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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Wilmar Mosquera

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 23-13313
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: CON

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (31K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 1 of 11

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-13312
Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

ANGEL LUVI-RAMIREZ,
a.k.a. Angel Luvi,
Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20185-CMA-2

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No. 23-13313
Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 2 of 11

2 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

WILMAR MOSQUERA,
Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20185-CMA-4

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No. 23-13336
Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

JOSE HERNANDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20185-CMA-1

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Before JILL PRYOR, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 3 of 11

23-13312 Opinion of the Court 3

Appellants Angel Luvi-Ramirez, Jose Hernandez, and Wil-
mar Mosquera pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent
to distribute cocaine on a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the
United States. On appeal, they challenge their convictions. The
government has moved for summary affirmance. We grant the
government’s motion.
I.
In April 2023, a go-fast vessel bearing no indicia of national-
ity was spotted in the Caribbean Sea about 125 nautical miles off
the coast of the Dominican Republic. There were four people
aboard the go-fast vessel, which was loaded with fuel drums and
visible packages. The United States Coast Guard, suspecting that
the go-fast vessel was involved in drug smuggling, launched a heli-
copter as well as a boat to track it. When the individuals aboard the
go-fast vessel spotted the Coast Guard, they began to throw pack-
ages overboard. The Coast Guard helicopter fired warning shots.
After seeing that the warning shots were ineffective, the Coast
Guard helicopter fired shots to disable the vessel.
When members of the Coast Guard team reached the disa-
bled vessel, they found Hernandez, Luvi-Ramirez, and Mosquera
aboard. 1 Hernandez identified himself as the vessel’s master and

1 The fourth person aboard the go-fast vessel was Endris Hernandez. Endris

pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine on a
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and received a sentence
of 66 months’ imprisonment. Endris has not appealed his conviction or sen-
tence.
USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 4 of 11

4 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

refused to make a claim of nationality for it. Based on his answers,
the Coast Guard treated the go-fast vessel as a vessel without na-
tionality. The Coast Guard team recovered some of the bales of
cocaine that had been tossed overboard.
A grand jury in the Southern District of Florida returned an
indictment charging Hernandez, Luvi-Ramirez, and Mosquera
with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms
or more of cocaine while on board a vessel subject to the jurisdic-
tion of the United States (Count One) and possession with intent
to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine while on board a
vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States (Count Two).
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment. They argued that
the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act (“MDLEA”), 46 U.S.C.
§§ 70501–08, was unconstitutional as applied to them. They as-
serted that the United States lacked the authority to punish them
because their conduct occurred in the Dominican Republic’s exclu-
sive economic zone and had no nexus to the United States. The
district court denied the motion.
After the court denied the joint motion to dismiss, the de-
fendants pleaded guilty to Count One in exchange for the govern-
ment’s dismissal of Count Two. As part of the plea agreement,
each defendant admitted that when the Coast Guard team boarded
the go-fast vessel, Hernandez identified himself as its master and
refused to make a claim of nationality for it. Each defendant also

References to “Hernandez” in this opinion refer to Jose Hernandez.
USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 5 of 11

23-13312 Opinion of the Court 5

stipulated that because of this response, the United States treated
the go-fast vessel as a vessel without nationality that was subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States. And each defendant agreed
that he was responsible for 250 kilograms of cocaine. The district
court ultimately sentenced Luvi-Ramirez to 48 months’ imprison-
ment, Hernandez to 76 months’ imprisonment, and Mosquera to
58 months’ imprisonment.
Luvi-Ramirez, Hernandez, and Mosquera appeal.
II.
Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-
sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”
or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a mat-
ter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the out-
come of the case, or where . . . the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke
Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). 2
We review de novo a district court’s determination on its sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction. United States v. Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th
1374, 1378 (11th Cir. 2025). “Likewise, we review de novo the con-
stitutionality of a criminal statute.” Id. “Although a guilty plea gen-
erally waives a defendant’s right to appeal his conviction, it does

2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we

adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued
before October 1, 1981.
USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 6 of 11

6 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

not waive the right to challenge the constitutionality of the statute
underlying the conviction.” Id.
When a defendant raises a challenge for the first time on ap-
peal, we review for plain error. See United States v. Alfonso, 104 F.4th
815, 820 (11th Cir. 2024). To establish plain error, a defendant must
show: (1) an error, (2) that is “plain,” (3) that “affects substantial
rights,” and (4) that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or pub-
lic reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Lejarde-Rada,
319 F.3d 1288, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (citation modified).
III.
The MDLEA makes it a crime to “knowingly or intention-
ally . . . possess with intent to . . . distribute, a controlled sub-
stance” on board “a vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States” and to conspire to do the same. 46 U.S.C. §§ 70503 (a)(1),
(e)(1); 70506(b). The MDLEA’s prohibitions apply even when the
criminal conduct is “committed outside the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.” Id. § 70503(b).
As the MDLEA’s text shows, its prohibitions apply to vessels
“subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” Id. § 70503(e)(1).
It defines a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States”
to include “a vessel without nationality.” Id. § 70502(c)(1)(A). And
it explains when a boat qualifies as a vessel without nationality. Id.
§ 70502(d). The MDLEA’s definition of “vessel without national-
ity” includes: (1) “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in
charge makes a claim of registry that is denied by the nation whose
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23-13312 Opinion of the Court 7

registry is claimed”; (2) “a vessel aboard which the master or indi-
vidual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United
States . . . , to make a claim of nationality or registry for that ves-
sel”; (3) “a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge
makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of reg-
istry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel
is of its nationality”; and (4) “a vessel aboard which no individual,
on request of an officer of the United States . . . , claims to be the
master or is identified as the individual in charge, and that has no
other claim of nationality or registry” under the MDLEA. Id.
§ 70502(d)(1).
On appeal, Luvi-Ramirez, Hernandez, and Mosquera chal-
lenge their MDLEA convictions. We begin by addressing the con-
stitutional challenges raised by all three defendants. We then dis-
cuss two additional issues raised by Luvi-Ramirez.
The two constitutional challenges raised by all defendants
are based, in whole or in part, on the Felonies Clause of the Con-
stitution, which authorizes Congress to punish certain offenses
committed on the high seas. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (grant-
ing Congress the authority “[t]o define and punish Piracies and Fel-
onies committed on the high Seas”). In the first challenge, they ar-
gue that the Felonies Clause did not authorize their prosecutions
USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 8 of 11

8 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

because the waters where they were arrested are part of the exclu-
sive economic zone of the Dominican Republic. 3 Relying on cus-
tomary international law, they assert that when waters are part of
another nation’s exclusive economic zone, they are not part of the
high seas and thus the United States lacks jurisdiction to enforce
the MDLEA over a vessel located in those waters. In the second
challenge, they argue that their prosecutions violated due process
and exceeded Congress’s power under the Felonies Clause because
their offenses had no connection or nexus to the United States.
Both challenges are foreclosed by precedent. First, we have
held that other countries’ exclusive economic zones are “part of the
‘high seas’ for purposes of the Felonies Clause” and thus enforce-
ment of the MDLEA in an exclusive economic zone is proper. Al-
fonso, 104 F.4th at 823. In reaching this conclusion, we rejected the
argument that “Congress’s authority under the Felonies Clause to
define and punish felonies committed on the ‘high seas’ is limited
by customary international law.” Id. at 825.
Second, we have rejected challenges to the MDLEA’s appli-
cation to a vessel on the high seas on the basis that the vessel lacked
a sufficient nexus to the United States and thus the prosecution vi-
olated principles of due process or was not permitted under the

3 A nation’s exclusive economic zone sits beyond its territorial waters but

within 200 nautical miles of its coastal baseline. Alfonso, 104 F.4th at 821. We
have described the concept of an exclusive economic zone as of “relatively
modern vintage.” Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1382; see also Alfonso, 104 F.4th
at 823 (explaining that at the time of the adoption of Article I of the Constitu-
tion, the concept of an exclusive economic zone “did not exist”).
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23-13312 Opinion of the Court 9

Felonies Clause. See United States v. Campbell, 743 F.3d 802, 809–12
(11th Cir. 2014). “[W]e have long upheld the authority of Congress
to extend the criminal jurisdiction of this country to any stateless
vessel in international waters engaged in the distribution of con-
trolled substances.” Id. at 810 (citation modified). We have recog-
nized that the prosecution of a noncitizen “captured on the high
seas while drug trafficking” does not offend due process because
the MDLEA “provides clear notice that all nations prohibit and
condemn drug trafficking aboard stateless vessels on the high seas.”
Id. at 812; see also Canario-Vilomar, 128 F.4th at 1382–83 (holding
that an identical nexus challenge was foreclosed by precedent).
Our precedent compels us to reject these two constitutional
challenges. We remain bound by our earlier decisions, which have
not been overturned or undermined to the point of abrogation by
the Supreme Court or this Court sitting en banc. See United States v.
Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008). As to these two consti-
tutional challenges, we conclude summary affirmance is appropri-
ate because the government’s position is clearly correct as a matter
of law.
We now turn to the two additional issues Luvi-Ramirez
raised. First, he says that § 70502(d)(1)(C)—the MDLEA provision
that defines “vessel without nationality” to include a vessel for
which the master made a claim of nationality, but the claimed na-
tion did not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel
was of its nationality—is unconstitutional. He argues that the
power granted to Congress under the Felonies Clause “is limited
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-13312

to those felonies which the United States has the right to prosecute
under international law.” Luvi-Ramirez Appellant’s Br. 7. He then
asserts that § 70502(d)(1)(C) is unconstitutional because it allows
the United States to extend its criminal jurisdiction to vessels that
“are not stateless under international law.” Id. Second, he asserts
that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that the
go-fast vessel here qualified as a vessel without nationality under
§ 70502(d)(1)(C) because there was no evidence that the Domini-
can Republic “fail[ed] to unequivocally confirm a verbal claim of
nationality.” Id. at 9–10. Luvi-Ramirez raises these two issues for
the first time on appeal. He raises both issues in the summary of
argument section of his opening brief. But he cites no case law to
support his position on either issue and does not discuss either issue
in the argument section of his brief.
Assuming that Luvi-Ramirez adequately raised these issues
on appeal, we agree with the government that there is no substan-
tial question as to their outcome. Because he raises them for the
first time on appeal, we review for plain error. Here, Luvi-Ramirez
cannot show any error. Both of his challenges rest on the premise
that the United States relied on § 70502(d)(1)(C) to establish that
the go-fast vessel was a vessel without nationality and to exercise
jurisdiction over it. But the record roundly refutes his position. As
Luvi-Ramirez admitted in the factual proffer in his plea agreement,
Hernandez admitted to the Coast Guard that he was the master of
the vessel and then made no claim of nationality or registry for it.
Given these responses, the United States treated the go-fast vessel
as a vessel without nationality and exercised jurisdiction over it
USCA11 Case: 23-13312 Document: 36-1 Date Filed: 03/27/2026 Page: 11 of 11

23-13312 Opinion of the Court 11

pursuant to § 70502(d)(1)(B), not § 70502(d)(1)(C). Luvi-Ramirez
makes no argument that § 70502(d)(1)(B) is unconstitutional be-
cause it is inconsistent with international law or that there was in-
sufficient evidence to establish that the go-fast vessel was without
nationality under this provision.
We GRANT the government’s motion for summary affir-
mance.