Cox Communications, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment - Copyright Infringement

--------- *Cox could not invoke the DMCA safe-harbor defense based on its ef- forts to reduce infringement because an earlier decision had foreclosed that defense for the relevant period. 93 F. 4th 222, 228 (CA4 2024) (cit- ing BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Communications, Inc., 881 F. 3d 293, 301-305 (CA4 2018)).

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have recognized specific forms of secondary copyright liabil- ity that predated the Copyright Act, we are loath to expand such liability beyond those precedents. B The provider of a service is contributorily liable for the user's infringement only if it intended that the provided ser- vice be used for infringement. The intent required for con- tributory liability can be shown only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement. Grokster, 545 U. S., at 930; Sony, 464 U. S., at 440-441. A provider induces infringement if it actively encourages infringement through specific acts. Grokster, 545 U. S., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). For example, in Grokster, we held that a jury could find two file-sharing software com- panies liable for inducement. Id., at 941 (majority opinion). The companies promoted and marketed their software as a tool to infringe copyrights. Id., at 926. The "principal ob- ject" of their business models "was use of their software to download copyrighted works." Ibid. Other decisions have held providers liable for similar conduct. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 62-63 (1911) (finding liabil- ity where "[t]he defendant not only expected but invoked by advertisement the use of its films" for infringement of an author's copyright); Henry v. A. B. Dick Co., 224 U. S. 1, 49 (1912) (finding liability because the sale was made "with the purpose and intent" that the object be used for patent infringement), overruled on other grounds, Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 518 (1917). A service is tailored to infringement if it is "not capable of 'substantial' or 'commercially significant' noninfringing uses." Grokster, 545 U. S., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (quoting Sony, 464 U. S., at 442). In Sony, copyright owners sued the maker and the retailers of the Betamax video tape

8 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC

recorder. Id., at 422. The tape recorder could be used to record copyrighted television programs for later personal viewing, which would not constitute infringement. Id., at

1. On the other hand, it could also be used to reproduce and sell copyrighted television programming, which would constitute infringement. Ibid. The lower court found the Betamax maker liable because the tape recorder was "not suitable for any substantial noninfringing use" and in- fringement "was either the most conspicuous use or the ma- jor use of the Betamax product." Id., at 428 (internal quo- tation marks omitted). This Court reversed, concluding that "[t]he Betamax is . . . capable of substantial nonin- fringing uses"--like personal use--so "sale of such equip- ment to the general public does not constitute contributory infringement." Id., at 456. These two forms of contributory infringement track pa- tent law. See Grokster, 545 U. S., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., con- curring). Under 35 U. S. C. §271(b), "[w]hoever actively in- duces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer." Such liability requires that the party express "an affirmative intent that the product be used to infringe." Grokster, 545 U. S., at 936. Under §271(c), a party is liable when it sells a product used for infringement "knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent." This Court has repeatedly made clear that mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is insuffi- cient to establish the required intent to infringe. In Kalem Co., the Court explained that "mere indifferent supposition or knowledge on the part of the seller" that the buyer will use the product unlawfully is "not enough" to make the seller liable for the buyer's conduct. 222 U. S., at 62. In Sony, the Court explained that "[t]here is no precedent in the law of copyright" for liability based only "on the fact that [the defendant] has sold equipment with constructive knowledge of the fact that its customers may use that

9 Cite as: 607 U. S. ____ (2026)

equipment to make unauthorized copies of copyrighted ma- terial." 464 U. S., at 439. And, in Grokster, the Court con- firmed that "a court would be unable to find contributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take af- firmative steps to prevent infringement." 545 U. S., at 939,

1. 12. III Thus, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony's copyrights. Cox provided Internet service to its subscribers, but it did not intend for that service to be used to commit copyright infringement. Holding Cox liable merely for failing to terminate Internet service to infringing accounts would expand secondary copyright liability be- yond our precedents. Cox neither induced its users' infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement. As for inducement, Cox did not "induce" or "encourage" its subscribers to infringe in any manner. Id., at 930. Sony provided no "evidence of ex- press promotion, marketing, and intent to promote" in- fringement. Id., at 926. And, Cox repeatedly discouraged copyright infringement by sending warnings, suspending services, and terminating accounts. As for providing a ser- vice tailored to infringement, Cox's Internet service was clearly "capable of 'substantial' or 'commercially significant' noninfringing uses." Id., at 942 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Cox did not tailor its service to make copyright infringe- ment easier. Cox simply provided Internet access, which is used for many purposes other than copyright infringement. The Fourth Circuit found otherwise based only on its Cir- cuit precedent establishing a new form of contributory lia- bility. The court did not suggest that Cox induced its users to infringe. 93 F. 4th, at 235, n. 4. And, it did not deny that Cox's service was "capable of substantial lawful use and not designed to promote infringement." Id., at 236. Rather, the court held that "supplying a product with knowledge that

10 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC

the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is . . . suffi- cient for contributory infringement." Ibid.; see also BMG, 881 F. 3d, at 311-312. The Fourth Circuit's holding thus went beyond the two forms of liability recognized in Grok- ster and Sony. It also conflicted with this Court's repeated admonition that contributory liability cannot rest only on a provider's knowledge of infringement and insufficient ac- tion to prevent it. See Kalem Co., 222 U. S., at 62; Sony, 464 U. S., at 439; Grokster, 545 U. S., at 939, n. 12. IV Finally, Sony argues that the DMCA safe harbor would have no effect if Internet service providers are not liable for providing Internet service to known infringers. Brief for Respondents 38. The DMCA safe harbor protects Internet service providers that terminate repeat infringers "in ap- propriate circumstances." 17 U. S. C. §512(i)(1)(A). Sony argues that Congress must have enacted the DMCA on the presumption that Internet service providers could be held liable in cases such as these. Sony overreads the DMCA. Sony does not contend that the DMCA expressly imposes liability for Internet service providers who serve known infringers. It does not. The DMCA merely creates new defenses from liability for such providers. And, the DMCA made clear that failure to com- ply with the safe-harbor rules "shall not bear adversely upon . . . a defense by the service provider that the service provider's conduct is not infringing." §512(l). V The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir- cuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further pro- ceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered.

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No. 24-171

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COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC., ET AL., PETITIONERS

1. SONY MUSIC ENTERTAINMENT, ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT [March 25, 2026]

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, with whom JUSTICE JACKSON joins, concurring in the judgment. Cox Communications, an internet service provider, re- ceives thousands of notices every day that specific Cox-sup- plied internet connections have been used to infringe copy- rights. The Court granted certiorari to decide whether Cox can be held secondarily liable for copyright infringement committed by others on its network because Cox knowingly continues to service specific internet connections that have been, and will continue to be, used to commit that infringe- ment. The majority holds that Cox is not liable solely because its conduct does not fit within the two theories of secondary liability previously applied by this Court. In so doing, the majority, without any meaningful explanation, unneces- sarily limits secondary liability even though this Court's precedents have left open the possibility that other com- mon-law theories of such liability, like aiding and abetting, could apply in the copyright context. By ignoring those past decisions, the majority also upends the statutory incentive structure that Congress created. I nonetheless agree with the majority that Cox cannot be held liable here for a different reason. Plaintiffs cannot prove that Cox had the requisite intent to aid copyright

infringement for Cox to be liable on a common-law aiding- and-abetting theory. I therefore concur in the judgment. I The Copyright Act does not expressly provide for second- ary liability. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U. S. 417, 434 (1984). Still, this Court has recognized that there are two types of secondary liabil- ity under the Copyright Act: vicarious and contributory lia- bility. See ibid. The former attaches when a party has con- trol over another's infringing activity and fails to stop it, and the latter attaches when a party materially contributes in some way to another's infringement. See Metro- Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U. S. 913, 930 (2005); see also Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Co- lumbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F. 2d 1159, 1162 (CA2 1971) (discussing vicarious and contributory liability). This case comes to the Court with only contributory liability remain- ing at issue. As the majority explains, this Court's cases have held that contributory liability for copyright infringement may attach in at least two circumstances. The first is when a defendant distributes or provides a product or service that is incapable of "commercially significant noninfringing uses." Sony, 464 U. S., at 442. In other words, the product or service must be " 'good for nothing else' but infringe-

ment." Grokster, 545 U. S., at 932. The Court applied that

doctrine in Sony, 464 U. S. 417, and held that Sony was not liable for copyright infringement for selling the Betamax, a tape-recorder device that enabled users to record television shows for later watching. Id., at 442. Regardless of whether the Betamax could be used to commit infringe- ment, the Court reasoned, it was also capable of "commer- cially significant noninfringing uses," such as recording a show for personal viewing at home after it aired. Ibid.

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The second circumstance in which contributory liability may attach is when a party induces another to commit in- fringement. The Court applied this rule in Grokster, 545

1. S. 913. There, the defendants distributed peer-to-peer file sharing software that had lawful uses but also enabled massive amounts of copyright infringement as users shared copyrighted materials with one another without authoriza- tion. Id., at 919-922. Drawing from the common law, the Court held that a party can be liable for the infringements of another if it takes "'active steps . . . to encourage direct infringement,' such as advertising an infringing use or in- structing how to engage in an infringing use." Id., at 936 (citation omitted). The Court found that the software dis- tributors had done just that by advertising their software to users of previous infringing services, declining to imple- ment filters or other policies to weed out infringing content, and relying on a revenue model tied to high-volume use of their software. Id., at 939-940. II I agree with the majority that neither of the two prior theories of secondary liability applied by this Court covers Cox's conduct. See ante, at 9-10. The majority is wrong, however, that those are or should be the only two forms of secondary liability for copyright infringement. The major- ity's artificial limiting of secondary liability is supported by neither precedent nor statute. A To determine whether Cox may be held liable, the major- ity starts by correctly explaining that "[t]he provider of a service is contributorily liable for the user's infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for in- fringement." Ante, at 7; see infra, at 7-12. The majority, however, errs in the very next sentence. It asserts, with no meaningful explanation, that "[t]he intent required for

contributory liability can be shown only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement." Ante, at 7. Because plaintiffs do not satisfy those theories of contributory liability, according to the ma- jority, their claims cannot succeed. The inflexible limit the majority imposes is nowhere to be found in either Sony or Grokster, the only authorities that the majority cites, see ante, at 7. Beginning with Sony, alt- hough that case acknowledged that the Copyright Act does not expressly provide for secondary liability, it also clarified that "[t]he absence of such express language in the copy- right statute does not preclude the imposition of" secondary liability, such as vicarious and contributory liability, be- cause both forms of liability are "imposed in virtually all areas of the law." 464 U. S., at 434-435; see id., at 436 (Contributory liability principles are " 'recognized in every

part of the law' "). Far from supporting the majority's limi- tation of secondary liability, Sony teaches that the scope of

secondary liability for copyright infringement should be de- fined by reference to other areas of the law. Id., at 435-437. The Court reinforced this point in Grokster. In that case, the Ninth Circuit attempted to limit contributory liability to the circumstances Sony confronted. This Court reversed, explaining that Sony neither "displace[d] other theories of secondary liability" nor "foreclose[d] rules of fault-based li- ability derived from the common law." 545 U. S., at 934-

1. Instead, all Sony did was "limi[t] imputing culpable intent as a matter of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product." 545 U. S., at 934. "[N]othing in Sony," the Court said, "requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if there is such evidence." Ibid. Properly understood, Sony and Grokster preserved other forms of secondary liability derived from the common law. The majority, however, does not even mention that Grokster expressly held the door open to other common-law liability rules. Instead, all the majority offers is that it is "loath to

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expand [secondary] liability" further based on the general principle that "[o]rdinarily, when Congress intends to im- pose secondary liability, it does so expressly." Ante, at 6-7. That principle, however, is irrelevant here because this Court held over 40 years ago that the Copyright Act im- pliedly provides for secondary liability. See Sony, 464 U. S., at 434-435. Stare decisis requires this Court to apply that holding fairly, not ignore or artificially constrain it. Indeed, "stare decisis carries enhanced force when a decision . . . in- terprets a statute." Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 576 U. S. 446, 456 (2015). Whatever the majority may think of Sony and Grokster, those decisions have "effectively become part of the [copyright] statutory scheme." Kimble, 576 U. S., at 456. Whether that statutory scheme imposes liability under these circumstances must be decided accord- ing to what those cases said, not what the majority might wish they had said. Adhering to precedent is even more important where, as here, Congress has legislated based on this Court's decisions. B The majority's limiting of secondary liability here dis- mantles the statutory incentive structure that Congress created. Congress passed the Digital Millennium Copy- right Act (DMCA) in 1998, 14 years after this Court held in Sony that the Copyright Act impliedly provided for second- ary liability. At the time, the internet was exploding in pop- ularity. Without knowing more about the outer bounds of secondary liability for copyright infringement, and faced with a rapidly changing technological landscape, Congress included in the DMCA a safe harbor that shields internet service providers (ISPs) like Cox from secondary liability for copyright infringement. To gain that protection, they must "adop[t] and reasonably implemen[t] . . . a policy that pro- vides for the termination in appropriate circumstances" of subscribers who repeatedly infringe copyrights using the

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ISP's network. 17 U. S. C. §§512(a) and (i)(1)(A). Im- portantly, Congress did not provide that ISPs could never be secondarily liable for copyright infringement. Instead, it struck a balance by creating incentives for ISPs to take rea- sonable steps to prevent copyright infringement on their networks, while also assuring ISPs that they do not need to take on the impossible task of responding to every instance of infringement on their networks. The majority's new rule completely upends that balance and consigns the safe harbor provision to obsolescence. Typically, this Court tries " '"to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute." ' " TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 31 (2001). After today, however, ISPs no longer face any realistic probability of secondary liability for copyright infringement, regardless of whether they take steps to address infringement on their networks and re- gardless of what they know about their users' activity. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 14 (counsel for Cox agreeing that it "would have no liability risk" based on knowledge alone). For ex- ample, under the majority's rule, an ISP faces no liability if it sells an internet connection to a company that the ISP knows runs a website that exclusively hosts illegally ob- tained copyrighted material. That ISP also faces no liabil- ity even if it sells a connection to a customer who walks into the store and says that he needs a new internet connection because the other, more scrupulous ISP in town cut his con- nection after years of unabated piracy. The majority's decision thus permits ISPs to sell an inter- net connection to every single infringer who wants one without fear of liability and without lifting a finger to pre- vent infringement. It also means that Cox is free to aban- don its current policy of responding to copyright infringe- ment. As Cox's counsel conceded at oral argument, under the rule the majority adopts today, the safe harbor provi- sion will not "d[o] anything at all" going forward, id., at 28-

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1. Congress did not enact the safe harbor just so that this Court could eviscerate it.* III Instead of artificially limiting secondary liability, the Court should have examined whether some other "rul[e] of fault-based liability derived from the common law" might hold Cox liable for copyright infringement committed on its network. Grokster, 545 U. S., at 934-935. Plaintiffs argue that Cox is liable because it materially contributed to in- fringement by servicing internet connections that it knew would be used to commit infringement. That argument is rooted in the common-law doctrine of aiding and abetting. That doctrine, however, requires plaintiffs to show that Cox intended to aid infringement, and the facts of this case fore- close that inference. A This Court has addressed common-law civil aiding-and- abetting liability twice in recent years. In both cases, it held that aiding-and-betting liability requires proof that the defendant aided another with the intent of helping that other person succeed in committing wrongful conduct. The first of this Court's recent cases is Twitter, Inc. v. Taamneh, 598 U. S. 471 (2023). There, the plaintiff alleged that social media platforms had aided and abetted a terror- ist attack by ISIS because they knowingly hosted content, posted by ISIS and its followers, that was intended to spread ISIS propaganda, recruit members, and raise funds. Id., at 481. The platforms also allegedly promoted that con- tent via their algorithms. Ibid. The plaintiffs asserted that

------------ *Under the majority's view, ISPs could still face secondary liability if they design their service to facilitate infringement or if they promote their service as infringement friendly. The safe harbor, however, is not intended to help an ISP facing liability on either of those two theories because it requires that an anti-infringement policy be "reasonably im- plemented." 17 U. S. C. §512(i)(1)(A).

8 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC S

the platforms had not done enough to "detect and remove a substantial number of ISIS-related accounts, posts, and videos." Ibid. This Court held that the platforms could not be held lia- ble as aiders and abettors based on the complaint's allega- tions. After surveying lower court cases and common-law sources, the Court identified the "conceptual core that has animated aiding-and-abetting liability for centuries: that the defendant consciously and culpably 'participate[s]' in a wrongful act so as to help 'make it succeed.'" Id., at 493

(quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U. S. 613, 619

(1949)). Put another way, "the defendant has to take some 'affirmative act' 'with the intent of facilitating the offense's commission.'" 598 U. S., at 490 (quoting Rosemond v. United States, 572 U. S. 65, 71 (2014)). The plaintiffs' claims did not plausibly meet this standard, however, be- cause they failed to allege that pro-ISIS accounts or content received "any special treatment." 598 U. S., at 498. Nor did they allege any other facts sufficient to overcome the "at- tenuated . . . nexus" between the platforms' actions and the ISIS attack or establish that the platforms intended to aid that attack. Id., at 506. Importantly, Twitter emphasized that "the concep[t] of aiding and abetting" does not "lend [itself] to crisp, bright- line distinctions," ibid., but rather "should be understood in light of the common law," id., at 497. The common law, in turn, recognizes that intent can sometimes be inferred from what the defendant knew when he acted. The Second Re- statement of Torts explains that this kind of knowledge- based intent can be found where "the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead." Restatement (Second) of Torts §8A, Comment b (1963-1964). In these circum- stances, the actor "is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result." Ibid. For example, someone who gives a gun to another, knowing with certainty that the

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other person will shoot someone with it, could be found to have intentionally aided a shooting even if he did not desire for anyone to be shot. If the recipient shoots someone with that gun, then under the common law, the person who gave the shooter the gun could be held liable for aiding and abet- ting the shooting. See id., §876(b) and Comment d (1977); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Economic Harm §28, Comment c (2018). This theory of intent requires a sufficiently specific show- ing of knowledge. In Smith & Wesson Brands, Inc. v. Esta- dos Unidos Mexicanos, 605 U. S. 280 (2025), this Court re- jected secondary liability for gun manufacturers whose guns were used by Mexican drug cartels to commit violence in Mexico due to insufficient allegations of intent. Id., at

1. There, Mexico alleged that the gun manufacturers had aided and abetted the unlawful gun sales that routed guns to those cartels. Id., at 287-289. As the Court observed, there was "little doubt that, as the complaint asserts, some [unlawful] sales take place--and that the manufacturers know they do." Id., at 294. Nonetheless, applying the prin- ciples of aiding-and-abetting liability discussed in Twitter, the Court concluded that Mexico had not plausibly alleged that the gun manufacturers had " 'participate[d] in' " the il-

licit sale of guns to the cartels such that they sought " 'by [their] action to make' " those sales succeed. 605 U. S., at

294 (second alteration in original). It observed that Mexico had "se[t] for itself a high bar" to clear because it did not "pinpoint, as most aiding-and-abetting claims do, any spe- cific criminal transactions." Ibid. Instead, Mexico "level[ed] a more general accusation: that all the manufac- turers assist some number of unidentified rogue gun deal- ers in making a host of firearm sales in violation of various legal bars." Ibid. The "systemic nature" of those more gen- eralized allegations, the Court explained, required "plausi- ble allegations of 'pervasive, systemic, and culpable assis- tance.' " Ibid. (quoting Twitter, 598 U. S., at 502).

10 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC S

Mexico's allegations failed to clear that high bar. To start, Mexico did not allege that the gun manufacturers had treated unlawful actors any differently from lawful actors. 605 U. S., at 295. Mexico also failed to account for the fact that gun manufacturers sold the guns to middlemen dis- tributors, whom the manufacturers did not control, who then sold the guns to illicit dealers. Id., at 295-296. Even if the gun manufacturers knew everything the distributors did, the Court continued, Mexico failed to allege plausibly that the manufacturers knew, or even could learn, which dealers were selling guns to the cartels. Id., at 296-297. Without that knowledge, or further evidence of the manu- facturers' intent, the Court held that Mexico's allegations did not satisfy the standards necessary to impose aiding and abetting on the manufacturers because those allega- tions did not plausibly show that they had participated in the unlawful sales to make them succeed. Id., at 296-299. B These principles of aiding-and-abetting liability and in- tent resolve this case. Plaintiffs must prove that Cox in- tended to aid, and therefore help make succeed, copyright infringement committed by those who use its network. To do so, plaintiffs point out that Cox, having received copy- right-violation notices, knew that specific connections it services have been, and will continue to be, used to infringe copyrights. Because Cox nonetheless continued to service those connections, plaintiffs argue that the jury could have found that Cox intended to facilitate infringement commit- ted using those connections. This record, however, cannot support finding the neces- sary intent for aiding-and-abetting liability to attach. To begin, Cox is merely supplying internet service to its cus- tomers. Nothing about that conduct is inherently culpable: Most internet traffic is lawful, and supplying an internet connection is just as consistent with lawful purposes as it is

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with unlawful purposes. See id., at 292 ("[R]outine and gen- eral activity that happens on occasion to assist in a crime . . . is unlikely to count as aiding and abetting"). Nor have plaintiffs shown that Cox intended to aid spe- cific instances of infringement. That is because, based on plaintiffs' evidence, Cox does not actually know that specific users will commit infringement using Cox's network. Cox supplies internet connections to a wide range of customers, ranging from single users all the way to smaller regional ISPs. When Cox receives a copyright violation notice, how- ever, the notice specifies only which connection was used to infringe, not who used it to commit infringement. That informational gap is fatal here. As Smith & Wesson explained, aiding-and-abetting liability most commonly at- taches where the defendant aided a specific instance of un- lawful conduct. Id., at 294. Often, that requires the plain- tiff to show that the defendant, at a minimum, knew who the "principals" in the alleged unlawful acts were. Id., at 295-296. Here, however, plaintiffs have not shown that Cox had specific knowledge of who committed the infringing conduct. Take, for example, a connection sold to a single- family home. Cox, after receiving three notices of copyright violations, would know only that that home's connection is substantially certain to be used again in the future to com- mit infringement. Yet Cox would have no knowledge (in- deed, plaintiffs have not shown that Cox has any way of knowing) who within the household committed infringe- ment. Nor, for that matter, have plaintiffs shown any way for Cox to know if the infringer was a neighbor who might have the Wi-Fi password. Without that knowledge, it is not reasonable to infer that Cox intended to aid infringement committed by another person just because it provided an internet connection to some unknown infringer. This problem is even more glaring when it comes to con- nections that serve hundreds or thousands of users. For instance, Cox provides internet service to regional ISPs who

12 COX COMMUNICATIONS, INC. v. SONY MUSIC

in turn supply internet service to thousands of users. Given the numbers involved, it is hardly surprising that Cox has received many copyright-violation notices as to connections supplied to regional ISPs. Still, Cox does not know who among a regional ISP's thousands of customers is commit- ting infringement, even if it knows that someone has in- fringed in the past and that someone will infringe in the future. In this scenario, the regional ISP is akin to the middle- men in Smith & Wesson: Like the middlemen who pur- chased lawful firearms and then redirected them to a mix of lawful and unlawful dealers, the regional ISP is purchas- ing lawful internet service and redirecting it to a range of users, some of whom will use the service lawfully and some who will use it unlawfully. See id., at 294-296. Further- more, just as the gun manufacturers in Smith & Wesson did not have control over the middlemen, Cox similarly does not have control over the regional ISP. Id., at 295-296. Given this degree of removal from the infringing activity and Cox's incomplete knowledge, Cox cannot be found to have in- tended to aid in any specific instance of infringement com- mitted using the connection that Cox provides to the re- gional ISP. The same is true for connections Cox provides to university housing, hospitals, military bases, and other places that are likely to have many different users. Without proof that Cox knew more about individual in- stances of infringement, and without evidence of "perva- sive, systemic, and culpable assistance" needed to support a more generalized theory of liability, see Twitter, 598 U. S., at 502, plaintiffs have at most shown that Cox was "indif- ferent" to infringement conducted via the connections it sells. Id., at 500. Mere indifference, however, is not enough for aiding and abetting liability to attach. Smith & Wesson, 605 U. S., at 297.

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The facts of this case do not establish the requisite intent needed to hold Cox liable for infringement that occurred on its network. Because the majority needlessly curtails sec- ondary liability in a manner inconsistent with both prece- dent and statute, I concur only in the judgment.