filing an admission; or (iii) filing a defence.
44. Mr Manning-Smith relies on the two Supreme Court cases on CPR 6.15:
46. i) In Abela the Supreme Court explained that whether there was a good reason to order that the steps taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant constituted good service of the claim form was a value judgment based on the evaluation of a number of different factors (?23). The Court should simply ask itself whether, in all the circumstances of the particular case, there is a good reason to make the order sought (?35). Whether the defendant "learned of the existence and content of the claim form" is a "critical factor" (?36). Rule 6.15 allows retrospective authorisation of "an erroneous method of service" or "mis-service", even where a claim would otherwise be timed-out (?36). The whole point of service is to ensure that the claim form is communicated to the defendant, to inform the defendant of the contents of the claim form (?37). It is relevant whether a defendant through their advisers is "fully apprised of the nature of the claim being brought", being "fully aware of the contents of the claim form" (?38).
47. ii) In Barton, the Supreme Court endorsed Abela (??9-10). Whether there was a good reason for validating service was a factual evaluation (?9). The main relevant factors (?10) were likely to be whether the claimant had taken reasonable steps to effect service in accordance with the rules, whether the defendant or their solicitor were aware of the contents of the claim form, and what if any prejudice the defendant would suffer by the retrospective validation of a non-compliant service of the claim form, bearing in mind what the defendant knew about its contents.
48. CPR 7.6(3)
49. The criteria in CPR 7.6(3)(b) and (c), for "an order to extend the time" for service of the claim form, are that "the court may make such an order only if ? (b) the claimant has taken all reasonable steps to comply ? but has been unable to do so; and (c) ? the claimant has acted promptly in making the application". As was explained in the planning statutory review case of Rogers at ??38d and 38e:
51. [d] Under CPR r 7.6(3) a claimant has to show, first, that it has taken all reasonable steps to serve the claim form within the relevant period? Events after the expiry of the period are strictly irrelevant to the issue of whether a claimant took all reasonable steps to serve within the period ? However later events may shed light on what happened or did not happen during the six-week period, and could be relevant to the overall exercise of the court's discretion. [e] The second step under rule 7.6(3) is for a claimant to show that an application for an extension of time made after the expiry of the relevant period has been made promptly? [T]he period under consideration starts with the date that the six-week period expires, and runs to the making of the application for an extension of time.
52. What happened before the service deadline
53. I have said that the 6-week deadline for filing and serving the Claimant's claim for planning statutory review expired at midnight on Monday 28 July 2025. What I now need to do is set out, in some detail, what happened ahead of that deadline:
55. On Thursday 17 July 2025, the Claimant's solicitor (Tom Barton at Keystone Law) wrote a 5-page letter before claim to the Secretary of State. That was eleven calendar days ahead of the service deadline of Monday 28 July 2025. The heading was "proposed s.288 statutory challenge". The letter referred to the pre-action protocol for "judicial review" and the "proposed application for statutory review". It enclosed 17-page, 43-paragraph "statement of facts and grounds" authored by Counsel (George MacKenzie), describing an "application for planning statutory review".
57. The letter before claim was written to the GLD:Petty France postal address. This was recorded in the top left hand corner on page one:
59. Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government
60. C/O Government Legal Department
61. 102 Petty France
62. London
63. SW1H 9GL
64. Also on page one of the letter before claim (17 July 2025) was this express reference to the NP@GLD email address, for service of a claim on the Secretary of State:
66. Details of the proposed defendant
67. [2] The proposed defendants in this matter are:
68. [a] the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government ("the Secretary of State") via the Government Legal Department's address for service at
69. newproceedings@governmentlegal.gov.uk; and
70. [b] South Hams District Council ("the Council") in its capacity as statutory Local Planning Authority ("LPA") for its administrative area. The Council's address is as follows:
71. > Follaton House
72. > Plymouth Road
73. > Totnes
74. > TQ9 5NE
75. The letter before claim asked for a response to be by post to Keystone Law and also by email to Mr Barton's email address. It asked for court documents to be cc'd to Mr Barton's email address adding: "but please note that this does not constitute an acceptance in writing of electronic means of service unless otherwise agreed in writing". The letter before claim said that the Claimant was prepared to wait 7 working days for a response, giving a deadline of Tuesday 29 July 2025. That timeframe was a very bad idea. The claim for planning statutory review would need to be filed, sealed and served, all by midnight on Monday 28 July 2025.
77. On Thursday 24 July 2025 at 10:43, David Fairbairn a solicitor at the LPA emailed Mr Barton to acknowledge the letter before claim and said: "if you could send any further correspondence to me, that would be appreciated". Mr Barton forwarded this to Mr Manning-Smith at 10:52.
79. At 11:30 on Thursday 24 July 2025, Laura Kenny a lawyer at GLD emailed Mr Barton (cc'd to Mr Fairbairn) to acknowledge the letter before claim. Mr Manning-Smith accepts that he saw this response. This was now four calendar days ahead of the service deadline of Monday 28 July 2025. Ms Kenny's response at 11:30 on Thursday 24 July 2025 was very clear. It said this (the emphasis added is mine):
81. The Government Legal Department (GLD) has been instructed by the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and I will have conduct of this matter. The GLD reference number is Z2508676. Given the number of proposed grounds and the short deadline requested for a response, it is not going to be possible for our client to provide a response today, or before the expiry of the statutory period for you to file and serve your client's proposed claim. We calculate the expiry of the statutory period to be 28 July 2025.
82. We therefore confirm that if your client decides to file and serve a claim, GLD will respond to the proceedings in the usual way. Should proceedings be brought, GLD will only accept service of new proceedings via email to GLD's dedicated email address in relation to new proceedings, as set out in GLD's GOV.UK webpage: newproceedings@governmentlegal.gov.uk. At the same time please copy me into any such email. Please note that GLD's server limit is 20MB per email ? any files larger than that will require prior special arrangements for transmission/reception. GLD would be grateful if, when serving new proceedings electronically, hard copy documents are not also sent to GLD's postal address (unless requested otherwise).
83. At 15:11 on Thursday 24 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith received an email from Mr Barton to say that Keystone and Mr MacKenzie would not be able to act without a conditional fee agreement. Mr Manning-Smith decided to file the claim himself. He set about drafting a planning judicial review claim form (N461PC), a planning judicial review application for urgent consideration (N463PC), and a 28-page, 67-paragraph statement of facts and grounds, using Mr MacKenzie's 17-page draft grounds, but now under Mr Manning-Smith's own name.
85. At 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith sent an email addressed to three recipients: (1) the NP@GLD email address; (2) Mr Fairbairn's email address; and (3) the immediates address at the Administrative Court Office (ACO). The subject line said "urgent s.288 statutory challenge". The text said: "Please find correspondence attached. Kindly acknowledge receipt". The email was not cc'd to Ms Kenny. Attached was a pdf attachment entitled "Valentine London File for Judicial Review".
87. i) Within this was Form N461PC (planning judicial review claim form). In it, the First Defendant was named as the Secretary of State. Under "Defendant's or (where known) Defendant's legal representative's address to which documents should be sent", Mr Manning-Smith wrote "2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF". The hard copy version of this document shows as blank the "phone number" and "email" boxes. The Second Defendant was named as the LPA. For the LPA, under "Defendant's or (where known) Defendant's legal representative's address to which documents should be sent", Mr Manning-Smith wrote "Follaton House, Plymouth Rd, Totnes, TQ9 5NE", adding the phone number 01803-861359 and Mr Fairbain's email address in the boxes. The Form N461PC answered yes to the question "have you complied with the pre-action protocol?" and added "Please find PAP enclosed Doc 6". The Keystone Law letter before claim of 17 July 2025 was included in the bundle as document 6. Ms Kenny's response of 24 July 2025 was not included.
88. ii) Also within the pdf bundle was Form N463PC (planning judicial review application for urgent consideration). It asked for consideration of the N463PC within 7 days, and of the N461PC within 25 days, with a substantive hearing by 19 August 2025. Under section 6 "service", the Form N463PC completed the statement "A copy of this form of application was served on the defendant(s) .. as follows" by marking the box "by email to" and giving the email addresses for Mr Fairbairn and NP@GLD.
89. iii) I interpose this. In response to receipt of this judgment in draft, GLD has indicated that the blank email box in Form N461PC had, or may have had, within it the NP@GLD email address. It has been said that by hovering over the blank box in the electronic version, the NP@GLD email address becomes visible. Mr Manning-Smith has not responded to this. It is sufficient for the purposes of this judgment to record that he used the NP@GLD email address within Form N463PC.
90. I will pause there, to make this important point. It is clear that as at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith was well aware of the NP@GLD email address, for service by email. First, the NP@GLD email address for service by email had been clearly set out on the first page of the letter before claim (Thursday 17 July 2025), which he included in the claim bundle and to which he drew attention in the Form N461PC. Second, the NP@GLD email address for service by email had been set out in Ms Kenny's very clear response at 11:30 on Thursday 24 July 2025. Third, the NP@GLD email address for service by email was used by Mr Manning-Smith as the GLD email address to which the judicial review claim documents were sent at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025. Fourth, the NP@GLD email address for service by email was used by Mr Manning-Smith to answer a question about service of his own Form N463PC.
92. As to the introduction of the address 2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF in the planning judicial review claim form N461PC, that was the postal address for the Department for Housing, Communities and Local Government. But it is not the correct postal address for serving the Secretary of State. There are three points. First, the correct postal address for service is found within the CPR, available online. Second, the correct postal address for service was set out at the top of the letter before claim (Thursday 17 July 2025), which Mr Manning-Smith included in the claim bundle and to which he drew attention in the Form N461PC. Third, the question in Form N461PC which Mr Manning-Smith answered with the Marsham Street departmental postal address had promoted him to think, "where known", about "Defendant's legal representative's address to which documents should be sent".
94. Returning to the sequence of events, at 15:05 on Friday 25 July 2025, Mr Fairbairn replied to Mr Manning-Smith. He said: "You should note that the Council does not accept service of court proceedings by email and has not been approached with reasons as to whether it is willing to do so in this case. For the avoidance of doubt, court documents should be served on the Council at Follaton House, Plymouth Road, Totnes TQ9 5NE". This response irritated Mr Manning-Smith. It meant service using the Council (the LPA)'s postal address which he had given in the Form N461PC, and not using Mr Fairbairn's email address. Mr Manning-Smith regarded this as inconsistent with Mr Fairbairn's email on Thursday 24 July 2025 at 10:43 ("if you could send any further correspondence to me, that would be appreciated"). In fact, there was no inconsistency. Keystone Law had made a similar point within the Claimant's own letter before claim (?21 above). Mr Manning-Smith did not approach Mr Fairbairn with "reasons as to whether" the Council was "willing" to accept service by email "in this case".
96. Mr Manning-Smith had made a mistake in using a planning judicial review claim form (N461PC). He should have used a planning statutory review claim form (N208PC). This was spotted at the ACO. The claim form N461PC was not issued or sealed by the Court. By an email at 16:04 on Friday 25 July 2025, the ACO told Mr Manning-Smith that his remedy was s.288 planning statutory review, not a planning judicial review, and that he needed to file a planning statutory review claim form (N208PC) with a further fee (?646). At first, Mr Manning-Smith responded with indignation. At 16:31 on Friday 25 July 2025, he emailed the ACO, Mr Fairbairn and NP@GLD, maintaining that judicial review was appropriate, and asserting that this has been the advice of the Claimant's former solicitors. In fact, the Keystone Law letter before claim and Mr MacKenzie's grounds each referred to planning statutory review (?18 above). Putting his indignation to one side, Mr Manning-Smith wisely decided to refile the papers as a planning statutory review. He set about drafting the claim form N208PC. He was now three calendar days, and one working day, before expiry of the service deadline.
98. Monday 28 July 2025 came. This was the deadline day for having filed and served the claim. Ms Kenny had explained this in her very clear email of 11:30 on 24 July 2025. Mr Manning-Smith sourced the further fee (?646), while the refund of the judicial review claim was awaited. He prepared a planning statutory review claim form N208PC. In it, the First Defendant was named as the Secretary of State. Under "Defendant's or (where known) Defendant's legal representative's address to which documents should be sent", Mr Manning-Smith again wrote "2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF", leaving blank the "phone number" and "email" boxes. The email box was later filled in by the ACO. The Second Defendant was named as the LPA. And under "Defendant's or (where known) Defendant's legal representative's address to which documents should be sent", Mr Manning-Smith wrote "Follaton House, Plymouth Rd, Totnes, TQ9 5NE". But this time ? in light of Mr Fairbairn's email at 15:05 on Friday 25 July 2025 ? Mr Manning-Smith left blank the "phone number" and "email" boxes. The 204-page claim bundle contained the same documents as had the judicial review claim bundle. The Keystone Law letter before claim of 17 July 2025 was included. Ms Kenny's response of 24 July 2025 was not.
100. Shortly before 15:11 on Monday 28 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith filed these planning statutory review claim documents with the Court. He did so using the Court's e-portal. His e-message was "Attached, please find a single PDF attachment comprised of the individual documents". He received the "system-generated e-mail notification" from the Court, timed at 15:11. It labelled the case with a case number AC-2025-LON-002485. The claim form N208PC was issued and sealed by the Court. The Court added the NP@GLD email address in the box for the Secretary of State as First Defendant.
102. At 15:19 on Monday 28 July 2025, the ACO emailed Mr Manning-Smith. The email subject line said "VERY URGENT". The email began with this:
104. Good afternoon,
106. Please be informed that the above case has now been issue under AC-2025-LON-002485.
108. Please confirm receipt of the Receipt letter and sealed N208 form.
110. Please be informed that the following has been added as acting for the Defendant:
112. Government Legal Department
113. Litigation Group
114. 102 Petty France
115. Westminster
116. London
117. SW1H 9GL
119. NewProceedings@governmentlegal.gov.uk
120. Mr Manning-Smith could now see from the attachment to the Court's email of 15:19 on Monday 28 July 2025 that his planning statutory review claim form N208PC had been stamped and sealed by the Court in the top right hand corner of the first page. He could see the Court stamp date of 28 July 2025, and the stamped case number AC-2025-LON-002485. In the box for the address of the Secretary of State was still the Marsham Street address, which he had entered. But in the email address box, which he had left blank, the Court had now entered the NP@GLD email address.
122. The Court's "Receipt letter" was attached to the Court's email of 15:19. It contained two mistakes. First, it said the Court had issued "your claim for Judicial Review". But this was a claim for planning statutory review. Second, it said "service must be effected within 7 days of the date of this letter". That would be true for a planning judicial review. But not for a planning statutory review. Mr Manning-Smith does not say he was misled by that mistake. The same mistake was also seen in a case called Aurora, where an extension of time was refused: see Rogers at ?31.
124. A handwritten certificate of service N215 was signed by Mr Manning-Smith on Monday 28 July 2025 in claim AC-2025-LON-002485. It had a statement of truth. It said the claim documents in claim AC-2025-LON-002485 had been served by first class post, on Friday 25 July 2025, to the Secretary of State at the Marsham Street address. But this could not be right. The only claim documents which existed on Friday 25 July 2025 was the unsealed judicial review claim, which the Court rejected. It was the planning statutory review which was claim AC-2025-LON-002485. That claim had been filed and issued on Monday 28 July 2025. Mr Manning-Smith knew all this.
126. Having received the Court's emails at 15:11 and 15:19 on Monday 28 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith did not send any emails during the rest of that day. Midnight came and the deadline for serving the claim passed. Mr Manning-Smith says he did take a step before midnight on Monday 28 July 2025, and I will deal with that next.
128. A contentious factual assertion
129. Mr Manning-Smith makes a factual assertion. He asserts that, after receiving the sealed claim form in the planning statutory review claim number AC-2025-LON-002485, at 15:19 on Monday 28 July 2025, he printed the bundle including the sealed claim form twice, then went out to a post box and posted the bundle (a) to the Secretary of State at the Department's Marsham Street postal address and (b) to the LPA at the Follaton House postal address. The Secretary of State does not accept that, as a fact, the sealed claim form was placed in a post box before midnight on Monday 28 July 2025. The Secretary of State submits that it cannot assist the Claimant, because the correct postal address for service ? as Mr Manning-Smith accepts ? was the GLD:Petty France address.
131. I have seen a replacement version of a witness statement of Mr Manning-Smith, with a statement of truth, bearing the date 1 September 2025. This replacement version was first sent under cover of a letter from Mr Manning-Smith dated 6 November 2025. It was first filed with the Court on 16 December 2025. Under "timeline of events" the replacement version of the witness statement says:
133. 28 July 2025 ? I received the Sealed Claim of AC-LON-2025-002085 ? I sent the sealed claim form and bundle by first-class post to the First Defendant at 2 Marsham Street, London SW1P 4DF (the official departmental address listed on gov.uk)? [sending] the sealed bundle[] on the 28th of July 2025 by 1st class post.
134. The replacement version of the witness statement later repeats:
135. I sent the claim by post to 2 Marsham Street on 28 th July 2025.
136. I record that the point can be made in the Claimant's favour that this is in line with a factual assertion made by Mr Manning-Smith in an email to Ms Kenny much closer to the time in question. That email was sent on Wednesday 30 July 2025 at 17:04. It told Ms Kenny at GLD that Mr Manning-Smith had sent "the sealed copy" by first class post "to you" on "Monday". To give the context, Ms Kenny had said this on 30 July 2025 at 17:00: "Your email dated 29 July 2025 at 17:22 notes that 'A new claim was filed and accepted by the court system on Monday for a section 288 statutory review.' If the Court has issued a sealed version of the claim, please provide this to us as soon as possible". Mr Manning-Smith was replying to that at 17:04, when he said:
138. The sealed copy was sent to you on Monday by 1st class post and I will send you the soft copy first thing tomorrow morning.
139. Mr Manning-Smith does not have any evidence by way of proof of posting on the evening of Monday 28 July 2025. And this was not the date he gave in the original witness statement. It was on 2 September 2025 that Mr Manning-Smith filed the original version of his witness statement, dated 1 September 2025, containing a statement of truth. He refiled that original version on 16 September 2025. It said this, under "timeline of events":
141. 29 July 2025 ? ? The sealed claim form was issued by the Court and sent to me. On the same day ?:
142. > I sent the sealed claim form and bundle by first-class post to the First Defendant at 2 Marsham Street, London SW1P 4DF (the official departmental address listed on gov.uk) and to the Second Defendant at Follaton House, Totnes.TQ9 5NE
143. I also attempted to send the documents by email.
144. The original, twice filed, version of the witness statement later repeats:
145. I sent the claim by post to 2 Marsham Street on 29 July 2025.
146. This original witness statement description was to Tuesday 29 July 2025. Not Monday 28 July 2025. It was alongside a clear description of attempting to send the documents by email, on the same day as sending the documents by first-class post. There is no email from Monday 28 July 2025 which "attempted" to send the documents. But there was an email on Tuesday 29 July 2025 which did so. It was sent at 15:02 on Tuesday 29 July 2025, after Ms Kenny sent two emails at 13:12 and 13:22 having now seen the email which sent the unsealed judicial review claim to the NP@GLD email address at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025. At 15:02 on Tuesday 29 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith sent an email saying "please find the documentation for service attached". The attachment was his planning statutory review claim form N208PC. But it was the unsealed claim form, as Mr Fairbairn pointed out in an email at 15:58, and as Mr Manning-Smith accepts. That explains why it was an "attempted" sending. Mr Fairbairn pointed out, in his email at 15:58 on Tuesday 29 July 2025, that time for service had "expired on 28 July 2025". He was agreeing with what Ms Kenny had said in an earlier email at 13:12 on Tuesday 29 July 2025. Mr Manning-Smith replied to them both. He said the judicial review claim documents had been posted on Friday 25 July 2025. He said the new claim had been filed and accepted on Monday 28 July 2025. He did not at that point say he had posted the sealed claim form on the evening of Monday 28 July 2025. That claim was made for the first time the following day, Wednesday 30 July 2025 at 17:04.
148. Neither the LPA nor the Department at the Marsham Street postal address received a bundle with the sealed claim form shortly after Monday 28 July 2025. On 31 July 2025 at 11:52 Mr Fairbairn emailed Mr Manning-Smith to say that a hard-copy of the bundle had been received, but it contained "the unsealed claim form". The Department did eventually receive a claim bundle in AC-2025-LON-002485, including the sealed claim form of Monday 28 July 2025. But that was received only on 23 September 2025. I interpose this. In response to this judgment in draft, GLD has informed the Court that it is in receipt of an email from the LPA stating that the LPA had received the claim form, but no bundle, on 4 August 2025. No party placed that email before the Court. Mr Manning-Smith has not responded to this point. In the circumstances, I record it and say no more about it.
150. The original version of Mr Manning-Smith's witness statement (1 September 2025) was not the only document to give a claimed posting date of 29 July 2025, and no claimed posting date of 28 July 2025. A skeleton argument also dated 1 September 2025 incorporating a statement of truth ? filed on 2 September 2025 and then refiled on 16 September 2025 ? said: "Immediately upon receipt of the sealed claim on 29 July 2025, the Claimant acted by posting and emailing the documents to both Defendants". It also said: "The sealed claim was sent by first-class post on 29 July 2025 and by email on 31 July 2025". A document entitled "Claimant's Response" dated 16 September 2025, also incorporating a statement of truth, said this: "On 25 July 2025, the Claimant (then suddenly unrepresented) served the claim documents on both Defendants by first-class post and by email. On 29 July 2025, upon receipt of the sealed claim form from the Court, the Claimant immediately served it again by post, and subsequently by email at the Defendants' own request".
152. Then there are the handwritten and electronic Forms N251, filed with the Court by Mr Manning-Smith as the Claimant's formal evidence of service of the claim form. These were generated on Monday 28 July 2025 in manuscript, and then regenerated by him electronically on Thursday 31 July 2025. Each of these N251 certificates contains the required statement of truth. Each N215 claims that service was effected on Friday 25 July 2025. No Form N251 certificate of service has ever been filed claiming service by post on Monday 28 July 2025, or for that matter Tuesday 29 July 2025.
154. Mr Manning-Smith told me, as part of his oral submissions at the hearing, that he went out and posted the sealed planning statutory review claim form in AC-2025-LON-002485, to the Department's Marsham Street address, during the evening of Monday 28 July 2025. There was no application by Ms Hall for the Secretary of State to cross-examine him. But the fact which he asserts is not accepted by the Secretary of State. I have also been unable to accept it. There have been multiple documents, filed with a statement of truth, which have referred to posting only on Tuesday 29 July 2025. They have referred to attempted email sending on the same day as posting. That fits with attempted email sending on Tuesday 29 July 2025. Mr Manning-Smith does not have any evidence of posting. His first reference to posting having taken place on Monday 28 July 2025 was only after an initial reaction the previous day, to being told he was out of time, which did not make reference to posting on Monday 28 July 2025. There are unexplained inconsistencies in his position, compared with Court-filed documents, each bearing statements of truth. In the light of this evidential picture, I am unable to be satisfied ? applying the balance of probabilities ? that the asserted posting on 28 July 2025 took place that evening. I do not accept that Mr Manning-Smith posted the sealed claim form before midnight on Monday 28 July 2025. I find, on the balance of probabilities, that he did not do so. But I will analyse the case, in the alternative, on the premise that he did post the sealed planning statutory review claim form on the evening of Monday, to the Department at Marsham Street.
156. What happened after the service deadline
157. Having addressed that factual controversy, I can return to the sequence of events. Tuesday 29 July 2025 was the day after service deadline day. At 13:12 on 29 July 2025, Ms Kenny emailed Mr Manning-Smith, in response to the claim documents which he had emailed at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025 to the NP@GLD email address, the ACO and Mr Fairbairn. He had not cc'd Ms Kenny to that email. He had not identified Ms Kenny in the claim documents. Ms Kenny had been left, by him, to receive his communication internally from within GLD. In her 13:12 email to Mr Manning-Smith (cc'd to the ACO and Mr Fairbairn), Ms Kenny made these clear and straightforward points: (1) the claim form received by the NP@GLD email address on Friday 25 July 2025 at 14:30 was unsealed and so that email could not be effective service of any claim; (2) the claim form was a judicial review claim; (3) the deadline for the claim to be filed and served had expired on Monday 28 July 2025; (4) urgent confirmation was sought as to whether a claim had been sealed and served; (5) it was recommended that Mr Manning-Smith get legal advice. Points (1)-(4) were reiterated in an email at 13:22 from Ms Kenny to the ACO (cc'd to Mr Manning-Smith and Mr Fairbairn). Mr Fairbairn emailed at 13:54 to agree with all Ms Kenny's points.
159. At 15:02 on Tuesday 29 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith emailed Mr Fairbairn (cc'd to Ms Kenny and the ACO) saying: "Please find the documentation for service attached", adding "the hardcopy is in the post to South Hams DC also". The attachment was the unsealed claim form (N208PC) for planning statutory review. That was pointed out by Mr Fairbairn in an email response at 15:58, reiterating that time to file and serve had now expired. Meanwhile, the Court emailed Mr Manning-Smith at 15:52, responding to his email of 15:02, by reissuing the claim, resealing it and allocating a new case number AC-2025-LON-002500. It appears that the ACO took the 15:02 email to be chasing the issuing of the claim. In fact, it had already been issued the day before, as AC-2025-LON-002485. It took a while to sort out the confusion of these parallel case numbers. In the end, claim AC-2025-LON-002485 ? which had been administratively deleted by the ACO ? was restored. This ensured the position most favourable to the Claimant.
161. At 17:22 on Tuesday 29 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith emailed Mr Fairbairn (cc'd to Ms Kenny and the ACO), responding to the observation that the unsealed planning statutory review claim form had been attached at 15:02. This email said: "Please check your documentation. A new claim was filed and accepted by the court system on Monday for a section 288 statutory review. The document[s] were also posted to you via first class post on Friday, they could not be served via email on Friday as you had refused service by that means on Friday even through your email confirmed that ALL correspondence could be sent via email".
163. At 11:18 on Wednesday 30 July 2025, Mr Fairbairn emailed Mr Manning-Smith to say that: (1) the bundle emailed on 15:02 on 29 July 2025 did not contain a sealed claim form; (2) the judicial review bundle said to have been posted on Friday 25 July 2025 had not been received, but it could not have contained a sealed claim form anyway; and (3) recommending that Mr Manning-Smith get legal advice. At 17:00 on Wednesday 30 July 2025, Ms Kenny emailed Mr Manning-Smith to say that the bundle emailed on 15:02 on 29 July 2025 did not contain a sealed claim form, the deadline expired on 28 July 2025, and that it was strongly recommended that Mr Manning-Smith get legal advice. This email told Mr Manning-Smith:
165. Your email dated 29 July 2025 at 17:22 notes that "A new claim was filed and accepted by the court system on Monday for a section 288 statutory review ." If the Court has issued a sealed version of the claim, please provide this to us as soon as possible.
166. GLD will only accept service of new proceedings via email to GLD's dedicated email address in relation to new proceedings, as set out in GLD's GOV.UK webpage:
167. newproceedings@governmentlegal.gov.uk. At the same time please copy me into any such email?
168. At 17:04 on Wednesday 31 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith responded by email to Ms Kenny, saying: "The sealed copy was sent to you on Monday by 1st class post and I will send you the soft copy first thing tomorrow morning".
170. On the morning of Thursday 31 July 2025 there were emails at 11:06, 11:24 and 11:51 between Mr Fairbairn and Mr Manning-Smith about the bundle which was said by Mr Manning-Smith to have been posted to Follaton House, a bundle being located, but it having contained an unsealed claim form. No sealed copy of a claim form was emailed to Ms Kenny in the "morning" ? still less "first thing" ? on Thursday 31 July 2025, as promised by Mr Manning-Smith at 17:04 the previous day. Ms Kenny chased at 13:05, asking that it be provided urgently. At 15:21 on Thursday 31 July 2025 Mr Manning-Smith emailed Ms Kenny and Mr Fairbairn saying: "Please find a soft copy of the sealed claim service claim which we have recreated as they were sent to you via 1st class post". The attachment was not a sealed claim form. It was two certificates of service on Form N215, created electronically at 10:45 on 31 July 2025 and e-signed on 31 July 2025, but backdated to 28 July 2025 and purporting to record ? with statements of truth ? that the claim documents in AC-2025-LON-002500 had been served on the Secretary of State by first class post to the Marsham Street address, on Friday 25 July 2025. That could not be right. The only claim documents which existed on Friday 25 July 2025 was the unsealed judicial review claim. It was the planning statutory review which was claim AC-2025-LON-002485, filed and issued on Monday 28 July 2025; and then reissued as AC-2025-LON-002500 on Tuesday 29 July 2025.
172. At 16:44 on Thursday 31 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith forwarded to Mr Fairbairn and Ms Kenny the ACO's email from 15:19 on Monday 28 July 2025, confirming the issue of claim AC-2025-LON-002485, and giving the GLD:Petty France postal address and the NP@GLD email address. That email again attached a certificate of service on Form N215, claiming service to have taken place on Friday 25 July 2025. I interpose that, having received this judgment in draft, GLD has said that the attached Form N215 was blank. Finally, at 16:59 on Thursday 31 July 2025, Mr Manning-Smith emailed Mr Fairbairn and Ms Kenny the sealed planning statutory review claim form N208PC in case AC-2025-LON-002485, filed with the Court and issued by the Court on Monday 28 July 2025. That email said: "You should also have received the copy in the post".
174. The week ended on Friday 1 August 2025, with another very clear email from Ms Kenny. She told Mr Manning-Smith: (1) that the sealed claim had been received by her at 16:59 on Thursday 31 July 2025; (2) that Mr Manning-Smith needed to serve the claim on the NP@GLD email address and cc her; (3) that the Marsham Street postal address was incorrect for serving the Secretary of State; (4) that the correct postal address was the GLD:Petty France postal address; and (5) that she was once again recommending that he take legal advice.
176. Mr Manning-Smith did not respond. He did not serve the sealed claim in AC-2025-LON-002485 on the NP@GLD email address. He did not post the sealed claim to the GLD:Petty France postal address. Ms Kenny continued to point out, for example on 19 and 26 August 2025, that there had still been no valid service on the Secretary of State. The default continued. Nor did Mr Manning-Smith make any application, despite being made aware of the judgments in Good Law and Rogers, no later than 6 August 2025. On 26 August 2025 the Secretary of State made an application to set aside the claim form in claim AC-2025-LON-002485 (and on 1 September 2025 in claim AC-2025-LON-002500), on the basis that the claim had not been served in accordance with the rules and the Court lacked jurisdiction. On 2 September 2025 Mr Manning-Smith filed his response, including an application for an extension of time for service. Directions were made and further documents filed, and the case came before me.
178. CPR 6.15 and the unsealed judicial review claim form
179. The first and primary argument which is put forward by Mr Manning-Smith was, in essence as I saw it, as follows. The Court should exercise its power under CPR 6.15, retrospectively to authorise the email sent at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025 to the NP@GLD email address (?25 above) as "good service" on the Secretary of State. The power should be exercised for these reasons. The substantive content, of the judicial review claim form N461PC and the 28-page grounds for judicial review sent by that email on Friday 25 July 2025, was identical to the planning statutory review claim form N208PC and 28-page grounds for statutory review subsequently filed with the Court on Monday 28 July 2025. Applying the principles in Abela and Barton (?15 above), the power of retrospective authorisation should be exercised. The purpose of service was achieved, by the sending of those documents on Friday 25 July 2025. It was achieved, ahead of the service deadline of midnight on Monday 28 July 2025. It was achieved by an email to the correct email address for new claims: the NP@GLD email address. The Secretary of State was aware of the substance of the claim. The steps taken on Friday 25 July 2025 were "steps taken to bring the claim form to the attention of the defendant", for the purposes of CPR 6.15(2). They were, in substance, effective steps. True, they were not the "method" required by the rules, but that is the very situation for which CPR 6.15 makes provision. The Court can and should authorise the "alternative method" that was used. There is every reason to do so, and no good reason not to do so. There is no prejudice to the Secretary of State; just the windfall of not having to defend the claim on its merits. There is huge prejudice to the Claimant, in not having its case dealt with on the merits. Mr Manning-Smith was acting in person, and was doing his level best, in the face of multiple obstacles. It would be unfair and unjust to shut out this claim on a technicality. GLD knew about the claim, well ahead of the service deadline. There was then prompt confirmation to Ms Kenny, on Tuesday 29 July 2025 at 17:22, that the planning statutory review claim had been filed and issued within the deadline. There was also prompt documentary confirmation, on Thursday 31 July 2025 at 16:59, when Ms Kenny had clear sight of the planning statutory review claim form and could see that it had indeed been filed with the Court and issued by the Court within the deadline, and could see that its substance was identical to the claim documents which had been sent to the NP@GLD email address at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025. In addition, Mr Manning-Smith had sent the documents by first-class post, albeit to the Departmental postal address accessible on-line. True, it was not sent by email on Monday 28 July 2025. But that was understandable in circumstances where Mr Fairbairn for the LPA was belatedly disavowing email service. This is why the CPR 6.15 power is needed. It is not a reason for refusing to exercise the power. That, as I see it, is the essence of the argument.
181. I have not been persuaded by these, or any of the other, points made by Mr Manning-Smith on this issue. My analysis is as follows. My starting-point is to accept that the fact of a default, in failing to use the "method" of service which was required by the rules, cannot ? in and of itself ? be the reason for refusing to exercise the CPR 6.15 power. That is the situation for the exercise of the power. It cannot be the reason for refusing to exercise the power. It is the necessary premise for the power, as the unanimous Supreme Court explained in Abela at ?24; and as the dissenting Phillips LJ emphasised in Good Law at ?92i.
183. I do not, however, accept that the purported service of an unsealed claim form ? to the correct email address for service of a sealed claim form ? is a "method of service" which the Court can authorise under CPR 6.15(2) as "good service". This was what happened in Good Law on 27 April 2021 (?12vii), well ahead of the service deadline of 5 May 2021 (see ?10). The first instance Judge there found that there "could not be valid service of non-existent proceedings" (see ?33). The argument maintained in the Court of Appeal was about service "at an alternative place" (?6ii). That must have been a reference to sending the sealed claim form on 28 April 2021, ahead of the service deadline, but only to the email address for the case lawyer at GLD and not to the NP@GLD email address (see ?12x). I think that was the way in which another Judge "might have" granted CPR 6.15 authorisation (?76). In Ideal Shopping, unsealed claim forms had been emailed to the correct email address for service, ahead of the service deadline (see ?13). The first instance Judge had found that the claimants "were not seeking an alternative method of service", but "a change in the thing which has to be served", finding "considerable force" in the submission that CPR 6.15 could not apply (?36). The Judge however proceeded on what was described by the Court of Appeal as the "somewhat liberal assumption" that this was not a complete answer (?37). The Court of Appeal, for its part, went on to find that unsealed claim forms are not claim forms within the rules (?144). I have found it impossible to accept that sending an unsealed claim form is "service by an alternative method" which can be validated to constitute "good service". But, even if it could be, I cannot accept that there could be "good reason" in the present case to allow what was done on Friday 25 July 2025 at 13:30 with the unsealed judicial review claim form N461PC to be authorised as "good service". Especially when it is remembered that the judicial review claim form N461PC was never sealed. It was rejected by the Court, a rejection which was itself cc'd to the NP@GLD email address. These are planning statutory review proceedings, which needed a different claim form N208PC. This was an unsealed claim form, in a different claim.
185. Nor am I able to accept that the purpose of service was achieved by what happened at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025. In Abela, the claim form had been issued and sealed and a copy of it and the accompanying documents were delivered to the defendant's Lebanese lawyer, who was authorised to conduct proceedings, and who signed for them (see ?25). This meant the defendant, through his adviser, was "fully apprised of the nature of the claim being made" (?27) and "fully apprised of the nature of the claim being brought" (?38). That was the context for referring to the purpose of ensuring that the contents of the claim form are communicated to the defendant (Abela?37; Barton?9(2)). And as Lord Briggs pointed out in his dissenting judgment in Barton, this is more than ensuring the contents of a claim form are communicated; it is also notifying the recipient "that the claim has ? actually commenced as against the relevant defendant, and upon a particular day" (Barton at ?28). All of this was achieved in Abela, where CPR 6.15 was triggered in favour of a claimant, in circumstances where the defendant was being deliberately obstructive (see Barton at ?9). All of it was achieved in Barton (see ?30), where CPR 6.15 (by 3-2) was not triggered in favour of a claimant, having sent the sealed claim form by email in time, but on lawyers who had not pre-notified a willingness to be served by email. In my judgment, and at least in the present case, it matters that there is no communication of the fact that proceedings have started. As I have explained (?6 above), it is the sealed claim form which gives the "clear message to the defendant that he or she is being served with originating process by authority of the court, and not being sent some informal demand" (Ideal Shopping at ?65). Service is an "act by which the defendant is subjected to the court's jurisdiction" (Good Law at ?41). Here, the unsealed judicial review claim form when emailed at 15:05 on Friday 25 July 2025 was no more than information that the Claimant had attempted to file an inappropriate form of planning judicial review claim. It was promptly followed by an exchange at 16:04 and 16:31 between the Court and Mr Manning-Smith (itself cc'd to the NP@GLD email address), about there needing instead to be a planning statutory review claim. That is what was subsequently issued. Notification of the unsealed judicial review claim form N461PC could not possibly communicate the substance of a planning statutory review claim; nor was it notification of the filing with the Court of a planning statutory review claim form N208PC; still less was it notification that the planning statutory review proceedings (or indeed any proceedings) had been commenced. For all these reasons, the essential purpose of service was not achieved.
187. Finally, there is, in my judgment, no "good reason" in any event for retrospectively validating the act of sending at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025 the unsealed judicial review claim form N461PC to the NP@GLD email address. The question of a "good reason" for making the order sought is the central question in the application of CPR 6.15 (Abela at ?35). It involves an evaluative judgment of the relevant facts (Abela at ??23, 33; Barton at ??9, 15). In addition to what I have said so far, there is what I see as the central point in the case. I adopt it here. But I will describe it in the next section of this judgment.
189. The central point in the case
190. I come to the central point in the case. It is that Mr Manning-Smith inexcusably failed, between 15:19 on Monday 28 July 2025 and midnight that night, and indeed at all stages after that, to serve the sealed claim form N208PC on the NP@GLD email address. It is not a question of simple default, such as is the premise for the exercise of the Court's power (?56 above). Nor is it a question of the rules being clear and accessible, though they are: see Barton at ?19. Rather, it is because of the following additional features in the circumstances of the present case. These features make the failure to send an email to NP@GLD wholly inexcusable. First, that the Claimant's own letter before claim dated 17 July 2025 recorded that the Secretary of State's address for service was the NP@GLD email address (?20 above). Second, that Ms Kenny's email at 11:30 on Thursday 24 July 2025, alongside her very clear explanation of the service deadline (Monday 28 July 2025), gave a very clear explanation that the Secretary of State's address for service was the NP@GLD email address (?23 above). In my judgment, this fact ? even if it stood alone ? would be fatal. Third, that Mr Manning-Smith plainly knew about the NP@GLD email address because he typed it out and used it when he was sending his email at 14:30 on Friday 25 July 2025, attaching the unsealed judicial review claim form (?25 above), and he also typed it out when he was filling out the form N463PC (?25ii above). Fourth, that Mr Manning-Smith was prompted about the NP@GLD email address by the Court, when it sent him the sealed planning statutory review claim form at 15:19 on Monday 28 July 2025, prominently in the main body of the Court's email (?32 above), but also in the box which the Court filled out within the sealed claim form itself (?31 above).
192. CPR 6.15 and posting the claim to Marsham Street
193. The next question is whether it would be appropriate to exercise the CPR 6.15 power of retrospective validation to the act of posting the sealed planning statutory review claim bundle to the Department's Marsham Street address. Mr Manning-Smith submits that there is the requisite "good reason" for this exercise of power. The argument in support of exercising the power, put at its highest, is as follows. The act of posting took place before the service deadline, because of the asserted posting on the evening of Monday 28 July 2025. This was not the use of the correct postal address, because that was the GLD:Petty France postal address. That means it was the wrong "method of service". But it was used for the sealed claim form. CPR 6.15 is directly engaged. There is "good reason" to treat posting to the wrong address as "good service". Mr Manning-Smith had found the correct Departmental address for the Secretary of State. That postal address is given in official Government websites. It was a straightforward mistake, by a litigant acting in person. There is no prejudice, except for the Claimant, and a windfall for the Secretary of State. Ms Kenny, the lawyer at GLD handling the case, was made aware by email on 17:22 on Tuesday 29 July 2025 that the planning statutory review claim had been filed and accepted, within the time for filing and serving the previous day. She already had what in substance were the identical claim documents. The Abela and Barton principles are satisfied. Ms Kenny was sent, by 16:59 on Thursday 31 July 2025 the sealed planning statutory review claim form N208PC and claim documents. She was told that the sealed claim was in the post. It was, albeit that it arrived eventually on 23 September 2025. That, as I see it, is the essence of the argument.
195. I am unable to accept that there is good reason to treat the posting to the Marsham Street postal address as "good service" under CPR 6.15. That would be the case, even if I were satisfied ? which I am not ? that the act of posting had taken place on the evening of Monday 28 July 2025 (see ?45 above). This is my analysis. My starting-point is to accept that providing a sealed claim form to the wrong person or place is a "method" of service which the Court can, in principle, authorise as "good service" under CPR 6.15. The sealed claim form in Abela was provided to the Lebanese lawyers. The sealed claim form in Barton was provided to the solicitors by email, instead of by post. The sealed claim form in Good Law was provided to the named GLD lawyer by email, instead of to the NP@GLD email address. CPR 6.15 was introduced after a case called Elmes, where the old rules did not allow retrospective validation of the sending of the sealed claim form to the defendant's insurers rather than to the defendant: see Barton at ?34.
197. But it was, in my judgment, inexcusable in the circumstances of the present case for Mr Manning-Smith to have served the sealed claim form by post to an incorrect postal address. The Claimant's letter before claim was written to the correct postal address for the Secretary of State, which was set out on the first page (?19 above). The Court's email confirming that the claim had been issued gave the correct postal address for the Secretary of State (?32 above), which Mr Manning-Smith simply ignored. Mr Fairbairn for the LPA had insisted on service by post, but Ms Kenny for the Secretary of State had given very clear information about service by email to the NP@GLD email address. An internet search for the postal address for the Department was a perilous course. What was needed was the postal address, not for the Secretary of State, but for service of proceedings on the Secretary of State. The rules are clear and accessible. Mr Manning-Smith was acting in person. But, like Mr Barton, he "made no attempt to serve in accordance with the rules. All that he did was employ a mode of service which he should have appreciated was not in accordance with the rules" (Barton at ?21). In all the circumstances, there is no good reason for retrospectively validating the sending of the sealed claim form by post to Marsham Street.
199. CPR 6.15 with CPR 7.6(3) and emailing the sealed claim form to Ms Kenny
200. The next question is whether it would be appropriate to exercise the CPR 6.15 power of retrospective validation to Mr Manning-Smith's action at 16:59 on Thursday 31 July 2025, of emailing the sealed claim form to Ms Kenny (?52 above). Retrospective validation as "good service" would, in my judgment, need to be accompanied by a 3-day extension of time for service to Thursday 31 July 2025 applying the criteria of CPR 7.6(3). Mr Manning-Smith says that there would be the requisite "good reason" for this exercise of power. He says that the criteria for an extension of time are also met. The argument in support of exercising the power, put at its highest, is as follows. The email to Ms Kenny was service to the wrong "place", just as in Good Law. Unlike Good Law which was a mistake by a firm of solicitors, where Carr LJ thought the power "might" have been exercised (see ?76) and the dissenting Phillips LJ thought it should have been (at ?94), Mr Manning-Smith was acting in person. That can involve some allowances, at least at the margins, albeit without diluting standards of compliance (Barton at ?18). The sealed claim form was, by 16:59 on Thursday 31 July 2025, in the hands of the right person at GLD. There is no prejudice, except to the Claimant, but rather a windfall benefit to the Secretary of State from a technical breach. That, as I see it, is the essence of the argument.
202. I can see no good reason for retrospectively validating as "good service" the email at 16:59 on Thursday 31 July 2025 to Ms Kenny. Nor do I consider that the CPR 7.6(3) criteria are met for a 3-day extension of time for service by email to Thursday 31 July 2025. My reasons are straightforward. As I have explained, there was an inexcusable failure by Mr Manning-Smith to serve the sealed claim form in time, on the NP@GLD email address: see ?60 above. There is no good reason for an order validating the use of Ms Kenny's email address, especially when Ms Kenny had been so very clear at 11:30 on Thursday 24 July 2025 (?23 above). But nor is there justification for a 3-day extension of time. Ms Kenny had been very clear, at 11:30 on Thursday 24 July 2025, as to the deadline for filing and serving the claim being Monday 28 July 2025. The relevant criteria in CPR 7.6(3) start with whether the Claimant has "taken all reasonable steps to comply ? but has been unable to do so" (CPR 7.6(3)(b)). The principled focus is on steps taken during the 6 week period to Monday 28 July 2025 (Rogers at ?38d). I find it impossible to say that Mr Manning-Smith did take "all reasonable steps". It is not just that the rules were clear and accessible, though they were. It is because his failure to serve by email at the NP@GLD email address was inexcusable in the particular circumstances of the case: see ?60 above.
204. CPR 7.6(3) more generally
205. That leaves a general fall-back position for which Mr Manning-Smith contends. He says that, independently of any exercise of the power under CPR 6.15, the Court should grant an extension of time for service of the claim form. He says the criteria in CPR 7.6(3) are satisfied. But that is an impossible submission to sustain. First, because of the failure to take "all reasonable steps" during the period to midnight on Monday 28 July 2025. But second, and in any event, because of what happened next and has happened since. Mr Manning-Smith has at no stage, ever, served the sealed claim form on the NP@GLD email address. He has at no stage, ever, sent the sealed claim form by post to the GLD:Petty France postal address. His excuse, in his oral submissions to me, was that he feared that doing so would undermine his position as to whether he had already complied. But that was not a good reason for failing to take a regularising step. He could have taken it, without prejudice to his contention that he did not need to do so. Given his choice never to serve the sealed claim form in the way he was told was necessary, the extension of time that the Court would need to grant would be one of very considerable length, up to the present. There is no justification, in my judgment, for taking that course. But nor can I find that Mr Manning-Smith meets the criterion in CPR 7.6(3)(c), of having acted promptly after midnight on Monday 28 July 2025 in making his application for an extension of time. It was made by him only on 2 September 2025, and reactively, in response to the Secretary of State's application.
207. Conclusion
208. For all these reasons, I will refuse to discharge the Order setting aside this claim for planning statutory review. I have asked myself whether this is a harsh outcome. The Court of Appeal has recognised that the application of the rules about service of the claim form can give rise to outcomes which are "harsh": see Good Law at ?58. But the appellate Courts ? to whose judgments I have referred throughout this judgment ? have identified this as an area where what is required is clarity and certainty: Rogers at ??38b, 70. Where there are justified bright lines: Barton at ?16. Where the rules are clear and accessible: Barton at ?19. Where the 6-week time limit to file and serve a planning statutory review claim is "precise, unambiguous and unqualified": Rogers at ?38b. Where standards are not diluted in the case of a litigant in person: Barton at ??18, 42. Where the service of a claim form requires the utmost diligence and care to ensure that the relevant procedural rules are properly complied with: Good Law at ?63. Where a defendant's solicitors are entitled to choose their email arrangements for accepting service: Barton at ?17. Where public law cases attract a special discipline, in the public interest: Good Law at ?39. Where planning cases involve time limits which are especially important: Rogers at ?70. Where GLD are entitled to insist on sealed claims being served through a single designated email address, to "ensure certainty ? in respect of all and any new claims": Good Law at ?59. Where serving the sealed claim on that designated email address is simple and involves no obstacles: Good Law at ?62. And where it is relevant whether GLD has, in correspondence with a claimant, clearly communicated the position about service: Good Law at ?12i and 12iii. This is an area of undoubted strictness. There can be an integrity in the law promoting certainty. Yes, the Court has powers to retrospectively validate, and to extend time. But they arise in a disciplined arena, where the rules and compliance with them really matter. In the present case, I have been left in no doubt that the present case is one where the failure to serve a sealed claim, in compliance with the rules, and within the prescribed deadline, is fatal. I will refuse to exercise the power under CPR 6.15. I will refuse the extension of time applying the criteria in CPR 7.6(3). Having done so, I will uphold the dismissal of the claim, on the basis that the Court has no jurisdiction to hear it.
210. Postscript
211. Mr Manning-Smith has asked, having seen this judgment in draft, that I record a point which he says was an issue before the Court. It concerns what he says was defective service by GLD of the application to set aside the claim form. However, his own skeleton argument emphasised, in my judgment rightly, that the Court was "concerned with one question", namely whether the Claimant's "steps ? should be treated as good service under CPR 6.15, or alternatively justify relief under CPR 7.6".
213. Costs
214. Deputy High Court Judge Marcus Pilgerstorfer KC ordered that the Claimant pay the Secretary of State's costs summarily assessed at ?11,000. The Secretary of State says this order should stand undisturbed, and that the Claimant should pay the Secretary of State's costs of resisting this failed application, to be assessed if not agreed. I am satisfied that this is the right costs order. Mr Manning-Smith says (a) the planning statutory review claim should be recognised as an Aarhus Convention claim, (b) with the default corporate costs cap (?10,000) further reduced to ?5,000. I have been unable to accept those submissions, given the Secretary of State's unanswered objections to uncured breaches by the Claimant of the CPR requirements regarding Aarhus evidence.

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