Future Community Services Inc. v. Labor Commission

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April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Future Community Services, Inc. v. Labor Commissio

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 63

• Docket Number: Case No. 20250064-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 63

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

FUTURE COMMUNITY SERVICES INC., FCS COMMUNITY
MANAGEMENT, ARLINGTON PLACE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
AND DEVIN LAWRENCE,
Petitioners,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION AND MATTHEW HINOJOS,
Respondents.

Opinion
No. 20250064-CA
Filed April 23, 2026

Original Proceeding in this Court

Lincoln W. Hobbs, Attorney for Petitioners
Freyja Johnson and Allison Herr, Attorneys for
Respondent Matthew Hinojos

JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES DAVID N. MORTENSEN and RYAN D. TENNEY concurred.

HARRIS, Judge:

¶1 This attorney fees dispute comes before us for a second
time. In our first decision, we set aside the Labor Commission’s
(the Commission) conclusion that it lacked authority to award
attorney fees, and we remanded the matter to the Commission for
it to consider the merits of an attorney fees request. On remand,
the Commission determined that Respondent Matthew Hinojos
was entitled to attorney fees and awarded him $27,513.28. Now,
Petitioners Future Community Services Inc., FCS Community
Management, Arlington Place Homeowners Association, and
Devin Lawrence (collectively, the Association) challenge that fee
award, claiming that the Commission failed to apply the correct
legal standard and that, for various reasons, the award was too
high in any event. We reject many of the Association’s factual
Future Community Services, Inc. v. Labor Commission

arguments regarding the Commission’s fee award. But we agree
with the Association that the Commission did not conduct a
complete reasonableness assessment of Hinojos’s fees request,
and we therefore set aside the Commission’s award and send this
case back to the Commission for a renewed assessment of the
reasonableness of Hinojos’s claimed attorney fees.

BACKGROUND 1

¶2 Hinojos and another individual (Second Claimant)
separately filed disability discrimination claims against the
Association. Before the Commission, Hinojos and Second
Claimant were represented by the same attorney, and their claims
were consolidated. Eventually, the Commission found that the
Association had failed to provide a reasonable accommodation
for Hinojos but not for Second Claimant. Relative to Hinojos’s
case, the Commission imposed a $4,000 penalty on the
Association, but it declined to consider Hinojos’s request for
attorney fees because it believed that it was precluded from
making such awards by Utah Supreme Court caselaw—namely
Injured Workers Ass’n of Utah v. State, 2016 UT 21, 374 P.3d 14.
Hinojos appealed, claiming that the Commission was misreading
Injured Workers and that it should have considered the merits of
his attorney fees request. We agreed with Hinojos and sent the
case back to the Commission with instructions for it to consider
the merits of Hinojos’s attorney fees request.

¶3 Our remand instructions were specific, and they required
the Commission to assess Hinojos’s fees request under the
guidelines we had set forth in Christensen v. Labor Commission
(Christensen I), 2023 UT App 100, 536 P.3d 1114, rev’d in relevant

1. “In reviewing an order from the Commission, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the Commission’s findings and recite them accordingly.” Jensen Tech Services v. Labor Comm’n, 2022 UT App 18, n.1, 506 P.3d 616 (cleaned up).

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Future Community Services, Inc. v. Labor Commission

part sub nom., Christensen v. Salt Lake County (Christensen II), 2025
UT 55, 582 P.3d 749. In Christensen I, we held that the Commission
could make attorney fees awards, but that in doing so it could not
“pass[] judgment on the reasonableness underlying those fees.”
2023 UT App 100, ¶ 55. We stated in a footnote that the forbidden
“reasonableness” inquiry included assessment of “the amount an
attorney charges for a particular service,” including any analysis
of whether “the attorney’s hourly rate was . . . consistent with
rates charged by similarly situated lawyers.” Id. ¶ 55 n.15. But we
clarified that the Commission could still address allocation issues,
including “concerns such as the relatedness of the charges” to the
matters for which attorney fees were awarded. Id.

¶4 On remand, Hinojos submitted a request for $42,457.19 in
attorney fees, plus additional fees that had not yet been
determined for work performed by one attorney. The fees had
been incurred by four sets of attorneys: (1) $27,566.80 incurred by
attorney Robert Spjute for representing both Hinojos and Second
Claimant in proceedings before the Commission, (2) $9,280.39
incurred by attorney Freyja Johnson for representing Hinojos on
appeal, (3) $5,610 incurred by the Disability Law Center for
representing Hinojos prior to the filing of the Commission
proceeding, and (4) an undetermined additional amount for a
fourth attorney. The Association opposed the motion, claiming
that some of the fees were “unreasonable” and that Hinojos had,
in any event, “failed to properly allocate the fees” between his
successful claims and Second Claimant’s unsuccessful claims. An
administrative law judge (the ALJ), after reviewing Hinojos’s
motion, determined that more information was required and
asked Hinojos to “provide supplemental information through
declarations detailing [which] fees related to [which] services.”

¶5 Hinojos complied, filing a renewed motion for attorney
fees and this time asking for an award of $42,906.93. The new fee
amounts were again allocated among four sets of attorneys:
(1) $30,787.30 for Spjute for representing both Hinojos and Second

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Claimant before the Commission, (2) $5,504.63 for Johnson for
representing Hinojos on appeal, (3) $5,610 for the Disability Law
Center for representing Hinojos prior to the filing of the
Commission proceeding, and (4) $1,005 incurred by attorney Alan
Bachman, who had represented both Hinojos and Second
Claimant. These new amounts were accompanied by affidavits
explaining why, in the opinions of the billing attorneys, the fees
were allocable to Hinojos’s claims. Notably, Johnson significantly
lowered her fee request, and Bachman explained that he had
divided his “time in half to take into account” the fact that he had
represented both Hinojos and Second Claimant. Spjute and the
Disability Law Center, however, did not lower their fee requests.
Spjute asserted that further allocation was impossible because
Hinojos’s claims had been “intertwined” with Second Claimant’s,
and the Disability Law Center relied on its prior statement that its
“calculations [were] based on a thorough review of billing entries
. . . during the course of” its representation of Hinojos.

¶6 The Association objected, claiming that Hinojos had not
provided sufficient evidence to support his request and that
Hinojos had again failed to properly allocate his requested fees.
The Association argued that “all fees . . . should be denied”
because of Hinojos’s “conscious disregard of court and
Commission directives, and in the absence of evidence which can
support an award.” The Association also requested an evidentiary
hearing at which it could “inquire into, analyze and challenge
[the] requested fees.”

¶7 After reviewing the submitted materials, and without
holding a hearing, the ALJ awarded Hinojos $27,513.28 in
attorney fees, which was significantly less than he had requested.
With regard to Spjute’s requested fees, the ALJ found that Hinojos
and Spjute had “made a good-faith argument that further
allocation [was] not possible due to the intertwined nature of the
claims.” Nevertheless, the ALJ did not agree that the claims
actually were intertwined to the extent that allocation was

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impossible. Despite noting that “[t]he absence of specific time
records [made] it challenging to ascertain the exact amount of
work performed exclusively for [Hinojos],” the ALJ—based on his
experience and familiarity with the case—found it “reasonable to
infer that an equal amount of attorney time” had been devoted to
Hinojos’s claim as to Second Claimant’s claim. Based on this
inference, the ALJ found it “reasonable that the workload would
be close to an even split,” and he awarded Hinojos only half of the
fees incurred by Spjute, thus reducing Hinojos’s fee request by
more than $15,000.

¶8 With regard to the fees incurred by the other attorneys, the
ALJ found—based on a review of the attorneys’ respective
declarations—that all of the fees requested were related to
Hinojos’s claim and that these fees were therefore “appropriately
allocated.” The ALJ thus awarded Hinojos all the requested fees
incurred by the other attorneys.

¶9 However, the ALJ made clear that, based on Christensen I,
he was “not determining the reasonableness of the fee amount
itself.” Thus, he did not purport to assess things like the difficulty
of the litigation, the efficiency of the attorneys, the reasonableness
of the number of hours spent, or the reasonableness of the hourly
rate charged given the attorneys’ experience and expertise. Nor
did he take into account the amount involved in the case or the
result obtained.

¶10 The Association asked the Commission to review the ALJ’s
award, arguing that the ALJ’s order “should be rescinded”
because “the ALJ’s unwillingness to determine the reasonableness
of the fee award results from a misreading of the Injured Workers
case.” In addition, the Association challenged the ALJ’s
determination regarding the allocation of fees, asserting (among
other things) that Hinojos had not even attempted to allocate
Spjute’s incurred fees.

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¶11 The Commission issued an order affirming the ALJ’s
decision. The Commission determined that the ALJ had correctly
interpreted Christensen I and this court’s remand order. And it
otherwise affirmed the ALJ’s determinations regarding the fees
award, offering its view that the ALJ had “performed a fair
analysis of the evidence.” The Commission later denied a request
from the Association to reconsider its decision.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶12 The Association now seeks judicial review of the
Commission’s decision regarding attorney fees, and it asks us to
consider four issues. First, it argues that the Commission misread
Injured Workers and Christensen I in refusing to evaluate the
reasonableness of the requested fees. “Whether the Commission
applied the correct legal standard is a question of law we review
for correctness.” YESCO v. Labor Comm’n, 2021 UT App 96, ¶ 13,
497 P.3d 839.

¶13 Second, the Association raises a factual challenge to the
Commission’s award of attorney fees. This challenge takes several
forms, including a challenge to the entirety of the award (here, the
Association asserts that Hinojos failed to properly allocate his
claimed fees and therefore shouldn’t have been awarded any fees
at all), as well as a challenge to the amount of the awarded fees
(here, the Association takes issue with certain line items in the fee
declarations). We review these aspects of the Commission’s
assessment for abuse of discretion. See Christensen II, 2025 UT 55,
¶ 105 (stating that the Commission “should assess an attorney fee
request for reasonableness just as any district court would”); see
also Raass Bros. Inc. v. Raass, 2019 UT App 183, ¶ 12, 454 P.3d 83
(“Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion
of the district court and will not be overturned in the absence of a
showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” (cleaned up)).

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¶14 Third, the Association challenges the decision not to hold
an evidentiary hearing on Hinojos’s fee request. We review this
decision for abuse of discretion. Cf. Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs.,
910 P.2d 1252, 1266 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (“[W]e address the issue
of whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to hold
an evidentiary hearing on the issue of attorney fees.”).

¶15 Finally, the Association challenges the Commission’s
denial of its motion for reconsideration, and in this same vein it
asserts that the Commission failed in its duty “to appropriately
review and reconsider” the ALJ’s order. We review the
Commission’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of
discretion. Cf. Brookside Mobile Home Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT
48, ¶ 18, 48 P.3d 968 (“Appellate courts review a trial court’s grant
of a motion to reconsider under an abuse of discretion
standard.”). Our oversight of the Commission’s overall duty to
review the ALJ’s decisions, however, is for correctness. See Stage
Dep’t Store v. Magnuson, 2024 UT App 85, ¶ 26, 552 P.3d 288
(“Whether the Commission has applied the correct legal standard
in reaching its . . . [conclusion] is a legal question, which we
review for correctness.” (cleaned up)).

ANALYSIS

¶16 We first address the Association’s legal challenge to the
scope of the ALJ’s and the Commission’s reasonableness review
of Hinojos’s claimed fees. For the reasons discussed, we find merit
in this part of the Association’s challenge, and on this basis alone
we send this matter back to the Commission for a renewed
reasonableness assessment. After that, we discuss some of the
Association’s other challenges, but only by way of giving
guidance to the Commission for it to apply on remand.

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I. The Scope of the Reasonableness Assessment

¶17 The Association claims that the ALJ and the Commission
failed to apply the correct legal standard by not considering the
reasonableness of the requested fees. 2 As recently explained by
our supreme court in Christensen II, the Association’s position on
this issue is correct.

¶18 At all times relevant to this proceeding, Utah law
permitted the Commission to award “reasonable attorneys’ fees
and costs” to a litigant who successfully demonstrated “that a
discriminatory housing practice has occurred or is about to
occur.” Utah Code § 57-21-11(1)(b). A similar statute allows the
Commission to award “attorney fees” and “costs” to individuals
who have demonstrated that an employer “has engaged in a
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice.” Id. § 34A-5-
107(8)(b)(iii)–(iv). Applying this latter statute, we held in
Christensen I—based on our interpretation of our supreme court’s
opinion in Injured Workers—that the Commission, due to its status
as part of the executive branch, could not conduct the same sort
of “reasonableness” inquiry with regard to attorney fees as
district courts could. See 2023 UT App 100, ¶¶ 53, 55 & n.15. In
particular, we held that the Commission could not weigh in on
“the amount an attorney charges for a particular service” or on
whether an attorney’s hourly rate was “consistent with rates
charged by similarly situated lawyers.” Id. ¶ 55 n.15. But we held

1. As a preliminary issue, Hinojos points out that much of the Association’s criticism is aimed at the ALJ’s order (rather than the Commission’s subsequent orders), and he argues therefrom that the Association has attacked the wrong order, given that this court can only review final agency orders. But here, the Commission’s subsequent orders adopted the same general approach used by the ALJ. We thus construe the Association’s criticism of the ALJ’s order to be indirect criticism of the Commission’s final agency orders, and we see no procedural problem with this approach.

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that the Commission could make determinations about “the
relatedness of the charges” to the successful claims for which fees
were awarded. Id. Our remand order, issued earlier in this case,
reflected the law as set forth in Christensen I.

¶19 But recently, in Christensen II, our supreme court ruled that
the interpretation we set forth in Christensen I was incorrect. See
2025 UT 55, ¶ 105. In particular, the supreme court clarified that
the Commission was authorized to “assess an attorney fee request
for reasonableness just as any district court would.” Id. It
explained that “the question of what constitutes a reasonable fee”
is not “controlled by any set formula” and that in conducting this
inquiry the Commission should consider various factors,
including “the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness of the number
of hours spent on the case, the fee customarily charged in the
locality for similar services, the amount involved in the case and
the result attained, and the expertise and experience of the
attorneys involved.” Id. (cleaned up).

¶20 While Christensen II was not published until after the
underlying events and briefing for this issue were completed, the
statutory language the court was interpreting in that case had
been in effect at all times relevant to this case. See id. That is,
Christensen II did not introduce a new rule that was effective only
prospectively; rather, it provided an interpretation of statutory
text that had already been in effect for years. See DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia, 577 U.S. 47, 56 (2015) (“[J]udicial construction of a
statute ordinarily applies retroactively.”); see also Rivers v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 311–12 (1994) (“The principle
that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions
operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student . . . .”
(cleaned up)). Indeed, no party to this proceeding asserts that
Christensen II is inapplicable here.

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¶21 In supplemental briefing, 3 however, Hinojos asserts that
remand is not required because, in his view, the Commission
actually did assess the reasonableness of his claimed fees. We
reject this argument. In keeping with our remand instructions, the
ALJ and the Commission did assess one aspect of
reasonableness—the extent to which the claimed fees were related
to Hinojos’s successful claims—but they expressly declined to
assess other aspects. Indeed, the ALJ said that he was “not
determining the reasonableness of the fee amount itself,” because
that would be contrary to the remand instructions. And the
Commission block-quoted Christensen I and noted that it was
prohibited from, for example, denying a fee request on the ground
“that the attorney’s hourly rate was not consistent with rates
charged by similarly situated lawyers.” It is clear from the record
that neither the ALJ nor the Commission performed a complete
reasonableness review.

¶22 Finally, Hinojos argues that even if the Commission failed
to undertake a complete reasonableness inquiry, the Association
has not shown that it was harmed by the Commission’s actions.
We disagree. Hinojos attempts to fault the Association for not
specifically raising reasonableness objections (for instance, to his
attorneys’ hourly rates or to the excessiveness of the requested
fees) before the ALJ or the Commission, but he overlooks that our
remand order—by referencing Christensen I—implicitly forbade
the Commission from engaging in such inquiries. Under these
circumstances, the Association’s decision not to raise these types
of reasonableness objections was entirely understandable.

¶23 In this situation, a remand is required so that the
Commission can engage in a complete reasonableness inquiry, as

1. We invited supplemental briefing from the parties on the question of whether, and to what extent, Christensen II affected the parties’ arguments in this case. Both sides accepted our invitation, and we appreciate the parties’ submissions.

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described by our supreme court in Christensen II. On this basis
alone, we set aside the Commission’s attorney fees award, and we
send this case back to the Commission so that it can conduct the
proper reasonableness inquiry in the first instance.

II. Guidance on Remand

¶24 Because we have set aside the attorney fees award and
returned this case to the Commission, we could end our analysis
here. But the parties have briefed additional issues that are likely
to come up in subsequent proceedings, and we opt to discuss
some of those issues so that we can provide guidance that we
hope will be useful on remand. Cf. State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 61,
192 P.3d 867 (stating that, when “there are other issues presented
on appeal that will likely arise” on remand, we may “exercise our
discretion to address those issues for purposes of providing
guidance on remand”).

A. Allocation

¶25 The Association argues that the ALJ abused its discretion
by not just outright denying Hinojos’s fee request “based upon
Hinojos’s failure to allocate” Spjute’s fees. In addition, and in this
same vein, the Association challenges the Commission’s award of
fees incurred by two of Hinojos’s earlier attorneys. We disagree
with both arguments.

¶26 As already noted, the Commission “should assess an
attorney fee request for reasonableness just as any district court
would.” Christensen II, 2025 UT 55, ¶ 105. And part of that
reasonableness inquiry—but not all of it, see id.—involves
assessing whether the requested fees are related to the claims
upon which the claimant is entitled to recover fees. See Christensen
I, 2023 UT App 100, ¶ 55 n.15. In making assessments about
whether fees have been properly allocated, district courts have
(and the Commission has) a fair amount of discretion. See Burdick
v. Horner Townsend & Kent, Inc., 2015 UT 8, ¶ 59, 345 P.3d 531 (“The

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district court may, in its discretion, deny fees altogether . . . if they
have not been allocated as to separate claims and/or parties.”
(cleaned up)). But a court’s discretion to deny fees in their entirety
“is not unlimited” and does not permit it “to forgo a reasoned
analysis.” In re A. Dean Harding Marital & Family Trust, 2023 UT
App 81, ¶ 148, 536 P.3d 38 (cleaned up). Indeed, in Burdick, our
supreme court determined that a district court had exceeded its
discretion by denying a request for fees, in its entirety, for failure
to allocate, noting that the movant’s “affidavit clearly identifie[d]
282 hours attributable only to” the successful claim. 2015 UT 8,
¶ 60. And more recently, we emphasized that “[w]holesale denial
of a fee request on allocation grounds should be reserved for
situations where a party either makes no effort to allocate at all . . .
or . . . makes only token or wholly inadequate attempts to
allocate.” In re Harding Trust, 2023 UT App 81, ¶ 150. We stated
that in cases “where a party has taken a good-faith and detailed
run at allocation, the better approach—if a [district] court remains
of the view that the cuts are not quite deep enough—is to make a
reduced award rather than to deny the request in its entirety.” Id.

¶27 Here, with regard to the fees incurred by Spjute, the ALJ
determined that Hinojos’s (and Spjute’s) allocation assertion—
“that further allocation [was] not possible due to the intertwined
nature” of Hinojos’s and Second Claimant’s claims—was made in
good faith, even though the ALJ ultimately disagreed with it. And
the ALJ—apparently taking In re Harding Trust at its word—
determined “to make a reduced award rather than to deny the
request in its entirety.” See id. Specifically, the ALJ decided to cut
Spjute’s fees in half, after determining that it was “reasonable” to
conclude “that the workload” between Hinojos’s and Second
Claimant’s claims “would be close to an even split.” The
Commission affirmed that ruling.

¶28 We are not prepared to hold that this analysis represented
an abuse of the Commission’s discretion to determine the amount
of reasonable attorney fees that should be awarded to a claimant.

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While the ALJ and the Commission will be free to revisit this
analysis on remand, in connection with the more complete
reasonableness inquiry required by Christensen II, the sort of
analysis employed by the Commission the first time around
regarding allocation of Spjute’s fees seems to us to fall within the
bounds of the Commission’s discretion.

¶29 And the same is true with regard to the ALJ’s and the
Commission’s decisions regarding whether Hinojos’s earlier
attorneys—Disability Law Center and Bachman—had performed
work related to the claims for which fees were awardable. The
attorneys in question averred as much in their affidavits, and the
ALJ’s and the Commission’s reliance upon those sworn
representations does not constitute an abuse of discretion.

B. Holding a Hearing

¶30 Next, the Association raises a challenge to the ALJ’s
decision to not hold an evidentiary hearing “at which [the
Association could have] inquire[d] into, analyze[d] and
challenge[d]” the fees requested by Hinojos. For support, the
Association cites Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, a case in which our
supreme court stated that, “[i]f necessary, . . . a party should have
an opportunity to contest the accuracy of the documents by either
counter-affidavit or cross-examination of the opposing attorney
before the court.” See 830 P.2d 266, 268–69 (Utah 1992). However,
a hearing is not mandatory in a situation like this one, and a court
(or an ALJ) has wide discretion to determine whether to hold a
hearing at all and, if it does, whether to allow evidence to be taken
and witnesses to be sworn and examined. Indeed, in Cottonwood
Mall, in the sentence immediately prior to the one relied upon by
the Association, the court implied that in this context a hearing
would be the exception rather than the rule, stating that it will
“[u]sually . . . be sufficient if the opponent is provided access to
supporting documents such as attorney time records.” Id.

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¶31 In this case, it was not an abuse of discretion for the ALJ to
decline the Association’s request for an evidentiary hearing. Here,
the ALJ asked for additional briefing when he believed he didn’t
have enough information to decide the matter. The Association
had a full and fair opportunity to examine Hinojos’s supporting
documentation and lodge appropriate objections. On remand, it
will again be up to the ALJ and the Commission to decide whether
to hold a hearing, and (if challenged) we will again review that
decision deferentially.

C. Meaningful Review

¶32 Finally, the Association assails the scope of the
Commission’s review of the ALJ’s attorney fees determination. In
particular, it asserts that the Commission improperly affirmed the
ALJ’s fees award and denied the Association’s motion for
reconsideration “without any meaningful analysis of the
Association’s . . . objections.” We see no support for this
contention in the record submitted to us. After all, the
Commission issued written decisions explaining its reasoning;
there is no indication whatsoever that the Commission’s review
was unduly cursory or that the Commission failed to
meaningfully analyze the Association’s objections.

CONCLUSION

¶33 In this case, the ALJ and the Commission studiously
followed our previous remand order and limited their review of
the reasonableness of Hinojos’s claimed attorney fees to issues
related to allocation. But as set forth in Christensen II, our remand
order incorrectly instructed the Commission, and for this reason
another remand is required. For the reasons discussed, we set
aside the Commission’s award of attorney fees, and we send this
case back to the Commission for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion, including a complete reasonableness review in
accordance with Christensen II.

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