State v. Vazquez - Bail Denial Affirmed

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April 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Vazquez

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 48

• Docket Number: Case No. 20251586-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (19.5K)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 48

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
FEDERICO APARICIO VAZQUEZ,
Appellant.

Opinion
No. 20251586-CA
Filed April 2, 2026

Second District Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable Craig Hall
No. 251902470

Hakeem Ishola and Francisco Roman,
Attorneys for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Michael Palumbo,
Attorneys for Appellee

JUDGE AMY J. OLIVER authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.

OLIVER, Judge:

¶1 Federico Aparicio Vazquez was charged with four counts
of aggravated sexual abuse of a child for alleged abuse of two of
his grandchildren, Maria and Sophia. 1 At his initial bail hearing,
the district court denied Vazquez bail, finding there was
substantial evidence to support the charges and Vazquez would
be a substantial danger to other individuals or the community if
released. Vazquez argues on appeal that such findings were not
supported by the evidence. We disagree and affirm.

1. Both children are referred to by pseudonyms. State v. Vazquez

BACKGROUND 2

¶2 This case began when Maria gave her mother (Mother) and
father (Father) 3 a note that read, verbatim,

Hey mom and dad i wanted to tell you that when
grandma is in her room or kitchen and granpa is in
the Living room he sits next to me and [Sophia] and
touches are private and and the upper part and me
and [Sophia] are really uncomfortable and we are
scared.

At the time of disclosure in 2024, Maria was nine and Sophia was
eleven. The girls explained to their parents that Vazquez would
begin “with back rubs, then progress[] to their chests and
stomachs, and eventually down their pants and underwear.”
Father confronted Vazquez, his own father, and the police were
eventually called. When interviewed by police, Vazquez denied
touching his granddaughters inappropriately but admitted “that
he would rub [their] stomachs [and] backs, and hug them.” He

1. This case comes before us as a statutorily authorized
   interlocutory appeal of the district court’s denial of bail. See Utah
   Code § 77-20-209. “On interlocutory review, we recount the facts
   as alleged and in a light most favorable to the ruling below.” State
   v. Taylor, 2015 UT 42, ¶ 2 n.2, 349 P.3d 696. We rely on the
   information available to the district court at the time it issued its
   ruling. See generally Utah Code § 77-20-205(8)(a). Despite our
   recitation, we note Vazquez “retains the presumption of
   innocence that attaches prior to conviction.” State v. Cordova, 2023
   UT App 99, n.1, 536 P.3d 666.

2. While Mother is Sophia’s stepmother and Father is Maria’s
   stepfather, we refer to them by “Mother” and “Father” for
   simplicity.

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State v. Vazquez

claimed the girls “must have seen something on the internet or
were seeking attention.”

¶3 Both girls were interviewed at the Children’s Justice Center
(CJC) shortly after the disclosure. Maria explained the
inappropriate touching would start with Vazquez touching her
back and her stomach before he began touching her “under her
underwear.” She indicated he used his palm and would go “all
the way around and back on her ‘vajayjay.’” She specifically
identified an instance “in the bathroom” where Vazquez
“touched something inside her where she pees,” which she said
was “really sensitive.” She said during the episodes of abuse, “her
private [felt] tingly and uncomfortable” and she would
sometimes apply Vaseline to help with the discomfort. Maria
explained that Vazquez’s wife (Grandma) did not witness the
abuse. Maria said that when she told Sophia about the abuse,
Sophia said “it was happening to her too.”

¶4 In Sophia’s CJC interview, she explained the abuse had
been occurring for about two years and Vazquez had “touched
her many times on the couch while [Grandma] was in the other
room.” She described two specific incidents in the interview. First,
she disclosed an occasion when she was at Vazquez’s house
watching television with her brother (Brother) in a bedroom. She
said Vazquez came into the room and began rubbing her back
“and then put his hands in her pants and rubbed her private part”
with “one hand on her back and one hand under her panties.” She
explained that after Vazquez left the room, she “locked the
bedroom door.” She did not believe Brother had seen what
Vazquez was doing. Brother later told her that “he saw [Vazquez]
rubbing her back and breathing heavily.” The other occasion
Sophia described took place in the living room while Grandma
was in the kitchen. She said Vazquez “started to rub her private
and chest, tried to kiss her with his tongue, put his mouth on her
boob and rubbed her chest.” She reported that Vazquez gave her
gifts of shoes, jewelry, and money but told her “not to tell

20251586-CA 3 2026 UT App 48
State v. Vazquez

[Grandma] about the money.” She described “feeling
uncomfortable and unsafe” because of the abuse.

¶5 Brother was also interviewed at the CJC and corroborated
the incident in the bedroom as described by Sophia. He was
thirteen years old at the time of the interview, and described
watching television in a bedroom with Sophia when Vazquez
came in and began “hugging [Sophia], kissing her forehead and
breathing hard.” Brother said he could see Vazquez “rubbing
[Sophia’s] back under her shirt” out of the corner of his eye while
watching television. And he observed Sophia lock the bedroom
door after Vazquez left. He also said Vazquez “does not rub his
back.” Texts between Brother and Sophia showed Sophia told
Brother that Vazquez touched her “in [her] private and the upper
part.”

¶6 Multiple people in the girls’ lives noted changes in their
behavior. Maria’s teacher (Teacher) had contacted Mother
indicating troubling behavior from Maria, including hiding under
her desk, being unwilling to communicate about sad moods, and
generally shutting down. Teacher indicated Maria “has done this
before during the year but it has been a lot lately.” A subsequent
interview of Teacher by police corroborated these concerns, with
Teacher indicating Maria had gone from “being a ‘happy and
smiley’ child that was spontaneous and full of life, to being
subdued, participating less, and hiding in a hoodie.” Mother
indicated that Maria “developed an attitude” and “became
depressed,” and Father indicated that he noticed behavioral
changes as well. Mother and Father had also noticed that Sophia
had begun “wetting the bed and not wanting to sleep alone,”
whereas before she had a more “independent attitude.”

¶7 Both girls received a medical examination as part of the
investigation. Maria and Sophia recounted the alleged abuse in
their medical examinations consistently with what was reported
in their respective CJC interviews. Although neither girl showed

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State v. Vazquez

physical signs of abuse or injury, the reports noted “that a normal
genital exam does not rule out the possibility of sexual abuse or
discount [the] disclosure” and, further, that the exams had been
conducted “outside the timeframe for evidence collection.”

¶8 In 2023, one year prior to Maria and Sophia’s disclosure,
the Utah Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) had
opened an investigation concerning Vazquez’s eleven-year-old
daughter (Daughter), who is intellectually disabled and mostly
non-verbal. Daughter had drawn a picture of herself in bed with
a man “on top of her,” and she had said “Papa” while pointing at
her buttocks, belly button, and vagina and grabbing her breasts.
Both Vazquez and Grandma denied allegations of sexual abuse of
Daughter, and because Daughter is mostly non-verbal, the
investigation was closed as unsupported “due to insufficient
evidence.” DCFS recommended Vazquez enroll in sex offender
treatment because he “may not understand boundaries or
consent.”

¶9 In October 2025, the State charged Vazquez with four
counts of aggravated sexual abuse of a child, first-degree felonies,
and moved for pretrial detention (Motion). In support of its
Motion, the State presented Maria’s and Sophia’s CJC interviews,
their medical reports, and the DCFS investigation. Vazquez
submitted numerous pieces of character evidence supporting bail,
including his marriage certificate, proof of his home ownership in
Utah, verification of his longtime employment, four letters of
support from his colleagues, and six letters of support from family
members—namely Grandma, Father, a niece, and three more of
Vazquez’s children. Grandma said she “kn[ew] in [her] heart that
[her] husband [was] innocent” and that Vazquez was “not a threat
to [their] family or the community.” In his letter, Father stated that
Vazquez was “not a criminal” and was “not a danger to [their]
family or the community.” The letters from Vazquez’s three other
children and niece voiced similar support for Vazquez and a

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State v. Vazquez

shared belief that he was not a threat to the family or the
community.

¶10 At the hearing on the Motion, Mother testified in support
of the State. She said she had seen “a night-and-day difference in
both [Maria] and [Sophia]” since Vazquez’s arrest; they were
more relaxed, and many of the behavioral shifts she and others
had previously noticed had begun to resolve. Additionally, she
voiced concern over Vazquez being a potential flight risk as his
nephew had recently fled to Mexico to avoid legal trouble and she
understood that “members of [their] family” aided this flight. The
State also proffered that family members informed the State that
Vazquez owns property in Mexico, “frequently visits the
country,” and has family that lives there.

¶11 The State argued Vazquez should be denied bail because
there was substantial evidence to support his felony charges and
there was clear and convincing evidence that he posed a
substantial danger to others or was a flight risk. Regarding the
substantial evidence of his crimes, the State argued that the
children’s thorough, consistent, and repeated disclosures; the
behavioral changes observed by Teacher, Mother, and Father;
Brother’s interview; and the similarities between the abuse
described by Maria and Sophia all worked together to constitute
substantial evidence of the charges. The State further argued that
Vazquez primarily posed “a psychological and emotional
danger” to Maria and Sophia. It also highlighted the concerning
nature of the DCFS investigation regarding Daughter and
Vazquez’s danger to her since she cannot verbalize abuse. The
State highlighted that less restrictive conditions of release would
not mitigate these concerns because the alleged abuse occurred
while others were in the house and location monitoring would not
show who Vazquez was with, only where he was located. Finally,
the State argued Vazquez’s ties to Mexico showed he was a
potential flight risk, including owning property, having family,
and frequently visiting there.

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State v. Vazquez

¶12 Vazquez argued that the lack of a confession, eyewitness
testimony, or DNA evidence meant this case fell short of the
substantial evidence requirement. Vazquez also pointed to the
closed DCFS investigation, his compliance and cooperation with
the criminal investigation, his lack of criminal history, and his
family support (specifically, the support from Father) as proof
that Vazquez did not pose a substantial danger to others. Further,
Vazquez contended his employment history, home ownership,
and longstanding familial relationships in Utah showed stability
and did not support a finding that he was a flight risk.

¶13 At the end of the hearing, the district court found “that
there is substantial evidence to support the charges” and found,
“by clear and convincing evidence, that [Vazquez] would
constitute a substantial danger to the other individuals or to the
community after considering available conditions of release that
the [c]ourt may impose if [he] is released on bail.” Accordingly,
the court ordered Vazquez held without bail pending trial.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶14 Vazquez challenges the district court’s findings that (1)
substantial evidence supported his charges and (2) he posed a
substantial danger to others or was a flight risk. We review “a
district court’s ultimate determination that substantial evidence
exists to support the charge[s]” de novo and overturn factual
findings made in support of that decision “only when they are
clearly erroneous.” Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 44, 515 P.3d
444. “A district court’s determination that there is clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant is a substantial danger or
likely to flee if released is a fact-intensive, credibility-assessment-
dependent inquiry that deserves deference. We reverse that
determination only if it is clearly erroneous.” Id. ¶ 49.

¶15 Vazquez also argues the district court incorrectly
interpreted Utah Code section 77-20-201’s (Section 201) definition

20251586-CA 7 2026 UT App 48
State v. Vazquez

of substantial danger to impermissibly include emotional and
psychological danger. We review issues of statutory
interpretation for correctness. See Bearden v. Croft, 2001 UT 76, ¶ 5,
31 P.3d 537.

ANALYSIS

¶16 Under Utah law, “an individual charged with, or arrested
for, a criminal offense shall be admitted to bail as a matter of
right,” with certain exceptions. Utah Code § 77-20-201(1). As
applicable here, one such exception is when an individual is
charged with

a felony when there is substantial evidence to
support the charge and the court finds, by clear and
convincing evidence, that:

(i) the individual would constitute a substantial
danger to any other individual or to the
community after considering available
conditions of release that the court may impose
if the individual is released on bail; or

(ii) the individual is likely to flee the jurisdiction
of the court if the individual is released on
bail . . . .

Id. § 77-20-201(1)(c).

¶17 Therefore, to deny Vazquez bail, the district court was
required to find that (1) substantial evidence supported the
charges and (2) he posed a substantial danger to others or was a
flight risk. See id. The court’s findings, though sparse, did find

20251586-CA 8 2026 UT App 48
State v. Vazquez

each of these requirements was present. Vazquez challenges both
of these findings. 4

I. Substantial Evidence

¶18 “The substantial evidence standard is met when the
prosecution presents evidence capable of supporting a jury
finding that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Randolph v. State, 2022 UT 34, ¶ 73, 515 P.3d 444. Vazquez argues
“the State did not demonstrate substantial evidence to support
charging . . . [him] with aggravated sexual abuse of a child.”
Vazquez contends the State fell short of meeting the substantial
evidence standard because “[t]he charges are based exclusively on
the alleged statements provided by the two minor-victims” and
there is no “DNA evidence, eyewitness testimony, or confession.”

1. Vazquez failed to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because his principal memorandum contained no citations to the record. See Utah R. App. P. 10(d)(2)(C) (requiring a party’s principal memorandum to include “an argument . . . supported by citations to legal authority and the record”). We are cognizant of the time-sensitive nature of this particular type of appeal and therefore do not fault Vazquez for filing his principal memorandum before the transcript of the hearing was available. But in such circumstances, to comply with rule 10(d)(2)(C), parties are required to file a corrected memorandum once the record becomes available to incorporate the appropriate record citations. Here, the transcript of the hearing became available the day after Vazquez filed his principal memorandum. Yet Vazquez did not file a corrected memorandum, nor did his reply memorandum include any record citations. Having reviewed the full transcript ourselves, we have identified representations in Vazquez’s principal memorandum that do not comport with the record. We thus take this opportunity to remind all counsel of their obligation to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

20251586-CA 9 2026 UT App 48
State v. Vazquez

¶19 In support of his argument, Vazquez points to State v.
Jennings, where our supreme court concluded the substantial
evidence standard had been met where the State presented direct
statements from the defendant along with physical evidence. 2025
UT 1, ¶¶ 38–45, 565 P.3d 523. But the defendant in Jennings was
charged with first-degree murder, and there was a crime scene
full of physical evidence and a clearly deceased victim. See id. ¶ 4.
It follows that the State would present physical evidence in that
context to meet the burden of substantial evidence. In cases
regarding sexual crimes, by contrast, physical evidence is not
always available, and statements from alleged victims alone are
strong enough to constitute substantial evidence. See, e.g., State v.
Skinner, 2020 UT App 3, ¶ 39, 457 P.3d 421 (noting that one
witness’s testimony was “sufficient to support the conviction”).

¶20 For example, in Randolph v. State, the defendant was
charged with “four first-degree felonies connected to an alleged
sexual assault.” 2022 UT 34, ¶ 1. The court denied him bail and he
appealed, arguing (as Vazquez does here) that the State had not
presented substantial evidence of his charges. Id. ¶ 76. The
evidence before the court included the victim’s statement, police
reports, and medical documents. Id. ¶¶ 7, 9. The supreme court
determined that, “at the very most, [the defendant’s] evidence
pokes holes in the State’s claim. . . . But poked holes do not
demand that the district court conclude that the substantial
evidence standard has not been satisfied.” Id. ¶ 80. The court
concluded “the State’s evidence [was] sufficient . . . to support” a
finding of substantial evidence. Id.

¶21 Similarly here, the State presented Maria’s and Sophia’s
CJC interviews and their medical reports. Although the medical
reports do not indicate any injuries to either Maria or Sophia, they
also did “not rule out the possibility of sexual abuse or discount
[the] disclosure.” Additionally, the disclosures from both girls
were supported and corroborated. Maria’s and Sophia’s
allegations contained numerous similarities, namely how the

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State v. Vazquez

abuse would begin with innocuous touching (like rubbing their
backs), would occur at Vazquez’s house while others were present
in the house, and would consist largely of Vazquez touching their
genitals under their clothes. Maria and Sophia reported this abuse
in numerous ways and were consistent in their accounts. These
disclosures included the note to Mother and Father, the
interviews at the CJC, the disclosures during their medical exams,
and the disclosure to Brother. Moreover, Brother corroborated
Sophia’s report of abuse when they had been watching television
in Vazquez’s house, noting he saw Vazquez “rubbing [Sophia’s]
back under her shirt” and “breathing hard.” The evidence before
the district court also contained corroboration of behavioral
changes in Maria and Sophia from Mother, Father, and Teacher.

¶22 Even though Vazquez made a “forceful denial” of the
allegations, the evidence presented by the State “provide[d] a
reasonable basis for a guilty jury verdict.” Id. ¶ 73. Accordingly,
the court’s finding that there was substantial evidence to support
the charges against Vazquez is not clearly erroneous.

II. Substantial Danger or Flight Risk

¶23 In order to deny bail, the district court must find that either
(A) “the individual would constitute a substantial danger to any
other individual or to the community after considering available
conditions of release that the court may impose if the individual
is released on bail” or (B) “the individual is likely to flee the
jurisdiction of the court if the individual is released on bail.” Utah
Code § 77-20-201(1)(c)(i)–(ii).

A. Substantial Danger

¶24 Vazquez challenges both the district court’s interpretation
of “substantial danger” in Section 201 and the evidentiary support
for a finding that he constitutes a substantial danger. We first
address the question of statutory interpretation, then apply the
interpretation to Vazquez’s case.

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State v. Vazquez

1. Statutory Interpretation

¶25 Vazquez contends the definition of “substantial danger” as
used in Section 201 does not include psychological and emotional
danger. To support his interpretation of the statutory language,
he points out that Utah Code section 77-20-301 (Section 301)—the
statute governing postconviction release prior to imposition of a
sentence—defines “danger” to include “psychological” danger
whereas Section 201 does not. Contrast Utah Code § 77-20-
301(1)(b), with id. § 77-20-201(1)(c)(i). He argues this is a
meaningful omission and the lack of the term “psychological” in
Section 201 means that psychological and emotional danger are
not to be considered in the court’s analysis. We disagree with his
interpretation of the statute.

¶26 “In interpreting statutory language, our primary goal is to
give effect to the legislature’s intent. To accomplish this goal, we
begin by looking to the statute’s plain language.” Marion Energy,
Inc. v. KFJ Ranch P’ship, 2011 UT 50, ¶ 33, 267 P.3d 863. While we
“seek to give effect to omissions in statutory language by
presuming all omissions to be purposeful,” the overall statutory
scheme and context also inform our interpretation. Penunuri v.
Sundance Partners, Ltd., 2013 UT 22, ¶ 15, 301 P.3d 984. Here, it
does not follow that the use of the term “psychological” danger in
Section 301 means that it is excluded from the term “substantial
danger” in Section 201.

¶27 First, the two sections are framed in opposition to one
another. Section 201 requires the court to affirmatively find “the
individual would constitute a substantial danger to any other
individual or to the community,” while Section 301 requires the
court to find “the defendant . . . will not pose a danger to . . . any
other person or the community if released.” Compare Utah Code
§ 77-20-201(1)(c)(i), with id. § 77-20-301(1). The two sections do not
ask the court to make the same finding. Rather, the court is
required to make the inverse finding in each section. Thus, the

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State v. Vazquez

enumeration of specific types of danger in one section does not
automatically mean that the lack of such enumeration in a
different section of the statute was intended to exclude those
types of danger.

¶28 Second, Section 301 thoroughly defines the kind of danger
the court is to consider, while Section 201 is entirely silent on the
matter. Section 301 asks the court to find that the defendant “will
not pose a danger to the physical, psychological, or financial and
economic safety or well-being of any other person or the community
if released.” Id. § 77-20-301(1)(b) (emphasis added). By contrast,
Section 201 instructs the court to consider whether “the individual
would constitute a substantial danger to any other individual or
to the community.” Id. § 77-20-201(1)(c)(i). Simply put, Section 301
enumerates all the types of danger the court is to consider, while
Section 201 does not specifically define the danger in any way.

¶29 Third, were we to adopt Vazquez’s interpretation of
Section 201, it would lead to a nonsensical result. If we presume
the omission of “psychological” from Section 201 was intentional,
we would also need to exclude “physical,” “financial,” and
“economic” from Section 201 because those types of danger are
likewise enumerated in Section 301 but are not included in Section
201. See id. § 77-20-201(1)(c)(i), -301(1)(b). This leaves no
commonly understood type of danger to consider in an analysis
under Section 201 and would render “substantial danger”
unnecessarily ambiguous and nearly meaningless. As recognized
by our supreme court, statutory interpretations “which render
some part of a [statute] nonsensical” are to be avoided. Jackson v.
Mateus, 2003 UT 18, ¶ 21, 70 P.3d 78 (cleaned up).

¶30 Therefore, in accordance with the plain language of Section
201, we conclude that “substantial danger” encompasses various
types of danger, including “physical, psychological, or financial
and economic” danger, as later enumerated in Section 301. See
Utah Code § 77-20-201(1)(c)(i), -301(1)(b). Accordingly, the district

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State v. Vazquez

court did not err in considering emotional and psychological
danger when finding Vazquez was a substantial danger to
others. 5

1. Evidentiary Support

¶31 Vazquez argues he is not a substantial danger to others and
the district court clearly erred in so finding. To support his
position, he points to his lack of criminal history, his employment
history, his character recommendations, the lack of medical
evidence of abuse, his compliance with the investigation, and the
closure of the DCFS case regarding Daughter. But the district
court had ample evidence before it that Vazquez posed a
substantial danger to Maria, Sophia, and Daughter and that he
also posed a substantial danger to the community where there
was evidence of abuse of multiple children.

¶32 Regarding Maria and Sophia, the alleged abuse took place
in Vazquez’s house while others were present, indicating the
presence of others in the house was not enough of a deterrent to
prevent such actions. The support of numerous family members
for Vazquez, including Grandma and Father, also indicated that
family members may not believe the children and would not be
vigilant in preventing situations similar to those that led to the
alleged abuse. And while the DCFS investigation regarding
Daughter was closed as unsupported, this was largely because
Daughter could not sufficiently verbalize any abuse she
sustained. The disclosures Daughter did make—her drawing of a

1. The State argued Vazquez posed “a psychological and emotional danger” to Maria and Sophia. But the district court did not specify the type of danger it relied on when it found Vazquez was a substantial danger to other individuals or to the community. Based upon our statutory analysis above, a district court can consider any type of danger in making its finding of substantial danger. See Utah Code § 77-20-201(1)(c)(i).

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State v. Vazquez

man on top of her in bed and saying “Papa” while pointing at her
buttocks, belly button, and vagina, and grabbing her breasts—
were highly concerning.

¶33 This same evidence also supports the district court’s
finding that conditions for pretrial release would be
inappropriate. The abuse happened while other people were
present, Maria and Sophia do not have strong familial support
aside from Mother to keep them safe, and Daughter would not be
able to report any abuse. Thus, release conditions such as ankle
monitors or travel restrictions would not have mitigated the risk
of harm.

¶34 Vazquez has thus failed to demonstrate that the district
court’s determination that he was a substantial danger was
“clearly erroneous such that no reasonable factfinder could
review the evidence presented and arrive at the disputed
finding.” Ream v. Ream, 2025 UT App 105, ¶ 36, 575 P.3d 1221
(cleaned up). Accordingly, we conclude the district court’s
determination that the evidence clearly and convincingly showed
that Vazquez was a substantial danger to others was not clearly
erroneous.

B. Flight Risk

¶35 Vazquez also contends he does not pose a flight risk and
the court could not correctly find him to be one. 6 If Vazquez was
not found to be a substantial danger to others, he could still be
denied bail if the court found “by clear and convincing evidence”
he was “likely to flee the jurisdiction of the court if . . . released on
bail.” Utah Code § 77-20-201(1)(c)(ii).

1. The district court did not specifically find Vazquez to be a flight risk. However, both Vazquez and the State fully presented this issue to the district court and to us on appeal. We therefore address the parties’ arguments on the merits.

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State v. Vazquez

¶36 Vazquez argues he “possesses strong family ties to the
local community, maintains a fixed address, . . . and has a history
of consistent and stable employment,” all of which render any
perceived benefit of fleeing far outweighed by the potential
disruption such a flight would bring. He cites his cooperation
with the investigation and compliance with prior court orders as
further support for this conclusion. However, the State correctly
highlights the “big difference [between] cooperating with a DCFS
investigation in reunification and being charged with four first-
degree felonies that carry life sentences.”

¶37 At this point, the stakes are higher and the incentives to flee
have increased. Vazquez’s strong connections out of the country
(namely, his ownership of property in Mexico, his family living
there, and his frequent visits to the country) and Mother’s
testimony that family recently helped Vazquez’s nephew flee to
Mexico to evade law enforcement clearly and convincingly
demonstrate that Vazquez is a flight risk. See generally Scott v.
Scott, 2017 UT 66, ¶ 18, 423 P.3d 1275 (“We have the ability to
affirm a decision on any ground apparent on the record[,] . . . even
though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial
court to be the basis of its ruling or action.”).

CONCLUSION

¶38 We agree with the district court’s determination that
substantial evidence supported the charges. The district court’s
finding that Vazquez posed a substantial danger was not clearly
erroneous. Further, the evidence clearly and convincingly
supported that Vazquez is a flight risk. We affirm the court’s
denial of bail.

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