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March 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Upside Foods Inc v. Commissioner, Florida Department of Agriculture an

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-13640

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (62)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6.1K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-13640 Document: 79-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 1 of 33

FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

---

No. 24-13640

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UPSIDE FOODS INC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus

COMMISSIONER, FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF
AGRICULTURE AND CONSUMER SERVICES,
ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATE OF FLORIDA,
STATE ATTORNEY, THE SECOND JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA,
STATE ATTORNEY, THE SIXTH JUDICIAL
CIRCUIT OF FLORIDA,
STATE ATTORNEY, 9TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
USCA11 Case: 24-13640 Document: 79-1 Date Filed: 03/23/2026 Page: 2 of 33

2 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:24-cv-00316-MW-MAF

---

Before NEWSOM and BRASHER, Circuit Judges, and HUCK, ∗ District
Judge.
BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
The question in this appeal is whether the Poultry Products
Inspection Act preempts a Florida law that bans the sale of lab-
grown chicken. Florida’s SB 1084 outlaws the manufacture, distri-
bution, and sale of all lab-grown meat in the state. Fla. Stat.
§ 500.452 (1)–(6). Upside Foods, Inc. is a startup based in California
that makes lab-grown meat, including chicken, and would like to
distribute and sell its chicken product in Florida. Upside has chal-
lenged SB 1084 as preempted under the federal Poultry Products
Inspection Act and has moved to preliminarily enjoin its enforce-
ment. The district court denied Upside’s motion, ruling that Upside
was unlikely to succeed on its preemption claims because a ban on
lab-grown chicken is not equivalent to a regulation of Upside’s in-
gredients, premises, facilities, or operations. We must wade
through a morass of justiciability and other preliminary issues be-
fore we can reach the merits. But the bottom line is that we agree
with the district court. Because Florida’s ban on lab-grown meat

∗ Honorable Paul C. Huck, United States District Judge for the Southern Dis-

trict of Florida, sitting by designation.
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 3

does not regulate Upside’s ingredients, premises, facilities, or oper-
ations, federal law does not preempt SB 1084. Accordingly, we af-
firm.
I.

We begin by summarizing the relevant provisions of the
Poultry Products Inspection Act before examining the origins of
this lawsuit and tracing its procedural history.
A.

Congress enacted the Poultry Products Inspection Act in
1957 to require the Secretary of Agriculture to establish uniform
federal standards for poultry products, 21 U.S.C. §§ 451, 455–57,
and to inspect poultry products to prevent them from being “adul-
terated or misbranded.” Id. § 452. To help the Secretary implement
these uniform standards, the PPIA contains two express preemp-
tion provisions: the Ingredients Provision and the Facilities Provi-
sion. The Ingredients Provision preempts state laws that require
additional or different “ingredient requirements . . . with respect to
articles prepared at any official establishment . . . .” Id. § 467e. The
Facilities Provision preempts state laws with additional or different
requirements “with respect to premises, facilities and operations of
any official establishment . . . .” Id. The language of the PPIA re-
sembles that of a companion statute, the Federal Meat Inspection
Act, which governs meat products much like the PPIA governs
poultry products, see id. § 603(a), and contains near-identical Facili-
ties and Ingredients Provisions. See id. § 678.
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

To be governed by the PPIA, a facility must be an “official
establishment.” Id. § 453(p). Because Upside has received a U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture Grant of Inspection, it is considered an “of-
ficial establishment” and is thus subject to the PPIA. See Upside
Foods, Inc., U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (last visited Jan. 22, 2026)
[https://perma.cc/X4V3-LPF5].
The PPIA defines “poultry” as “any domesticated bird,
whether live or dead,” and defines “poultry product” as “any poul-
try carcass, or part thereof; or any product which is made wholly
or in part from any poultry carcass or part thereof.” Id. §§ 453(e)–
(f). The USDA has repeatedly characterized lab-grown chicken as
“poultry food products” and determined that existing regulatory
requirements apply to lab-grown poultry. See FSIS Responsibilities
in Establishments Producing Cell-Cultured Meat and Poultry Food
Products, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., at 1–2 (June 21, 2023),
[https://perma.cc/7VUP-2KRN]; see also Human Food Made with
Cultured Animal Cells, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. (last visited Oct. 7,
2025), [https://perma.cc/7JVC-27E8].
Finally, the PPIA requires that “[a]ll proceedings for the en-
forcement or to restrain violations of [the PPIA] shall be by and in
the name of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 467c.
B.

We draw the following facts from Upside’s evidentiary sub-
mission in support of its motion for a preliminary injunction. Up-
side produces lab-grown chicken by banking embryonic chicken
cells, placing them in a “cultivator,” supplying them with the same
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 5

nutrients they would receive in an animal’s body, and forming the
resulting product into a shape that looks like conventional meat—
for example, a chicken breast. Upside’s founder and CEO, Uma
Valeti, testified that lab-grown meat can replicate the sensory,
taste, and nutritional profile of conventional meat. According to
Valeti, Upside’s chicken product “looks, cooks, and tastes, like a
conventional boneless, skinless chicken cutlet.” Doc. 11-3 ¶ 24. Val-
eti explained that Upside’s goal is to produce a meat product that
avoids ethical, environmental, and health concerns related to
slaughtered or conventional meat.
Upside has completed a pre-market consultation with the
Food and Drug Administration, and the FDA issued Upside a letter
stating that the FDA had “no questions” as well as a scientific mem-
orandum regarding the safety of Upside’s lab-grown chicken. The
USDA’s Food Safety and Inspection Service has also issued product
labeling approval and a Grant of Inspection to Upside, allowing it
to sell its lab-grown chicken in interstate commerce. Upside under-
goes the same kind of routine federal inspection of its facility as do
producers of conventional meat.
After Upside received these federal approvals, the company
began distributing its product in California and has showcased its
product in at least four other states (including Florida). In Florida,
before SB 1084 went into effect, Upside held a tasting event in Mi-
ami and talked with a Florida chef who was interested in serving
lab-grown chicken. Upside also alleges that it was planning to hold
at least two other tasting events in Miami—one at the Art Basel
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

event in December 2024, and another at the South Beach Wine and
Food Festival in February 2025. Upside wishes to continue devel-
oping business relationships with Florida chefs because Florida
contains the headquarters of the world’s largest full-service restau-
rant company and one of the largest quick service restaurants in
the world, and it is the third-most populous state in the country.
But Upside’s ambitions in Florida are limited to selling and distrib-
uting—not manufacturing. No companies produce lab-grown
meat in Florida, and Upside is not planning to be the first to do so.
Although Upside claims that its product tastes, feels, and has
a nutrition profile like that of conventional meat, Florida policy-
makers who promoted SB 1084 highlighted the experimental na-
ture of the product. They also referenced the threat that lab-grown
meat poses to Florida’s commercial agriculture industry.
Reflecting this concern, Florida policymakers passed SB
1084 to ban the manufacture, sale, holding, or distribution of lab-
grown meat in the state. See Fla. Stat. § 500.452 (1). SB 1084 imposes
criminal and civil penalties on violators. Id. § 500.452(2)–(5). For
example, it is a second-degree misdemeanor “for any person to
manufacture for sale, sell, hold or offer for sale, or distribute culti-
vated meat in this state.” Id. § 500.452. If restaurants violate this
ban, Florida officials can revoke their permits and administratively
fine them up to $5,000 per violation. Id. §§ 500.121(1)(b),
570.971(1)(b).
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 7

C.

Shortly after SB 1084 went into effect, Upside sued Florida’s
Commissioner of Agriculture, State Attorneys for four judicial dis-
tricts in Florida, and the Florida Attorney General, seeking declar-
atory and injunctive relief. Upside’s complaint argued that because
the USDA has approved it to sell lab-grown chicken, Florida could
not ban Upside’s product because such a ban amounted to an addi-
tional or different ingredient or facilities requirement and was thus
expressly preempted under the PPIA. And although not at issue in
this appeal, Upside also brought a dormant Commerce Clause
claim. Upside alleged that SB 1084 had injured the company “in the
form of lost revenue, missed business and promotional opportuni-
ties, reputational damage, and loss of consumer goodwill.” Doc. 1
at 20.
Upside moved for a preliminary injunction. The district
court held a hearing and denied Upside’s motion. The district court
first held that Upside did not have standing to enjoin the Attorney
General or the State Attorneys for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits of
Florida because the Attorney General did not have power to en-
force SB 1084 and Upside’s complaint did not specify any injury
traceable to the State Attorneys for the Sixth and Ninth Circuits.
The district court then held that Upside had standing to enjoin the
remaining defendants—the Commissioner and the State Attorneys
for the Second and Eleventh Circuits—because those defendants
had statutory authority to enforce SB 1084 and Upside alleged that
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

it had talked with chefs or distributed its product in Florida’s Sec-
ond and Eleventh Circuits.
But the district court concluded that the PPIA did not
preempt SB 1084 and denied the preliminary injunction. The dis-
trict court first addressed whether Upside had a cause of action to
enforce the PPIA. The court assumed that there was a cause of ac-
tion to enforce the PPIA under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 but noted that
there was some confusion on this point, as both sides agreed the
PPIA does not create a private cause of action. The court suggested
that Upside file an amended complaint to clarify whether it was
bringing preemption claims in equity. The district court held that
lab-grown chicken qualified as a “poultry product” because Upside
produced its product by growing cells taken from a slaughtered
chicken. The district court then held that the Ingredients Provision
did not preempt SB 1084 because Upside had not identified any fed-
eral requirement mandating that states permit the sale of lab-
grown meat. The district court also held that the Facilities Provi-
sion did not preempt SB 1084 because banning the sale of a product
does not “reach into [Upside]’s facilities to tell them how they
should handle their cultivated chicken cells.” Doc. 40 at 20.
Taking the district court’s advice, Upside filed an amended
complaint to clarify that it was bringing its preemption claims in
equity and under section 1983. The main changes to the amended
complaint were to: omit the Florida Attorney General from the list
of defendants, split each of the two preemption claims (premised
on SB 1084’s Facilities Provision and Ingredients Provision,
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 9

respectively) into a section 1983 claim and an Ex parte Young equi-
table claim, and add allegations related to Upside’s business activi-
ties in other areas of Florida.
Upside filed its notice of appeal four days after it filed the
amended complaint. The Commissioner and State Attorneys
moved to dismiss the amended complaint. Before oral argument
on this appeal, the district court dismissed Upside’s preemption
claims, maintaining only its dormant Commerce Clause claim. The
district court concluded that Upside did not have a cause of action
under section 1983 or in equity to bring its preemption action be-
cause 21 U.S.C. § 467c foreclosed private enforcement of the PPIA.
The district court then concluded that even if there were a cause of
action, neither the Ingredients Provision nor the Facilities Provi-
sion preempted SB 1084.
We ordered additional briefing on the question: “Did
UPSIDE’s appeal of the order denying its request for a preliminary
injunction become moot after the district court entered an order
dismissing all of UPSIDE’s preemption claims?” The parties timely
filed supplemental briefs, with Upside arguing that the appeal was
not moot and with the Commissioner and State Attorneys arguing
that it was.
II.

We review jurisdictional questions de novo, United States v.
Amodeo, 916 F.3d 967, 970 (11th Cir. 2019), and we also review de
novo whether a cause of action exists, Fulton v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of
Comm’rs, 148 F.4th 1224, 1235 (11th Cir. 2025) (first quoting Davis
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 n.18 (1979); then citing Duke Power Co.
v. Carolina Env’t Study Grp., Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 70 (1978)). We review
a denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction for abuse of dis-
cretion, Vital Pharms., Inc. v. Alfieri, 23 F.4th 1282, 1288 (11th Cir.
2022) (citing Jysk Bed’N Linen v. Dutta-Roy, 810 F.3d 767, 773 (11th
Cir. 2015)), but we review de novo the “legal conclusions on which
the denial is based,” Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir.
2011) (citing Am. C.L. Union of Fla., Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd.,
557 F.3d 1177, 1198 (11th Cir. 2009)).
III.

Upside argues that the district court should have granted its
motion for a preliminary injunction. To be entitled to a preliminary
injunction, a plaintiff must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) a substantial threat of irreparable injury;
(3) that the threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the poten-
tial harm to the defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not dis-
serve the public interest.” Keister v. Bell, 879 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Palmer v. Braun, 287 F.3d 1325, 1329 (11th Cir.
2002)). If a plaintiff does not demonstrate a substantial likelihood
of success on the merits, we need not address the remaining pre-
liminary injunction requirements. See Bloedorn, 631 F.3d at 1229.
This appeal turns on three issues: mootness, the existence of
a private cause of action to enjoin the enforcement of a preempted
state law, and the likelihood of success on the merits of Upside’s
preemption claims. As to mootness, we must decide whether this
appeal has been mooted by the filing of an amended complaint or
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 11

the dismissal of Upside’s preemption claims in that amended com-
plaint. As to the cause of action, we must assess whether Upside
may bring a preemption claim as a matter of equity. And as to like-
lihood of success on the merits, we must determine whether Flor-
ida’s law is likely preempted by federal law.
We address each issue in turn. We conclude that this appeal
is not moot. We conclude that Upside has a cause of action to chal-
lenge Florida’s law as preempted. But we conclude that Upside’s
action is unlikely to succeed. For that reason, we affirm the district
court’s denial of the preliminary injunction.
A.

We turn first to mootness. Article III of the Constitution re-
quires that parties in litigation have a “legally cognizable interest in
the outcome” of a dispute throughout the proceeding. Keohane v.
Fla. Dep’t of Corrs. Sec’y, 952 F.3d 1257, 1267 (11th Cir. 2020) (quot-
ing Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969)). So even if a con-
troversy is live in the district court, we cannot rule on an appeal if
an intervening event or change in status eliminates our ability to
give “meaningful relief” to the appellant. Id. (quoting Al Najjar v.
Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir. 2001)). Appeals like this one,
from orders denying or granting preliminary injunctions, often run
into mootness problems. Such an appeal may be mooted if the re-
quested injunction is about an event that happens while the appeal
is pending, see Graham v. Att’y Gen., 110 F.4th 1239, 1244 (11th Cir.
2024), if the district court enters final judgment granting or denying
injunctive relief while the appeal is pending, see Harper ex rel. Harper
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12 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S. 1262, 1262 (2007), or if a key
event cannot be unwound after the fact (for example, an election),
see Ga. Muslim Voter Project v. Kemp, 918 F.3d 1262, 1279 (11th Cir.
2019) (Newsom, J., concurring).
When assessing whether we can grant “meaningful relief,”
we shouldn’t elevate form over substance. We ask whether a judi-
cial decision would have “any practical effect.” Ohio v. U.S. Env’t
Prot. Agency, 969 F.3d 306, 308 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974)); see also ABN Amro Verzekeringen BV
v. Geologistics Ams., Inc., 485 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2007) (considering
whether there is an “issue of practical importance for the court to
adjudicate”). The mootness question is whether a lawsuit would
be “a waste of effort on questions now more pedantic than practi-
cal.” Winzler v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 681 F.3d 1208, 1209
(10th Cir. 2012) (Gorsuch, J.).
The defendants argue that two procedural developments in
the district court make it so that we cannot give Upside “meaning-
ful relief.” First, the defendants say that we cannot reverse the de-
nial of Upside’s motion for a preliminary injunction because Upside
filed an amended complaint before filing its notice of appeal. Sec-
ond, the defendants say that we cannot reverse the denial of Up-
side’s motion for preliminary injunction because the district court
dismissed Upside’s preemption claims after Upside filed its notice
of appeal. We disagree. Neither procedural development in the dis-
trict court prevents us from potentially giving Upside meaningful
relief.
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 13

1.

Let’s start with the amended complaint. The defendants be-
lieve that the filing of Upside’s amended complaint necessarily
eliminates our ability to review the earlier denial of its motion for
a preliminary injunction. The defendants reason that, because a
party can request an injunction based only on the relief that is re-
quested in a complaint, any change to the complaint between the
denial of a preliminary injunction and an appeal moots the appeal.
The defendants’ argument betrays a misunderstanding of in-
terlocutory appellate review and is squarely foreclosed by our prec-
edent. We have—at least twice—resolved appeals from prelimi-
nary injunction rulings even though the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint between the district court’s order and the notice of ap-
peal. See Barber v. Governor of Ala., 73 F.4th 1306, 1316 n.16 (11th
Cir. 2023) (amended complaint filed between denial of preliminary
injunction and appeal); Rosen v. Cascade Int’l, Inc., 21 F.3d 1520, 1524
n.5 (11th Cir. 1994) (amended complaint filed between grant of pre-
liminary injunction and appeal). We simply look to the record at
the time of the district court’s ruling, which is what an appellate
court always does when reviewing an interlocutory order. See id.;
see also League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Johnson, 902 F.3d 572, 578–
79 (6th Cir. 2018) (on interlocutory appeal, an appellate court is
“not called to decide whether” the district court erred “as the case
currently stands” but whether the district court erred “as the case
stood”).
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

The mere fact of an amended complaint doesn’t stop us
from resolving whether the district court’s preliminary injunction
decision was correct. Instead, under our caselaw, so long as the
plaintiff is still seeking relief in the district court on substantively
the same claims that the plaintiff is pursuing in this Court, the filing
of an amended complaint doesn’t moot an interlocutory appeal.
Our decision in Johnson v. 3M Co., 55 F.4th 1304 (11th Cir. 2022), is
instructive. There, we concluded that an amended complaint did
not moot a plaintiff’s interlocutory appeal about a nuisance abate-
ment claim because the plaintiff’s amended complaint did not
meaningfully change the nuisance abatement claim. Id. at 1309.
“The key point,” we said, “is that [the] fourth amended complaint
does not change the nuisance abatement allegations on which” the
appeal was based. Id.
Applying Johnson’s reasoning here, nothing about Upside’s
amended complaint—which dropped some defendants and reor-
ganized its claims—changes the fundamental nature of its case
against the remaining defendants. Upside’s amended complaint did
not moot its appeal.
2.

Moving to the defendants’ second mootness argument, they
say that the district court’s separate interlocutory order dismissing
Upside’s preemption claims prevents us from granting meaningful
relief. They say that, because the district court has rejected the
claims that Upside seeks to vindicate on appeal, we cannot review
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 15

the district court’s earlier denial of Upside’s motion for a prelimi-
nary injunction on those claims. Again, we disagree.
It is axiomatic that a district court cannot defeat our appel-
late jurisdiction by entering additional orders. After a party files an
interlocutory appeal, the district court has the authority to move
forward only with aspects of the case that are not on appeal. Green
Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1309
(11th Cir. 2003) (quoting May v. Sheahan, 226 F.3d 876, 880 n.2 (7th
Cir. 2000)). A district court lacks the jurisdiction to take any action
that would “alter the status of the case on interlocutory appeal.”
Johnson, 55 F.4th at 1309 (citation modified) (quoting Green Leaf
Nursery, 341 F.3d at 1309). A district court cannot take such action
because a notice of appeal shifts jurisdiction over the appealed as-
pects of the case from the district court to the appellate court.
Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).
For similar reasons, we believe the district court’s partial dis-
missal order can’t defeat our ability to grant the relief that Upside
seeks. Despite the district court’s order, Upside is still pressing its
preemption claims. And if we were to order the district court to
enter a preliminary injunction on those claims, it would have to
“enter an order in strict compliance with the mandate,” notwith-
standing its partial dismissal order. Piambino v. Bailey, 757 F.2d 1112,
1119 (11th Cir. 1985) (citing In re Sanford Fork & Tool Co., 160 U.S.
247, 255 (1895)). It may be true that, if we were to order the district
court to grant the preliminary injunction, the district court would
also want to (or, perhaps, need to) revise its dismissal order. But
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16 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

that doesn’t matter. A district court can revise an interlocutory or-
der like the partial dismissal order at any time before a final judg-
ment. See Hornady v. Outokumpu Stainless USA, LLC, 118 F.4th 1367,
1380 (11th Cir. 2024); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). And although there are
several narrow exceptions to the mandate rule, see Piambino, 757
F.2d at 1120, there isn’t one that would allow a district court to
ignore our mandate just because following it would require the
court to revise a related ruling too.
There is one, final mootness issue: the defendants say that
the district court’s partial dismissal order moots this appeal just like
the entry of final judgment moots an appeal from a preliminary in-
junction. But the defendants are wrong yet again. It is true that the
entry of a final judgment moots an interlocutory appeal about a
preliminary injunction. See Harper ex rel. Harper, 549 U.S. at 1262.
But the reason a final judgment moots such an appeal is that a pre-
liminary injunction lasts only until final judgment. After a final judg-
ment is issued, any dispute related to a preliminary injunction is no
longer live because the time period for a preliminary injunction has
run. By contrast, the district court’s partial dismissal order isn’t fi-
nal, and the time period for a preliminary injunction has not ex-
pired.
B.

Because this appeal is not moot, we now turn to whether
Upside can bring this action at all. Upside is asking the federal
courts to enjoin the defendants from prosecuting it under a Florida
law because, Upside says, the law facially and as applied to it is
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 17

preempted by the PPIA. The defendants argue that Upside has no
cause of action under the PPIA, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or as a mat-
ter of equity. Because Upside’s “likelihood of success turns on
whether it can raise a PPIA preemption claim in the first place,” the
defendants argue that we must “resolve that procedural question
first.” State Att’ys Br. at 32 n.17. We agree that we should address
whether Upside has a cause of action. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,
425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976) (resolving “the existence of a private cause
of action” before examining its substantive elements). We con-
clude that it does.
It is well established that a regulated entity like Upside has a
cause of action in equity 1 to restrain the enforcement of a
preempted state law if that entity could raise such a preemption
defense to an enforcement action. See Armstrong v. Exceptional Child
Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 326–27 (2015). That is, if a regulated entity
would have a federal defense to a state prosecution, then the regu-
lated entity can seek declaratory and equitable relief in federal
court without waiting for the state prosecution. This equitable
remedy “reflects a long history of judicial review of illegal execu-
tive action, tracing back to England.” Id. at 327 (citing Jaffe & Hen-
derson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins, 72 L.Q.
Rev. 345 (1956)). And the availability of pre-enforcement

1 We believe that Upside’s original complaint, which requested declaratory,

injunctive, and other equitable relief, was sufficient to put the defendants on
notice that it was raising a claim in equity. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). We take
no position on whether section 1983 also provides a cause of action.
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

declaratory relief has been codified in the Declaratory Judgment
Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02.
The logic of this cause of action stems from the idea that, if
a state enforces a law against a private entity, that entity can invoke
the defense that federal law preempts the state law being enforced.
See Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts. v. Governor of Ga., 691 F.3d 1250,
1261 n.7 (11th Cir. 2012) (quoting Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S.
Cal., Inc., 565 U.S. 606, 620 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (in turn
citing Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 262 (2011)
(Kennedy, J., concurring))). As the Supreme Court explained in Ex
parte Young, requiring a private party to “suffer imprisonment and
pay fines” before “obtaining a judicial decision” would “close up all
approaches to the courts.” 209 U.S. 123, 148 (1908). For this reason,
federal courts have the power to recognize “the pre-emptive asser-
tion in equity of a defense that would otherwise have been availa-
ble in the State’s enforcement proceedings at law.” Va. Off. for Prot.
& Advocacy, 563 U.S. at 262; see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463
U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983).
A regulated entity’s ability to sue to enjoin a state law as
preempted is so ingrained in our jurisprudence that it “has gone
largely unquestioned.” Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts., 691 F.3d at
1261. The Supreme Court has regularly entertained such equitable
preemption claims by private parties. 2 We regularly entertain

2 See, e.g., Shaw, 463 U.S. at 92, 96 n.14 (arguing that ERISA preempted state

laws); Nat’l Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 459 (2012) (challenging California
slaughterhouse law as preempted by the FMIA); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 19

equitable preemption claims by private parties. 3 And other circuits
do as well. 4

U.S. 519, 523–24 (1977) (challenging California food labeling statute as
preempted by FMIA and other federal laws); Whiting, 563 U.S. at 594 (chal-
lenging state alien employment law as preempted by federal immigration
law); Hines, 312 U.S. at 74 (challenging state alien registration act they were
enforcing was preempted by federal Alien Registration Act); Verizon Md., Inc.
v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642 (2002) (challenging a state entity’s
order as preempted by federal law).
3 See, e.g., Ga. Latino All. for Hum. Rts., 691 F.3d at 1260–62 (challenging Georgia

immigration law as preempted by the Immigration and Nationality Act); Sims
v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1454–55 (11th
Cir. 1989) (en banc) (challenging Florida motor vehicle safety standards as
preempted by the Clean Air Act and the Safety Act); Scurlock v. City of Lynn
Haven, 858 F.2d 1521, 1524–25 (11th Cir. 1988) (challenging municipal ordi-
nance as preempted by federal and state law); Fla. State Conf. of N.A.A.C.P. v.
Browning, 522 F.3d 1153, 1155 (11th Cir. 2008) (challenging Florida voter reg-
istration statute as preempted by federal law); America’s Health Ins. Plans v.
Hudgens, 742 F.3d 1319, 1326 (11th Cir. 2014) (challenging state insurance law
was preempted by ERISA); Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Mia. Beach, 341 F.3d
1249, 1250 (11th Cir. 2003) (challenging local ordinance regulating towing on
the grounds that it was preempted by the Interstate Commerce Commission
Termination Act).
4 See, e.g., Local Union No. 12004, United Steelworkers of Am. v. Massachusetts, 377

F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2004) (explaining that Supreme Court precedent makes
clear that a private plaintiff may challenge state action as preempted by federal
law); Nw. Selecta, Inc. v. Ramón González-Beiró, 145 F.4th 9, 13–15 (1st Cir. 2025)
(entertaining PPIA preemption suit by private plaintiff); Loyal Tire & Auto Ctr.,
Inc. v. Town of Woodbury, 445 F.3d 136, 149 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a private
plaintiff had an “undisputed” right to challenge a municipal regulation as
preempted by federal law); Lozano v. City of Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297, 301 (3d Cir.
2013); Planned Parenthood of Hou. & Se. Tex. v. Sanchez, 403 F.3d 324, 334 (5th
Cir. 2005); Cavel Int’l, Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2007); Bio Gen LLC
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20 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

Notwithstanding this well-established caselaw, the defend-
ants say that Upside lacks a cause of action to bring preemption
claims in equity for two reasons. We reject both arguments.
First, the defendants say that all this precedent has been
overruled, sub silentio, by Armstrong. They are wrong. In Armstrong,
medical providers sued state officials, claiming that they were be-
ing reimbursed at rates lower than what Section 30(A) of the Med-
icaid Act required. 575 U.S. at 323–24. They wanted the federal
courts to order state officials to reimburse them at higher rates.
The Supreme Court rejected that kind of lawsuit. It held that the
Supremacy Clause did not confer a private right of action to en-
force all federal law and that the Medicaid Act itself did not con-
template lawsuits to compel higher payments. Id. at 324–25.
Armstrong has no bearing on this case, except to emphasize
that Upside can, in fact, bring its preemption claims. No one in Arm-
strong was attempting to prevent the enforcement of a state law.
Rather, Armstrong was about whether a medical provider could
compel a state official to follow the medical provider’s view of fed-
eral law in the way the officer administered a joint state-federal pro-
gram. See id. at 323–24. For good measure, the Court expressly dis-
tinguished its well-established preemption jurisprudence from

v. Sanders, 142 F.4th 591, 599–600 (8th Cir. 2025); Bud Antle, Inc. v. Barbosa, 45
F.3d 1261, 1269 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14) (holding that
a private plaintiff may seek declaratory and injunctive relief against a state law
on the ground that federal law preempts it); Ass’n des Éleveurs de Canards et
d’Oies du Québec v. Bonta, 33 F.4th 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2022); Chamber of Com.
of United States v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 755 (10th Cir. 2010).
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 21

what the plaintiffs were asking for in that case. The Court recog-
nized the longstanding rule that “if an individual claims federal law
immunizes him from state regulation, the court may issue an in-
junction upon finding the state regulatory actions preempted.” Id.
at 326 (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155–56). But the Court said
that what the medical providers wanted in Armstrong was different
in kind. Here, Upside is asking for the standard, well-established
remedy of an injunction against a preempted state law, not the “fol-
low-federal-law-and-pay-me-more-money” injunction the medical
providers wanted in Armstrong.
Second, the defendants point to language in section 467c of
the PPIA that reserves the exclusive right to enforce the PPIA’s pro-
visions to the United States. The statute says that “[a]ll proceedings
for the enforcement or to restrain violations of this chapter shall be
by and in the name of the United States.” 21 U.S.C. § 467c. Broadly
construing this language, the defendants say that this reservation
of rights to the United States precludes Upside’s lawsuit. But we
cannot construe section 467c “in a vacuum”; instead, we must read
it in “context and with a view to [its] place in the overall statutory
scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012)
(quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989)).
And, in context, nothing about section 467c precludes a plaintiff in
equity from seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a preempted state
law.
Section 467c says that only the United States may enforce or
restrain violations of the PPIA. The PPIA regulates poultry
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22 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

processors, not state actors. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 456 (authorizing
regulations of premises, facilities, and equipment); 457 (outlining
labeling and container standards); 458 (outlining prohibited acts in
poultry processing, transport, and sale). The ordinary meanings of
the terms “enforce” (“to put in force”), “restrain” (to “prevent from
doing something”), and “violation” (“an infringement or transgres-
sion”) are not broad enough to cover a lawsuit like this one that
seeks to stop state officers, not from breaking the PPIA, but from
enforcing a state law. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary
751, 1936, 2554 (1961). Moreover, the language in section 467c is
common, and courts routinely allow private plaintiffs to bring eq-
uitable preemption actions in relation to federal statutes that con-
tain similar language. See Council for Responsible Nutrition v. James,
159 F.4th 155, 170 (2d Cir. 2025) (entertaining a preemption chal-
lenge under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, despite exclusive
enforcement provision in 21 U.S.C. § 337 (a)); United Egg Producers
v. Dep’t of Agric. of P.R., 77 F.3d 567, 569 (1st Cir. 1996) (entertaining
a dormant Commerce Clause challenge related to the Egg Prod-
ucts Inspection Act, despite exclusive enforcement provision in 21
U.S.C. § 1050).
Although the defendants insist that Upside’s lawsuit is about
“enforcing” the PPIA’s express preemption provision, this is a mis-
understanding of the nature of preemption. Upside is advancing a
constitutional defense to a putative prosecution under Florida law.
“Preemption is the power of federal law to displace state law sub-
stantively” and provides “a substantive defense to a state law action
on the basis of federal law.” Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 23

1349, 1352 (11th Cir. 2003). Although an express preemption pro-
vision like the PPIA’s may define the scope of a preemption defense
in any given case, the force of preemption is constitutional in na-
ture. See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 736 (2009) (holding that
a state law contrary to federal law “violates the Supremacy
Clause”); Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 281 (2003) (describing a
state law that “violates the Supremacy Clause” as “a legal nullity”);
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (“It is basic to this
constitutional command that all conflicting state provisions be
without effect.”). That is, under the Supremacy Clause, preemp-
tion “is compelled whether Congress’ command is explicitly stated
in the statute’s language or implicitly contained in its structure and
purpose.” Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977). Be-
cause Upside could raise a preemption defense to the enforcement
of Florida’s statute in a state proceeding, it can bring this claim for
declaratory and injunctive relief.
C.

Finally, we arrive at the merits of Upside’s claim. Because
we have decided that Upside has a cause of action to restrain the
enforcement of state laws that are contrary to the PPIA, we must
decide whether its action is likely to succeed on the facts of this
case. Two main parts of the statute are implicated by Upside’s
claim. First, there is the Facilities Provision, which preempts state
laws that impose different or additional requirements “with respect
to premises, facilities and operations of any official establishment.”
21 U.S.C. § 467e. Second, there is the Ingredients Provision, which
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24 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

preempts state laws that impose different or additional “ingredient
requirements . . . with respect to articles prepared at any official es-
tablishment.” Id. Upside argues that Florida’s law is preempted by
both provisions. The defendants argue that Florida’s ban on lab-
grown chicken doesn’t regulate Upside’s facilities or the ingredi-
ents in Upside’s products. 5 On this issue, we agree with the defend-
ants. We will address the Facilities Provision and Ingredients Pro-
vision in turn.
1.

The PPIA’s Facilities Provision does not preempt SB 1084
because a pure product ban like this one does not regulate the
premises, facilities, or operations of any official establishment. The
Facilities Provision prohibits additional or different requirements
“with respect to premises, facilities and operations of any official
establishment.” 21 U.S.C. § 467e. Florida’s SB 1084 provides that

5 The defendants also argue that lab-grown meat isn’t covered by the PPIA at

all because it was not part of a living chicken. The PPIA covers “poultry prod-
ucts”—which it defines as “any poultry carcass, or part thereof; or any product
which is made wholly or in part from any poultry carcass or part thereof.” 21
U.S.C. § 453 (f). Upside says that, at some point in its process, it uses chicken
cells to create its chicken breasts. And the USDA has characterized lab-grown
chicken products as “poultry food products” and regulates them as such. See
FSIS Responsibilities in Establishments Producing Cell-Cultured Meat and
Poultry Food Products, U.S. Dep’t of Agric., at 1 (June 21, 2023),
[https://perma.cc/7VUP-2KRN]. We are unconvinced that the preliminary
injunction record in this case is sufficiently developed for us to opine on this
question. So, we will assume without deciding that lab-grown chicken is a
“poultry product” regulated by the PPIA.
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 25

“[i]t is unlawful for any person to manufacture for sale, sell, hold
or offer for sale, or distribute cultivated meat in this state.” Fla. Stat.
§ 500.452 (1). Upside asserts that this ban on lab-grown meat is es-
sentially a ban on “the use of a specific production method” and
could affect Upside’s facilities by causing them to close. Blue Br. at
35. The defendants respond that nothing in SB 1084 tells Upside
how to operate its manufacturing facilities.
We agree with the defendants. We conclude that the PPIA
preempts state laws with a direct relationship to the onsite opera-
tions of a poultry processor. And the product ban in SB 1084 does
not regulate Upside’s (or any other) out-of-state operations facili-
ties. We think this is the best reading of the PPIA for four reasons.
First, the PPIA’s preemptive scope is limited to premises, fa-
cilities, and operations. The PPIA does not define “premises, facili-
ties, and operations,” so we give these terms their “ordinary, con-
temporary, common meaning.” Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37,
42 (1979). Both “premises” and “facilities” refer to the site of poul-
try slaughtering or processing. When the PPIA was enacted in
1957, a contemporaneous dictionary defined “premises” as “a spec-
ified piece or tract of land with the structures on it” or “the place
of business of an enterprise or institution.” Webster’s Third New In-
ternational Dictionary 1789 (1961). The same dictionary defined “fa-
cilities” as “something (as a hospital, machinery, plumbing) that is
built, constructed, installed, or established to perform some partic-
ular function or to serve or facilitate some particular end.” Id. at
812–13. These definitions all refer to a physical site. The PPIA lends
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26 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

further context by limiting preemption to “premises, facilities and
operations of any official establishment,” confirming that “premises”
and “facilities” refer to the land and structures of an establishment
that slaughters poultry or processes poultry products.
Although “operations” has a broader definition, in the con-
text of the PPIA we believe it also refers to onsite operations. A
contemporaneous dictionary defines “operations” as “the whole
process of planning for and operating a business or other organized
unit.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1581 (1961). Con-
sidered alone, this definition could encompass offsite as well as on-
site operations and thus presents some ambiguity. But under the
contextual canon noscitur a sociis, when several nouns are associ-
ated in a way suggesting they have something in common, we
should assign them a permissible meaning that makes them similar.
Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
of Legal Texts 195 (2012). The series qualifier “of any official estab-
lishment,” reinforces this conclusion, as the PPIA defines an “offi-
cial establishment” as an establishment “at which inspection of the
slaughter of poultry, or the processing of poultry products” occurs.
21 U.S.C. § 453 (p).
Second, the phrase “with respect to” narrows the application
of the Facilities Provision to only those state laws with a direct ef-
fect on premises, facilities, or operations. We have recognized that
one meaning of the phrase “with respect to” is a “direct relation to,
or impact on.” In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 958 (11th Cir. 2017) (quot-
ing Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 506 (1992))), aff’d,
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 27

Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LP v. Appling, 584 U.S. 709, 719 (2018)).
Phrases like this can “ha[ve] different relevant meanings in different
contexts,” Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S.
1, 7 (2011), so we must examine the ordinary meaning of this
phrase in the context of the Facilities Provision.
Here, the phrase requires a direct relationship to the prem-
ises, facilities, and onsite operations of a poultry processor. The
phrase “with respect to” has an operative effect only if it requires a
direct connection between state law and premises, facilities, and
operations. The Facilities Provision preempts state laws that regu-
late premises, facilities, or operations. If we read “with respect to”
expansively, to cover regulations with even incidental downstream
effects on premises, facilities, or operations, then the list items
would become largely redundant. Most regulations with an inci-
dental effect on premises (such as a regulation that reduces product
sales) would also have incidental effects on facilities and operations.
Reading “with respect to” expansively would thus violate the sur-
plusage canon, which counsels that we should attempt to give ef-
fect to every word in a statute. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 174 (2012). Thus, the
phrase “with respect to” narrows the application of the Facilities
Provision to only those state laws with a direct effect on premises,
facilities, or operations.
Third, this reading also preserves the operation of the sav-
ings clause that follows the PPIA’s preemption provisions. That
clause provides that “[t]his chapter shall not preclude any
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28 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

State . . . from making requirement or taking other action, con-
sistent with this chapter, with respect to any other matters regu-
lated under this chapter.” 21 U.S.C. § 467e. Any state law respect-
ing other matters that the PPIA regulates could have an incidental
or indirect effect on premises, facilities, or operations. Interpreting
the facilities preemption provision broadly would leave nothing for
the savings clause to do.
Applying this understanding of the PPIA to SB 1084, we con-
clude that the Facilities Provision does not preempt Florida’s lab-
grown meat ban. SB 1084 makes it “unlawful for any person to
manufacture for sale, sell, hold or offer for sale, or distribute culti-
vated meat in this state.” Fla. Stat. § 500.452 (1). This ban covers lab-
grown chicken, not how lab-grown chicken is created or processed.
Even though the ban could have a plausible downstream effect on
Upside’s premises, facilities, or onsite operations, the PPIA’s clause
“with respect to” limits the clause to the preemption of laws with
a direct relationship to a poultry processing premises, facilities, or
operations. Because SB 1084 lacks such a direct relationship, it is
not preempted by the PPIA’s Facilities Provision.
Fourth, our sister circuits have read comparable language
similarly. The Fifth Circuit and Seventh Circuit have both held that
an analogous Facilities Provision in the FMIA did not preempt state
bans on processing or selling horsemeat for human consumption
because the bans didn’t regulate onsite slaughterhouse operations.
See Empacadora de Carnes de Fresnillo, S.A. de C.V. v. Curry, 476 F.3d
326, 333 (5th Cir. 2007); Cavel Int’l Inc. v. Madigan, 500 F.3d 551,
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 29

553–54 (7th Cir. 2007). Both circuits explained that the Facilities
Provision did not require a state to permit the sale of certain meat
just because the federal government regulated the production of
that meat. See Empacadora, 476 F.3d at 333; Cavel, 500 F.3d at 553–
54. In the same way, we believe the PPIA’s regulation of lab-grown
chicken does not obligate states to permit the manufacture or sale
of lab-grown chicken—it obligates states not to impose additional
or different regulations on such manufacture or sale if it is permit-
ted.
Upside relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in National
Meat Association v. Harris, 565 U.S. 452, 464 (2012), which held that
the FMIA’s Facilities Provision preempted a California law about
swine processing. But the California law in that case was meaning-
fully different than the Florida law in this one. California’s law pro-
hibited slaughterhouses from buying or selling nonambulatory an-
imals, from processing or selling their products for human con-
sumption, and from holding nonambulatory animals without im-
mediately euthanizing them. Id. at 458–59 (quoting Cal. Penal
Code Ann. § 599f). The Supreme Court held that the FMIA
preempted California’s law because: (1) it required slaughterhouses
to handle nonambulatory pigs onsite in a different way than the
USDA did, id. at 460, (2) the state purchase ban regulated onsite
operations because that is where purchases happened, id. at 462–
63, and (3) although the sales ban could operate offsite (after oper-
ations had ended), its combination with the onsite regulations
made it “a command to slaughterhouses to structure their opera-
tions in the exact way the remainder of § 599f mandates.” Id. at 464.
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30 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

Unlike California’s swine processing law, SB 1084 does not
instruct Upside how to make its product. It bans its manufacture or
sale. Fla. Stat. § 500.452 (1). The key difference here is that the Cal-
ifornia swine-processing law permitted an end product—pork—
but told facilities how to handle or process that product if the pigs
were nonambulatory. By contrast, SB 1084 bans an end product—
lab-grown chicken—and doesn’t tell facilities how to handle or pro-
cess that product. SB 1084 might look more like the California
swine processing law if it told Upside what cell harvesting methods
to use, what material the “cultivator” should be made of, or how
to dispose of waste products from the manufacturing process. But
SB 1084 does none of those things. It just bans the end product by
prohibiting the manufacture or sale of that end product.
In short, SB 1084 does not tell Upside how to make its lab-
grown chicken. Although it bans a category of meat, SB 1084 does
not reach into Upside’s premises, facilities, or onsite operations.
Therefore, the Facilities Provision does not preempt SB 1084.
2.

Upside is also unlikely to succeed on its claim that the PPIA’s
Ingredients Provision preempts SB 1084. The Ingredients Provision
preempts state laws that require additional or different “ingredient
requirements . . . with respect to articles prepared at any official es-
tablishment.” 21 U.S.C. § 467e. Upside asserts that SB 1084 is an
ingredient requirement because it bans all poultry products that
contain the ingredient of lab-grown cells. The defendants respond
that a ban on lab-grown chicken bans a product, not its ingredients,
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 31

and that a state is free to ban meat products even if the federal gov-
ernment regulates them.
We reject Upside’s reading of the Ingredients Provision for
the same reason we reject its reading of the Facilities Provision: SB
1084 is not an ingredient requirement because it bans the poultry
product of “cultivated meat.” Fla. Stat. § 500.452 (1). The PPIA does
not define “ingredient requirement,” so we give this term its “ordi-
nary, contemporary, common meaning.” Perrin, 444 U.S. at 42.
When the PPIA was enacted in 1957, a contemporaneous diction-
ary defined “ingredient” as “something that enters into a com-
pound or is a component part of any combination or mixture.”
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1162 (1961). The same
dictionary defined “requirement” as “a requisite or essential condi-
tion.” Id. at 1929. Together, an “ingredient requirement” means a
rule establishing an essential component of a mixture or combina-
tion. SB 1084 does not establish an essential component of a mix-
ture; it bans an end product (lab-grown meat).
Upside’s argument that SB 1084 bans the “ingredient” of lab-
grown chicken cells ignores the ordinary meaning of “ingredient”
in a food production context. A recipe book, for example, would
never list “chicken cells” as an ingredient for fried chicken. Rather,
it would list items like chicken, milk, flour, seasoning, and oil. The
PPIA also describes ingredients at a non-cellular level, prohibiting
foreign poultry product imports if the products contain certain
“dye[s], chemical[s], preservative[s], or ingredient[s]” that would
make them harmful to humans, 21 U.S.C. § 466 (a), and stating that
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32 Opinion of the Court 24-13640

a product would be misbranded if its label does not state the “com-
mon names of optional ingredients (other than spices, flavoring,
and coloring).” 21 U.S.C. § 453 (h)(7). Regulations implementing
the PPIA use the term “ingredient” similarly, approving poultry
product ingredients such as citric acid, gelatin, or coloring agents,
and never once referring to components on a cellular level. C.F.R.
§ 424.21(c); see also Armour & Co. v. Ball, 468 F.2d 76, 81–82 (6th Cir.
1972) (holding that the FMIA’s analogous Ingredients Provision
preempted a state sausage regulation because it regulated ingredi-
ents like cereal, soya binders, milk, and fatty tissue).
Our reasoning is consistent with that of our sister circuits
that have concluded that product bans are not preempted by the
Ingredients Provision. The Ninth Circuit upheld as non-preempted
a state ban on foie gras produced by force-feeding birds. Ass’n des
Éleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Québec v. Becerra, 870 F.3d 1140 (9th
Cir. 2017). It interpreted the PPIA’s Ingredients Provision to “ad-
dress the physical components of poultry products, not the way the
animals are raised.” Id. at 1147. Likewise, the Fifth Circuit upheld
as non-preempted a state ban on horsemeat. Empacadora, 476 F.3d
at 333. It reasoned that, that notwithstanding the FMIA’s analogous
Ingredients Provision, states may “regulate what types of meat
may be sold for human consumption in the first place.” Id. Just like
state bans on foie gras and horsemeat, Florida’s categorical ban on
lab-grown chicken is not an ingredient regulation that is preempted
by the PPIA.
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24-13640 Opinion of the Court 33

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s order denying
the motion for a preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED.