Andanayya vs Deputy Chief Engineer - Land Acquisition Compensation

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• Know your Kanoon - Doc Gen Hub - Counter Argument - Case Predict AI - Talk with IK Doc -... Upgrade to Premium [Cites 30, Cited by 0 ] ### Supreme Court of India

Andanayya vs Deputy Chief Engineer on 25 March, 2026

2026 INSC 293

                                                                                 REPORTABLE

                                            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                                             CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                                         CIVIL APPEAL NOs. ………. OF 2026
                                     (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 2587 - 2593 of 2021)

                        ANDANAYYA AND ORS.                                    … APPELLANTS

                                                                VERSUS

                        DEPUTY CHIEF ENGINEER AND ORS.                      … RESPONDENTS

                                                          JUDGMENT M. M. Sundresh, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellants in the present appeals are the landowners who have lost

                           their land in the acquisition proceedings. They are aggrieved by the
   
                           impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of
   
                           Karnataka, wherein the second application filed by them before the
   
                           Collector, seeking re-determination of compensation, has been rejected.
   
                           The appellants had earlier sought re-determination of compensation on Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHA SUNDRIYAL Date: 2026.03.25 the basis of the award of the Reference Court and now seek further re-
   

   16:35:30 IST
   Reason:

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 1 of 38

determination on parity with similarly placed landowners, in whose

favor the High Court was pleased to pass an enhanced award.
3. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the

learned Additional Solicitor General of India (ASG), as well as the

learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondents. Documents filed,

judgments relied upon, and the written submissions have been perused

and duly taken on record.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

1. Lands situated at Mavanoor Village, Hubballi Taluk, were acquired for

   the construction of the Hubballi-Ankola Broad Gauge Line. On

   18.04.2002, a preliminary notification was issued under Section 4(1) of

   the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”).

   On 31.03.2003, respondent No.2, who is the Land Acquisition Officer

   (hereinafter referred to as “the LAO”), passed an award under [Section

   11](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/291273/) of the Act, fixing compensation at Rs. 40,000/- per acre. Being

   dissatisfied with the amount awarded, some landowners sought a

   reference under Section 18 of the Act. The Reference Court awarded an Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 2 of 38 enhanced sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- per acre as compensation, vide

   judgment dated 17.11.2006.

2. The appellants, who did not seek a reference, filed an application under Section 28-A of the Act on 01.02.2007, within 90 days from the date of

   the award of the Reference Court, seeking re-determination of their

   compensation based upon the award of the Reference Court in LAC

   Nos. 1-5/2003. During the pendency of the said application, appeals

   were filed before the High Court by some of the landowners, as well as

   by respondent No.2, seeking enhancement and reduction of

   compensation, respectively. After the appeals filed by respondent No.2

   were dismissed by the High Court, vide order dated 06.08.2012, the first

   application filed by the appellants under Section 28-A of the Act was

   allowed on 02.04.2013, and their compensation was re-determined on

   the basis of the award of the Reference Court, even though the appeals

   filed by the landowners were still pending and came to be allowed by

   the High Court only on 22.07.2013, further enhancing the compensation

   to Rs. 3,50,000/- per acre.

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 3 of 38

1. Upon receipt of knowledge of the award passed by the High Court, the

   appellants filed another application under Section 28-A of the Act on

   25.11.2013, seeking re-determination of compensation on the basis of

   the enhanced award passed by the High Court in MFA No. 3289/2007

   and MFA No. 3291/2007 dated 22.07.2013, presumably within the

   period of limitation, which is to be computed by excluding the time

   requisite for obtaining a copy of the award. In any case, the issue of

   limitation in filing the said application is not a matter of concern, before

   us, in the present appeals.

2. The second application made under Section 28-A of the Act was

   rejected by respondent No.2, vide order dated 30.11.2013, on the ground

   that the appellants had already accepted the earlier compensation on

   02.04.2013, as enhanced by the Reference Court and, that, they did not

   bring the pendency of the appeals before the High Court challenging

   the award of the Reference Court to the notice of the competent

   authority, even though one set of appeals was filed by respondent No.2

   itself. It is also observed that in the said order passed by respondent

   No.2, there is no indication of any delay on the part of the appellants in Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 4 of 38 filing the second application, particularly, in light of the proviso to Section 28-A(1) of the Act.

3. Aggrieved, the appellants filed writ petitions before the High Court. The

   learned Single Judge was pleased to find force in the submissions made

   by the appellants and, accordingly, the order of rejection was quashed

   with a direction to the official respondents to exercise the powers

   available under Section 28-A of the Act and re-determine the market

   value of the lands on the basis of the enhanced award passed by the

   High Court.

4. Aggrieved, the official respondents filed writ appeals, which have been

   allowed by the Division Bench, vide the impugned judgment, on the

   premise that re-determination under Section 28-A of the Act is available

   only in respect of an award passed by a Civil Court of original

   jurisdiction under Part-III of the Act, and that the judgment of an

   Appellate Court does not fall within the purview of Section 28-A of the

   Act. The said order has been passed by placing reliance upon a decision

   of this Court in Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat, (2018) Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 5 of 38 16 SCC 445. The appellants, thus aggrieved, have filed the present

   appeals.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANTS

10.The learned counsel appearing for the appellants would submit that the

decision which has been relied upon by the High Court in the impugned

judgment in [Ramsingbhai Jerambhai](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179658922/) (supra) has been taken note of

in [Banwari v. Haryana SIIDC](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/58924408/), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3685, and

found to be per incuriam, as it did not take into consideration the earlier

decision of this Court in [Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/), (1995) 2

SCC 736. It is his further submission that one has to see the object of

the Act and, therefore, there cannot be any discrimination between poor

landowners and other landowners who have received higher

compensation, either from the Reference Court or the High Court.

Section 28-A has been inserted into the Act by way of an amendment

for this very purpose. In any case, respondent No.2 was well aware of

the pendency of the appeals filed by the landowners before the High

Court, at least at the time of allowing the earlier application under [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act, as respondent No.2 was also a party to the said Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                      Page 6 of 38 appeals. Reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in [Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22209155/), (2018) 11 SCC 92, to buttress

the submission that the Collector/LAO must stay his hands in the matter

of re-determination of compensation under [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act until

the appeal is disposed of by the appellate forum, and that the re-

determination must be made only on the basis of the final judgment of

the appellate forum.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

11.The learned ASG and the learned Senior counsel appearing for the

respondents would submit that the decision of this Court in the case of [Ramsingbhai Jerambhai](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179658922/) (supra), has been rightly taken note of by the

High Court in the impugned judgment. They would further submit that

even in the case of [Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) (supra), which has been relied

upon by the appellants, this Court was pleased to hold that only one

application under [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act is maintainable and, thus, the

second application made by the appellants herein, after the judgment

rendered by the High Court, would not be maintainable. The appellants, Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                    Page 7 of 38 having already accepted the earlier compensation as enhanced by the

Reference Court, cannot seek re-determination once again.

DISCUSSION ON THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE LAND

ACQUISITION ACT, 1894 (ACT NO. 1 OF 1894)

1. The Act is dual in nature. It is both expropriatory and beneficial. It is

   expropriatory in nature insofar as the acquisition proceedings are

   concerned, and beneficial, when it comes to the payment of

   compensation to the landowners. The Act contains both procedural and

   substantive provisions to give effect to the objectives envisaged under

   it. When it comes to the re-determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act, it is clearly spelt out in the Statement of Objects

   and Reasons of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 that an

   endeavor should be made to give equal compensation to all the similarly

   placed landowners, and that procedural technicalities will have to be

   avoided for the same. The spirit of the enactment is encapsulated in the

   following paragraph of the Statement of Objects and Reasons:

xxx xxx xxx

    “(ix) Considering that the right of reference to the Civil Court under [section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) of the Act is not usually taken advantage of by inarticulate Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                            Page 8 of 38 and poor people and is usually exercised only by the comparatively
    affluent land owners and that this causes considerable inequality in
    the payment of compensation for the same or similar quality of land
    to different interested parties, it is proposed to provide an
    opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is covered under the
    same notification to seek re-determination of compensation, once any
    one of them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation
    from the reference Court under [section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) of the Act.”

        xxx                             xxx                    xxx
                                                        (emphasis supplied) [Section 3(d)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147625098/) of the Act

     “3. Definitions.—In this Act, unless there is something repugnant in the
  subject or context,—

              xxx                       xxx                      xxx

(d) the expression “Court” means a principal Civil Court of original
jurisdiction, unless the [appropriate Government] has appointed
(as it is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within
any specified local limits to perform functions of the Court under
this Act;”

              xxx                      xxx                     xxx

                                                        (emphasis supplied)

1. Section 3(d) of the Act defines the expression ‘Court’. It means a court

   of first instance, which is otherwise a principal Civil Court of original

   jurisdiction. In other words, it is the first judicial forum in the scheme

   of the Act before which an adjudication takes place, to test the award

   passed by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act. This provision Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 9 of 38 clearly defines the Court that will have jurisdiction to decide cases

   where references are made under Section 18 of the Act. Therefore, the

   jurisdiction is consciously vested with a principal Civil Court of original

   jurisdiction. An exception has been carved out in cases where the

   Appropriate Government has appointed a special judicial officer to

   undertake the said exercise. Power is, thus, expressly conferred on the

   Appropriate Government to appoint a special judicial officer in order to

   perform the functions of a Court under this Act. This definition clearly

   indicates the intention of the legislature for a reference made under Section 18 of the Act to be treated as an original proceeding. It has also

   got no application to the Appellate Courts, namely, the High Court and

   the Supreme Court.

Section 28-A of the Act

     “28-A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the
  basis of the award of the Court.—(1) Where in an award under this
  Part, the Court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in
  excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under [Section 11](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/291273/), the
  persons interested in all the other land covered by the same notification
  under [Section 4](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/43654/), sub-section (1) and who are also aggrieved by the
  award of the Collector may, notwithstanding that they had not made
  an application to the Collector under [section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/), by written application
  to the Collector within three months from the date of the award of the
  Court require that the amount of compensation payable to them may Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                           Page 10 of 38 be re-determined on the basis of the amount of compensation awarded
  by the Court:

Provided that in computing the period of three months within which an
application to the Collector shall be made under this sub-section, the day
on which the award was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a
copy of the award shall be excluded.

(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section
(1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the persons interested and
giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard, and make an award
determining the amount of compensation payable to the applicants.

(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section (2)
may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be
referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court and the
provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as may be, apply to such
reference as they apply to a reference under section 18.”
(emphasis supplied)
14. Section 28-A of the Act provides for the re-determination of

compensation in the case of landowners who have not made any

reference under [Section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) of the Act, on the basis of the award passed

under [Part III of the Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) alone. Now, it is pertinent to note that there can

only be one award passed by the Court under [Part III of the Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/). In other

words, the award passed by the High Court or this Court would also be

an award under this provision, subject to the rider that the award

pertains to [Part III of the Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) alone. The opening words of this Section,

“where in an award under this Part, the Court allows to the applicant

any amount of compensation in excess of the amount awarded by the Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                               Page 11 of 38 Collector under [Section 11](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/291273/),” must be understood from the point of view

of finality of the said award. Thus, one cannot say that the applicability

of this provision is restricted to the award passed by the Reference Court

alone. We would only clarify that, on a conjoint reading of [Sections 3(d)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147625098/) and [28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act, the term ‘Court’ used in Section 28-A would

include under its ambit the High Court and this Court as well. Any

interpretation to the contrary would militate against the very objective

of the Act, making [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act redundant. If the object of

the Act is to ensure equality between similarly placed landowners, re-

determination cannot be done partially qua an award of the Reference

Court alone as against that of the High Court or this Court. [Section 54](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151577964/) of the 1894 Act
     “54. Appeals in proceedings before Court.—Subject to the
  provisions [of the Code of Civil Procedure](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/), 1908 (5 of 1908), applicable
  to appeals from original decrees, and notwithstanding anything to the
  contrary in any enactment for the time being in force, an appeal shall
  only lie in any proceedings under this Act to the High Court from the
  award, or from any part of the award, of the Court and from any
  decree of the High Court passed on such appeal as aforesaid an appeal
  shall lie to [the Supreme Court] subject to the provisions contained in [section 110](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1832764/) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in Order XLIV
  thereof.”

                                                     (emphasis supplied) Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                          Page 12 of 38

1. At this juncture, it is pertinent to refer to Section 54 of the Act which

   speaks about appeals to the High Court and this Court. In fact, the

   heading of this provision would clearly indicate that the appeals are in

   proceedings before the Court. Therefore, the terms “High Court” or

   “Supreme Court”, used hereinabove, are to be understood with

   reference to their nomenclature and, thus, they are also Courts under

   the scope of Section 28-A of the Act. Once an award is passed by the

   High Court, the earlier one passed by the Reference Court ceases to

   exist, and stands subsumed within the award of the High Court. The

   same is the case when an award is passed by this Court. Neither the law

   nor the Act recognizes the existence of two awards emanating from the

   same proceedings, simultaneously. The aforesaid provision also throws

   more light on the definition of ‘Court’ under Section 3(d) of the Act, as

   it clearly says that the appeals are subject to the provisions [of the Code

   of Civil Procedure](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/161831507/), 1908, applicable to ‘appeals from original decrees.’

   Therefore, it clearly indicates that Section 3(d) of the Act concerns

   itself with the Court of original jurisdiction in particular. Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 13 of 38 DOCTRINE OF MERGER

16.The principle governing the doctrine of merger already stands settled

by this Court. Once an Appellate Court renders a decision by setting

aside the judgment of the court below, the consequential decree or order

passed by the Appellate Court merges with that of the court below. This

is based on the principle that there can only be one decree or order in

operation at a given point in time. In a judicial system that has its own

hierarchy of forums, a decree or order passed by an appellate forum

would certainly become the one binding on the parties, as the earlier

decree or order passed by the forum below ceases to exist, on becoming

subsumed or merged with the one passed by the appellate forum. We do

not wish to delve much into the settled position of law except by placing

reliance on the decision of this Court in [Surinder Pal Soni v. Sohan

Lal (Dead](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147061017/)) through Legal Representatives, (2020) 15 SCC 771. The

following paragraphs capture the essence of the aforesaid principle:

“11. Upon the decision of the appellate court, there was a merger of
the judgment of the trial court with the decision which was rendered
in appeal. Consequent upon the passing of the decree of an appellate Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 14 of 38 court, the decree of the trial court merges with that of the appellate
court. The doctrine of merger is founded on the rationale that there
cannot be more than one operative decree at a given point of time. The
doctrine of merger applies irrespective of whether the appellate court
has affirmed, modified or reversed the decree of the trial court. In Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala [(2000) 6 SCC 359], while explaining
the doctrine of merger, this Court held thus : (SCC p. 370, para 12)

“12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there
cannot be more than one decree or operative orders governing the
same subject-matter at a given point of time. When a decree or
order passed by an inferior court, tribunal or authority was
subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior
forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues
to be effective and binding, nevertheless its finality is put in
jeopardy. Once the superior court has disposed of the lis before it
either way — whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside
or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the
superior court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and
operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order
passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the
doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of
jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or
subject-matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall
have to be kept in view.”

xxx xxx xxx

1. More recently, the decision in [Chandi Prasad Chandi Prasad v. Jagdish Prasad, (2004) 8 SCC 724] was followed by a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Shanthi v. T.D. Vishwanathan [(2019) 11 SCC 419 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 787] rendered on 24-10-2018 in the following terms:

(Shanthi case [(2019) 11 SCC 419 : (2019) 4 SCC (Civ) 787] , SCC OnLine
SC para 7)
“7. … When an appeal is prescribed under a statute and the
appellate forum is invoked and entertained, for all intents and
purposes, the suit continues. When a higher forum entertains an
appeal and passes an order on merit, the doctrine of merger would
apply. The doctrine of merger is based on the principles of the
propriety in the hierarchy of the justice delivery system. The
doctrine of merger does not make a distinction between an order Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 15 of 38 of reversal, modification or an order of confirmation passed by the
appellate authority. The said doctrine postulates that there cannot
be more than one operative decree governing the same subject-
matter at a given point of time.”
(emphasis supplied)

JUDGMENTS RELIED UPON BY THE PARTIES

i. Babua Ram v. State of U.P., (1995) 2 SCC 689

“39. The next question is whether the Collector/LAO on receipt of
the application under sub-section (1) of Section 28-A is bound to
redetermine the compensation while the award and decree under Section 26 is pending consideration in the appeal in the High Court or
appellate forum. If he does so, whether award under Section 28-A(2) is
illegal? It is settled law that the decree of the trial court gets merged in
the decree of the appellate court which alone is executable. The finality
of the determination of the compensation is attained with the decree of
the appellate forum, be it the High Court or this Court. Take for instance
that ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ are interested persons in the land notified under Section
4(1) and the compensation determined in the award under Section 11. ‘A’
received the compensation without protest. ‘B’ and ‘C’ received the
compensation under Section 31 under protest and sought and secured
reference under Section 18. The court enhanced the compensation from the
Collector's award of Rs 10,000 to Rs 20,000. ‘B’ did not file appeal under Section 54 while ‘C’ filed the appeal. The High Court, suppose, further
enhances the compensation to Rs 25,000 or reduces the compensation to Rs
15,000 per acre. ‘A’ is a person aggrieved only to the extent of the excess
amount awarded either by the award and decree of the court under Section
26 but he will not get the enhancement of further sum of Rs 5000 granted
by the High Court in favour of ‘C’. The decree of the High Court is the
executable decree made in favour of ‘C’. Unless redetermination is kept
back till the appeal by the High Court is disposed of, incongruity would
emerge. Suppose the State filed appeal in this Court under Article 136 against the High Court decree and this Court confirms the award of the
Collector and sets aside the decree of civil court under Section 26 and of
the High Court under Section 54. There is nothing left for redetermination.
With a view to save ‘A’ or ‘B’ or the State from the consequences of
such incongruous situations, the Collector/LAO should stay his hands Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 16 of 38 in the matter of redetermination of compensation till the appeal is
finally disposed of and he should redetermine the compensation only
on the basis of the final judgment and decree of the appellate forum.
Adoption of such course, would not merely avoid the chance element in
the claimants getting the amounts of redetermined compensation but
also avoids needless burden on public exchequer. As soon as the award
of the civil court is carried in appeal, it becomes obligatory for the
Collector to keep the application/applications for redetermination of
compensation filed within limitation pending, awaiting decision by the
appellate forum and to redetermine the compensation on the basis of
the final judgment and decree. Normally the LAO would file the appeal
against the enhanced compensation in a decree of either the civil court
or the High Court and will know their pendency. In the case of appeal
filed by the interested persons, the latter should inform the
Collector/LAO of the pendency of appeal or otherwise comes to know
of it should keep the applications for redetermination, received under
sub-section (1) of Section 28-A within limitation pending, awaiting the
decision by the appellate court. Before proceeding with the
determination, he should obtain an affidavit from the party making the
application under Section 28-A that no appeal against the award made under Section 26 relied upon by him was filed or if had been filed was disposed
of by the appellate court and to produce the certified copy of decree and
judgment, if already disposed of.”
(emphasis supplied)

1. In the aforesaid decision, this Court was pleased to deal with the

   doctrine of merger in the context of Section 28-A of the Act by stating

   that the finality of the determination of compensation is attained only

   with the decree of the appellate forum. It also dealt with a scenario

   where an application under Section 28-A of the Act was being

   considered by the Collector when appeals challenging the award of the

   Reference Court were pending before the appellate forum. Accordingly, Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 17 of 38 it was held that the doctrine of merger shall become applicable in such

   a scenario and, thus, any request for re-determination under [Section 28-

   A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act is to be kept pending, till the disposal of the pending

   appeals. Incidentally, this Court also held that Section 28-A of the Act

   can be invoked only on the basis of the first award passed by the

   Reference Court and not subsequent awards, as the limitation period

   begins to run from the date of the first award of the Reference Court.

ii. Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736

       “8. We may, at the outset, state that having regard to the Statement
    of Objects and Reasons, referred to earlier, the object underlying the
    enactment of Section 28-A is to remove inequality in the payment of
    compensation for same or similar quality of land arising on account of
    inarticulate and poor people not being able to take advantage of the
    right of reference to the civil court under [Section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) of the Act. This is
    sought to be achieved by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved
    parties whose land is covered by the same notification to seek
    redetermination once any of them has obtained orders for payment of
    higher compensation from the reference court under [Section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) of the
    Act. Section 28-A is, therefore, in the nature of a beneficent provision
    intended to remove inequality and to give relief to the inarticulate and
    poor people who are not able to take advantage of right of reference to
    the civil court under [Section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) of the Act. In relation to beneficent
    legislation, the law is well-settled that while construing the provisions
    of such a legislation the court should adopt a construction which
    advances the policy of the legislation to extend the benefit rather than
    a construction which has the effect of curtailing the benefit conferred
    by it. The provisions of Section 28-A should, therefore, be construed
    keeping in view the object underlying the said provision.

1. A perusal of the provisions contained in sub-section (1) of Section 28-
   A of the Act would show that after an award is made under Part III whereby Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 18 of 38 the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensation in excess of
   the amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11, a right accrues to a
   person interested in the other land covered by the same notification under
   sub-section (1) of Section 4 who is also aggrieved by the award of the
   Collector but who had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18, to move an application before the Collector for redetermination
   of the amount of compensation payable to him on the basis of the amount
   of compensation awarded by the court. This application for redetermination
   of the compensation is required to be made within three months from the
   date of the award of the court. The right to make the application under
   Section 28-A arises from the award of the court on the basis of which
   the person making the application is seeking redetermination of the
   compensation. There is nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A to
   indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest award that
   is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A. By
   construing the expression “where in an award under this Part” in sub-
   section (1) of Section 28-A to mean “where in the first award made by
   the court under this Part”, the word ‘first’, which is not found in sub-
   section (1) of Section 28-A, is being read therein and thereby the
   amplitude of the said provision is being curtailed so as to restrict the
   benefit conferred by it. In the matter of construction of a beneficent
   provision it is not permissible by judicial interpretation to read words
   which are not there and thereby restrict the scope of the said provision.
   (See : Jnan Ranjan Sen Gupta v. Arun Kumar Bose [(1975) 2 SCC 526,
   530])

2. It is possible to visualise a situation where in the first award that is
   made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A the
   enhancement in the amount of compensation by the said award is not very
   significant for the reason that the person who sought the reference was not
   able to produce adequate evidence in support of his claim and in another
   reference where the award was made by the court subsequently such
   evidence is produced before the court and a much higher amount is awarded
   as compensation in the said award. By restricting the benefit of Section
   28-A to the first award that is made by the court after the coming into
   force of Section 28-A the benefit of higher amount of compensation on
   the basis of the subsequent award made by the court would be denied
   to the persons invoking Section 28-A and the benefit of the said
   provision would be confined to redetermination of compensation on the
   basis of lesser amount of compensation awarded under the first award
   that is made after the coming into force of Section 28-A. There is
   nothing in the wordings of Section 28-A to indicate that the legislature Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 19 of 38 intended to confer such a limited benefit under Section 28-A. Similarly,
   there may be a situation, as in the present case, where the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act covers lands falling in different villages and a
   number of references at the instance of persons having lands in different
   villages were pending in the court on the date of coming into force of
   Section 28-A and awards in those references are made by the court on
   different dates. A person who is entitled to apply under Section 28-A
   belonging to a particular village may come to know of the first award that
   is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A in a
   reference at the instance of a person belonging to another village, after the
   expiry of the period of three months from the date of the said award but he
   may come to know of the subsequent award that is made by the court in the
   reference at the instance of a person belonging to the same village before
   the expiry of the period of three months from the date of the said award.
   This is more likely to happen in the cases of inarticulate and poor
   people who cannot be expected to keep track of all the references that
   were pending in court on the date of coming into force of Section 28-A
   and may not be in a position to know, in time, about the first award
   that is made by the court after the coming into force of Section 28-A.
   By holding that the award referred to in Section 28-A(1) is the first
   award made after the coming into force of Section 28-A, such persons
   would be deprived of the benefit extended by Section 28-A. Such a
   construction would thus result in perpetuating the inequality in the
   payment of compensation which the legislature wanted to remove by
   enacting Section 28-A. The object underlying Section 28-A would be
   better achieved by giving the expression “an award” in Section 28-A its
   natural meaning as meaning the award that is made by the court in Part III of the Act after the coming into force of Section 28-A. If the
   said expression in Section 28-A(1) is thus construed, a person would be
   able to seek redetermination of the amount of compensation payable to
   him provided the following conditions are satisfied:

(i) An award has been made by the court under Part III after the
coming into force of Section 28-A;

(ii) By the said award the amount of compensation in excess of the
amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been
allowed to the applicant in that reference;

(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is
interested in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to which the said award relates;
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 20 of 38
(iv) The person moving the application did not make an application
to the Collector under Section 18;

(v) The application is moved within three months from the date of
the award on the basis of which the redetermination of amount
of compensation is sought; and

(vi) Only one application can be moved under Section 28-A for
redetermination of compensation by an applicant.
11. Since the cause of action for moving the application for
redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A arises from the
award on the basis of which redetermination of compensation is
sought, the principle that “once the limitation begins to run, it runs in
its full course until its running is interdicted by an order of the court”
can have no application because the limitation for moving the
application under Section 28-A will begin to run only from the date of
the award on the basis of which redetermination of compensation is
sought.

1. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the view expressed in
   Babua Ram [(1995) 2 SCC 689 : JT (1994) 7 SC 377] and Karnail Singh
   [(1995) 2 SCC 728 : (1995) 1 Scale 21] that application under Section
   28-A for redetermination of compensation can only be made on the
   basis of the first award that is made after the coming into force of
   Section 28-A. In our opinion, the benefit of redetermination of amount
   of compensation under Section 28-A can be availed of on the basis of
   any one of the awards that has been made by the court after the coming
   into force of Section 28-A provided the applicant seeking such benefit
   makes the application under Section 28-A within the prescribed period
   of three months from the making of the award on the basis of which
   redetermination is sought. The first contention urged by Shri Goswamy
   in support of the review petitions is, therefore, rejected.”
   (emphasis supplied)

2. In the aforesaid decision, this Court was considering the invocation of Section 28-A of the Act when multiple awards, arising out of the same

   acquisition proceedings, granting different amounts, were passed by the Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 21 of 38 Reference Court. The object and legislative intent behind Section 28-A of the Act was considered in extenso. It was, accordingly, held that the

   re-determination of compensation need not necessarily be sought on the

   basis of the first award passed by the Reference Court alone, but can be

   sought on the basis of any one of the multiple awards passed by the

   Reference Court, as the limitation period begins to run from the date of

   the award on the basis of which re-determination is sought and not from

   the date of the first award. Thus, the views expressed by this Court in Babua Ram (supra) with respect to the invocation of Section 28-A of

   the Act only on the basis of the first award of the Reference Court when

   there are multiple ones, did not find acceptance in this judgment and

   came to be overruled.

3. While the above judgment, in laying down certain conditions, held that

   only one application is maintainable under Section 28-A of the Act, the

   said condition is confined to cases where multiple awards have been

   passed by the Reference Court. It does not apply to situation wherein, a

   second or subsequent application is preferred, seeking re-determination

   of compensation, based on the judgment of the Appellate Court. In other Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 22 of 38 words, the aforesaid ruling does not prohibit the filing of an application

   for re-determination of compensation on the basis of the judgment of

   the Appellate Court.

iii. [Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. Land Acquisition

   Collector](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/178452445/), (1996) 6 SCC 746

       “4. We may now refer to the case-law. A two-Judge Bench of this Court
     in [Babua Ram v. State of U.P.](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1806862/) [(1995) 2 SCC 689] dealt with this precise
     question and held that the period of limitation begins to run from the date
     of the first award made on a reference under [Section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) of the Act, and
     successive awards cannot save the period of limitation; vide paragraphs 19
     and 20 of the reporter. This view was reiterated by the same Bench in [Union
     of India v. Karnail Singh](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/166471636/) [(1995) 2 SCC 728] wherein this Court held that
     the limitation of three months for an application for redetermination of
     compensation must be computed from the date of the earliest award made
     by a civil court, and not the judgment rendered by an appellate court. This
     was followed by the decision of a three-Judge Bench in [Union of
     India v. Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) [(1995) 2 SCC 736] wherein it was held that the
     benefit under Section 28-A can be had within three months from the date
     of the award of the Reference Court on the basis whereof redetermination
     is sought. The earlier two decisions in the case of Babua Ram [(1995) 2
     SCC 689] and Karnail Singh [(1995) 2 SCC 728] were overruled on the
     limited question that they sought to confine the right to seek
     redetermination to the earliest award made by the Court under [Section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) of the Act after the introduction of Section 28-A into the Act. There is,
     however, no doubt that the period of limitation has to be computed
     from the date of the Court's award under [Section 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) on the basis
     whereof redetermination is sought. Admittedly, in both the cases at
     hand, the applications for redetermination of compensation under
     Section 28-A were made long after the expiry of three months from the
     date of the award of the Court which constituted the basis for seeking
     redetermination. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court
     was right in taking the view that both the applications were time-
     barred.

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 23 of 38

1. However, the counsel for the appellants drew our attention to an
   order made in the present proceedings by a two-Judge Bench in Jose
   Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodrigueses v. Land Acquisition Collector [(1996)
   1 SCC 88] referring two questions to a five-Judge Bench, namely: (SCC
   pp. 89-90, para 4)
   “1. Whether the award of the Court, i.e., civil court made under Section 26 on reference under Section 18 would also include
   judgment and decree of the appellate court under Section 54? [Union of India v. Raghubir Singh, (1989) 2 SCC 754; G. Krishna
   Murty v. State of Orissa, (1995) 2 SCC 733 and State of
   Punjab v. Raghbir Singh, 1995 Supp (2) SCC 679 are relevant for
   the point.]

2. Whether each successive award or judgment and decree (if
   answer on Question No. 1 is positive) would give cause of action to
   file application under Section 28-A; if so construed, does not such
   a construction violate the language used in Section 28-A when
   Parliament advisedly did not use such expressions?”

   So far as the first question is concerned, there is no difference of
   opinion on the question that the period of limitation would start to run
   from the date of the Reference Court's order on the basis whereof the
   redetermination is sought. In the present case, the redetermination was
   sought on the basis of the Reference Court's order long after three
   months even from the time the last order had elapsed and hence the
   applications were clearly time-barred. We, therefore, do not see any
   need to keep these matters pending for decision by a five-Judge Bench.

3. On the second question, there was a difference of opinion as the
   three-Judge Bench in Pradeep Kumari case [(1995) 2 SCC 736] had
   departed from the view taken earlier in two cases by the two-Judge
   Bench. If and when that question arises in an appropriate case, perhaps
   a reference to a five-Judge Bench may become necessary.

4. For the above reasons, we see no merit in these appeals and dismiss
   the same but with no order as to costs.”
   (emphasis supplied) Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 24 of 38

20.In the aforesaid decision, this Court was dealing with a different factual

background, wherein, the application seeking re-determination of

compensation was filed by the landowners after the expiry of the period

of limitation of three months from the date of the award of the Reference

Court. One of the questions which came to be framed by this Court

during the proceedings was whether each successive award would give

a cause of action to file an application under [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act.

This Court was of the opinion that it may be necessary to refer the said

question to a five-Judge bench as and when such question arises in an

appropriate case, as the three-Judge bench in [Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) (supra)

had departed from the view taken in the earlier decisions. We are of the

view that such a reference may not be necessary as the principle of the

doctrine of merger and the concept that an appeal constitutes only a

continuation of the proceedings were not previously brought to the

attention of this Court. Furthermore, the Statement of Objects and

Reasons of the Act, particularly, para (ix), was also not taken into due

consideration.

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 25 of 38 iv. Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 11 SCC 92

       “14. In the case of the appellants, when their Section 28-A
    application was decided, based on awards in LARs Nos. 123 and 129 of
    1983, the very same awards were pending in appeal before the High
    Court. However, the Collector proceeded to consider their application
    and decided the same on 25-10-2000. Thereafter, fresh application
    under Section 28-A was filed on 27-5-2009 based on the judgment of
    the High Court dated 23-3-2009 [State of Maharashtra v. Sahebrao
    Kishanrao Rahane, 2009 SCC OnLine Bom 2383] . It was this application
    that was held to be not maintainable, being a second application.

1. Though there is no quarrel with the principle that only a single
   application is maintainable, in the instant case, unfortunately, the High
   Court omitted to take note of the fact that the appeals on the relied on
   awards were pending when the Section 28-A application was decided.
   That is the special and distinctive factual position in the instant case. It
   must also be kept in mind that Section 28-A is a beneficial provision.

2. The Section 28-A application dated 31-12-1992 based on the
   awards in LARs Nos. 123 and 129 of 1983 was decided on 25-10-2000
   when the appeals therefrom were pending. The Collector ought to have
   kept the application pending till the appeals were decided on 23-3-2009.
   On principle, the High Court is correct and justified in the view taken
   in the impugned judgment [Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra, 2015
   SCC OnLine Bom 6306 : (2016) 5 Bom CR 450] that there cannot be
   successive applications under Section 28-A in view of [Pradeep
   Kumari Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736]. But that
   is not the point arising for consideration here. No doubt, the second
   application dated 27-5-2009 for refixation in light of the appellate court
   judgment is not maintainable. However, since the Collector is also at
   fault in deciding the application when the matter was pending in
   appeal, we are of the view that in the peculiar facts of the instant case,
   the application dated 31-12-1992 should be considered afresh.”
   (emphasis supplied)

21.In the aforesaid decision, this Court, while placing reliance upon the

  decision rendered in [Babua Ram](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1806862/) (supra), reiterated that no decision Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                              Page 26 of 38 can be made on the application filed under [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act

during the pendency of any appeal. In fact, this decision would clearly

show that even though an applicant makes a claim for a particular

amount awarded by the Reference Court, there is no bar in law to seek

an enhancement of compensation on the basis of the award of an

appellate forum. In other words, the nature and extent of benefit to be

granted is irrelevant, and what is of utmost importance is maintaining

parity between similarly placed landowners.

22.We may also note that the stray observation made by this Court in Bharatsing (supra) to the effect that a second application made under Section 28-A of the Act after the judgment of the High Court is not

maintainable, by placing reliance upon the earlier decision rendered in [Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) (supra), may not be in tune with the law laid down

as, this Court, in [Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) (supra), was only dealing with a

scenario where multiple awards were made by the Reference Court

itself, as discussed hereinabove. Perhaps, this distinction was not

brought to the notice of this Court while rendering the decision in [Bharatsing](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22209155/) (supra).

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 27 of 38 iv. Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat,

(2018) 16 SCC 445

      “3. It is clear from the opening words of the provision that the
   redetermination under Section 28-A is available only in respect of an
   “award” passed by the “court” under [Part III of the Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/), comprising [Sections 18](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1517117/) to 28-A (both inclusive). The “Court” referred to in [Section
   28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act is the Court as defined under [Section 3(d)](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147625098/) to mean “…
   a Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction …”. Thus, the
   judgment of the appellate court is not within the purview of [Section 28-](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1945807/) A. It is also to be noted that the appellate courts under [Section 54](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/151577964/) are
   under [Part VIII of the Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) whereas the redetermination is only in
   respect of the award passed by the Reference Court under [Part III of
   the Act](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/). [See Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. LAO, (1996) 6 SCC
   746]. In its recent judgment in [Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22209155/) [(2018) 11 SCC 92 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 44], this Court has surveyed the
   decisions on this issue and reiterated the legal principle.

1. What the appellant seeks is redetermination of compensation under the Act in terms of the judgment in Ramsingbhai v. State of Gujarat of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the Act. In view of the settled legal position which we have explained above, the appellant is not entitled to such a relief; his entitlement, if any, is only in terms of Section 28-A of the Act based on the award of the Reference Court.” (emphasis supplied)

23.In the aforesaid decision, this Court held that the re-determination of

  compensation under [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act can be sought for only on

  the basis of the award of the Reference Court and cannot be further

  sought for on the basis of the award of the Appellate Court. We do not

  agree with this position of law as laid down by this Court for the

  following reasons. Firstly, the aforesaid decision of this Court has been Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                                  Page 28 of 38 rendered without taking note of the one rendered earlier in [Pradeep

 Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) (supra). Secondly, this decision has not considered the

 relevant provisions in light of the object of the Act, particularly, para

(ix) of the Statement of Objects and Reasons as extracted hereinabove.

 Certain other concepts such as the doctrine of merger and an appeal

 being only a continuation of the proceedings, were also not placed

 before it and, thus, were not given due consideration. Therefore, we are

 inclined to state that the aforesaid decision, not having considered the

 aforesaid material aspects, cannot be termed as a binding precedent.

v. Banwari v. Haryana SIIDC, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3685

  “7. This Court, speaking through a bench of three learned Judges, in
  the case of [Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179658922/) (supra), has
  observed thus:

“3. It is clear from the opening words of the provision that the
redetermination under Section 28-A is available only in respect of
an “award” passed by the “court” under Part III of the Act,
comprising Sections 18 to 28-A (both inclusive). The “Court”
referred to in Section 28-A of the Act is the Court as defined under Section 3(d) to mean “… a Principal Civil Court of Original
Jurisdiction …”. Thus, the judgment of the appellate court is not
within the purview of Section 28-A. It is also to be noted that the
appellate courts under Section 54 are under Part VIII of the Act whereas the redetermination is only in respect of the award passed
by the Reference Court under Part III of the Act. [See Jose Antonio
Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese v. LAO [Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R.
Rodriguese v. LAO, (1996) 6 SCC 746]]. In its recent judgment
in Bharatsing v. State of Maharashtra [Bharatsing v. State of Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 29 of 38 Maharashtra, (2018) 11 SCC 92 : (2018) 5 SCC (Civ) 44], this Court
has surveyed the decisions on this issue and reiterated the legal
principle.

1. What the appellant seeks is redetermination of compensation
   under the Act in terms of the judgment in Ramsingbhai v. State of
   Gujarat [Ramsingbhai v. State of Gujarat, 2014 SCC OnLine Guj
   5840 : AIR 2015 CC 1046] of the High Court passed under Section 54 of the Act. In view of the settled legal position which we have explained
   above, the appellant is not entitled to such a relief; his entitlement, if
   any, is only in terms of Section 28-A of the Act based on the award of
   the Reference Court.”
   xxx xxx xxx

2. It, however, appears that this Court in the case of Ramsingbhai
   (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has not noticed an earlier judgment
   rendered by this Court in Pradeep Kumari (supra).”
   xxx xxx xxx

3. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that the object
   underlying the enactment of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act is to remove
   inequality in the payment of compensation for same or similar quality
   of land arising on account of inarticulate and poor people not being
   able to take advantage of the right of reference to the civil court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It was held that this is sought to be achieved
   by providing an opportunity to all aggrieved parties whose land is
   covered by the same notification to seek redetermination once any of
   them has obtained orders for payment of higher compensation from
   the Reference Court under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It was held that
   while construing the provisions of such a legislation, the Court should
   adopt a construction which advances the policy of the legislation to
   extend the benefit rather than a construction which has the effect of
   curtailing the benefit conferred by it.

4. It has further been held by this Court that under Section 28-A of the
   1894 Act, a right accrues to a person interested in the other land covered by
   the same notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4, where the Court
   allows a higher compensation to the similarly circumstanced persons who
   are covered by the said notification. It has been held that the application for
   redetermination of the compensation is required to be made within three
   months from the date of the award by the Court. It has been held that the
   right to make an application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act arises from Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 30 of 38 the award of the Court on the basis of which the person making the
   application is seeking redetermination of the compensation. The Court
   further held that there is nothing in sub-section (1) of Section 28-A of the
   1894 Act to indicate that this right is confined in respect of the earliest
   award that is made by the Court after coming into force of Section 28-A of
   the 1894 Act. This Court held that Section 28-A of the 1894 Act if read in
   such a manner, it will be contrary to the principles of construction of a
   beneficial provision. It is further held that by judicial interpretation, the
   Court could not read the words which are not there and thereby restrict the
   scope of a provision.

5. In paragraph 10 of the said case, this Court had referred to
   various eventualities that may occur if such a restrictive interpretation
   is given to the provision of Section 28-A of the 1894 Act. The Court
   observed that it has to be seen from the point of view of inarticulate
   and poor people. The Court held that the object underlying Section 28-
   A of the 1894 Act would be better achieved by giving the expression
   “an award” in Section 28-A of the 1894 Act, its natural meaning as
   meaning the award that is made by the Court in Part III of the 1894
   Act after coming into force of Section 28-A.

1. This Court has laid down the conditions which are required to be satisfied for invoking the provisions of Section 28-A(1) of the 1894 Act as follows:

(i) An award has been made by the Court under Part III of the Act after
coming into force of Section 28-A;

(ii) By the said Award, the amount of compensation in excess of the
amount awarded by the Collector under Section 11 has been allowed
to the applicant in that reference;

(iii) The person moving the application under Section 28-A is interested
in other land covered by the same notification under Section 4(1) to
which the said award relates;

(iv) The person moving the application did not move the application
under Section 18;

(v) The application is moved within three months from the date of the
award on the basis of which redetermination of amount of
compensation is sought; and

(vi) Only one such application can be moved under Section 28-A for
redetermination of the compensation by the applicant.
Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 31 of 38 15. In the present case, it is not in dispute that the First Appeal which
was allowed by the High Court vide judgment and order dated 2nd May
2016 was in respect of the land which was covered by the same notification
under which notification the appellants' land is also covered. It is also not
in dispute that the amount awarded by the High Court in the said First
Appeal is in excess of the amount awarded by the Collector under Section
11 of the 1894 Act in the case of the land of the appellants. It is also not in
dispute that the appellants had not made an application to the Collector
under Section 18 of the 1894 Act. It is also not in dispute that the application
made by the appellants under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act to the Collector
was within a period of three months from the date of the judgment and order
of the High Court.

1. From the perusal of the judgment of this Court in the case
   of Pradeep Kumari (supra), it is clear that the limitation for moving the
   application under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act will begin to run only from
   the date of the award on the basis of which redetermination of the
   compensation is sought. The appellants are seeking redetermination of the
   compensation on the basis of the judgment and order of the High Court in
   First Appeal No. 429 of 2023 dated 2nd May 2016. It is not disputed that the
   application of the appellants under Section 28-A of the 1894 Act is within
   a period of three months from 2nd May 2016.

2. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the case of the
   appellants is fully covered by the judgment of this Court in the case
   of Pradeep Kumari (supra).

3. It is further to be noted that the cases of Pradeep Kumari (supra)
   and Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), both have been
   decided by a Bench strength of three learned Judges of this Court. The
   case of Pradeep Kumari (supra) is decided on 10th March 1995,
   whereas Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), has been
   decided on 24th April 2018.

4. A perusal of the judgment rendered in Ramsingbhai
   (Ramsangbhai) Jerambhai (supra), would reveal that the said case does
   not take note of the earlier view taken by three learned judges of this
   Court in the case of Pradeep Kumari (supra).

5. In this respect, we may gainfully refer to the observations of a
   Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance
   Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi [(2017) 16 SCC 680 : 2017 INSC
   1068]. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment read as under: Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 32 of 38

“27. We are compelled to state here that in Munna Lal Jain, the
three-Judge Bench should have been guided by the principle stated
in Reshma Kumari which has concurred with the view expressed
in Sarla Verma or in case of disagreement, it should have been well
advised to refer the case to a larger Bench. We say so, as we have
already expressed the opinion that the dicta laid down in Reshma
Kumari being earlier in point of time would be a binding precedent and
not the decision in Rajesh.

1. In this context, we may also refer to Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra [Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 16 SCC 623 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 558] which correctly lays down the principle that discipline demanded by a precedent or the disqualification or diminution of a decision on the application of the per incuriam rule is of great importance, since without it, certainty of law, consistency of rulings and comity of courts would become a costly casualty. A decision or judgment can be per incuriam any provision in a statute, rule or regulation, which was not brought to the notice of the court. A decision or judgment can also be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench. There can be no scintilla of doubt that an earlier decision of co-equal Bench binds the Bench of same strength. Though the judgment in Rajesh case was delivered on a later date, it had not apprised itself of the law stated in Reshma Kumari but had been guided by Santosh Devi. We have no hesitation that it is not a binding precedent on the co-equal Bench.”
2. It can thus be seen that, this Court in unequivocal terms has held that an earlier decision of a Bench of particular strength would be binding on the subsequent Benches of this Court having the same or lesser number of judges.

1. While considering the rule of per incuriam, the Constitution
   Bench of this Court has held that a decision or judgment can be said to
   be per incuriam if it is not possible to reconcile its ratio with that of a
   previously pronounced judgment of a co-equal or larger Bench.

2. In any case, the judgment in Pradeep Kumari (supra) has been
   rendered by three learned Judges of this Court after considering the
   relevant provisions of the Statute and the principles of interpretation. However, the judgment in the case of Ramsingbhai (Ramsangbhai) Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 33 of 38 Jerambhai (supra) is a short judgment only referring to the text of
   Section 28-A(1) of the 1894 Act.”
   (emphasis supplied)

24.In the aforesaid decision, this Court took into due consideration the

earlier decisions rendered in [Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) (supra) and [Ramsingbhai](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179658922/) (supra). As discussed above, cogent reasons have been

given for following the decision in [Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) (supra), while

taking note of the fact that the subsequent decision in [Ramsingbhai](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179658922/) (supra) has been rendered without taking note of the earlier decision

and thus, the latter was held to be per incuriam. Hence, we are in

agreement with the aforesaid view.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

25.From the analysis made hereinabove on the relevant provisions of the

Act and the judgments relied upon by the parties, we are inclined to

hold that even a second application made under [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act

after the award passed by the High Court is maintainable and entitled to

be considered by the Collector/LAO. We are of the view that,

entertaining an earlier application filed under [Section 28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act

on the basis of the award of the Reference Court followed by the receipt Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                      Page 34 of 38 of money, shall not act as a bar for the same applicant to seek further

re-determination of compensation on the basis of the award passed by

the High Court or this Court.

1. It is the doctrine of merger that comes into application in such

   circumstances. The benefit of an enhanced compensation received by a

   landowner, consequent to the final award passed by the appellate forum,

   would also extend to similarly placed landowners who seek re-

   determination of compensation under Section 28-A of the Act. To put it

   differently, when ‘A’ obtains an award from the Reference Court, ‘B’

   can also receive the benefit of the same by invoking Section 28-A of the

   Act. Similarly, when ‘A’ receives an enhancement from the High Court

   or this Court, ‘B’ is also entitled to receive the same enhancement,

   notwithstanding the earlier receipt of money under Section 28-A of the

   Act based upon the award of the Reference Court. The decision of this

   Court in Pradeep Kumari (supra) has to be understood and applied

   only in a context when multiple awards come to be passed by the

   Reference Court itself and not in the present context when a subsequent

   award is passed by the High Court or by this Court. Ultimately, the Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 35 of 38 object of Section 28-A of the Act is to maintain parity and equality

   between the similarly placed landowners in the payment of

   compensation. The question of estoppel, waiver or acquiescence would

   thus not arise, in view of the statutory prescriptions under Section 28-A of the Act.

FACTUAL ANALYSIS

27.Admittedly, the first application filed by the appellants under [Section

28-A](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/7832/) of the Act, seeking re-determination of compensation on the basis

of the award of the Reference Court, was pending before the competent

authority when the appeals challenging the said award were filed by the

respondents and the other landowners before the High Court.

Conveniently, the said application came to be allowed upon the

dismissal of the appeals preferred by respondent No.2, while the appeals

filed by the landowners were still pending before the High Court. This

act of the respondent No.2 is contrary to the law [laid down in](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) [Babua

Ram](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1806862/) (supra) and [Bharatsing](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/22209155/) (supra). Even otherwise, as held

hereinabove, in the absence of any statutory prohibition, there is no bar

for the appellants to seek re-determination of compensation on the basis Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021                     Page 36 of 38 of the award of the High Court, even if they had previously filed an

application after the award of the Reference Court. The fact that the

appellants received the compensation, pursuant to the order passed on

the earlier occasion, is irrelevant. The High Court, in our considered

view, erred in placing reliance upon the subsequent decision of this

Court in [Ramsingbhai Jerambhai](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/179658922/) (supra) without taking note of the

one rendered in [Pradeep Kumari](https://indiankanoon.org/doc/409818/) (supra).

28.In such view of the matter, the impugned judgment and order passed by

the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka stands set aside.

Consequently, the order of rejection passed by respondent No.2 dated

30.11.2013 also stands set aside with a direction to the respondents to

re-determine the compensation in favor of the appellants in light of the

judgment of the High Court dated 22.07.2013 in MFA Nos. 3289 and

3291 of 2007, within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of

a copy of this judgment.

29.The appeals stand allowed, accordingly.

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 37 of 38

30.Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

.………………………. J.

(M. M. SUNDRESH)

                              ………………….…………………………. J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 25, 2026 Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) Nos. 2587-2593 of 2021 Page 38 of 38