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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Griffin

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 925
• Docket Number: 114895

• Judges: E.T. Gallagher

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (3.8K)

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Syllabus

R.C. 2923.02; R.C. 2903.02; attempted felony murder; void conviction. Attempted felony murder is not a cognizable crime in Ohio, and appellant's conviction must be vacated.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Griffin, 2026-Ohio-925.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 114895
v. :

TYRON GRIFFIN, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: VACATED AND REMANDED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 19, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-24-693342-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Eric Collins and Andrew Boyko, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Flowers & Grube and Louis E. Grube, for appellant.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

Appellant Tyron Griffin (“Griffin”) appeals his bindover to the general

division of the common pleas court and his sentence for convictions of attempted

murder and failure to comply. He raises two assignments of error:
1. The juvenile court erred by finding probable cause for the mandatory
bindover offense of felony murder predicated on felonious assault.

1. The trial court committed plain error by imposing a mixed sentence of prison and community control.

After a thorough review of the applicable law and facts, we find that

Griffin pled guilty to attempted felony murder, which is not a cognizable offense in

Ohio. Consequently, we vacate Griffin’s convictions and remand to the trial court

for further proceedings.

I. Procedural History

Griffin was charged in a juvenile complaint with the following

delinquent acts that would be felonies if committed by an adult: murder, an

unclassified felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B); aggravated vehicular homicide,

a felony of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.06(A)(2)(a); two counts of

felonious assault, felonies of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1)

and (A)(2); three counts of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police

officer, two of which were felonies of the third degree and one of which was a fourth-

degree felony, all in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B); vehicular assault, a felony of the

fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.08(A)(2)(b); receiving stolen property, a

felony of the fourth degree, in violation of R.C. 2913.51(A); and improperly handling

firearms in a motor vehicle, a felony of the fourth degree, in violation of

R.C. 2923.16(B). The charges also had accompanying firearm and forfeiture

specifications.
A bindover hearing was held where the State presented two witnesses

and various exhibits. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court stated that

probable cause existed to support all of the charges. The court found that it was

required to transfer the case to the general division under R.C. 2152.10, because (1)

Griffin was over 16 years of age at the time of the offenses, (2) murder is a “category

one offense” under R.C. 2152.12(A)(1)(a), and (3) there was probable cause to believe

that Griffin had committed the acts charged, including murder.

Griffin was subsequently indicted on the same ten charges that had

been set forth in the juvenile complaint. Following the exchange of discovery, the

parties entered into a plea agreement where Griffin would plead to an amended

charge of attempted murder, along with firearm and forfeiture specifications, and

one count of failure to comply. They further agreed to a sentencing range of 9 to 14

years in prison with no judicial or early release.

Griffin pled guilty to the offered charges, and the trial court sentenced

him to a ten-year prison term on the attempted-murder charge with an additional

year for the firearm specification. It further imposed a three-year term of

incarceration for the failure-to-comply charge. The sentences were to run

consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 14 years to an indefinite sentence of 19

years under the Reagan Tokes Law.

Griffin then filed the instant appeal, arguing that the juvenile court

erred by finding probable cause for the offense of felony murder predicated on
felonious assault and by imposing a mixed sentence of both prison and community

control.

II. Law and Argument

As an initial matter, although not assigned as error by Griffin, we must

address the viability of his convictions. The trial court stated in both the journal

entry reflecting Griffin’s plea and in the sentencing entry that Griffin was convicted

of attempted murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) and 2923.02. While the State and the

court used the shorthand of “attempted murder” when discussing the amended

charges, Griffin’s plea under the above statutes was actually for attempted felony

murder. However, as noted by Griffin in his brief, “attempted felony murder is not

a cognizable crime in Ohio.”1 State v. Nolan, 2014-Ohio-4800, ¶ 10. In Nolan, the

Ohio Supreme Court analyzed whether a person could be guilty of attempting to

cause an unintended death. The Court determined that such a finding would be

impossible:

[A]n attempt crime must be committed purposely or knowingly and
intent to kill need not be proven for the state to obtain a conviction for
felony murder, so that a person can be convicted of that offense even
though the death was unintended. . . . [I]t is impossible to purposely or
knowingly cause an unintended death.

Id. Consequently, a conviction for attempted felony murder is void. State v.

Johnson, 2018-Ohio-3799, ¶ 10 (8th Dist.), citing State v. Bozek, 2016-Ohio-1305,

¶ 21 (11th Dist.).

1 The State did not respond to Griffin’s assertions regarding the propriety of the attempted

felony-murder conviction.
Although the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the case,

because attempted felony murder is not a cognizable crime in Ohio, the trial court

lacked authority to sentence Griffin and to enter an order of conviction for attempted

felony murder under R.C. 2903.02(B) and 2923.02. Therefore, Griffin’s conviction

of that offense must be vacated. Moreover, because Griffin’s conviction for failure

to comply was part of a plea agreement, his remaining conviction also cannot stand.

“When a plea is vacated . . . the vacation and reversal is complete as to
all portions of the bargain. Both the defendant and the State are in the
same position as if no agreement had been made and as if no action had
been taken by the trial court on the agreement. Where more than one
separate offense is involved in the agreement, all so involved may be
reinstated upon vacation of the agreement. Re-indictment by the grand
jury is not necessary because upon vacation all are still pending.”

Bozek at ¶ 26, quoting State v. Peck, 1978 Ohio App. LEXIS 11167, *3 (2d Dist. Aug.

2, 1978).

Thus, despite Griffin’s acknowledgement that his conviction was for a

“non-crime” and his implicit request that we overlook this issue and analyze his

arguments related to the bindover proceedings instead, Griffin’s guilty plea is void

in its entirety and vacated as to all parts. See State v. Brooks, 2016-Ohio-489, ¶ 27

(8th Dist.) (sua sponte vacating conviction for attempted felony murder on the

authority of Nolan, 2014-Ohio-4800 (8th Dist.)); see also Patterson v. Bracy, 2019-

Ohio-747, ¶ 26 (11th Dist.) (noting that because “attempted felony murder is not a

recognized crime in Ohio . . . a serious miscarriage of justice would occur if petitioner

is required to serve a prison term for a crime that does not exist”).
Because Griffin’s judgment of conviction was void, there was no

judgment to appeal from, and we cannot consider his arguments relating to the

bindover proceedings. The Ohio Supreme Court has held that a defendant may not

immediately appeal a juvenile court’s order transferring jurisdiction of his or her

case to adult court but must wait to appeal any error stemming from the order until

it becomes a final judgment, following conviction and sentencing, in the general

division. See In re D.H., 2018-Ohio-17, ¶ 1 and 22; In re Becker, 39 Ohio St.2d 84,

(1974), syllabus.

There is no longer a final judgment in this matter; Griffin’s convictions

and resulting sentence are hereby vacated. On remand, the parties shall be in the

same position as if no plea agreement had been entered and the trial court had not

taken any action on the plea. All counts of the indictment shall be reinstated.

Both of Griffin’s assignments of error are rendered moot. Judgment

vacated, and this matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
TIMOTHY W. CLARY, J., CONCUR