United States v. Tomas Alksnys, Eleventh Circuit opinion

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April 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Tomas Alksnys

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-14077
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

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• Similar Cases (61K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-14077 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 04/03/2026 Page: 1 of 21

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 24-14077
Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

TOMAS ALKSNYS,
a.k.a. John Himmer,
Defendant-Appellant.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:24-cr-20173-JB-1

---

Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Tomas Alksnys pleaded guilty to one count of
bank fraud and one count of money laundering. For these crimes,
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2 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

he received a 36-month sentence. On appeal, Alksnys challenges his
sentence. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
This case arises from a fraudulent scheme involving the sale
of vehicles on the internet. As part of the fraud, vehicles were ad-
vertised for sale on websites by Auto Haus, a Florida limited liabil-
ity company. When a purchaser agreed to buy a vehicle, he was
directed to wire money to Auto Haus’s Bank of America account
to complete the transaction.
Alksnys opened the Auto Haus bank account. He presented
the bank with fraudulent documents that identified him as John
Himmer. And Auto Haus’s corporate documents identified John
Himmer as one of its managers or members. Based on the infor-
mation Alksnys provided, Bank of America opened an account for
Auto Haus with Himmer as the sole authorized signatory for the
account.
A few months later, three victims wired money to Auto
Haus’s Bank of America account. The first victim used the internet
to arrange to purchase a classic car, a 1969 Chevrolet Camaro, and
wired $24,000 to the Auto Haus bank account. The day after the
wire was received, Alksnys went to two different Bank of America
branches. At each branch, Alksnys identified himself as Himmer,
provided fraudulent identification documents, and withdrew
money. At one branch, he withdrew $10,000, and at the other he
withdrew $14,000.
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24-14077 Opinion of the Court 3

The second and third victims also arranged over the internet
to purchase vehicles. A few days after the first victim wired money,
the second victim agreed to purchase a luxury vehicle, a used Mer-
cedez Benz G-class vehicle, and wired $63,729 to the Auto Haus
bank account. On the same day, the third victim agreed to purchase
a used recreational vehicle and wired $84,500 to the Auto Haus ac-
count. Two business days after the money was wired, Alksnys
went to a Bank of America branch, identified himself as Himmer,
presented fraudulent identification documents, and withdrew
$38,000 from the Auto Haus account. None of the three victims
ever received a vehicle.
About a year after the victims wired money to the Auto
Haus account and Alksnys withdrew the money, a grand jury in
the Southern District of Florida returned an indictment charging
Alksnys with two counts of bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1344 (Counts One and Two) and two counts of money launder-
ing in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (Counts Three and Four). Alk-
snys, a Lithuanian citizen, initially entered a plea of not guilty.
When he appeared in court, he relied on the assistance of a Lithu-
anian interpreter.
Before trial, Alksnys signed a written plea agreement in
which he agreed to plead guilty to one count of bank fraud and one
count of money laundering in exchange for the government drop-
ping the remaining charges. As part of the plea, he admitted that
each victim attempted to purchase a vehicle over the internet,
wired money to the Auto Haus bank account, and never received
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

a vehicle. He also agreed that he used the alias John Himmer to
open the Bank of America account and provided the bank with fake
identification documents. And he admitted returning to Bank of
America branches, identifying himself as Himmer, presenting false
identification documents, and withdrawing at least $62,000 from
the Auto Haus account. In the plea agreement, Alksnys agreed to
“waive[]” his right to appeal his sentence “unless the sentence ex-
ceeds the maximum permitted by statute or is the result of an up-
ward departure and/or an upward variance from the advisory
guideline range that the Court establishes at sentencing.” Doc. 38
at 7. 1
After Alksnys signed the plea agreement, the court held a
change-of-plea hearing. At the hearing, a Lithuanian interpreter
was present and translated for Alksnys.
At the start of the hearing, Alksnys’s attorney told the court
that he had not used an interpreter when meeting with Alksnys be-
cause it was “very difficult” to find a Lithuanian interpreter.
Doc. 66 at 3. The attorney explained that Alksnys understood Eng-
lish “well,” even though his spoken English was a “little bit
choppy.” Id. at 2. According to the attorney, when discussing the
plea agreement, Alksnys at times needed him to “clarify” technical
terms. Id. Although it had been a “long process” that required the
attorney to “explain a lot,” he believed that Alksnys had “a good
understanding” of the plea. Id.

1 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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24-14077 Opinion of the Court 5

The court was concerned that Alksnys did not have an inter-
preter when reviewing the written plea agreement. The court
stopped the hearing so that Alksnys could meet with his attorney
and an interpreter to review the plea agreement and factual proffer.
After a 30-minute break, the court resumed the hearing. It
noted that during the recess the interpreter fully translated the plea
agreement and factual proffer for Alksnys. During the plea collo-
quy, the court reviewed the rights that Alksnys was waiving by
pleading guilty, including his right to appeal. It explained that Alk-
snys was waiving his right to appeal his sentence unless the court
sentenced him “above the advisory guideline range.” Id. at 30. It
continued that Alksnys could appeal if the court imposed an “up-
ward adjustment or an upward variance.” Id. The court repeated,
“[s]o again, if I sentence you with an upward adjustment, yes, you
can appeal.” Id. After making these statements, the court asked Alk-
snys whether he understood the appeal waiver. He stated that he
did. The court then asked Alksnys’s attorney and the government
if there were any issues with the description of the appeal waiver.
They answered that there were no issues. The court found that
Alksnys’s waiver of his appellate rights was knowing and volun-
tary. The court accepted the guilty plea.
Before the sentencing hearing, a probation officer prepared
a presentence investigation report (“PSR”). The PSR stated that the
offense conduct involved opening the Auto Haus bank account and
withdrawing money from the account. It also included as offense
conduct the actions of other unindicted co-conspirators who listed
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

the vehicles for sale on the internet and communicated with the
victims.2
The PSR then addressed the Sentencing Guidelines. It used
the base offense level for a money laundering offense where the
underlying offense was bank fraud. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines
§ 2S1.1(a)(1). It applied several adjustments to the offense level, in-
cluding one for committing the offense through mass marketing.
After applying the adjustments, it calculated Alksnys’s total offense
level as 18.
The PSR also set forth Alksnys’s criminal history. It reported
that in November 2023, which was after Alksnys committed the
instant offenses but before he was charged with them, he gave a
law enforcement officer in Florida a fake Lithuanian identification
card for John Himmer and a fake Lithuanian passport for Jerric
Ulfred. Alksnys was placed under arrest. In a search after arrest, of-
ficers found that he was carrying three fraudulent debit cards. He
admitted that he had purchased the fraudulent passport, identifica-
tion, and debit cards. In the Florida state criminal case that fol-
lowed, Alksnys was adjudicated guilty of a single charge—theft of
a credit card—and received a sentence of 74 days with credit for

2 The PSR, as initially prepared by the probation office, stated that Alksnys and

his accomplices advertised the vehicles for sale on the internet and communi-
cated with victims. Alksnys objected to this portion of the PSR because he had
not participated in the advertising of the vehicles or communicating with vic-
tims. At the sentencing hearing, the court resolved the factual objection by
modifying the PSR to state that Alksnys’s co-conspirators (not Alksnys) adver-
tised the vehicles and communicated with the victims.
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24-14077 Opinion of the Court 7

time served. Because Alksnys was incarcerated for at least 60 days,
the PSR assigned this sentence two criminal history points. Id.
§ 4A1.1(b). With two criminal history points, Alksnys was in crim-
inal history category II.
Based on the total offense level and criminal history cate-
gory, the PSR reported Alksnys’s guidelines range as 30 to
37 months’ imprisonment. And it stated that the applicable statu-
tory maximum penalties were 30 years for the bank fraud offense
and 10 years for the money laundering offense. It also noted that
Alksnys was subject to a final order of removal.
Alksnys raised several objections to the PSR. First, he ob-
jected to the application of a two-level increase for mass marketing.
He pointed out that he did not “post advertisements for the sale of
vehicles on any website” or “negotiate the sale of any vehicle with
any potential buyer.” Doc. 49 at 3. He did not dispute that co-con-
spirators had engaged in such acts and thus used mass marketing.
He nevertheless argued that he should not be held responsible for
their actions because the actions were not within the scope of the
jointly undertaken criminal activity and were not reasonably fore-
seeable to him.
He also objected because the PSR failed to apply a minor-
role reduction. He argued that he played only a minor role in the
scheme when he opened the Auto Haus bank account and later
withdrew money from it. He pointed out that he kept only $17,000
of the proceeds for himself, which was 10% of the total amount
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

victims wired to the Auto Haus account, stating that others in-
volved in the scheme had kept the rest of the proceeds.
Alksnys also challenged the PSR’s determination that his
Florida sentence scored two criminal history points. He argued that
it should score no points because the sentence was for conduct that
was “part of the instant offense.” Id. at 4. He maintained that he
possessed the fraudulent documents at issue in the Florida case
solely for the purposes of “withdraw[ing] ill-gotten gains of the car
sale scheme.” Id. Alksnys further argued that if he scored zero crim-
inal history points, the court should apply a two-level reduction in
his offense level under § 4C1.1 because he was a zero-point of-
fender.
The court overruled Alksnys’s objections. As to the mass-
marketing enhancement, it acknowledged that it was co-conspira-
tors, not Alksnys, who used mass marketing to advertise vehicles
on the internet. The court nevertheless concluded that the actions
of the co-conspirators qualified as relevant conduct for which Alk-
snys could be held responsible at sentencing. Based on the unob-
jected-to facts in the PSR and the factual proffer in the plea agree-
ment, the court explained that the fraudulent scheme included
multiple transactions involving high-end vehicles and large
amounts of money being wired to the Auto Haus bank account
that Alksnys had used fraudulent documents to open. Given these
facts, the court concluded that it was reasonably foreseeable to Alk-
snys that the fraudulent scheme involved mass marketing, as op-
posed to a fraud performed in some other way. Although the court
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24-14077 Opinion of the Court 9

applied the mass-marketing enhancement, it acknowledged that
the issue was “very close.” Id. at 27.
The court also concluded that Alksnys was not entitled to a
minor-role reduction. It stated that this issue was not “even close.”
Id. at 20. It found that Alksnys played an important role in the fraud
because he presented fraudulent documents to the bank to open
the Auto Haus account and found that his role was more than a
“money mule” or “cash checker.” Id. at 21.
The court further determined that Alksnys’s sentence for the
Florida conviction scored two criminal history points. It concluded
that the sentence scored criminal history points because the con-
duct underlying the Florida conviction was insufficiently similar to
Alksnys’s conduct in this case. Because the court concluded that
Alksnys had two criminal history points, he did not qualify for a
reduction to his offense level as a zero-point offender.
After resolving the objections, the court adopted the PSR’s
guidelines calculations. Alksnys’s attorney then requested a down-
ward variance. He urged the court to consider the nature and cir-
cumstances of the offenses, which did not involve violence. The
attorney described Alksnys as a “straw man” who served as a
“pawn” for others and asserted that he received only a “minimal
amount” of compensation for participating in the scheme. Id. at 28.
The attorney also asked the court to consider Alksnys’s personal
history and circumstances, including that he had come from Lith-
uania to the United States to play rugby but his career did not pan
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

out. The attorney also stated that Alksnys’s conduct was exemplary
while he was detained.
The government opposed Alksnys’s request for a variance
and requested a sentence of 30 months, which was at the bottom
of the applicable guidelines range. Although the offense was not
violent, the government argued that the conduct was serious be-
cause the fraud had “essentially extracted life savings from at least
three individuals.” Id. at 30.
Alksnys addressed the court. He apologized for his conduct,
took full responsibility for his actions, and promised that he would
no longer participate in criminal activity.
The court imposed a 36-month sentence. It discussed Alk-
snys’s conduct in the offense as well as his history and characteris-
tics. It stated that Alksnys entered the United States on a visa
waiver and “within months” was participating in a fraudulent
scheme. Id. at 34. It determined that his participation was not “just
a one-off event” because on multiple occasions he went to Bank of
America branches and used fake identification. Id. at 35. The court
also emphasized that Alksnys played an important role in the fraud-
ulent scheme: he was trusted enough by the others to be the sole
signatory on the Auto Haus bank account, which received more
than $170,000 from the victims. Although Alksnys kept only
$17,000 for his role in the scheme, the court observed that he was
able to earn this money in a relatively short period of time, approx-
imately 60 days. It ultimately concluded that Alksnys’s conduct in
the offense suggested “a level of sophistication that really belies the
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24-14077 Opinion of the Court 11

defense’s argument that he is a nice kid from Lithuania who is a
rugby player who got hurt and, oh my God, these things happen.”
Id. at 35.
This is Alksnys’s appeal.
II.
Several standards of review govern this appeal. We review
de novo the district court’s interpretation of the guidelines and its
application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Moran,
778 F.3d 942, 959 (11th Cir. 2015). But we review for clear error a
district court’s factual findings under the guidelines. Id. We review
a district court’s denial of a role adjustment for clear error. United
States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d 1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016). “Clear
error review is deferential, and we will not disturb a district court’s
findings unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that
a mistake has been committed.” Id. (citation modified). A district
court’s “choice between two permissible views of the evidence as
to the defendant’s role in the offense will rarely constitute clear er-
ror so long as the basis of the trial court’s decision is supported by
the record and the court did not involve a misapplication of a rule
of law.” Id. (citation modified).
We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence un-
der a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States,
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
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III.
Alksnys challenges his sentence on appeal. 3 He says that the
district court erred in its application of aspects of the Sentencing
Guidelines. He also argues that his sentence is substantively unrea-
sonable. We begin with his challenges to the district court’s appli-
cation of the guidelines and then consider the substantive reasona-
bleness of the sentence.
A.
As to the Sentencing Guidelines, Alksnys argues that the dis-
trict court erred at sentencing when it (1) applied a two-level mass-
marketing enhancement, (2) denied his request for a two-level mi-
nor role reduction, and (3) concluded that his Florida sentence aris-
ing out of his conviction for theft of a credit card scored two crim-
inal history points. We have carefully reviewed each issue, and we
see no error.
1.
We begin with Alksnys’s challenge to the mass marketing
enhancement. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant re-
ceives a two-level increase to his offense level if the “offense . . .
was committed through mass-marketing.” U.S.S.G.

3 The government moved to dismiss this appeal as barred by the appeal waiver

in the plea agreement. Alksnys opposed the motion to dismiss, arguing that he
had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. We previously
carried the government’s motion with the case. Because we conclude that
none of Alksnys’s arguments on appeal have merit, we deny the government’s
motion to dismiss as moot.
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§ 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii). No one disputes that the conduct of Alksnys’s
unindicted co-conspirators, which involved advertising vehicles for
sale through the internet, involved mass marketing.
The question here is whether the district court erred in hold-
ing Alksnys responsible for the conduct of his co-conspirators. We
have previously explained that when deciding whether an offense
was committed through mass marketing, a court may consider “all
relevant conduct under § 1B1.3.” Moran, 778 F.3d at 975. Under
§ 1B1.3, a defendant, of course, may be held accountable for acts
that he “committed.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A). In addition, “in the
case of jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan,
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in
concert with others, whether or not charged as a conspiracy),” he
may be held accountable for the acts of others that were (1) “within
the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity,” (2) “in fur-
therance of that criminal activity,” and (3) “reasonably foreseeable
in connection with that criminal activity.” Id. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B).
Before a district court may hold a defendant liable for the
conduct of others, it must “make individualized findings concern-
ing the scope of criminal activity undertaken by a particular defend-
ant.” United States v. Barry, 163 F.4th 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 2026) (ci-
tation modified). A court must make these findings “because the
scope of the defendant’s jointly undertaken activity is not neces-
sarily the same as the scope of the entire conspiracy.” Id. But even
when a district court fails to make the required individualized find-
ings, we may affirm a sentence when “the record supports the
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14 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

court’s determination with respect to the offense conduct, includ-
ing the imputation of others’ unlawful acts to the defendant.” Id.
(citation modified).
Here, the district court applied the mass marketing enhance-
ment based on the conduct of Alksnys’s co-conspirators. Yet the
court failed to make findings about the scope of Alksnys’s jointly
undertaken criminal activity. We nevertheless affirm because the
record supports the district court’s decision to impute the co-con-
spirators’ unlawful activities using mass marketing to advertise the
vehicles to Alksnys.
The record in this case shows that the criminal activity Alk-
snys agreed to undertake jointly included fraudulently selling auto-
mobiles. He argues that there was no direct evidence that he was
aware that his co-conspirators were defrauding victims by falsely
promising to sell them vehicles and then stealing their money. So,
he never agreed to jointly undertake these activities. But the record
contains circumstantial evidence supporting an inference that Alk-
snys knew that his co-conspirators were engaged in the fraudulent
sale of vehicles and agreed to undertake it together. Importantly,
he was the one who opened a bank account for Auto Haus using
fraudulent identification documents for John Himmer. This evi-
dence supports an inference that he was aware that the company,
which he knew from its name was engaged in business related to
automobiles, was engaged in fraud. He also was aware that, over a
period of approximately one week, Auto Haus’s bank account re-
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24-14077 Opinion of the Court 15

ceived three separate wire transfers from three different individu-
als, each wire in an amount roughly equal to the price of a vehicle.
And when the wires reached the Auto Haus account, Alksnys
quickly withdrew large amounts of cash from the account. Taken
together, this evidence supports an inference that he knew that his
co-conspirators were engaged in fraudulent sales of vehicles and
agreed to jointly engage in this criminal activity. This evidence also
supports an inference that it was reasonably foreseeable that the
fraudulent automobile sales would involve the use of the internet
and mass marketing.
On appeal, Alksnys also argues that the evidence in the rec-
ord was inadequate to support the mass-marketing enhancement.
He says that because he objected, the government was required to
introduce evidence to establish that the enhancement applied, and
it failed to do so. It is true that when “the government seeks to ap-
ply an enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines over a de-
fendant’s factual objection, it has the burden of introducing suffi-
cient and reliable evidence to prove the necessary facts by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d
1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). But the government
may satisfy its burden using facts the defendant admitted in the fac-
tual proffer of the plea agreement, as well as unobjected-to factual
assertions in the PSR. See United States v. Thomas, 32 F.4th 1073,
1077 (11th Cir. 2022); United States v. Baldwin, 774 F.3d 711, 734–35
(11th Cir. 2014). Here, the factual proffer in Alksnys’s plea agree-
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16 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

ment and the unobjected-to facts in the PSR supported the en-
hancement. We thus cannot say that the district court erred in ap-
plying the mass-marketing enhancement.
2.
Next, we consider whether the district court erred in deny-
ing Alksnys’s request for a minor-role reduction. The Sentencing
Guidelines provide that a defendant is entitled to a two-level de-
crease in his offense level if he was a “minor participant” in the
criminal activity. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A “minor participant” is
someone “who is less culpable than most other participants in the
criminal activity, but whose role could not be described as mini-
mal.” Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.5. The decision whether to apply a minor-
role adjustment is “based on the totality of the circumstances and
involves a determination that is heavily dependent upon the facts
of the particular case.” Id. § 3B1.2 cmt. n.3(C). 4
We have instructed district courts that when deciding
whether to apply a minor-role adjustment, to consider “first, the
defendant’s role in the relevant conduct for which [he] has been
held accountable at sentencing, and, second, [his] role as compared

4 We acknowledge that a court is required to defer to the Sentencing Commis-

sion’s commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines only when the relevant
guideline is ambiguous. See United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269, 1275–78
(11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Neither party here contests the application of the
commentary to § 3B1.2 or argues that it is inconsistent with the guideline’s
text. Instead, on appeal, both parties cite and rely upon it. And so we consider
it as well. See United States v. Jews, 74 F.4th 1325, 1327 n.2, 1329 n.5 (11th Cir.
2023) (considering guidelines commentary in a similar situation).
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24-14077 Opinion of the Court 17

to that of other participants in [the] relevant conduct.” United
States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 940 (11th Cir. 1999).
“These principles advance both the directives of the Guidelines and
our case precedent by recognizing the fact-intensive nature of this
inquiry and by maximizing the discretion of the trial court in deter-
mining the defendant’s role in the offense.” Id. at 934.
Here, Alksnys argues that the district court erred in denying
his request for a minor-role reduction because a review of the “to-
tality of the circumstances” shows that “his role was limited.” Ap-
pellant’s Br. 23. The district court accepted that Alksnys did not ad-
vertise the vehicles on the internet or communicate with the vic-
tims. Still, for all three vehicles, he played a critical role in the fraud-
ulent scheme. He went in person to the Bank of America branch
and presented fraudulent documents so that the bank would open
the Auto Haus account. Then, after the victims wired money to
the account, he returned to bank branches multiple times. Each
time, he presented fraudulent identification documents and with-
drew large amounts of money. On this record, we are not left with
a definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a
mistake in denying the minor-role reduction. See Cruickshank,
837 F.3d at 1192.
3.
We now consider whether the district court erred when it
assigned Alksnys two criminal history points for his Florida convic-
tion. In arriving at a defendant’s criminal history, a court adds two
criminal history points “for each prior sentence of imprisonment of
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18 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

at least sixty days” but not exceeding one year and one month.
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b). Under the guidelines, a “prior sentence” refers
to any sentence “previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt,
whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct
not part of the instant offense.” Id. § 4A1.2(a)(1). Commentary to
the Sentencing Guidelines explains that conduct is part of the in-
stant offense if it is “relevant conduct to the instant offense under
the provisions of § 1B1.3.” Id. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1. 5
We conclude that the district court did not err in assigning
Alksnys’s Florida sentence two criminal history points. He argues
that the sentence should score no points because the conduct un-
derlying his Florida conviction included providing law enforce-
ment with the same fraudulent Himmer identification that he used
when committing the offenses in this case. But the conduct giving
rise to the Florida conviction occurred months after he completed
the offenses in this case. With this gap in time, we are not per-
suaded that the Florida conviction was for conduct relevant to the
offenses in this case.
Relatedly, Alksnys argues that the district court erred in
denying his request for a two-level reduction under § 4C1.1. Under
this provision, a defendant who “did not receive any criminal his-
tory points” and meets certain other criteria is eligible to receive a
two-level reduction to his offense level. Id. § 4C1.1(a). Because the

5 Neither party challenges the application of the commentary to § 4A1.2 or

argues that it is inconsistent with the guideline’s text. Instead, on appeal, both
cite and rely upon it. We likewise consider it. See Jews, 74 F.4th at 1329 n.5.
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24-14077 Opinion of the Court 19

district court properly concluded that Alksnys had two criminal his-
tory points, it did not err by denying him a two-level reduction to
his offense level under § 4C1.1.
B.
Lastly, we consider Alksnys’s challenge to the substantive
reasonableness of his sentence. When reviewing the substantive
reasonableness of a sentence, we consider the totality of the cir-
cumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We will vacate a sentence only if
we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that the district
court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the
§ 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range
of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.” United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (citation
modified). Importantly, “the weight given to any specific § 3553(a)
factor is committed to the sound discretion of the district court.”
United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1309 (11th Cir. 2016). The
party challenging the sentence bears the burden of showing that it
is substantively unreasonable. United States v. Boone, 97 F.4th 1331,
1338–39 (11th Cir. 2024).
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
Alksnys’s request for a downward variance and instead imposed a
36-month sentence. At sentencing, the court considered the rele-
vant § 3553(a) factors, including the nature and circumstances of
the offense. Although there is no presumption of reasonableness,
the sentence was well below the statutory maximum and within
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20 Opinion of the Court 24-14077

the applicable guidelines range, which further supports a conclu-
sion that the sentence was reasonable. See United States v. Woodson,
30 F.4th 1295, 1308 (11th Cir. 2022) (“We ordinarily expect that a
sentence falling within the guideline range will be reasonable, and
a sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty in-
dicates reasonableness.” (citation modified)).
Alksnys argues that the district court should have given
greater weight to a different § 3553(a) factor—his personal his-
tory—that he says supported a shorter sentence. Even if the evi-
dence of his personal circumstances supported a shorter sentence,
it was up to the district court to decide how much weight to give
each factor. See Croteau, 819 F.3d at 1310.
Alksnys also asserts that the district court should have im-
posed a shorter sentence to account for the fact that his co-con-
spirators had not been indicted and thus received no criminal sen-
tence. But the relevant § 3553(a) factor directs a court to consider
“the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among de-
fendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(6) (emphasis added). So, the fact that
Alksnys’s co-conspirators, who have not been found guilty of any
crime, have received no sentences does not create an unwarranted
disparity under § 3553(a)(6). After considering the record, we con-
clude that district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in
imposing a 36-month sentence in this case.
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IV.
For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We DENY as moot the government’s motion to dismiss the
appeal. We also DENY as moot Alksnys’s motion to expedite the
appeal.
AFFIRMED.