Sutton v. PennyMac Loan Services - Preliminary Injunction Denied
Summary
The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee denied the Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction filed by Joel Aaron Sutton and Terry Melissa Sutton in Adversary Proceeding No. 2:26-ap-90041. The Suttons sought to prevent PennyMac Loan Services, LLC from evicting them or transferring their property pending resolution of the adversary proceeding. Applying the four-factor Winter test for preliminary injunctive relief, the Court found that the Suttons failed to establish a substantial probability of success on the merits, particularly given that PennyMac had already obtained certified copies of the Deed of Trust, Substitute Deed of Trust, and state court orders granting judgment of possession.
About this source
GovPing monitors US Bankruptcy Court MDTN Docket Feed for new courts & legal regulatory changes. Every update since tracking began is archived, classified, and available as free RSS or email alerts — 4 changes logged to date.
What changed
The Court denied the plaintiffs' Amended Motion for Preliminary Injunction [Dkt. No. 4] seeking to maintain status quo and prevent eviction or transfer of the subject property pending the adversary proceeding. Applying the four-factor Winter test (likelihood of success, irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest), the Court found the Suttons failed to demonstrate substantial probability of success, noting PennyMac had provided certified copies of the Deed of Trust, Substitute Deed of Trust, and state court orders granting judgment of possession. The Court had previously found the real estate was not property of the estate and granted PennyMac stay relief to pursue post-foreclosure eviction.\n\nAffected parties in similar Chapter 7 proceedings filed post-foreclosure should note that courts may view eviction as personal harm insufficient to warrant the extraordinary relief of a preliminary injunction, even where the debtor challenges the underlying foreclosure sale validity. Mortgage servicers pursuing post-foreclosure eviction in Chapter 7 cases have a pathway to relief from the automatic stay upon demonstrating the real estate is not property of the estate.
Archived snapshot
Apr 24, 2026GovPing captured this document from the original source. If the source has since changed or been removed, this is the text as it existed at that time.
Jump To
Top Caption Trial Court Document The text of this document was obtained by analyzing a scanned document and may have typos.
Support FLP
CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.
Please become a member today.
April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note
In re: Joel Aaron Sutton and Terry Melissa Sutton v. PennyMac Loan Services, LLC
United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. Tennessee
- Citations: None known
- Docket Number: 2:26-ap-90041
Precedential Status: Unknown Status
Trial Court Document
BX
SO ORDERED. 2)
SIGNED 23rd day of April, 2026 So □□□□□
□□□□□□
THIS ORDER HAS BEEN ENTERED ON THE DOCKET. Nancy B. King
PLEASE SEE DOCKET FOR ENTRY DATE. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
AT NASHVILLE
IN RE: )
) CASE NO. 2:26-bk-00774
JOEL AARON SUTTON, and )
TERRY MELISSA SUTTON, ) JUDGE NANCY B. KING
)
Debtors. ) CHAPTER7
)
)
JOEL ARRON SUTTON, and )
TERRY MELISSA SUTTON, ) ADV. NO. 2:26-ap-90041
)
Plaintiffs, )
v. )
)
PENNYMAC LOAN SERVICES, LLC, )
)
Defendant. )
)
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Preliminary
Injunction [Dkt. No. 4]. Specifically, the Plaintiffs seek “to maintain the status quo and prevent
eviction or transfer of the subject property pending resolution of this adversary proceeding.”!
Plaintiffs also filed “Debtors’ Motion to Strike Movant’s Exhibits,” [Adv. Dkt. No. 2], and “Motion for Extension
of Time and Temporary Stay of Proceedings.” [Adv. Dkt. No. 5]. Duplicate motions were filed in the main bankruptcy
case and have already been addressed by this Court. [Bankr. Dkt. No. 56].
Whether to issue a preliminary injunction is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Tennessee v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 615 F. Supp. 3d 807, 819 (E.D. Tenn. 2022) (citing
Friendship Materials, Inc. v. Mich. Brick, Inc., 679 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir. 1982)). “When issuing
a preliminary injunction . . ., a bankruptcy court must consider the traditional factors governing
preliminary injunctions issued pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65.” Am. Imaging
Servs., Inc. v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. (In re Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc.), 963 F.2d 855, 858 (6th
Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The general standard for a preliminary injunction is well known. “A
plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits,
that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (citations omitted); see also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7065. As in all
applications for preliminary injunctions, “the four considerations applicable to preliminary
injunction decisions are factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met. Accordingly,
the degree of likelihood of success required may depend on the strength of the other factors.”
Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. of DeLorean Motor Co v. DeLorean (In re DeLorean Motor Co.), 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985). The Sixth Circuit has emphasized the flexibility of the four
factors by noting that, as an alternative if circumstances warrant, courts may relax the need for
likelihood of success by showing that “the merits present a sufficiently serious question to justify
further investigation.” Id. at 1230.
Balancing the four factors here, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to injunctive relief. The
Plaintiffs cannot meet the substantial probability of success standard to justify an injunction. At
the hearing on PennyMac Loan Services, LLC’s (“PennyMac”) motion for relief from the
automatic stay, the Plaintiffs asserted the same challenges now argued here about the validity of
the foreclosure sale. PennyMac provided certified copies of the Deed of Trust, the Substitute Deed
of Trust, and the state court orders granting a judgment of possession and dismissing the appeal of
that order of possession. PennyMac was granted stay relief to pursue post-foreclosure eviction of
the Debtors after the Court found the real estate was not property of the estate.
This is a Chapter 7 case which was filed post-foreclosure, and the harm to the Chapter 7
Debtors at this point is eviction. While a difficult result for the Plaintiffs personally, it is not the
type of harm that would warrant injunctive relief. The third and final factors do not tip the scales
in favor of injunctive relief.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have not met their burden to justify such
extraordinary relief.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Plaintiffs’ Amended Motion for Preliminary
Injunction is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
THIS ORDER WAS SIGNED AND ENTERED ELECTRONICALLY
AS INDICATED AT THE TOP OF THE FIRST PAGE.
Related changes
Get daily alerts for US Bankruptcy Court MDTN Docket Feed
Daily digest delivered to your inbox.
Free. Unsubscribe anytime.
About this page
Every important government, regulator, and court update from around the world. One place. Real-time. Free. Our mission
Source document text, dates, docket IDs, and authority are extracted directly from USBC MDTN.
The summary, classification, recommended actions, deadlines, and penalty information are AI-generated from the original text and may contain errors. Always verify against the source document.
Classification
Who this affects
Taxonomy
Browse Categories
Get alerts for this source
We'll email you when US Bankruptcy Court MDTN Docket Feed publishes new changes.
Subscribed!
Optional. Filters your digest to exactly the updates that matter to you.