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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Interest of I.S., a Child v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 10th District (Waco)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 10-25-00077-CV
• Nature of Suit: Termination of parental rights or conservatorship - accelerated

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Lead Opinion

Court of Appeals
Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-25-00077-CV

In the Interest of I.S., a Child

On appeal from the
272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas
Judge John L. Brick, presiding
Trial Court Cause No. 24-000347-CV-272

CHIEF JUSTICE JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The parental rights of I.S.’s mother (Mother) were terminated; she has

appealed. 1 In her sole issue, Mother contends that the trial court violated

Family Code section 201.015 as well as her due process rights by signing the

order terminating her parental rights before completing a de novo hearing. We

will reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand Mother’s case for a de novo

hearing.

1 The parental rights of I.S.’s father were also terminated, but he has not appealed.
Background

On February 3, 2025, following a bench trial before an associate judge,

the associate judge issued a letter stating that the court found by clear and

convincing evidence that Mother had violated Family Code subsections

161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and that termination was in I.S.’s best interest. See

generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b). The associate judge’s letter ruling

further stated that Mother’s parental rights as to I.S. were terminated.

Thereafter, on February 6, 2025, Mother filed a request for a de novo

hearing. The associate judge then signed a formal order of termination on

February 14, 2025.

On February 18, 2025, the referring court conducted “the start of the de

novo hearing.” At that time, the referring court announced that it had

requested a copy of the official reporter’s record from the trial before the

associate judge. The referring court further explained that, once the record

was received, the de novo hearing would be set to be completed.

On March 7, 2025, however, before the de novo hearing was completed,

the referring court signed an order adopting the associate judge’s order of

termination. The referring court’s order provides: “The above and foregoing

orders have been presented to this Court, and no demand for hearing having

been made in the time and manner permitted by law, it is ORDERED that said

orders be and are hereby adopted as orders of this Court.”

In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 2
That same day, Mother filed a notice of accelerated appeal; however,

Mother pointed out in her notice of appeal: “A De Novo [hearing] was timely

requested. At the time of this filing, the matter is currently pending a final

hearing before the referring district court.”

Subsequently, on April 10, 2025, the referring court completed the de

novo hearing, and on April 15, 2025, the referring court signed a second order

adopting the associate judge’s order of termination. The referring court also

signed an order on April 21, 2025, which states: “[T]his Court declines to

change the Associate Judge’s ruling and affirms the Order of Termination

previously entered by the Associate Judge in this cause.”

Discussion

A party who timely requests a de novo hearing before the referring court

is entitled to a de novo hearing before the referring court. In re N.W., No. 07-

17-00409-CV, 2018 WL 1440896, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 22, 2018, no

pet.) (mem. op.); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 201.015; State ex rel. Latty v.

Owens, 907 S.W.2d 484, 484 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam) (citing predecessor

statute of Family Code section 201.015). Furthermore, the referring court’s

failure to hold a de novo hearing after a timely request is filed is presumed

harmful. N.W., 2018 WL 1440896, at *2 (citing Phagan v. Aleman, 29 S.W.3d

632, 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.)).

In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 3
Here, the parties agree that Mother filed a timely request for a de novo

hearing on February 6, 2025. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 201.015, 201.2042.

The parties further agree that the referring court should not have signed an

order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination on March 7, 2025,

before the de novo hearing was completed. See N.W., 2018 WL 1440896, at *2;

see also Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 484. The parties disagree, however, about

whether such error was harmful.

Mother argues that she was harmed by such error whereas the Texas

Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) argues that

the referring court cured the error. The Department points to the referring

court’s completion of the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025, followed by the

referring court’s signing of a second order adopting the associate judge’s order

of termination. But, in this case, the Department’s argument fails because, as

explained below, the referring court had lost jurisdiction by April 10, 2025,

when the referring court completed the de novo hearing, and by April 15, 2025,

and April 21, 2025, when the referring court signed its additional orders. Cf.

In re Lausch, 177 S.W.3d 144, 154–55 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005,

orig. proceeding) (“The trial court’s reincarnation and adoption of the order

under the proper circumstances . . . cured the error.”).

An order that purports to dispose of all issues and all parties is a final,

appealable judgment. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485; In re E.K.C., 486 S.W.3d 614,

In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 4
616 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.). Accordingly, the referring court’s

March 7, 2025 order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination was a

final, appealable judgment. See Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485; E.K.C., 486 S.W.3d

at 616.

The Department points out in its brief that the record is silent as to why

the referring court signed the order adopting the associate judge’s order of

termination on March 7, 2025. The Department observes that the March 7,

2025 order may have been signed inadvertently or may have been the product

of improper procedure. Either way, however, the order is a final, appealable

judgment that is merely voidable, not void. See Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 485 (“A

judgment is void only when it is clear that the court rendering the judgment

had no jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, no jurisdiction to render

judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. Mere failure to follow proper

procedure will not render a judgment void.” (citations omitted)).

After signing a final judgment, a trial court retains plenary power for

only the next thirty days unless the judgment is modified, corrected, or

reformed during that thirty-day period, or a party timely files a motion that

extends the trial court’s plenary power. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b; In re J.L.,

163 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tex. 2005) (“The Family Code . . . does not purport to

eliminate post-trial motions or otherwise constrict the trial court’s plenary

power.”). Here, neither of these plenary-power-extending events occurred.

In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 5
Therefore, the referring court’s plenary power expired before April 10, 2025,

when the referring court completed the de novo hearing, and before April 15,

2025, and April 21, 2025, when the referring court signed its additional orders.

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b; J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 82. Accordingly, the referring

court lacked jurisdiction to complete the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025,

and to sign its additional orders on April 15, 2025, and April 21, 2025. See

Martin v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 176 S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.).

Judicial action taken after the court’s jurisdiction over a cause has

expired is a nullity. Latty, 907 S.W.2d at 486. Accordingly, the referring

court’s actions of completing the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025, followed by

signing a second order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination,

were a nullity and could not cure the referring court’s error of signing the order

adopting the associate judge’s order of termination on March 7, 2025, before

the de novo hearing was completed. See id.

In light of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court reversibly erred

by signing the order adopting the associate judge’s order of termination on

March 7, 2025, before completing the de novo hearing. We sustain Mother’s

sole issue.

In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 6
Conclusion

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand Mother’s case for a de

novo hearing.

MATT JOHNSON
Chief Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: March 26, 2026
Before Chief Justice Johnson,
Justice Smith, and
Justice Harris
Reversed and remanded
CV06

In the Interest of I.S., a Child Page 7