Trevor Covert v. Media Intercept, Inc. — Case Transferred to Middle District of Florida

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Trevor Covert v. Media Intercept, Inc.

District Court, D. Idaho

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-00506

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (28)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (45.6K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO

TREVOR COVERT,
Case No. 3:25-cv-00506-DKG
Plaintiff,

v. MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER
MEDIA INTERCEPT, INC.,

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. (Dkt. 9). The motion is fully
briefed and at issue. Having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds the facts and legal
arguments are adequately presented and that oral argument would not significantly aid its
decision-making process, and, therefore, will decide the motions on the record. Dist.
Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(1)(B); Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) (“By rule or order, the court may
provide for submitting and determining motions on briefs, without oral hearings.”). For
the reasons that follow, the Court finds personal jurisdiction is lacking in this District and
will order that the case be transferred to the Middle District of Florida.1

1 The parties have consented to proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (c)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1(a)(1). (Dkt. 17).
BACKGROUND
This case arises out of Plaintiff Trevor Covert’s claims that Defendant Media

Intercept, Inc. (Media) failed to pay him commissions and expenses owed following his
termination. Covert began working at Media as the Director of Sales in June 2023, and
was terminated on or about April 30, 2025. Media is a digital marketing company that is
incorporated in Florida with its principal place of business in Orlando, Florida. Covert is
a resident of Idaho who performed his work for Media from his home in Idaho.
On September 4, 2025, Covert filed the Complaint in this Court based on diversity

jurisdiction, raising state law claims of breach of contract, violation of Idaho Code § 45 -
617, unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and declaratory judgment. (Dkt. 1). On
November 24, 2025, Media filed the motion presently before the Court seeking dismissal
of the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(2) or, in the alternative, for dismissal due to improper venue and the

doctrine of forum non conveniens or transfer to the Middle District of Florida. (Dkt. 9,
24).
LEGAL STANDARD
Personal jurisdiction is the “power of a court to enter judgment against a person.”
S.E.C. v. Ross, 504 F.3d 1130, 1138 (9th Cir. 2007). Under Rule 12(b)(2), a party may

file a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. When opposing such a
motion, “the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that jurisdiction is proper.” Mavrix
Photo, Inc. v. Band Tech., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Where, as here, “the defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an
evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdictional
facts to withstand the motion to dismiss.” Id. (citation omitted); see also Yamashita v. LG

Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023); Cox v. Gritman Med. Cntr., 2026 WL
738569, (9th Cir. March 16, 2026). The Court may consider other evidence outside of the
pleadings such as declarations and affidavits to determine whether it has personal
jurisdiction. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001).
“Uncontroverted allegations in the complaint are taken as true,” Yamashita, 62
F.4th at 502 (quoting Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223 (cleaned up)), and all genuine disputes

are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, LNS Enters. LLC v. Cont’l Motors, Inc., 22 F.4th
852, 858 (9th Cir. 2022). However, the Court “may not assume the truth of allegations in
a pleading which are contradicted by affidavit,” and the “plaintiff cannot simply rest on
the bare allegations of its complaint” in the face of a contradictory affidavit. Ayla, LLC v.
Alya Skin Pty. Ltd., 11 F.4th 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys.

Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977)); see also Yamashita, 62 F.4th at
502. Where both parties submit conflicting affidavits, the Court must resolve
controverted allegations in the plaintiff’s favor. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223.
ANALYSIS
1. Personal Jurisdiction

Where, as here, there is no applicable federal statute governing the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant, the district court applies the law of
the forum state in which it sits. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d
1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); Panavision Int’l,
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998)). Still, the assertion of personal
jurisdiction under the law of the forum state must be consistent with the Due Process

Clause. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Doe v. Deutsche Lufthansa, 157 F.4th 1103, 1109 (9th Cir. 2025).
“Idaho’s long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of ‘all the jurisdiction available to the
State of Idaho under the due process clause of the United States Constitution.’” Davis v.
Cranfield Aerospace Sols., Ltd., 71 F.4th 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Lake v.
Lake, 817 F.2d 1416, 1420 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing Doggett v. Elecs. Corp. of Am., [454

P.2d 63,67](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1133066/doggett-v-electronics-corp-of-am-combust-con-div/#67) (1969) and Idaho Code § 5-514)). Thus, personal jurisdiction under state law
and federal due process are coextensive.
The exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant complies with due process
“only if [the defendant] has certain minimum contacts with the relevant forum such that
maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.” Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205; see also Int’l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. There are
two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 141 S.Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021). Here, Covert seeks to invoke only
specific personal jurisdiction. (Dkt. 16).
“Specific jurisdiction exists when a case arises out of or relates to the defendant’s

contacts with the forum.” Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159, 1171 (9th Cir.
2022) (brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted). “The inquiry whether a forum
State may assert specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant ‘focuses on ‘the
relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.’” Walden v. Fiore, 571
U.S. 277, 283-284 (2014) (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)); see also Ford, [592 U.S. at

365](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/4867543/ford-motor-co-v-montana-eighth-judicial-dist/#365) (The “essential function” of specific jurisdiction is a strong “relationship among the
defendant, the forum, and the litigation.”). “[T]he relationship must arise out of contacts
that the ‘defendant [itself]’ creates with the forum State,” not “with persons who reside
there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 284 -286 (quoting Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475 (1985)). “Due process requires that a defendant be haled into court in a forum State
based on [its] own affiliation with the State, not based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or

attenuated’ contacts [it] makes by interacting with other persons affiliated with the State.” Id. at 286 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475). “The proper question is not where the
plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether the defendant’s conduct
connects [it] to the forum in a meaningful way.” Id. at 290
To determine whether the exercise of specific jurisdiction over a nonresident

defendant is appropriate, the Ninth Circuit applies a three-part test: (1) the non-resident
defendant must have sufficient minimum contacts with the forum; (2) the claim must
arise out of or relate to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and (3) “the exercise of
jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be
reasonable.” Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 750-751 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting

Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004)); see also
Cox, 2026 WL 738569 at *5. The plaintiff bears the burden on the first two prongs; and
“the burden then shifts to the defendant to ‘present a compelling case’ that the exercise of
jurisdiction would not be reasonable.” Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (quoting Burger
King, 471 U.S. at 476-78).

Under the first part of the test, “to be subject to specific jurisdiction the defendant
must purposefully direct its activities toward the forum state, purposefully avail itself of
the privileges of conducting activities there, or engage in ‘some combination thereof.’”
Impossible Foods Inc. v. Impossible X LLC, 80 F.4th 1079, 1088 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting
Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1206); see also Cox, 2026 WL 738569, at *5. “When a defendant’s
conduct primarily occurs outside the forum state, we generally apply the purposeful

direction test and look to whether the defendant expressly aimed acts at the forum state
knowing that they would harm the plaintiff there.” Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th at 1088.
Purposeful availment, on the other hand, “is satisfied when ‘the defendant has taken
deliberate action within the forum state or ... has created continuing obligations to forum
residents.’” Id. (quoting Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995)).

These two concepts are distinct and often, but not always, turn on the nature of the
underlying claim. Id. at 1088-1089 (recognizing that typically purposeful direction
applies to tort claims while purposeful availment applies to contract claims, but that this
is not an “iron-clad” distinction applicable in every case); Doe, 157 F.4th at 1111; Davis, 71 F.4th at 1162. “At the end of the day, the purposeful direction and availment tests

simply frame our inquiry into the defendant’s ‘purposefulness’ vis-à-vis the forum state,
ensuring that defendants are not ‘haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of random,
fortuitous, or attenuated contacts.’” Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th at 1089 (quoting Global
Commodities Trading Grp., Inc. v. Beneficio de Arroz Choloma, S.A., 972 F.3d 1101,
1107 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475); see also Walden, 571 U.S.
at 284–85 (emphasizing that “minimum contacts” requires that the defendant create

“contacts with the forum State itself” and not merely “contacts [the defendant] makes by
interacting with other persons affiliated with the State”).
Here, the claims in the Complaint are contract based and the parties’ arguments
center on purposeful availment, although Plaintiff briefly mentions purposeful direction.
(Dkt. 1, 9, 16, 24). The Court will therefore analyze personal jurisdiction under the
purposeful availment test, while remaining mindful that the inquiry ultimately looks to

the Defendant’s purposeful contacts with the forum state. Impossible Foods, 80 F.4th at
1089; see also Walden, 571 U.S. at 284–85.2
Covert is an individual residing in the forum state (Idaho). Media is a Florida
corporation with its principal place of business in Orlando, Florida. Covert alleges the
contacts establishing specific personal jurisdiction are that the acts giving rise to the

claims occurred in Idaho, Media was doing business in Idaho, Covert worked as an
employee of Media while located in Idaho, and Media hired and fired Covert in Idaho.
(Dkt. 1 at ¶ 4). Covert’s primary bases for asserting specific personal jurisdiction over
Media are that he worked from Idaho while employed by Media, Media defended against
Covert’s Idaho unemployment claim, and a business relationship between Media and an

2 Even under the purposeful direction test, the outcome is the same. Media did not expressly aim
its actions at the forum state such that it can be said that Media’s conduct connects it to the forum in a
meaningful way. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 803 (applying the Calder effects test); Walden, 571 U.S. at
290 (“The proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but whether
the defendant’s conduct connects [it] to the forum in a meaningful way.”). That Media knew Covert
resided in Idaho when it fired him and that Covert would suffer the effects of the termination in Idaho is
not sufficient. Van Hook v. Crete Carrier Corp., 2025 WL 1643098, at *4 (D. Idaho June 10, 2025).
Idaho-based company, Kit, Inc. (Dkt. 16). Covert filed a declaration stating that Media
knew he was an Idaho resident when they hired him and that he would be performing all

of his work, other than travel, from Idaho. (Dkt. 16-2 at ¶¶ 7, 15). Covert notes that
Media electronically sent his employment agreement and paid wages to him in Idaho.
Covert argues that Media controlled his work hours, pay, benefits, and had “significant
control over the means, methods, and tools I used to perform my work.” (Dkt. 16-2 at ¶¶
16-30, 32). The Court finds as follows.
The parties dispute whether Covert was an employee or an independent contractor,

with both submitting testimonial evidence in support of their positions. (Dkt. 16, 24).
Under the Rule 12(b)(1) standard, this dispute is resolved in favor of Plaintiff and,
therefore, the Court will presume that Covert was an employee of Media for purposes of
this motion. Mavrix, 647 F.3d at 1223. However, Covert’s status as an employee rather
than an independent contractor does not establish personal jurisdiction in Idaho over

Media given the circumstances of this case, as discussed below.
It is undisputed that Media’s sole office is located in Orlando, Florida; Covert was
hired as a sales consultant to service clients and to retain new business, neither of which –
Media’s clients or business - were located in Idaho; and the employment agreement,
payroll, and records of Covert’s sales were initiated from and are located in Florida. (Dkt.

9-1). Further, Media does not advertise or market its business in Idaho; is not registered
or licensed to do business in Idaho; has never paid taxes on profits earned in Idaho; owns
no property in Idaho; has no agent or clients; has no employees in Idaho since firing
Covert; and has no bank accounts in Idaho. (Dkt. 9-1). Media did not provide Covert with
workers’ compensation coverage and did not withhold payroll taxes for Covert. (Dkt 24-
1). Further, the manager Covert reported to was based out of Florida. (Dkt. 16-2 at ¶ 31).

Resolving controverted allegations in Covert’s favor and taking Covert’s
allegations as true, and considering the undisputed facts in Media’s submissions, the
Court finds specific personal jurisdiction over Media is lacking in this District. The
central fact Covert relies on to establish specific personal jurisdiction is his being located
in Idaho while employed by Media. However, “the plaintiff cannot be the only link
between the defendant and the forum.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. Covert could have been

located anywhere while working for Media. That Covert chose to work from Idaho does
not demonstrate that Media purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting
business in Idaho. Nor do the facts that Media hired Covert knowing he resided in Idaho,
would be performing his job while located in Idaho, would be paid wages in Idaho, and
was terminated while in Idaho, establish the requisite minimum contacts needed to

exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Media.
While Covert’s presence in Idaho is relevant, the “[m]ere foreseeability that an
action will cause an injury in the forum is insufficient to find minimum contacts.” Cox, 2026 WL 738569, at *5 (citing Burger King, 471 U.S. at 474). Again, the jurisdictional
minimum contacts must arise out of the defendant’s contacts with the forum and the

litigation, not the person who resides there. Walden, 571 U.S. at 284-285. A plaintiff’s
connection with the forum—or defendant’s knowledge of such connection—is
insufficient to establish purposeful availment. See e.g. Alliant, LLC v. McCoy, 2026 WL
18808, at *7-8 (D. Idaho Jan. 2, 2026) (finding the remote employee of an Idaho business
had not purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in Idaho
under the facts of the case and, therefore, was not subject to personal jurisdiction in

Idaho). Covert’s presence in Idaho, and Media’s knowledge of the same, therefore do not
constitute minimum contacts between Media and the forum-state for purposes of specific
personal jurisdiction.
Further, Media’s underlying employment relationship with Covert does not
support exercising personal jurisdiction. Media’s acts of hiring and firing an Idaho-based
individual, which included paying wages and some travel expenses, and providing

standard benefits, simply do not evidence that Media purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in Idaho. Particularly given Covert’s work for Media
did not involve any clients or business in Idaho and Media never marketed its business
activities to Idaho. Rather, the record shows that, other than Covert being located in
Idaho while employed by Media, Media had no presence in or relevant contacts with

Idaho, let alone contacts showing that it had purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting business in Idaho.
Covert’s reliance on Idaho statutes governing worker’s compensation, labor,
employment, and income tax are misplaced and do not evidence that Media’s actions
invoked the benefits and protections of Idaho laws. Media did not withhold taxes from

Covert’s paycheck and did not provide workers’ compensation coverage to Covert. The
fact that Media participated in the unemployment claim in front of the Idaho Department
of Labor does also not evidence that Media took actions availing itself of Idaho’s laws or
the benefits of doing business in Idaho. Media did not seek out any ruling by the Idaho
Department of Labor against Covert. Rather, Covert filed the unemployment claim and
sought to obtain benefits from Idaho’s Department of Labor. The only reason Media

appeared in the Idaho Department of Labor proceeding was to respond to Covert’s claim.
Media’s participation in the unemployment proceeding does not constitute purposeful
availment because it did not initiate that action or otherwise seek to avail itself of the
benefits of the forum state through that proceeding – Media was simply responding to the
unemployment claim filed by Covert.
Covert contends that when he filed for unemployment with the State of Idaho,

Media never claimed it was not an employer subject to unemployment and that the
central issue on the claim was Media’s business relationship with Kit, Inc., an entity
located in Idaho. (Dkt. 16-2 at ¶¶ 39-42). However, neither of those arguments establish
the requisite minimum contacts. As discussed above, Media’s response and participation
in the unemployment claim proceedings was due to Covert’s actions, not the actions of

Media. That Media did not deny having employed Covert in the unemployment
proceeding is not evidence of purposeful availment.
Media’s dealings with Kit, Inc., an Idaho-based company, also do not establish a
basis for asserting specific personal jurisdiction. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286. Media’s
business interactions with Kit, Inc. were isolated and incidental to Media’s marketing

operations outside of Idaho. (Dkt. 24-1 at ¶ 3). Media has never developed a product
directed at Idaho, never targeted Idaho markets, never solicited or obtained Idaho
customers, and never structured its business to operate under Idaho law. (Dkt. 24-1 at
¶ 4). The Court finds that Media’s isolated contacts with Kit, Inc. to market its business
outside of Idaho do not constitute purposeful availment with the forum. Notably, Covert
has not asserted that general personal jurisdiction applies. (Dkt. 16).

More importantly, Media’s interactions with Kit, Inc. are unrelated and irrelevant
to Covert’s claims asserted in this litigation for unpaid wages, commissions, and
expenses. (Dkt. 1). Kit, Inc. is mentioned in the decision denying unemployment benefits
only due to the fact that one of its employees was involved in the circumstances
underlying the reason for Covert’s termination of employment. (Dkt. 9-2). However,
none of Covert’s claims contest the termination of his employment or the denial of

unemployment benefits. Therefore, Media’s unrelated business dealings with Kit, Inc. do
not constitute forum-related contacts giving rise to the claims as necessary to assert
specific personal jurisdiction over Media this litigation. Walden, 571 U.S. at 286.
The case relied on by Covert, Haisten v. Grass Valley Med. Reimbursement Fund,
Ltd., 784 F.3d 1392, 1397 (9th Cir. 1986), is inapposite. (Dkt. 16 at 10-11). In Haisten,

the defendant was an insurance fund incorporated and physically located in the Cayman
Islands. The fund provided indemnity insurance for doctors located at a hospital in
California, but was carefully structured to deliberately avoid California insurance
regulations. The Ninth Circuit looked at the “economic reality” of the defendant-insurer’s
activities and concluded that it had purposefully directed its activities toward California,

despite the fact that it had no physical contacts with the forum state, and, therefore, the
district court had properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant-
insurer in California. The facts and circumstances of this case are vastly different.
Unlike the defendant in Haisten, Media has not directed its business activities into
Idaho, availed itself of the benefits of doing business in Idaho, or subjected itself to

Idaho’s laws. As discussed herein, Media has no clients in Idaho, has no presence in
Idaho aside from when Covert worked for Media, and does not market its business in
Idaho. None of the contacts between Media and Idaho alleged by Covert were based on
actions initiated by Media. Media’s hiring and termination of Covert while he resided in
Idaho, do not establish specific personal jurisdiction. Media’s participation in the
unemployment claim was in response to Covert’s filing of the claim, not due to Media’s

own actions. Media’s separate business dealings with Kit, Inc. are unrelated to Covert’s
wage claims.
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Covert has not made a prima facie
showing that Media availed itself of the benefits of Idaho’s forum or directed its actions
toward Idaho and, therefore, has failed to establish that Media has sufficient minimum

contacts with Idaho as needed to exercise specific personal jurisdiction over Media.
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802 (holding plaintiff bears the burden to establish the first
two steps of the analysis). Accordingly, the Court need not more fully or separately
address the remaining steps of the test (relatedness and reasonableness). See Boschetto v.
Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008); Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, [453 F.3d

1151, 1155](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/794934/pebble-beach-company-a-california-general-partnership-v-michael-caddy-an/#1155) (9th Cir. 2006) (“If any of the three requirements is not satisfied, jurisdiction
in the forum would deprive the defendant of due process of law.”) (citation omitted). In
any event, the second and third steps of the analysis also support finding that personal
jurisdiction is lacking because the claims do not arise out of or relate to Media’s forum
contacts and exercising jurisdiction over Media in Idaho would be unreasonable. For
these reasons, the Court finds that it does not have specific personal jurisdiction over

Media and, therefore, cannot hear Covert’s claims.
2. Transfer of Action
Where jurisdiction is lacking, the Court must consider whether the case should be
dismissed or transferred to a court properly having jurisdiction:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court ... and that court finds that there
is a want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action ... to any other such court ... in which the action or
appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the
action or appeal shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the
court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it was actually filed
in or noticed for the court from which it is transferred. 28 U.S.C. § 1631; see also Miller v. Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1990)
(encouraging courts to consider sua sponte whether a case should be transferred under
Section 1631). This statute “confers on [a federal court] authority to make a single
decision upon concluding that it lacks jurisdiction – whether to dismiss the case or, ‘in
the interest of justice,’ to transfer it to a court of appeals that has jurisdiction.”
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988).3
Normally, transferring a case to a court where the suit could have originally be
brought will be in the interest of justice because dismissal of an action that could be

3 There is a circuit split concerning whether § 1631 applies to transfers where personal jurisdiction is
lacking. See Tisher v. Boeing Co., 2026 WL 982883, at *12-13 (D. Or. April 13, 2026); Asbury v. Stout, 2025 WL 1906707, at *10 n. 9 (M.D. Fla. July 10, 2025). The Court finds instructive and is in agreement
with the reasoning of the caselaw concluding the lack of personal jurisdiction is a proper basis for
transfers under § 1631. Id.; Alliant, 2026 WL 18808, at *11 (considering whether to transfer a case under
§ 1631 where personal jurisdiction was lacking); Lewis v. Abbot Labs., Inc., 2020 WL 631595, at *10
(M.D. Fla. Feb. 5, 2020) recommendation adopted by 2020 WL 998717 (M.D. Fla. March 2, 2020).
brought elsewhere is “time-consuming and justice-defeating.” Amity Rubberized Pen Co.
v. Market Quest Grp., Inc., 793 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Miller, 905 F.2d at
262). Such is the case here. The Court finds that the interest of justice warrants
transferring the case to the Middle District of Florida to allow Covert an opportunity to
pursue his claims on their merits in the proper jurisdiction, rather than dismissal.
ORDER
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. 9) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The Motion is
granted to the extent that the Court concludes it lacks specific personal jurisdiction over
Defendant Media Intercept Inc., and denied to the extent the Court elects to transfer the
case under 28 U.S.C. § 1631 rather than dismiss the action.
The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to TRANSFER this case to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division.

KEE DATED: April 24, 2026
ey @. } Mb & KL Mfr

MU Honorable Debora K. Grasham
ol United States Magistrate Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 15