State v. Herman - Criminal Bail Review Jurisdiction

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April 2, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Herman

Court of Appeals of Utah

• Citations: 2026 UT App 46

• Docket Number: Case No. 20251423-CA

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

2026 UT App 46

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
WILLIE JAMES HERMAN,
Appellant.

Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20251423-CA
Filed April 2, 2026

Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Vernice S. Trease
No. 251910307

Zachary Powell, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Michael Palumbo,
Attorneys for Appellee

Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, RYAN M. HARRIS,
and AMY J. OLIVER.

PER CURIAM:

¶1 Willie James Herman appeals a pretrial status order that
afforded him the opportunity for pretrial release, but with
conditions. In particular, he challenges the district court’s decision
to set bail in the amount of $20,000. The State argues that this court
lacks jurisdiction because the target order is not appealable at this
point in the proceedings. We agree with the State and dismiss
Herman’s appeal.

¶2 After Herman was arraigned on attempted rape charges,
his attorney filed a request for a bail hearing. At that hearing, the
State asked that bail be set in the amount of $20,000, noting
Herman’s extensive criminal record and history of failing to
appear in other criminal matters. For his part, Herman argued
State v. Herman

that he should be “release[d] on his own recognizance” but be
required to “check in with his probation” officer. The district court
issued a pretrial status order denying Herman’s request to be
released on his own recognizance but affording Herman the
opportunity for conditional pretrial release and setting bail in the
amount of $20,000. However, the court informed Herman that it
would reconsider its decision if Herman were to submit
information indicating that there was a bed for him in an inpatient
treatment facility. Herman challenges that pretrial status order.

¶3 Generally, this court does not have jurisdiction to consider
an appeal unless it is taken from a final judgment or order. See
Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶¶ 10, 15, 37 P.3d 1070. An order is
final only if it disposes of the case as to all parties and “finally
disposes of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the
case.” Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 649 (cleaned
up). A pretrial status order, by definition, does not end the
controversy between the parties, and is therefore not a final
judgment or order. However, our legislature has created a
statutory right to immediately appeal certain orders, and two
related statutes are at issue here.

¶4 One of those statutes states that “[a] defendant may, as a
matter of right, appeal from . . . an order denying bail.” Utah Code
§ 77-18a-1(1)(d). And the other statute states that, “[i]f a
magistrate or judge issues a pretrial status order that orders the
individual be detained during the time the individual awaits trial
or other resolution of criminal charges, the individual has the
right to an expedited appeal of the pretrial status order.” Id. § 77-
20-209. Herman contends that this second statute (referred to
herein as Section 209) gives him the right to immediately appeal
his pretrial status order. He takes the position that Section 209
allows defendants to immediately appeal not only orders denying
bail entirely but also orders allowing for conditional release. In
essence, he argues that Section 209 allows for immediate appeal
of any pretrial status order except orders of unconditional release

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State v. Herman

(for instance, on his or her own recognizance). The State, on the
other hand, asserts that these statutes apply only to orders
denying bail entirely, and that they do not allow for immediate
appeal of orders that allow for pretrial release with conditions,
including financial conditions like bail.

¶5 At first blush, each party’s interpretation of the statutes
appears supportable. However, the statutory provisions at issue
must be read “in harmony with other provisions in the same
statute and with other [related] statutes.” State v. Moreno, 2009 UT
15, ¶ 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (cleaned up). “In essence, statutes should
be construed so that no part or provision will be inoperative or
superfluous, void or insignificant, and so that one section will not
destroy another.” State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 9, 217 P.3d 265
(cleaned up).

¶6 Utah’s bail statute defines the phrase “pretrial status
order” as used in Section 209. Under that definition, a “pretrial
status order” is an order issued by a magistrate or judge that

(a) releases the individual on the individual’s own
recognizance while the individual awaits trial or
other resolution of criminal charges;

(b) sets the terms and conditions of the individual’s
pretrial release while the individual awaits trial or
other resolution of criminal charges; or

(c) denies pretrial release and orders that the
individual be detained while the individual awaits
trial or other resolution of criminal charges.

Utah Code § 77-20-102(18). These same three options are also
delineated in the statutory provision (referred to herein as Section
205) that tells judges and magistrates what their options are when
issuing a pretrial status order; that provision states as follows:

20251423-CA 3 2026 UT App 46
State v. Herman

When a magistrate or judge issues a pretrial status
order, the pretrial status order shall:

(i) release the individual on the individual’s own
recognizance during the time the individual awaits
trial or other resolution of criminal charges;

(ii) designate a condition, or a combination of
conditions, to be imposed upon the individual’s
release during the time the individual awaits trial or
other resolution of criminal charges; or

(iii) subject to the requirements of Subsection (10),
order the individual to be detained during the time
that individual awaits trial or other resolution of
criminal charges.

Id. § 77-20-205(3)(a); see also State v. Harris, 2025 UT 48, ¶ 20
(stating that a magistrate or judge may select one of three
statutory options in determining a defendant’s pretrial status
while the defendant “awaits trial or other resolution of criminal
charges”). Section 205 goes on, in a subsequent subsection, to list
a number of “condition[s], or combination of conditions” that a
magistrate or judge “may impose . . . for pretrial release,” and this
list includes financial conditions. Utah Code § 77-20-205(5)(t).

¶7 After considering Section 209 in tandem with Section 205
and with the statutory definition of “pretrial status order,” we
conclude that the State’s interpretation of the relevant statutes is
the stronger one. Section 209 allows immediate appeals of pretrial
status orders only when the magistrate or judge “orders the
individual be detained during the time the individual awaits trial
or other resolution of criminal charges.” Id. § 77-20-209. This
language tracks directly with the third option referenced in both
Section 205, which sets forth a court’s options in issuing a pretrial
status order, see id. § 77-20-205(3)(a), and in the statutory

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State v. Herman

definition of “pretrial status order,” see id. § 77-20-102(18). We
assume, of course, that our legislature used this matching
language purposely. See Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ¶ 10, 387
P.3d 1000 (stating that courts must “presume that the legislature
used each word advisedly” (cleaned up)). As we read the statutes
together, Section 209 allows immediate appeals of pretrial
detention orders that meet the criteria in the third option set forth
in Section 205 and in the statutory definition of “pretrial status
order.” And because orders of conditional release are included in
the second option set forth in both Section 205 and the statutory
definition, they are not included in the third option set forth in
those same statutory provisions. Stated another way, Section 209
allows for immediate appeal only of orders that do not allow for
conditional release and that compel a defendant to remain
detained without the opportunity for pretrial release. And
notably, this interpretation also matches up with the other bail-
appeal statute, which quite clearly states that a defendant may
only immediately appeal “an order denying bail.” Utah Code
§ 77-18a-1(1)(d).

¶8 In this case, the court decided not to deny Herman the
opportunity for pretrial release but, instead, opted to set terms
and conditions on his release. Specifically, the court imposed a
financial condition upon Herman’s release—the payment of a
$20,000 bond. Thus, the court’s order was not one that ordered
Herman detained without the opportunity for pretrial release.
Accordingly, Section 209 does not provide Herman the right to
immediately appeal from that order. Thus, this court lacks
jurisdiction to hear this appeal and must dismiss it. See Loffredo v.
Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 11, 37 P.3d 1070.

¶9 Accordingly, Herman’s appeal is dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of a timely appeal after the district court
enters a final, appealable order or one that is immediately
appealable by statutory right.

20251423-CA 5 2026 UT App 46