Sutton v. PennyMac - Stay Pending Appeal Denied

Jump To

Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Joel Aaron Sutton and Terry Melissa Sutton

United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:26-bk-00774

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Trial Court Document

BX
SO ORDERED. 2)
SIGNED 24th day of April, 2026 So □□□□□
□□□□□□
THIS ORDER HAS BEEN ENTERED ON THE DOCKET. Nancy B. King
PLEASE SEE DOCKET FOR ENTRY DATE. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
IN RE: )
) CASE NO. 2:26-bk-00774
JOEL AARON SUTTON, and )
TERRY MELISSA SUTTON, ) JUDGE NANCY B. KING
)
Debtors. ) CHAPTER7
)

ORDER DENYING STAY PENDING APPEAL

On April 21, 2026, the Debtors filed an Emergency Motion for Stay Pending Appeal
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007. [Docket No. 61]. Specifically, the
Debtors seek a stay of this Court’s Order granting relief from the automatic stay to PennyMac
Loan Services, LLC (“PennyMac”), [Docket No. 66], pending their appeal to the Sixth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.
In deciding whether to grant a stay pending appeal pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 8007(a)(1), courts ordinarily consider the same factors as when ruling on a motion for
preliminary injunction:!
(1) whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to
succeed on the merits;
In Sutton v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC (In re Sutton), Adv. No. 2:26-ap-90041, the Court already denied the
Debtors’ Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction which was based on the same challenges to the validity of a pre-
petition foreclosure sale [Adv. Docket No. 9].

(2) whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay;
(3) whether issuance of the stay will substantially injure the other parties interested
in the proceeding; and
(4) where the public interest lies.

Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009) (citation omitted); see also Mich. Coal. of Radioactive
Material Users, Inc. v. Griepentrog, 945 F.2d 150, 153 (6th Cir. 1991).
In determining whether to grant a stay pending appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
applies a stricter standard when analyzing the first factor. See Mason Cty. Med. Ass’n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261-62 (6th Cir. 1977) (upholding the denial of a stay in part because the likelihood
of success on the merits was “remote”); In re Thomas, 565 B.R. 856, 865 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2017)
(same). Therefore, the mere “possibility” of success on the merits is not enough to justify a stay
under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007. Mason Cty. Med. Ass’n at 261, n.4. Instead,
there must be “a strong or substantial likelihood or probability of success on the merits.” Id. For
purposes of the first factor, the Debtors needed to show that this Court abused its discretion by
granting PennyMac’s Motion for Relief from the Automatic Stay. The Debtors have failed to meet
this standard for all the reasons explained by the Court when granting PennyMac's Motion. See
e.g., In re Merit St. Media, Inc., No. 25-80156-swe-11, 2025 WL 3237432, at *11, n.9 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2025) (“Likelihood of success on the merits should be determined on the facts
presented at trial.”).
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Debtors’ Emergency Motion for Stay Pending
Appeal Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

THIS ORDER WAS SIGNED AND ENTERED ELECTRONICALLY
AS INDICATED AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE.