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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

City of Mission v. Enrique Maximus Rodriguez

Texas Court of Appeals, 13th District

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 13-24-00585-CV
• Nature of Suit: Plea to jurisdiction

• Disposition: Reversed and Remanded

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (68.3K)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and Remanded

Lead Opinion

NUMBER 13-24-00585-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG

CITY OF MISSION, Appellant,

v.

ENRIQUE MAXIMUS RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.

ON APPEAL FROM THE 139TH DISTRICT COURT
OF HIDALGO COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Peña and West
Memorandum Opinion by Justice West

Appellee Enrique Maximus Rodriguez initiated the underlying lawsuit after a

motorist fleeing from appellant City of Mission (the City) police collided with him. The trial

court denied the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. By three issues, the City argues it is

immune because: (1) Rodriguez has not satisfied the required nexus under the general
waiver of governmental immunity, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1), (2) the

emergency exception to the general waiver of governmental immunity shields the City,

see id. § 101.055(2), and (3) the police officer’s actions enjoyed official immunity. We

reverse and remand.

I. BACKGROUND

Rodriguez pleaded the following:

[1] On September 21, 2021, Mr. Rodriguez was driving through San
Juan, Texas, as he normally does. Unbeknownst to Mr. Rodriguez, Samuel
Monjar[a]s, a police officer for the City of Mission, initiated a high-speed
chase when he attempted to pull over Samuel Martinez for a license plate
light being out. Instead of understanding the extreme degree of danger this
chase posed to the public for a simple traffic stop, Officer Monjar[a]s
continued the needless chase at reckless and dangerous speeds.
Ultimately, Officer Monjar[a]s continued to chase Mr. Martinez down U.S.
Business 83 reaching speeds over 60 mph in a 35-mph zone. At some point,
Officer Monjar[a]s should have realized that the chase was not worth the
unreasonable danger and either slowed down or stopped chasing Mr.
Martinez. However, Officer Monjar[a]s, with subjective knowledge of the risk
this chase posed to the public, deliberately disregarded that risk and
continued the chase.

[2] At the intersection of Nebraska Avenue and U.S. Business 83,
Mr. Rodriguez proceeded through a green light to continue on his trip. When
Mr. Rodriguez reached the middle of the intersection, Mr. Martin[]ez while
still being chased at a high speed by Officer Monjar[a]s violently collided
with Mr. Rodriguez’s vehicle. Mr. Rodriguez lost consciousness and woke
up over a week later in the hospital. Mr. Rodriguez remained in the hospital
for over a month suffering numerous medical procedures and enduring
excruciating therapy even learning to walk again. Mr. Rodriguez had no idea
that when he proceeded through the green light that he would endure life-
altering injuries.[ 1]

1 Rodriguez also enumerates several duties breached by Officer Monjaras: (a.) Failure to use due

caution; (b.) Failure to control speed in violation of Texas Transportation Code section 545.351; (c.) Failure
to conduct a police chase in a safe and reasonable manner with due regard to the safety and well-being of
the public; (d.) Failure to operate his vehicle in a manner to avoid increasing the police chase to an
unreasonably safe speed; (e.) Failure to operate the vehicle with appropriate regard for the safety of all
persons in violation of Texas Transportation Code section 546.005; (f.) Operating the vehicle with reckless
disregard for the safety of others in violation of Texas Transportation Code section 546.005; (g.) Operating
the vehicle with conscious indifference to the safety of others; (h.) Failure to use that degree of care as a
2
The trial court denied the plea as discussed above, and this appeal ensued.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

Jurisdictional challenges are reviewed de novo. City of Houston v. Gomez, 716

S.W.3d 161, 164 (Tex. 2025) (citing Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

217, 228 (Tex. 2004)). In de novo review, we exercise our own discretion and accord no

deference to the trial court’s decision. Vaughn v. Vaughan, 710 S.W.3d 412, 418 (Tex.

App.—Eastland 2025, pet. denied) (citing Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex.

1998)). “When a plea to the jurisdiction challenges the pleadings, we determine if the

pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s jurisdiction to hear the

cause.” Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226. “We construe the pleadings liberally in favor of

the plaintiffs and look to the pleaders’ intent.” Id. “If the pleadings do not contain sufficient

facts to affirmatively demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively

demonstrate incurable defects in jurisdiction, the issue is one of pleading sufficiency and

the plaintiffs should be afforded the opportunity to amend.” Id. at 226–27. “If the pleadings

affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, then a plea to the jurisdiction may be

granted without allowing the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend.” Id. at 227.

III. GENERAL IMMUNITY WAIVER – CAUSATION

By its first issue, the City argues it enjoys governmental immunity because

Rodriguez’s injuries as pled did not arise from Officer Monjaras’s use or operation of his

government vehicle under the general waiver of governmental immunity. See TEX. CIV.

person of ordinary, reasonable prudence would have used under similar circumstances; and (i.) Additional
acts of negligence and reckless disregard to the safety of others as will be identified in discovery.

3
PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1). We agree.

A. Law & Analysis

Governmental immunity is waived related to

personal injury . . . proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or
the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if . . .
the . . . personal injury . . . arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven
vehicle . . . and . . . the employee would be personally liable to the claimant
according to Texas law.

Id. (emphasis added). “The phrase ‘arises from’ requires a nexus between the injury

negligently caused by a governmental employee and the operation or use of a motor-

driven vehicle or piece of equipment.” Dall. Area Rapid Transit v. Whitley, 104 S.W.3d

540, 543 (Tex. 2003) (quotation omitted). It requires “more than mere involvement” of a

government vehicle. Id. “The vehicle’s use must have actually caused the injury.” Id.

(citation modified). “[T]he operation or use of a motor vehicle ‘does not cause injury if it

does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible.’” Id. (quoting Dall.

Cnty. Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Bossley, 968 S.W.2d 339, 343 (Tex. 1998)).

In Whitley, a public bus passenger verbally harassed and threatened Whitley, a

disabled passenger, with a box cutter. Id. at 541. Disturbed by the commotion, the bus

driver directed Whitley to exit the bus, and as he exited, the aggressor threatened to kill

him. Id. at 542. The bus driver then dropped the aggressor off at another stop about two

blocks away. Id. The aggressor assembled her friends, and they beat Whitley severely.

Id. The Texas Supreme Court found there was no nexus between Whitley’s injury and the

government employee’s operation of the bus because “[the aggressor] and her

accomplices caused Whitley’s injuries.” Id. at 543. And while the “failure to control or

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supervise the public” may have contributed, “the operation or use of the bus did not.” Id.

In City of Dallas v. Hillis, law enforcement attempted “a routine traffic stop” of a

motorcyclist, Hillis. 308 S.W.3d 526, 528–29 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2010, pet. denied). Hillis

fled, a police chase reaching speeds of 110 miles per hour ensued, Hillis lost control and

fell off an overpass resulting in his death. Id. at 529. His estate sued the city, and the

appellate court held the city was immune. Id. at 535. Specifically, the court concluded as

a matter of law that law enforcement’s “use of [a] patrol car” in pursuit of Hillis was “too

attenuated from Hillis’s conduct for that use to constitute a cause of Hillis’s injuries.” Id.

In Teague v. City of Dallas, law enforcement attempted to stop a car—for lack of

a registration sticker—driven by Aponte and also occupied by Teague. 344 S.W.3d 434,

436 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). Aponte failed to stop, and a police chase

ensued involving speeds in excess of ninety miles per hour, passing through red lights,

and running stop signs. Id. Aponte swerved across three lanes of traffic, lost control of his

car, and collided with a police cruiser resulting in his death and injuries to Teague. Id.

Teague sued seeking recovery for her injuries. Id. The appellate court found the city was

immune because there was no nexus between operation of the cruisers and Teague’s

injuries. Id. at 439. Specifically, “the operation of the [police] vehicles is too attenuated

from the injuries” because “the County’s and the City’s operation of their vehicles was too

physically and temporally separated from Aponte’s conduct to constitute a cause of

Teague’s injuries.” Id.

In Lopez v. Escobar, law enforcement sought to conduct a stop of a truck

suspected of carrying illegal immigrants. No. 04-13-00151-CV, 2013 WL 4679062, at *2

5
(Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 28, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). The truck did not initially

stop, then stopped in a median separating a divided highway, and then took off again into

traffic. Id. Escobar was unable to stop before hitting the truck. Id. Escobar sued law

enforcement. Id. The appellate court found law enforcement enjoyed immunity. Id. at *6.

Specifically, law enforcement’s actions “did not actually cause Escobar’s injuries.” Id. The

court explained as follows:

The unknown driver of the truck’s decision to try to flee by darting out into
traffic caused the injuries. The only connection between the use of the patrol
car and Escobar’s injuries is that Captain Martinez was attempting to initiate
a stop of the vehicle with which Escobar collided. That fact alone is nothing
more than mere involvement of the official vehicle and is an insufficient
nexus to result in a waiver of immunity.

Id.

In Williams v. City of Baytown, law enforcement pursued two suspected shoplifters

in a chase involving high speeds and weaving through traffic. 467 S.W.3d 566, 569 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Another officer ahead of the chase deployed a

spike strip. Id. The suspect car hit the spike strip, continued fleeing for about 200 feet,

and then rear ended a car with two teenagers. Id. One of the teenagers died, and his

family sued the city. Id. The appellate court held that the city was immune, found there

was no nexus between use of the cruisers and injuries sustained by the victim, and

observed that “[t]he plaintiffs concede that no police car was directly involved in the

collision.” Id. at 576.

Here, Rodriguez pled he was hit by Martinez, not Officer Monjaras, while Martinez

was fleeing from Officer Monjaras. Rodriguez further pled that Officer Monjaras was at

fault for pursuing Martinez. Such is insufficient to generate a nexus under section

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101.021(1). Rodriguez failed to plead facts that Officer Monjaras’s use of his cruiser

“actually caused [his] injury,” as opposed to merely “furnish[ing] the condition that [made

his] injury possible.” See Lopez, 2013 WL 4679062, at *6; Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543.

Officer Monjaras was not required to “supervise” or “control” Martinez’s reaction to an

attempted traffic stop. See Williams, 467 S.W.3d at 576; Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543.

Officer Monjaras’s use of his cruiser to attempt a traffic stop alone was “too far attenuated

from” and “too physically and temporally separated from” Martinez’s driving through an

intersection and collision with Rodriguez to constitute a cause of Rodriguez’s injuries. See

Teague, 344 S.W.3d at 439; Hillis, 308 S.W.3d at 535. It was Martinez’s “decision to try

to flee by darting out into” the intersection that “caused [Rodriguez’s] injuries.” See Lopez,

2013 WL 4679062, at *6. “The only connection between the use of” Officer Monjaras’s

cruiser “and [Rodriguez’s] injuries is that [Officer Monjaras] was attempting to initiate a

stop of the vehicle with which [Rodriguez] collided. That fact alone is nothing more than

mere involvement of the official vehicle and is an insufficient nexus to result in a waiver

of immunity.” See id. “[N]o police car was directly involved in the collision.” See Williams,

467 S.W.3d at 576.

B. Counterarguments

Rodriguez first complains that Officer Monjaras engaged in a high-speed chase of

Martinez, he should have known the risks associated with such, and he ignored those

risks. However, Rodriguez provides no authority that injuries emanating from a collision

between a pursued suspect and a third party are caused by use of the pursuing police

cruiser under section 101.0201(1) when the pursuit involves high speeds. See Hillis, 308

7
S.W.3d at 529 (holding section 101.0201(1) nexus failed despite involving high speeds);

Teague, 344 S.W.3d at 436 (same); Williams, 467 S.W.3d at 569 (same). Moreover, the

Texas Supreme Court has acknowledged that “exceeding the speed limit is part and

parcel of a police chase,” City of Austin v. Powell, 704 S.W.3d 437, 458 (Tex. 2024). The

court has additionally noted:

[W]e are loath to lay down a rule requiring the police to allow fleeing
suspects to get away whenever they drive so recklessly that they put other
people’s lives in danger . . . . Every fleeing motorist would know that escape
is within his grasp, if only he accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the
double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few red lights.

City of San Antonio v. Maspero, 640 S.W.3d 523, 532 (Tex. 2022) (quoting Scott v. Harris,

550 U.S. 372, 385 (2007)).

Rodriguez second complains that Officer Monjaras’s pursuit was prompted by a

minor traffic violation—a nonfunctional license plate light—and continued after law

enforcement learned Martinez’s license plate number. However, Rodriguez provides no

authority that injuries emanating from a collision between a pursued suspect and a third

party are caused by use of a pursuing police cruiser under section 101.0201(1) when

(1) the offense for which the suspect is pursued is insufficiently severe, or (2) a license

plate number was ascertained. See Teague, 344 S.W.3d at 436 (finding the nexus under

section 101.0201(1) failed where chase was initiated as a stop for lack of a registration

sticker); Williams, 467 S.W.3d at 578–79 (finding the nexus under section 101.0201(1)

failed where officers engaged in a dangerous, high-speed pursuit in heavy traffic after

learning the suspect driver’s identity).

8
Rodriguez third argues the Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County

decision requires a finding that there is a fact issue as to causation in this case. 453

S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2015). But in Ryder, the officer was not chasing a suspect who

independently hit a third party. Id. The officer pulled over a motorist and positioned his

cruiser facing oncoming traffic with his high beam lights blinding oncoming motorists. Id.

As a result, a truck driver hit and killed the stopped motorist. Id. In Ryder, rather than

furnishing a condition where an accident occurred, the officer was an alleged tortfeasor

whose actions directly caused the truck driver’s impaired driving that killed the motorist.

See id. at 929. 2 Here, Rodriguez has not alleged that Officer Monjaras did anything to

cause the collision other than pursue a traffic stop of Martinez.

Rodriguez fourth argues that Travis v. City of Mesquite requires a finding that a

fact issue exists as to causation in this case. See 830 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1992). Similar

to this case, Travis involved the collision of a fleeing suspect with a motorist who

thereafter sued the city for her injuries. Id. However, in that case, the city’s counsel

conceded that fact issues existed requiring reversal and remand for trial. Id. at 99. And

the city merely asserted common law official immunity related to performance of

discretionary acts rather than governmental immunity. Id. at 100. Thus, Travis is

inapplicable to the present issue. 3

2 The plaintiff in Williams v. City of Baytown asserted the same argument based on Ryder
Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette County, 453 S.W.3d 922, 926 (Tex. 2015) as Rodriguez. See 467
S.W.3d 566, 575 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). Our sister court made the same
distinguishments we make herein. See id.

3 The plaintiff in City of Dallas v. Hillis asserted the same argument based on Travis v. City of

Mesquite, 830 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1992) as Rodriguez. See 308 S.W.3d 526, 534 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2010, pet. denied). Our sister court made the same distinguishments we make herein. See id. at 535.

9
C. Summary

In short, while officer Monjaras’s use of his cruiser may have furnished a condition

that made Rodriguez’s injuries possible, Rodriguez failed to plead facts that his injuries

were actually caused by Officer Monjaras’s use of his cruiser under section 101.0201(1).

See Williams, 467 S.W.3d at 569; Lopez, 2013 WL 4679062, at *2; Teague, 344 S.W.3d

at 436; Hillis, 308 S.W.3d at 529; Whitley, 104 S.W.3d at 543. We sustain the City’s first

issue.

IV. EMERGENCY EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY WAIVER

By its second issue, the City argues the emergency exception to the State’s waiver

of immunity applies. We agree. The relevant statute provides that governmental immunity

is not waived related to

claim[s] arising . . . from the action of an employee while responding to an
emergency call or reacting to an emergency situation if the action is in
compliance with the laws and ordinances applicable to emergency action,
or in the absence of such a law or ordinance, if the action is not taken with
conscious indifference or reckless disregard for the safety of others.

TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.055(2).

We first address Rodriguez’s counterargument that the foregoing statute is wholly

inapplicable because there was no “emergency call” or “emergency situation” and second

address whether Rodriguez sufficiently pled waiver of the State’s immunity.

A. Emergency Call or Situation

Rodriguez avers that Officer Monjaras was not “responding to an emergency call

or reacting to an emergency situation” because he initially attempted to stop Martinez for

the minor offense of a nonfunctional license plate light. See id.

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The Texas Supreme Court has broadly interpreted “emergency” under

section 101.055(2) and cautioned “we cannot construe section 101.055(2) to exclude

emergencies the Legislature might have intended to include.” City of San Antonio v.

Hartman, 201 S.W.3d 667, 673 (Tex. 2006) (rejecting appellate court’s holding that

“emergency” does not include “what might be colloquially referenced to as an

‘emergency’” and holding government employees’ decisions regarding where to erect

traffic barricades during unprecedented flooding satisfied the “emergency” prong under

section 101.055(2)). Similarly, the Houston Court of Appeals held section 101.055(2)’s

“emergency” prong was satisfied by a collision that occurred while a police officer was

trying to discern whether the dispatched call he was responding to was a true emergency.

Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Little, 259 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2008, no pet.). And the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held section 101.055(2)’s

“emergency” prong was satisfied when two police cruisers following a leading cruiser ran

over an arrestee who escaped from the leading cruiser (where officers originally picked

up the arrestee for exhibiting combative behavior at the scene of a car wreck).

Pakdimounivong v. City of Arlington, 219 S.W.3d 401, 406–07, 410 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2006, pet. denied). Under this broad standard, police pursuit of an evading suspect

is unquestionably an “emergency situation” under section 101.055(2). See Maspero, 640

S.W.3d at 531–32 (explaining that allowing a suspect’s flight may be more dangerous to

the community than high speed pursuit).

Thus, we hold Officer Monjaras’s pursuit of a fleeing Martinez, albeit originally

initiated over a nonfunctional license plate light, satisfied the emergency prong under

11
section 101.055(2).

B. Pleading Sufficiency: Recklessness

Now, we address whether Rodriguez sufficiently pled waiver under section

101.055(2). Rodriguez identified two statutes that “apply to emergency action”: Texas

Transportation Code sections 546.001(3) and 546.005. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE

§§ 546.001(3), 546.005. The former provides that “[i]n operating an authorized

emergency vehicle the operator may . . . exceed a maximum speed limit, except as

provided [under certain ordinances], as long as the operator does not endanger life or

property.” Id. § 546.001(3). The latter provides that operators of emergency vehicles are

not relieved of the duty to “operate the vehicle with appropriate regard for the safety of all

persons” or “the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others.” Id.

§ 546.005.

However, the Texas Supreme Court has provided that the foregoing statutes do

not convert the State’s immunity waiver for recklessness into a waiver for mere

negligence; thus, a successful plaintiff must still plead facts amounting to recklessness.

Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 453–54, 458 (applying a recklessness standard to officer’s “failure

to control speed” after finding section 546.001 does not prohibit conduct but merely

provides a list of “safe harbors” that, if satisfied by police, “remove any doubt that

undertaking those actions is categorically permissible”); City of Amarillo v. Martin, 971

S.W.2d 426, 431 (Tex. 1998) (holding that section 546.005 merely imposes liability for

reckless conduct); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Zakir, 665 S.W.3d 884, 892 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.) (explaining that “the Transportation Code does not

12
waive immunity for ‘mere negligence’; a showing of recklessness is required”).

Recklessness involves willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others. Gomez,

716 S.W.3d at 165. A “momentary judgment lapse” or “inattentiveness” is not enough. Id.

at 165–66. In the police immunity context, “we must tread carefully” for certain police work

involves “obvious risk of serious injury to bystanders” but is necessary to prevent “even

greater danger to the community.” Maspero, 640 S.W.3d at 531. As a result, “[l]aw

enforcement must retain discretion to assess and balance these risks using reasoned

judgment.” Id. Thus, we consider whether the officer engaged in “some degree of risk

assessment.” Id. at 532.

In Powell, two officers in separate cruisers responded to a welfare check and heard

shots fired. 704 S.W.3d at 446. While pursuing a suspect car leaving the location of the

shots, the leading officer slowed to make a turn, the following officer was unable to slow

down in time and collided with the leading cruiser, the officers lost control of their cruisers,

and one cruiser impacted a car stopped at a stop sign. Id. The crash report cited the

following officer’s inattention and failure to control speed as contributing causes of the

accident. Id. The Powell court found that there was no showing of recklessness related

to the officer’s “failure to control speed.” Id. at 458. The court opined:

We do not hold that excessive speed is categorically a matter of only
negligence that never could be relevant to recklessness. Adverse weather
conditions, roadworks, or the presence of pedestrians could make some
speeds reasonable or negligent in one chase but inordinately risky and
reckless in another. As Maspero observed, speeding is ordinarily “part and
parcel of a police chase,” so deeming speed in and of itself to raise a fact
question about recklessness in such cases would be exceptional. Absent
any evidence as to [the officer’s] speed in the context of this chase, we
decline to hold that this is one of the exceptional cases. At most, in the
context of a pursuit, there could be a question only of negligence—a

13
momentary lapse in judgment within a chase that inherently would involve
high speed. Momentary lapses in judgment are not grounds for finding
recklessness. There is simply no evidence in the record that under any test
for recklessness the alleged “failure to control speed” would qualify.

Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Here, Rodriguez merely pled that Officer Monjaras should have ceased high speed

chase of Martinez. However, excess speed alone in the context of a police pursuit may

rise to no more than a mere lapse in judgment, not recklessness. See id. Rodriguez failed

to plead other facts that—in conjunction with Officer Monjaras’s speed—may equate to

recklessness such as “[a]dverse weather conditions, roadworks, or the presence of

pedestrians.” See id. Thus, Rodriguez’s pleading fails to aver facts that, taken as true,

give rise to a claim for which the State has waived its immunity. We sustain the City’s

second issue.

V. OFFICIAL IMMUNITY

By its third issue, the City argues for the first time on appeal that it is immune

because Officer Monjaras enjoyed official immunity for the actions complained of by

Rodriguez. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.021(1)(B) (providing that

governmental immunity is only waived related to a government employee’s conduct

where the employee would also be personally liable for the same under law). We

disagree. “[O]fficial immunity is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and

proved . . .; otherwise, the defense is lost.” City of Houston v. Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d

462, 469 (Tex. 2024). Here, the City did not plead official immunity as an affirmative

defense and moreover did not address such in its plea. Thus, we overrule the City’s third

14
issue. See Rodriguez, 704 S.W.3d at 469.

VI. REMEDY

The City argues that Rodriguez failed to respond to its plea with jurisdictional

evidence and, therefore, asserts this Court should render judgment dismissing this case

for lack of jurisdiction. See Powell, 704 S.W.3d at 447–48, 462 (providing that where a

defendant challenges the existence of jurisdictional facts in its plea, the case shall be

dismissed unless the plaintiff produces evidence generating a fact issue for jurisdiction).

However, we do not find a challenge to the existence of jurisdictional facts in the City’s

plea but merely a challenge to pleadings. Moreover, Rodriguez’s pleading does not

affirmatively provide that (1) Rodriguez’s injuries could not have been caused by Officer

Monjaras’s use of his cruiser under section 101.0201(1) or (2) Officer Monjaras could not

have engaged in conduct equating to recklessness under section 101.055(2). Thus, the

correct remedy is to reverse the trial court’s denial of the City’s plea and remand to provide

Rodriguez an opportunity to amend his pleading. See Tex. Tech Univ. Sys. v. Martinez,

691 S.W.3d 415, 425 (Tex. 2024) (reversing and remanding for an opportunity to re-plead

where pleadings did not affirmatively foreclose jurisdiction); Miranda, 133 S.W.3d at 226–

27.

VII. CONCLUSION

We find Rodriguez’s pleading fails to assert facts sufficient to establish a waiver of

immunity under both the general waiver of governmental immunity statute and the

emergency exception statute. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 101.021, 101.055(2).

15
We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the case for further proceedings.

JON WEST
Justice

Delivered and filed on the
19th day of March, 2026.

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