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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Alan Roy Hartzel v. the State of Texas

Texas Court of Appeals, 9th District (Beaumont)

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 09-24-00199-CR
• Nature of Suit: Injury to a Child, Elderly or Disabled Individual

• Disposition: Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (44.4K)

• PDF

Disposition

Affirmed

Lead Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

---

NO. 09-24-00199-CR

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ALAN ROY HARTZEL, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

---

On Appeal from the Criminal District Court
Jefferson County, Texas
Trial Cause No. F20-34323

---

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Alan Roy Hartzel (“Appellant” or “Hartzel”) was indicted for

causing injury to an elderly person by omission, a first-degree felony punishable by

five to ninety-nine years or life imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000. See Tex.

Penal Code Ann. §§ 12.32, 22.04(a), (e). The jury convicted Hartzel and, pursuant

to the jury’s verdict, the trial court sentenced Hartzel to life imprisonment in the

Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.

1
In a single issue, Hartzel appeals his conviction, contending that the evidence

is insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

BACKGROUND

When Hartzel called 911 to report that his seventy-five-year-old mother

(“Mother”) was “semi-responsive” and needed an ambulance, Mother was hours

from death. 1 Since emergency responders and hospital personnel believed that

Mother died due to inadequate nutrition and medical care, Hartzel, Mother’s

caregiver, was charged with injury to an elderly person by omission. We summarize

the pertinent trial evidence below.

The Firefighters’ Testimony

Port Arthur Firefighters and EMTs Dylan Tompkins and Dylan Compton, and

now-retired fire captain Brian Simmons (“Tompkins,” “Compton,” and “Simmons,”

respectively), testified that they were dispatched to Mother’s home in response to

Hartzel’s 911 call. When they arrived, they observed that the house was cold, in

disrepair, and smelled like urine, feces, and “death.” In addition, the house, and

Mother’s room in particular, were so full of furniture, trash, and other items that only

1
We refer to the victim and the civilian witnesses by pseudonyms or familial
relationships to conceal their identities. See Tex. Const. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (granting
crime victims “the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s
dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”); Smith v. State, No. 09-
17-00081-CR, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1874, at *1 n.1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont Mar.
14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
2
one person could enter Mother’s room at a time. When Tompkins began to assess

Mother, he believed that she was already deceased until she moved and made a

sound. Tompkins removed the blanket covering Mother, and as he did so, “a swarm

of flies” flew out from under the blanket, and maggots were visible on Mother’s

person. Mother and her bed were covered in feces, urine, and blood. Rather than

continue to assess Mother’s condition at the scene, the firefighters decided to

transport Mother to the hospital. Hartzel offered to carry Mother to the waiting

ambulance, and when the firefighters accepted his offer, Hartzel retrieved a

“butcher’s apron” and gloves and carried Mother from her bed to a stretcher, where

the ambulance attendants assumed Mother’s care.

They described Mother as emaciated, and in need of food and medical care.

All of the firefighters considered Mother’s condition to be the worst they had seen

in their years of service. They believed that it would have taken Mother a long time,

possibly a month or longer, to deteriorate to the condition they observed.

The Police Officers’ Testimony and Body Camera Recordings

Port Arthur police officers Angel Bush, Jennifer Simmons, Matt Bulls,

Lawrence Myers, and Tomas Barboza testified that they witnessed Mother’s

condition and the condition of the house on the date Hartzel reported that Mother

was not responsive. They generally confirmed the firefighters’ testimony that the

house was rundown, cluttered, and smelly, and that Mother was in poor condition.

3
Officer Simmons recalled that she transported Hartzel to the police station so

he could provide a statement. During the drive, Officer Broussard called from the

hospital “to ask if they wanted to abide by the do not resuscitate order[,]” and Hartzel

verbally agreed to the order. Officer Simmons also testified that while they were en

route to the police station, Hartzel did not ask about Mother’s condition.

Officer Myers testified that during the investigation into Mother’s death, he

reviewed three years of Mother’s bank statements. From February through May

2017, Mother spent money for “[n]ormal everyday supplies[,]” but in May 2017 and

continuing to December 2019, Mother’s account reflected purchases from liquor

stores, smoke shops, and showed purchases of weapons and tactical gear.

Barboza, the detective who interviewed Hartzel, testified that during the

interview, Hartzel acknowledged that he was Mother’s sole care giver and that he

assumed Mother’s care, custody, and control. Barboza also recalled that Hartzel

mentioned Mother’s dementia, which had worsened over the previous two to three

months. Although Hartzel told Barboza that Mother ‘“wanted to die in her house[,]”’

Hartzel’s “demeanor seemed very wrong to” Barboza.

These officers authenticated their body camera recordings, which the State

played during the officers’ testimony. While at the scene, Hartzel stated that Mother

did not like doctors and last saw a doctor in 2011. Hartzel also advised that Mother

had chosen to die at home, but that he called 911 that day because he was not going

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to continue to watch her suffer. Hartzel further acknowledged that Mother was

malnourished and dehydrated because she did not want to eat and that Mother was

dirty and infested with maggots because she would not allow Hartzel to bathe her.

The officers, however, acknowledged never having met Mother and therefore being

unaware of her wishes.

“Julia’s” Testimony

Julia testified that she was a retired nurse’s aide and had been Mother’s

neighbor for about thirty-five years. Julia called Mother “a very friendly neighbor[]”

who often would visit and chat with Julia. When Julia moved into Mother’s

neighborhood, Hartzel and his sister, “Ginny” were teenagers. Although Ginny

eventually moved out, Hartzel did not. After Ginny left, Hartzel “did start doing a

lot of drinking, a lot.”

About two or three years before Mother died, Julia noticed that she no longer

saw Mother. The last time Julia saw Mother, Mother was not her usual talkative self

and did not respond when Julia greeted her. When Julia attempted to visit Mother’s

house, Hartzel would not permit it, saying that Mother was napping or reading. Julia

also recalled that after she no longer saw Mother outside the house, Hartzel bought

a lot of alcohol and guns.

Julia recalled that although Mother was a packrat, Mother’s house was always

clean and neat. Julia was certain that Mother would not have chosen to remain in the

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condition she was in at the end of her life. The conditions in Mother’s house were

such that on the day Hartzel called 911, Julia noticed that some of “the paramedics

were sick. There was a couple of them leaning over, like, throwing up ‘cause of what

they saw.’”

Martha Broussard’s Testimony and Mother’s Medical Records

Martha Broussard (“Broussard”) testified that she was the charge nurse while

Mother was treated at the Medical Center of Southeast Texas. The records of

Mother’s care at the Medical Center of Southeast Texas reflect that Mother was

admitted at 1:16 p.m. Mother was five feet four inches tall and weighed twenty-

seven and one-half kilograms (under sixty-one pounds), approximately half her ideal

body weight of fifty-five kilograms. Hospital personnel diagnosed Mother with

“unspecified severe protein-calorie malnutrition[,]” and “altered mental status[.]”

Personnel further noted that Mother was “very unkempt[,] emaciated[,]” and had

“significant bruising/mottling to skin[.]” Broussard explained “mottling” as “a

darkened pattern on the extremities that shows you that they’re not getting the proper

fluids to the extremities.”

The records further reflect that Mother was incontinent, was “covered in stool

and maggots.” Broussard explained that the maggots had “burrowed into” Mother’s

body and that “when maggots burrow in and flies start coming out, that means

they’ve been there for a while and they’ve already hatched eggs and are – the flies

6
are coming from it.” Although Broussard could not recall how many days it would

take to hatch flies in this manner, she agreed that it would take more than a day.

Mother also had multiple “unstageable” decubitus ulcers, including one on

Mother’s shoulder measuring about one inch in diameter, and one on her hip more

than two inches across. Broussard described a decubitus as an open wound typically

found on a bony prominence, such as a shoulder or hip. Although, according to

Broussard, a decubitus can usually be classified according to its size and depth, some

of Mother’s wounds were so large that they could not be assigned a stage. Broussard

also explained “tenting” as meaning that skin, when pulled up, did not “pop[]

back[,]” and indicated that Mother “was basically skin and bones.” Broussard

testified that Mother’s condition could not have happened overnight, and that no

patient would choose to be treated that way. In addition, Broussard explained the

record entry showing that Mother had a Glasgow Coma Scale score of three by

contrasting it to people who are awake, alert, and able to respond physically and

verbally, who would have a score of fifteen.

According to the records, when the nurses attempted to clean Mother of the

“days, weeks, months” of caked fecal matter and urine, they noticed their efforts

appeared to be removing some of Mother’s skin. Broussard recalled that the situation

was so horrific that the nurses were crying and had to “tag team[]” to be able to

address Mother’s condition.

7
The records also show that Mother’s pupils were unequal in size, and one was

unreactive to light, which Broussard explained as meaning that “there’s something

going on in the brain.” In the attempt to increase Mother’s temperature of 87.6

Fahrenheit, the nurses gave Mother warm saline IV fluid and used a Bair hugger,

which is a device that “blows warm air[]” on the patient. When the nurses could not

detect Mother’s pulse, they began CPR. After Hartzel gave a “do not resuscitate”

order by telephone, the hospital personnel discontinued lifesaving efforts, and

Mother died at 2:54 p.m., approximately an hour and forty-five minutes after she

arrived.

According to Broussard, it would take “[s]everal, several months, possibly a

year[]” for Mother to have reached the condition in which the hospital personnel saw

her, and it would be impossible for a caregiver not to realize that the person needed

medical care. Broussard had never heard of a person in Mother’s condition stating

that they wished to be left alone and remain in that state. Like other witnesses,

Broussard testified that despite having “seen tragic things and horrible things,”

Mother’s case was the “worst thing I have ever seen.”

Janet Gunter’s Testimony

Janet Gunter (“Gunter”) testified that she was the manager at Homestead, a

business that provides in-home caregivers for senior citizens. Although Homestead

does not provide medical services, its employees can do light housekeeping, laundry,

8
cooking, personal care assistance, and can transport clients to appointments. In 2017,

Homestead charged from $17.50 to $20.50 per hour for its services, with a four-hour

minimum.

Gunter testified that when a client refuses to eat or bathe, caregivers attempt

to “redirect” the client by changing the subject and revisiting it later. If a client soiled

themselves, the caregiver would “keep trying[,]” and if Gunter found a client in

Mother’s condition, she would not permit the situation to continue and would report

it to the State as soon as possible.

Dr. Erin Carney’s Testimony

Erin Carney M.D. (“Carney”) testified that she is a forensic pathologist and

that she had performed over 3,000 autopsies. Although Dr. Strauch-Rivers, not

Carney, performed Mother’s autopsy, Carney reviewed Dr. Strauch-Rivers’ report

and notes, Mother’s medical records, the police report, and the photographs taken at

the scene, the hospital, and during the autopsy. Carney agreed with Strauch-Rivers’

medical conclusion that Mother died of “complications of long-term malnutrition

due to unknown etiology.” Carney believed that it took “[a]t least weeks[,]” and

possibly months for Mother’s malnutrition to reach the state depicted in the

photographs. As for Mother’s possible dementia, Carney referenced a photograph

showing “the widening of the gaps between the folds of the brain. And we see that

9
in atrophy of the brain.” This finding supports the proposition that Mother had

dementia.

“Ginny’s” Testimony

Hartzel’s sister, Ginny, testified that she and Hartzel grew up in the house in

question. At the time of trial, Ginny lived in Central Texas, where she worked as a

paralegal. When Ginny last visited Mother, in December 2019, Mother gave Ginny

a check for $8,000 to help Ginny and her family. At that time, according to Ginny,

Mother “did not look well[]” but did not seem to be experiencing dementia. When

Ginny took Mother to lunch during that visit, Mother ate. When asked about

Mother’s spending habits, Ginny testified that Mother was frugal and would not have

approved of expenditures for guns or tactical armor.

Hartzel’s Testimony and Recorded Interview

Hartzel testified that he began living with Mother in late 2005 and that in

exchange for room and board, he cooked, did yard work, took care of the cats, and

performed similar tasks. Hartzel agreed that the house was in deplorable condition

because Mother was a hoarder and he was lazy. During his interview with Barboza,

Hartzel stated that Mother had dementia, but in his testimony, he stated that although

Mother was “just a little slower than she had been[,]” the word “dementia” did not

fit.

10
According to Hartzel, Mother did not want anyone coming into the house to

care for her and “barely tolerated service technicians when she needed the washer

repaired or the house rewired. She didn’t want anybody else in her house.” Hartzel

acknowledged having drunk “to excess on occasion,” but denied that his drinking

was as bad as it sounded. Hartzel explained the weapons in the house by stating that

he owned eight of them, Mother owned three of them, and that since they did not

live in “the safest of neighborhoods[,]” he bought an AR-15 with Mother’s

knowledge, to prepare to take a rifle training course.

When questioned about Mother’s state of health, Hartzel stated that since

Mother “was always clothed[,]” and never mentioned any health issues other than

nerve damage in her hand, pelvic fractures, and a bee allergy, Hartzel was unaware

of Mother’s skin breakdown. Although Hartzel admitted having failed to take care

of Mother, he testified that Mother refused to permit him to do so. Hartzel admitted

that he had assumed Mother’s care and was the one responsible for Mother. In

hindsight, Hartzel realized that he “should have been more forceful in feeding her or

in attempting to get someone to come in and assist with that[,]” even though Mother

wanted to die in her own home. Hartzel did not disagree with the State’s

characterization of Mother as looking “like she may have been pulled out of an

Auschwitz death camp.” Hartzel could not remember when Mother last bathed or

brushed her hair, and he testified that he last changed Mother’s incontinence pad

11
“[r]oughly a week prior[]” to the time the photographs were taken. He explained this

delay by stating that Mother would not let him pick her up to change the pad. Hartzel

did not disagree that the filth Mother lay in caused her serious bodily injury. Hartzel

denied, however, that he failed to provide Mother with her nutritional needs, stating

that he “provided them. She didn’t take them in.”

ANALYSIS

Hartzel argues that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to convict

him of the offense charged, since “the State failed to prove that [Hartzel]

intentionally or knowingly caused injuries as alleged in the indictment.” Hartzel

concedes that although “the State established that [Hartzel] through ignorance, lack

of training, inattentiveness, or negligence failed to properly care for his mother[,]”

the State did not prove that he acted intentionally or knowingly.

In evaluating sufficiency of the evidence to prove the charged offense, we

view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether

any rational trial of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond

a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Hooper

v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Metcalf v. State, 597

S.W.3d 847, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Under the Jackson standard, we defer to

the jury’s responsibility to fairly resolve conflicting testimony, weigh the evidence,

and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Metcalf, 597

12
S.W.3d at 855; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13, 16-17. The jury as factfinder is the sole

judge of the weight of the evidence and witnesses’ credibility, and it may believe all,

some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties. Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855

(citations omitted). We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of

the evidence, nor do we substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. See Williams v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citation omitted); see also

McPherson v. State, 677 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2023). “Each fact need

not point directly and independently to a defendant’s guilt, as long as the cumulative

force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.”

Balderas v. State, 517 S.W.3d 756, 766 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (citation omitted).

A person commits the offense of injury to an elderly person by omission if he:

(a) . . . intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal
negligence, by act or intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly by
omission, causes to a child, elderly individual, or disabled
individual:

(1) serious bodily injury;

(2) serious medical deficiency, impairment, or injury; or

(3) bodily injury.

...

(b) an omission that causes a condition described by Subsection (a)(1),
(2), or (3) . . . is conduct constituting an offense under this section
if:

(1) the actor has a legal or statutory duty to act; or
13
(2) the actor has assumed care, custody, or control of a child, elderly
individual, or disabled individual.

(c) In this section:

...

(2) “Elderly individual” means a person 65 years of age or older.

...

(d) For purposes of an omission that causes a condition described by
Subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3), the actor has assumed care, custody,
or control if the actor has by act, words, or course of conduct acted
so as to cause a reasonable person to conclude that the actor has
accepted responsibility for protection, food, shelter, or medical care
for a child, elderly individual, or disabled individual. [].

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04 (a), (b), (c)(2), (d).

Since Hartzel argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove his mens rea,

only, we do not address the remaining elements of the offense of injury to an elderly

individual.

“Intentionally” and “knowingly” are defined as follows:

(a) A person acts intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature
of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious
objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result.

(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the
nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct
when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the
circumstances exist. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge,
with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03 (a), (b).
14
Injury to an elderly individual is a result-oriented offense, requiring a mental

state that relates not to the charged conduct but to the result of the conduct. See

Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). It is not enough for

the State to prove that the defendant engaged in the alleged conduct with the requisite

criminal intent. Lee v. State, 21 S.W.3d 532, 540 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2000, pet.

ref’d). “The State must also prove that the defendant caused the result with the

requisite criminal intent.” Id. (citing Cook v. State, 884 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1994)). The jury may infer intent from the defendant’s acts and words as well

as the surrounding circumstances. See Ledesma v. State, 677 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1984).

Hartzel does not dispute that Mother was over sixty-five years old or that she

sustained a serious bodily injury. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 1.07 (a)(46) (defining

“[s]erious bodily injury” as including death); 22.04(c). Hartzel instead argues that

there was insufficient evidence of his requisite mental state, in that the evidence does

not show that Hartzel’s poor choices intentionally or knowingly resulted in serious

bodily injury.

Hartzel contends he attempted to care for Mother but met with Mother’s

resistance when he tried to either retain outside help or care for her himself. Hartzel

also testified that he was unaware of the extent of Mother’s condition and stated he

neither intentionally nor knowingly allowed Mother to be harmed. The jury,

15
however, need not have credited or believed the evidence of Hartzel’s good

intentions and best efforts. See Metcalf, 597 S.W.3d at 855.

Hartzel, by his own admission, knew that Mother was not eating as much as

she previously ate. Hartzel realized that Mother “couldn’t have been well[]” yet he

did not seek help. Hartzel’s admission that Mother needed help that he could not

personally provide and did not obtain, satisfies the statutory definition of “knowing,”

since Hartzel knew that his continued inaction would cause Mother serious bodily

harm. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03 (b).

In addition, the jury could have inferred that Mother must have lost weight

due to her diminished food intake, and Hartzel’s failure to address Mother’s weight

loss was evidence that Hartzel intended Mother’s death by starvation. In Proo v.

State, a case addressing injury to a child by omission, our sister court held that “the

testimony and medical evidence established that [the victim] had obvious and

apparent emaciation . . . that the jury could reasonably infer [the defendant] ‘would

have noticed’ during the times she babysat [the victim].” 587 S.W.3d 789, 810 (Tex.

App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. ref’d). Similarly, in this case, there was expert

medical testimony that Mother was emaciated, and both Carney and Broussard

testified that it would have taken a long time for Mother’s condition to have

developed. As Broussard stated, Mother’s deteriorating state could not have escaped

a caregiver’s notice. Here, as in Proo, eyewitness testimony about the victim’s

16
appearance was sufficient to indicate the extent of Hartzel’s awareness and

knowledge of Mother’s condition and need for medical care. See id. at 811.

The jury also heard Hartzel’s own testimony that he had not changed Mother’s

incontinence pad for a week and thus determined that Hartzel was intentionally or

knowingly failing to attend to Mother’s needs. The jury likewise could have

considered Hartzel’s admission that he did not know when Mother last bathed or had

her hair brushed and from that the jury could have inferred that Hartzel acted

knowingly and intentionally. In addition, the jury could have believed that Hartzel’s

refusals to allow Julia to visit Mother constituted Hartzel’s attempt to conceal

Mother’s condition. See id. at 813 (citing Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2004)) (holding defendant’s attempt to conceal incriminating evidence

is a circumstance of guilt).

Although Hartzel testified he did not realize how badly Mother had

deteriorated, Hartzel told Barbosa that his mother “wanted to die at home.” His

neighbor, Jeanette Guillory, warned him that his mother needed medical care and he

refused to seek treatment for her. The record contains sufficient evidence from which

the jury could have concluded that Hartzel knew Mother needed help yet he failed

to provide it. We conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to allow the jury

to reasonably infer that Hartzel either intentionally or knowingly caused serious

bodily injury to Mother by failing to provide Mother with adequate care, nutritional

17
needs, and medical care or proper medical attention, and we overrule Hartzel’s sole

issue on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Having overruled Hartzel’s sole appellate issue, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

AFFIRMED.

JAY WRIGHT
Justice

Submitted on December 9, 2025
Opinion Delivered March 25, 2026
Do Not Publish

Before Johnson, Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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