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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Andrew Golobic

Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-3661
• Panel: Jeffrey S. Sutton, Joan Louise Larsen

• Judges: Jeffrey S. Sutton; Joan L. Larsen; Stephanie Dawkins Davis

• Opinion

• Authorities (30)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (5.5K)

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Combined Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 26a0084p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

┐
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
│
Plaintiff-Appellee, │

   Nos. 25-3173/3661

│
v. │
│
ANDREW GOLOBIC, │
Defendant-Appellant. │
┘

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati.
No. 1:22-cr-00107-1—Michael R. Barrett, District Judge.

Decided and Filed: March 19, 2026

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; LARSEN and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

---

COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Stephanie F. Kessler, KESSLER DEFENSE LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.
Kevin Koller, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellee.

---

OPINION

---

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Andrew Golobic worked as an agent for Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. One of his responsibilities was to monitor illegal immigrants and, if need
be, to recommend detention or deportation. He used that authority, regrettably, to coerce
immigrants to have sex with him. Golobic impeded investigations into his behavior by
exchanging lenient supervision measures for other supervisees’ silence and by destroying
evidence. A jury found him guilty of a wide range of federal crimes. The district court
sentenced him to 144 months. We affirm.
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 2

I.

In 2015, Golobic began working in the Alternatives-to-Detention program within
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. The program monitors illegal immigrants who
otherwise face detention as they await immigration proceedings. Golobic’s position gave him
discretion over how strictly he monitored participants in the program. He could allow a
participant to check in with the agency via phone or require her to wear an ankle monitor; he
could allow a participant to move out of Ohio or require her to stay in the State. The program
required participants to turn over their passports, which Golobic could give back to them as he
wished. If participants violated program conditions, Golobic could recommend detention or
deportation.

Golobic engaged in sexual conduct with at least six women he supervised, all in violation
of agency policy prohibiting such behavior. In May 2020, one woman reported her sexual
history with Golobic to the agency and requested a new supervisor. Federal officials interviewed
Golobic. He acknowledged the relationship and his violation of agency policy.

Officials obtained a warrant to search Golobic’s phone. It revealed pictures of Golobic in
“various states of undress” with various program participants. R.97 at 113. Forensic
investigations revealed that Golobic had recently deleted pictures, contacts of women, and a
messaging app.

Before long, Golobic’s other efforts to hide his behavior came to light. A program
participant, Evelin, knew a woman monitored by Golobic who traveled to other States and did
not have to wear a GPS monitor. The woman posted pictures with Golobic on social media,
which Evelin reported to a contractor for the agency, complaining about disparate treatment.
The contractor in turn told Golobic. Fearing exposure, Golobic instructed his colleague to
remove Evelin’s GPS monitor, hoping she would not tell his supervisors about his actions.

Officials reached out to women identified on Golobic’s phone who participated in the
program. One woman, Betty, accused Golobic of sexual assault. She testified that Golobic
pressured her into dating him. He would appear uninvited at her home, her office, and her
sister’s home and insist on seeing her. When Betty ultimately agreed to go out to dinner with
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 3

him, he picked her up at home, drove her to his apartment, and had sex with her against her will.
He continued to do the same several times over the course of that year.

A jury found Golobic guilty of violating Betty’s constitutional rights under color of law,
18 U.S.C. § 242, obstructing a sex-trafficking investigation, id. § 1591(d), tampering with
witnesses, id. § 1512(b)(3), and destroying or concealing records, id. § 1519. The court
sentenced him to 144 months.

II.

Golobic challenges his convictions on two grounds: (1) that the district court abused its
discretion by excusing an ill juror during deliberations, and (2) that the court committed plain
error by allowing multiplicitous counts to go to the jury.

Excusing a juror. Golobic argues that the district court lacked good cause to excuse one
of the twelve jurors when he became sick during deliberations. The decision receives abuse-of-
discretion review. United States v. De Oleo, 697 F.3d 338, 342 (6th Cir. 2012).

A district court may “permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict . . . if the court finds
good cause to excuse a juror.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 23(b)(3). Good cause “encompass[es] a variety
of temporary problems that may arise during jury deliberations, confronting the trial judge with
the need to exercise sound discretion . . . at a particularly sensitive stage of the trial.” United
States v. Ramos, 861 F.2d 461, 466 (6th Cir. 1988) (quotation omitted). One example is a juror’s
illness. United States v. Dunnican, 961 F.3d 859, 879 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v. Casey,
2000 WL 1721055, at *5 (6th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); United States v. Simpson, 1999
WL 777348, at *3 (6th Cir. 1999).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in excusing the juror. The juror became
sick and went to the Emergency Room. He received abnormal test results that required further
investigation. The juror, who was a doctor, told the court that additional tests could take some
time and that he likely would be admitted to the hospital. He was indeed admitted to the
hospital. Before the juror became sick, the jury had already deliberated for nearly five days and
a further delay until the juror received a concrete diagnosis would have burdened the remaining
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 4

jurors with uncertain benefit. The court made a reasonable assessment of the situation and did
not exceed its discretion.

Golobic claims that several out-of-circuit cases support a contrary conclusion. Besides
coming from other circuits, the cases do not contradict this conclusion even on their own terms.
In United States v. Spence, the district court excused a juror even though “everything [it]
knew . . . indicated that the juror would be able to return in the morning.” 163 F.3d 1280, 1283
(11th Cir. 1998). Not so here. The juror’s abnormal lab results and the need for additional tests
pointed toward an extended stay. In United States v. Patterson, the district court “made no
attempt to learn the precise circumstances or likely duration of the twelfth juror’s absence.”
26 F.3d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Not so here. The district court requested updates about the
juror’s health while he was at the hospital and excused him only after learning of the need for
further testing. That leaves United States v. Araujo, which involved a juror excused based solely
on car trouble, 62 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 1995), a far cry from a serious illness. No error
occurred.

Multiplicity. Golobic claims that Count 2 (obstructing a sex-trafficking investigation)
was multiplicitous with Count 5 (witness tampering) and Count 6 (destruction of records in a
federal investigation). Golobic did not raise this argument below, requiring us to review it for
plain error. United States v. Branham, 97 F.3d 835, 841 (6th Cir. 1996).

A multiplicitous indictment raises double jeopardy concerns because it “charge[s] a
single offense in more than one count.” United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 844 (6th Cir.
2008). But those concerns disappear if the indictment charges distinct crimes, even if they arise
from the same action or actions. A “single act may be an offense against two statutes,” so long
as “each statute requires proof of an additional [element] which the other does not.” Gavieres v.
United States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911); see Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304
(1932). No double jeopardy violation arises “merely because the same evidence is used to
establish more than one statutory violation if discrete elements must be proved in order to make
out a violation of each statute.” United States v. DeCarlo, 434 F.3d 447, 455–56 (6th Cir. 2006).
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 5

No plain error occurred. In the first place, Golobic has not identified any precedents that
support his claim that the three counts, or some combination of them, are multiplicitous of the
others. That by itself dooms his claim. United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir.
2015). In the second place, each count required proof of facts that the other did not. Count 2
required proof that Golobic interfered with the enforcement of 18 U.S.C. § 1591, an anti-sex
trafficking law, between the date of his interview on June 24, 2020, through July 27, 2022, when
he uttered several false and misleading statements to an agency worker. 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (d).
By contrast, Count 5, the witness-tampering charge, required proof that Golobic used misleading
conduct to lower Evelin’s reporting status on February 5, 2020, which is more than four months
before the conduct alleged in Count 2. Each charge also required evidence of a distinct element
that the other did not. Count 2 did not require the government to show that Golobic intended to
prevent the delivery of information to a law enforcement officer. See id. And Count 5 did not
require the government to show that Golobic specifically interfered with a sex-trafficking
investigation. See id. § 1512(b)(3).

Count 6 also required distinct proof—that Golobic destroyed a record in an investigation
on June 24, 2020. See id. § 1519. It did not require the destroyed record to relate to a sex-
trafficking investigation, as Count 2 did. And Count 2 did not require evidence that Golobic’s
obstruction consisted of altering, destroying, or concealing records, as Count 6 did.

Golobic claims that United States v. Ehle is to the contrary. 640 F.3d 689 (6th Cir. 2011).
Not so. It held that dual convictions for possessing and receiving child pornography plainly
violated double jeopardy because the Supreme Court had held that dual convictions for
possessing and receiving firearms violated double jeopardy. Id. at 699 (citing Ball v. United
States, 470 U.S. 856, 864–65 (1985)). But that shows only that plain error can be met in the
abstract. It does not show by itself, and Golobic has not otherwise shown, that we or the
Supreme Court have found multiplicity in any analogous case here. No plain error occurred.

III.

Golobic claims that, at sentencing, the district court erred by (1) applying an
enhancement for obstructing investigations, (2) applying an enhancement for kidnapping,
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 6

(3) double counting his behavior, (4) relying on sentencing guidelines that ignore statutory
maximums, and (5) requiring Golobic to register as a sex offender.

Obstruction of justice enhancement. The district court applied this two-level
enhancement based on Golobic’s efforts to silence Evelin after she reported one of his
relationships, all of which occurred before the formal start of the federal investigation. He
claims that he could not obstruct an investigation that had not yet started. Because he did not
raise this argument below, we review for plain error. United States v. Koeberlein, 161 F.3d 946,
949 (6th Cir. 1998). This standard requires him to show (1) an error (2) that was plain and
(3) that affected his substantial rights. Id.

Golobic never engages with this standard. He never addresses, most conspicuously,
whether it would have made any difference in his sentence. See United States v. Page, 232 F.3d
536, 545 (6th Cir. 2000). That is highly doubtful given that the Presentence Investigation Report
said the enhancement would also apply for Count 6, which covered conduct after his
investigation had begun. Golobic thus fails to make the necessary showing that the district
court’s application of the enhancement affected his substantial rights.

Golobic also fails to show that the district court erred. In his opening brief, he makes a 6-
sentence argument that the enhancement shouldn’t apply because the obstructive conduct
occurred before the commencement of a formal investigation. His reply brief never engages
with, or for that matter even attempts to rebut, the government’s argument that a 2006
amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines overruled the Sixth Circuit precedent on which he
relies.

Our circuit, it is true, previously limited the obstruction of justice enhancement to
conduct taken after a formal investigation had commenced. See United States v. Baggett, 342
F.3d 536, 541 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Boyd, 312 F.3d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 2002). Before
2006, the guidelines required a defendant to have impeded justice “during the course of the
investigation.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (2005). In 2006, however, the Sentencing Commission
amended the enhancement to require only that a defendant impede justice “with respect to the
investigation.” Id. § 3C1.1 (2006). In the application note to the amendment, the Commission
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 7

stated that the enhancement may cover conduct occurring “prior to the start of the investigation
of the instant offense.” Id. § 3C1.1 cmt. n.1.

Since 2006, we have recognized that the amendment allows the enhancement to apply to
pre-investigation conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Vysniauskas, 593 F. App’x 518, 532 (6th
Cir. 2015); United States v. Fisher, 824 F. App’x 347, 358 (6th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Elliott, 521 F. App’x 513, 518 (6th Cir. 2013). The language of the amendment says as much.
Conduct may obstruct justice “with respect to” an investigation before a formal investigation
begins. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.

There are no contrary holdings in our circuit. Since 2006, it is true, a few cases have
continued to apply the pre-2006 language. But they all concerned pre-2006 conduct. See United
States v. Bazazpour, 690 F.3d 796, 806 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v. Walker, 399 F. App’x
75, 86 (6th Cir. 2010). And a few other cases, it is also true, invoke our pre-2006 case law. But
they all involve defendants who, for reasons of their own, did not raise any argument about the
2006 amendment. See e.g., United States v. Wallace, 600 F. App’x 322, 329 n.3 (6th Cir. 2015);
United States v. Rudra, No. 25-3040, 2026 WL 75323, at *5 (6th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026).

Other circuits have followed the same path. The Fifth and Eighth Circuits both limited
the enhancement before 2006 but have expanded the enhancement to pre-investigation conduct
since. United States v. Diaz, 90 F.4th 335, 345 (5th Cir. 2024); United States v. Montanari, 863
F.3d 775, 781 (8th Cir. 2017).

Golobic offers no explanation, or any argument, why his conduct did not obstruct justice
“with respect to” this investigation. The record supports the district court’s conclusion that he
did. Golobic’s decision to lessen Evelin’s supervision was intended to thwart the eventual
investigation into his unlawful actions. He admitted as much at trial, acknowledging that he did
so because he feared she would report him. All in all, Golobic has not only failed to show a
violation of his substantial rights, he also has failed to show any error.

Abduction enhancement. Golobic claims that the district court impermissibly sentenced
him based on acquitted conduct by adding a four-level enhancement for abduction. See U.S.S.G.
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 8

§ 2A3.1(b)(5). We review the district court’s findings of fact for clear error and its legal
conclusions afresh. United States v. Bailey, 973 F.3d 548, 571 (6th Cir. 2020).

In applying the abduction enhancement, the district court relied on evidence that Golobic
took Betty to his house to have dinner and forced her to have sex with him against her will.
Golobic challenges the enhancement on the ground that the jury acquitted him of kidnapping
Betty through the interrogatories on the verdict form. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(c) (effective
November 1, 2024, “relevant conduct” under the Sentencing Guidelines “does not include
conduct for which the defendant was criminally charged and acquitted in federal court”).

But the jury did not acquit Golobic of abduction. An acquittal is “any ruling that the
prosecution’s proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense.” Evans v.
Michigan, 568 U.S. 313, 318 (2013). The jury did not have an opportunity to acquit Golobic of
abduction or for that matter kidnapping because the government did not charge Golobic with
abduction or kidnapping. The jury verdict form, we appreciate, included several interrogatories,
one of which asked the jurors whether Golobic’s “[deprivation of rights] offense include[d]
kidnapping,” giving “yes” or “no” as options. R.74 at 5. The court instructed the jury to answer
the questions only if they found Golobic guilty of depriving Betty of rights under color of law,
R.74 at 5, and to respond “no” unless they came to a unanimous agreement of “yes,” R.135 at 26.
The jury responded “no” to the kidnapping interrogatory. R.74 at 5. But this does not amount to
an acquittal, because the response to the interrogatory could merely reflect that a single juror
disagreed that kidnapping occurred. The jury did not unanimously find, as it must for an
acquittal, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(a), that the government could not prove a charged offense and
thus did not make a decision about criminal liability for kidnapping. See Evans, 568 U.S. at 318.

The enhancement, moreover, did not affect Golobic’s sentence anyway. Even without
the four-level enhancement, his total offense level would have been 42 and his advisory
guidelines range still would have been 360 months to life. All of this was well above the district
court’s ultimate sentence of 144 months, a downward variance that the judge explained would
take into account Golobic’s policy arguments about kidnapping and abduction.
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 9

Last of all, the jury instructions asked whether Golobic “kidnapped” Betty, which is
distinct from the “abduction” required by the sentencing enhancement. Kidnapping, as defined
by the jury instructions, required “seiz[ing], confin[ing], ke[eping], or detain[ing Betty] without
her consent for the purpose of sexual gratification.” R.75 at 28. The abduction sentencing
enhancement asks only whether Betty “was forced to accompany [Golobic] to a different
location.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(a). No error occurred.

Impermissible double counting. Golobic claims that the court applied three
enhancements for the same behavior. We review such claims with fresh eyes. United States v.
Clark, 11 F.4th 491, 494 (6th Cir. 2021).

“Double counting occurs when precisely the same aspect of the defendant’s conduct
factors into his sentence in two separate ways.” United States v. Battaglia, 624 F.3d 348, 351
(6th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). The sentencing guidelines permit more than one
enhancement for the same crime in view of the different circumstances that often undergird
crimes. In United States v. Volkman, as an example, we permitted an enhancement for the use of
special skills (because the defendant was a doctor) and an enhancement for vulnerable victims
(because the victim was a drug-addicted patient) for the same crime. 797 F.3d 377, 399 (6th Cir.
2015). We held that the enhancements turned on different aspects of the crime—the nature of
the defendant and the nature of the victim—and thus did not impermissibly double count. Id.

The district court did not impermissibly double count when it applied several
enhancements with respect to Golobic’s conviction of depriving Betty of her constitutional
rights. The underlying charge for calculating Golobic’s guideline range was “Criminal Sexual
Abuse.” R.96 ¶ 50. The district court added several enhancements based on the scope and
nature of the crime: (1) an enhancement for committing a crime under color of law because
Golobic worked for the immigration agency at the time of the offense, U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(b)(1);
R.96 ¶ 53; (2) an enhancement because Betty “was in the custody, care, or supervisory control”
of Golobic, U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(3); accord R.96 ¶ 51; and (3) an enhancement because Betty
was a vulnerable and previously exploited victim who feared deportation, U.S.S.G.
§ 3A1.1(b)(1); R.96 ¶ 54.
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 10

The enhancements each target distinct aspects of Golobic’s actions and do not cross the
line into forbidden double counting. The first one punishes his abuse of federal authority. The
second one punishes his exploitation of his professional control over Betty. And the third one
punishes his manipulation of Betty’s vulnerable circumstances to his advantage.

Golobic’s federal authority, it is true, gave rise to his supervisory role, and his
supervisory role arose in this instance due to Betty’s illegal status. Even so, the enhancements
still punish distinct wrongs: his abuse of his governmental authority, the vulnerability of the
victim, and the nature of the relationship between the defendant and the victim and its potential
for coercion and abuse. See United States v. McCoy, 480 F. App’x 366, 373 (6th Cir. 2012). No
impermissible double counting occurred.

Statutory maximums. Golobic claims that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its
power by drafting guidelines that allowed Golobic’s conviction for Count 4 (depriving Betty of
her constitutional rights under color of law) with a statutory maximum of 12 months to lead to a
guidelines range that extended to a life sentence. He did not raise this argument below, and as a
result he must meet the imposing strictures of plain-error review. United States v. Barnes, 822
F.3d 914, 924 (6th Cir. 2016).

Golobic is wrong. His guidelines range for Count 4 was limited to twelve months under
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(b) and Application Note 3 and thus did not exceed the statutory penalties
under 18 U.S.C. § 242. In addition, it bears noting that Count 4 did not drive his guidelines
range by itself. It resulted from the grouping of several counts together. He never accounts for
this reality and thus never rebuts this salient point. In reality, his sentence fell at or below each
count’s applicable statutory maximum. Compare R.136 at 79 (stating statutory maximums: 300
months for Count 2, 12 months for Count 4, 240 months for Count 5, and 240 months for Count
6), with R.136 at 75 (assigning sentence: 144 months for Count 2, 12 months for Count 4, 144
months for Count 5, 144 months for Count 6). No error, much less a plain error, occurred.

Sex-offender status. Golobic claims the district court should not have required him to
register as a sex offender wherever he lives, works, or goes to school. 34 U.S.C. § 20913 (a).
A “sex offender” includes those convicted of “a Federal offense . . . under [18 U.S.C. §] 1591.”
Nos. 25-3173/3661 United States v. Golobic Page 11

Id. § 20911(1), (5)(A)(iii). The jury convicted Golobic of obstructing a sex-trafficking
investigation under 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (d).

Golobic has no answer to the unmistakable direction of the statute. He gestures at the
idea that he should not have to register as a sex offender because the relevant convictions consist
of obstruction rather than a sexual act or sexual contact. But he offers no textual explanation, or
for that matter caselaw, why the statute does not mean what it says.

We affirm.