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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Supporters Alliance etc. v. City of Inglewood CA2/5

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B345195

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/19/26 Supporters Alliance etc. v. City of Inglewood CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

SUPPORTERS ALLIANCE FOR B345195
ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSIBILITY, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
Plaintiff and Respondent, 23STCP00195)

v.

CITY OF INGLEWOOD et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

PRAIRIE STATION, LLC,

Real Party in Interest and
Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed.
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis and Patrick
E. Breen for Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
Lozeau Drury, Michael R. Lozeau, and Richard T. Drury for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Supporters Alliance for Environmental Responsibility
(SAFER) successfully challenged the City of Inglewood and City
Council of the City of Inglewood’s (collectively, the City’s) decision
to prepare and adopt a mitigated negative declaration, rather
than an environmental impact report, for a new housing
development. The trial court subsequently awarded SAFER
$165,072.50 in attorney fees pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1021.5 (Section 1021.5). The developer and real party in
interest Prairie Station LLC (Prairie) appeals the fee award and
we consider (1) whether the trial court gave due weight to factors
identified in the Housing Accountability Act (HAA) (Gov. Code,1
§ 65589.5) when assessing whether the lawsuit conferred a
significant benefit on the public or a large class of persons and (2)
whether SAFER’s links to trade unions gave it a financial
incentive to litigate that should have foreclosed an award of
Section 1021.5 fees.

I. BACKGROUND
A. The Project
The 5.07-acre project site is located at the intersection of
Prairie Avenue and 113th Street in Inglewood. It is bordered by
Interstate 105 (I-105) to the southwest, a freeway ramp to the
north, Prairie Avenue to the east, and a residential property to
the northeast.
The site’s zoning designation under the City’s general plan
is “Airport Commercial,” meaning there can be no newly
constructed residential uses without a general plan amendment

1
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Government Code.

2
and a zoning change. The surrounding area is primarily
commercial, and nearby uses include a hotel, a grocery store, and
a car dealership. Structures previously occupying the site
included two commercial buildings, two single-family dwellings,
an equipment building, a sign, and an antenna. Most of these
have been demolished, leaving a parking lot and a one-story
commercial building that is unoccupied.
The project was to include three apartment buildings with
a total of 440 apartments. Each building was to have one or two
floors of parking and six stories of residential units. There was to
be open courtyard space on the second floor of each building.
There were to be up to 670 parking spaces, including
approximately 100 surface parking spaces. Pursuant to a
disposition and development agreement between the City and a
Prairie affiliate—by which the affiliate would acquire a portion of
the site from the City for $3.75 million—40 of the units were to be
restricted for occupancy by lower- and moderate-income
households.

B. Project Approval
The City’s approval of the project involved several
discretionary actions implicating the California Environmental
Quality Act (CEQA). (Pub. Resources Code, § 21080, subd. (a).)
These included approving the disposition and development
agreement, amending the general plan, and approving a zoning
change. In August 2021, the City made an initial study and
mitigated negative declaration (IS/MND) available for public
review and comment. In October 2022, the City made a revised
IS/MND draft available for public review and comment. The
revised IS/MND assessed the Project’s environmental impacts to

3
be “less than significant” as mitigated, which would obviate the
need for preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR).
(Pub. Resources Code, § 21064.5.)
Counsel for SAFER submitted a series of comments during
the public comment period on the revised IS/MND. One of these,
dated October 27, 2022, asked the City to prepare an EIR because
“the IS/MND fails as an informational document” and “there is a
fair argument that the Project may have adverse environmental
impacts.” (SAFER did not specify any potentially significant
environmental impacts in this letter.)
On December 19, 2022—after the public comment period
closed and one day prior to a public hearing on the disposition
and development agreement and IS/MND—counsel for SAFER
submitted a letter detailing “significant, unmitigated
environmental impacts [that] the [IS/MND] . . . failed to
adequately address.” These included “cumulatively significant
health risks to future Project residents that would result from
exposure to indoor formaldehyde emissions and diesel particulate
matter emissions from the immediately adjacent I-105 freeway;
insufficient mitigation of health risks to future Project residents
and area residents resulting from the Project’s future
construction and operational emissions; significant impacts to at
least three special-status species living on or near the Project
site; and insufficient mitigation of the Project’s significant
greenhouse gas and energy impacts.” SAFER’s letter enclosed
reports from several independent experts. SAFER’s attorney also
reiterated the letter’s concerns at the public hearing held the
next day.
The administrative record does not show there was any
substantive consideration by the City of the concerns SAFER

4
raised. Minutes from the public hearing simply reflect a general
response by planning manager Mindala Wilcox (Wilcox), who
“stated that several comments were received when the Draft
MND was released and made available to the public” and “when
the initial MND was prepared, it was based on the current state
and the city’s best practices in compliance with CEQA.”2
The City Council voted unanimously to approve the
disposition and development agreement and to adopt the revised
IS/MND.

C. Litigation
After the City’s approval, SAFER petitioned the trial court
for a writ of mandate to compel the City to vacate and set aside
its project approval and to prepare an EIR. SAFER argued there
was substantial evidence of a fair argument that the Project
would have significant adverse impacts relating to biological
resources, greenhouse gas emissions, and indoor emissions of
formaldehyde and the City lacked substantial evidence to
conclude emissions of diesel particulate matter would not result
in significant cancer risks.
The City, joined by Prairie, opposed the petition, arguing
SAFER’s petition suffered from several procedural flaws. Among
other things, they argued SAFER lacked standing and failed to
plead and prove exhaustion of administrative remedies (chiefly
by failing to timely submit comments). They did not address the
merits of SAFER’s CEQA-related contentions.

2
The administrative record does include emails between
Wilcox and others circulating SAFER’s December 2022 letter
without substantive comments.

5
On July 17, 2024—one day before the trial court ruled on
SAFER’s writ petition—Patrick Breen (Breen), counsel for
Prairie, filed a declaration stating Prairie “determined within the
last several days that the project at issue in this litigation is no
longer economically viable because of high interest rates, tight or
unavailable credit, low loan-to-value loan capability, much higher
construction costs (labor and materials), and low rents for the
project.” Prairie therefore would “not be proceeding with the
project,” and it was “exploring what next steps should be [taken]
to vacate the multifamily approvals.”
The following day, the trial court granted SAFER’s petition.
With respect to the City and Prairie’s procedural arguments, the
trial court determined SAFER alleged and proved public interest
standing and exhausted its administrative remedies by raising
its concerns before the close of the public hearing.
As to the merits of SAFER’s petition, the trial court focused
on impacts to biological resources, greenhouse gas emissions, and
indoor emissions. Relying on the expert reports accompanying
SAFER’s December 2022 letter to the City, the trial court
determined there was substantial evidence of a fair argument the
Project would have significant adverse environmental impacts.3

3
As set forth in the CEQA Guidelines (Cal. Code Regs., tit.
14, § 15000 et seq.; hereafter, Guidelines), an EIR is required
where, among other things, there is substantial evidence that a
project “has the potential to substantially degrade the quality of
the environment[,] substantially reduce the habitat of a . . .
wildlife species[,] cause a . . . wildlife population to drop below
self-sustaining levels[,] threaten to eliminate a[n] . . . animal
community[, or] substantially reduce the number or restrict the
range of an endangered, rare or threatened species.” (Guidelines,
§ 15065(a)(1).) The Guidelines define “substantial evidence” to

6
The court determined there was “substantial evidence of a fair
argument that the [p]roject has the potential to substantially
reduce the habitat of wildlife species, cause a wildlife population
to drop below self-sustaining levels, threaten to eliminate an
animal community, and substantially reduce the number or
restrict the range of an endangered, rare, or threatened species.”
Further, in light of missing documentary support for the City’s
threshold for significant greenhouse gas emissions—and the fact
that expected emissions would exceed thresholds adopted
elsewhere—there was a fair argument the [p]roject’s greenhouse
gas emissions would have a significant cumulative effect on the
environment. And “[b]ased on the toxic indoor formaldehyde
emissions that may result from the [p]roject, as well as the
cumulative impact with the emissions from the I-105 freeway, a
fair argument [could] be made that the [p]roject may cause
substantial adverse impacts on human beings.”
The trial court entered judgment in SAFER’s favor and
issued a peremptory writ of mandate ordering the City to vacate
and set aside its certification of the IS/MND and approval of the
project. The trial court further ordered the City to prepare and
circulate an EIR in the event that it reconsiders the project.

mean “enough relevant information and reasonable inferences
from this information that a fair argument can be made to
support a conclusion, even though other conclusions might also be
reached. Whether a fair argument can be made that the project
may have a significant effect on the environment is to be
determined by examining the whole record before the lead
agency. . . .” (Guidelines, § 15384(a).)

7
D. Attorney Fees Award
SAFER moved for attorney fees pursuant to Section 1021.5.
As we will discuss in more detail, the statute allows a court to
award attorney fees to a successful party against one or more
opposing parties in an action enforcing an important right
affecting the public interest if a significant benefit has been
conferred on the general public or a large class of persons and the
necessity and financial burden of private enforcement are such as
to make the award appropriate. SAFER’s proposed lodestar
attorney fees amount was $330,145.00, and it requested a 1.5
multiplier.
The City and Prairie opposed the fees motion. In addition
to challenging the reasonableness of the attorney fees requested,
they argued SAFER’s lawsuit did not confer a significant benefit
on the general public and the financial burden of private
enforcement did not make a fee award appropriate.4
With respect to the significant benefit element, Prairie
argued the “technical, procedural victory” of a writ of mandate
“commanding the City, should it elect to consider the proposed
Project, to prepare and circulate an [EIR]” did not constitute a
significant benefit.5 Moreover, Prairie argued the trial court’s

4
The City also argued SAFER was not a successful party
within the meaning of Section 1021.5 because Prairie abandoned
the project before the trial court ruled on the petition. The trial
court rejected this argument, and Prairie does not reprise the
argument on appeal.
5
The City advanced a similar argument that SAFER could
not “show that, after the abandonment of [a] 400 unit housing
project, a ‘significant benefit’ was conferred on the general public
worth $414,000 to the people of the City of Inglewood.”

8
analysis must account for the HAA, which requires courts
considering a fee award under Section 1021.5 to “give due weight
to the degree to which the local agency’s approval furthers
policies” promoting urban development, the suitability of the site
for housing development, and the reasonableness of the local
agency’s actions. (§ 65589.5, subds. (a)-(c), (p)(1).) Prairie argued
the Project would have created hundreds of dwelling units in an
existing urban area near public transportation and other
amenities.
With respect to the financial burden element, Prairie
argued “all of SAFER’s officers are also officers and employees
of . . . Laborers International Union of North America” (LIUNA).
Prairie contended SAFER serves as a “front for L[I]UNA’s
Southern California District Council of Laborers
[(SCDCL)] . . . and its local unions in Southern California.”
According to Prairie, SAFER routinely “threatens or files a CEQA
lawsuit that has the potential to significantly delay (if not kill) a
project, [and] then uses this leverage to demand that developers
enter into [project labor agreements] providing favorable terms
for L[I]UNA laborers.”6
Prairie requested judicial notice of more than a dozen
documents purportedly establishing SAFER’s ties to LIUNA and
affiliated unions and their alleged abuse of CEQA. As described
in Prairie’s request for judicial notice and its opposition to
SAFER’s motion for attorney fees, these documents include

6
The City offered a more cursory argument that “SAFER
provide[d] no information about itself or its members for th[e]
court to evaluate the financial burden of private enforcement on
its organization.”

9
complaints “alleging that L[I]UNA violated [a]nti-[t]rust and
RICO laws by filing repeated sham litigation under the guise of
[CEQA]” (Exhibits A and B); SAFER’s articles of incorporation,
which include a mailing address shared with SCDCL and the
signature of an attorney who represented a union in one of the
federal lawsuits (Exhibits C and D); various public filings
showing “all of SAFER’s officers have also been officers or
employees of L[I]UNA, its [SCDCL], or its local unions in
Southern California” (Exhibits E-J); SAFER’s tax returns for
several recent years showing “its primary source of revenue
(other than ‘settlement income’) was contributions from the
SCDCL” (Exhibits I, K-N); “[a] list of cases filed by SAFER in
California Superior Courts since January 2019” (Exhibit O); a
webpage titled “Phony Union Tree Huggers” purporting to
compile SAFER’s “submittals to courts and local agencies
concerning alleged CEQA violations” (Exhibit P); and comments
on a separate project under consideration by the City of Los
Angeles submitted on behalf of both SAFER and LIUNA (Exhibit
Q).
In addition to these materials, Prairie submitted another
declaration from its attorney Breen. He declared attorneys at his
firm “spoke with a number of attorneys who have represented
developer clients in administrative or legal proceedings where
SAFER alleged that various aspects of their clients’ development
project[s] violated CEQA. Those attorneys informed [Breen’s
firm] that, in order to settle these matters, SAFER required that
their clients enter into [p]roject [l]abor [a]greements . . . . Those
[agreements] are typically kept confidential. When [Breen and
his colleagues] asked these attorneys to file declarations in

10
support of Prairie’s [o]pposition, they declined to do so, out of
concern that might prejudice their clients.”7
In its reply, SAFER argued its alleged ties to organized
labor did not demonstrate any of the relevant unions could expect
to benefit from this litigation for purposes of Section 1021.5. In
addition, one of SAFER’s attorneys filed a declaration stating
SAFER never proposed a project labor agreement to settle this
matter.
The trial court ruled it would award SAFER attorney fees,
but not in the amount requested. The court applied a negative
multiplier and reduced the award to $165,072.50.8
In making the fee award, the trial court expressly found all
prerequisites to award fees under Section 1021.5 were satisfied,
including the two disputed by Prairie: whether the lawsuit
conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large
class of persons and whether the necessity and financial burden
of private enforcement made an award appropriate. The trial
court reasoned that enforcing CEQA conferred a significant
benefit on the general public and the HAA did not preclude a fee
award because the court “[could not] find that the City acted in

7
If the trial court determined it was “unable to fairly
evaluate SAFER’s financial interests,” Prairie asked the court to
continue the hearing on SAFER’s fee motion so that Prairie could
conduct “limited discovery on this issue.”
8
The trial court reasoned that, “[a]t its core, this case
involved a straightforward analysis of whether an EIR was
required” and “the difficulty of the case [did] not warrant a
lodestar of $330,145.” Moreover, “an across-the-board negative
multiplier [was] warranted” because the “lodestar figure [was]
overstated . . . .”

11
good faith in approving the Mitigated Negative Declaration.” The
trial court explained that, “[d]espite [SAFER] having presented
substantial evidence of a fair argument that the project as
mitigated may have a significant impact on the environment, the
City Council voted to adopt the Mitigated Negative Declaration.
The fact that the City Council may have disagreed that the
project as mitigated would have a significant effect on the
environment did not relieve the City and real party from having
to prepare an EIR, especially when the definition of ‘substantial
evidence’ allows for differing opinions. [Citation.]” With respect
to SAFER’s financial interests, the trial court denied Prairie’s
request for judicial notice as unnecessary to the resolution of the
issues before it. Although the trial court acknowledged Prairie
“certainly raised concerning ties between [SAFER] and labor
unions that might beg the conclusion that [SAFER] has sufficient
pecuniary interest in bringing CEQA challenges to development
projects to defeat a claim for fees under [S]ection 1021.5,” there
was no admissible evidence to support the hearsay assertion in
Breen’s declaration that SAFER leveraged CEQA actions to
extract project labor agreements from developers. Moreover, “the
evidence before the [c]ourt d[id] not demonstrate that [SAFER]
ever leveraged the instant action to obtain concessions from
[Prairie].”

II. DISCUSSION
Prairie’s appeal of the attorney fee award is limited to the
question of whether SAFER is eligible for fees at all under
Section 1021.5; the amount of the fee award is unchallenged. As
framed, the issues are the same as they were in the trial court:
whether the lawsuit conferred a significant benefit on the general

12
public or a large class of persons (giving due weight to
considerations identified in the HAA) and whether SAFER’s costs
were out of proportion to its financial interest in the litigation.
With respect to the latter issue, Prairie further contends the trial
court should have granted its request for judicial notice or, in any
case, permitted limited discovery. We review these rulings for
abuse of discretion. (Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. County of
Santa Clara (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 714, 737.)
As to the significant benefit element, Prairie contends the
trial court did not give due weight to pro-housing objectives
expressed in the HAA and instead treated the City’s CEQA
violation as conclusive evidence of a countervailing factor—that
the City acted unreasonably. The argument lacks merit because
the administrative record establishes the City never engaged at
all with the issues SAFER raised. It was within the trial court’s
discretion to conclude this lack of engagement (not the mere fact
of a CEQA violation) was unreasonable and outweighed the other
considerations identified in the HAA.
As to SAFER’s financial interest in the litigation, Prairie
contends SAFER was required to disprove any association with
trade unions and, in any case, its request for judicial notice
established (or further discovery would have established) such a
link. It was within the trial court’s discretion, however, to
conclude the fact and amount of any benefit to SAFER’s asserted
backers was too speculative to preclude a fee award and that
neither the documents furnished by Prairie nor additional
discovery would show otherwise.

13
A. The Trial Court Properly Applied the HAA in
Determining the Lawsuit Conferred a Significant
Benefit on the General Public or a Large Class of
Persons
1. Legal framework
“An important exception to the American rule that litigants
are to bear their own attorney fees is found in [S]ection 1021.5,”
which “‘codifi[es] . . . the private attorney general doctrine of
attorney fees developed in prior judicial decisions. [Citation.]’”
(Graham v. DaimlerChrysler Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 553, 565, fn.
omitted.) Section 1021.5 provides, in relevant part: “Upon
motion, a court may award attorneys’ fees to a successful party
against one or more opposing parties in any action which has
resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the
public interest if . . . a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or
nonpecuniary, has been conferred on the general public or a large
class of persons . . . [and] the necessity and financial burden of
private enforcement . . . are such as to make the award
appropriate . . . .”
“In the CEQA context, courts have held that actions
requiring a governmental agency to analyze or reassess
environmental impacts associated with a proposed project confer
a significant benefit. [Citations.]” (Keep Our Mountains Quiet,
supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at 737-738.) But as we have already
mentioned, the HAA imposes additional requirements for an
award of fees under Section 1021.5 “in a case challenging a local
agency’s approval of a housing development project . . . .”
(§ 65589.5, subd. (p)(1).) That is, “in weighing whether a
significant benefit has been conferred on the general public or a
large class of persons and whether the necessity of private

14
enforcement makes the award appropriate, [the court] shall give
due weight to the degree to which the local agency’s approval
furthers policies of [the HAA], . . . the suitability of the site for a
housing development, and the reasonableness of the decision of
the local agency.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (p)(1).)
The HAA policies to which section 65589.5, subdivision (p)
refers generally concern housing costs and the role of local
government in constraining supply. (§ 65589.5, subds. (a)-(c).)
Prairie emphasizes two of these: subdivision (a)(2)(K)’s discussion
of the need “to significantly increase the approval and
construction of new housing for all economic segments of
California’s communities” and subdivision (c)’s discussion of “the
policy of the state that development should be guided away from
prime agricultural lands” and “local jurisdictions should
encourage, to the maximum extent practicable, in filling existing
urban areas.”
The HAA declares “[i]t is the intent of the Legislature that
attorney’s fees and costs shall rarely, if ever, be awarded if a local
agency, acting in good faith, approved a housing development
project that satisfies” certain conditions. (§ 65589.5, subd. (p)(1).)
It is undisputed here that the Project would have satisfied at
least one of the relevant conditions.9
The HAA provides that it is to “be interpreted and
implemented in a manner to afford the fullest possible weight to
the interest of, and the approval and provision of, housing.”
(§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(L).) Nonetheless, the HAA also provides

9
For instance, the Project’s density exceeded “15 dwelling
units per acre.” (§§ 65589.5, subd. (p)(1), 65589.5.1, subd. (a)(3),
65589.5.2, subd. (a)(3).)

15
it does not relieve local agencies from complying with CEQA.
(§ 65589.5, subd. (e).)

1. Analysis Prairie contends the trial court failed to give due weight to the HAA policies and the suitability of the site for a housing development; instead, Prairie believes the court “collaps[ed]” the issues “into the statutory ‘reasonableness’ analysis required under . . . section 65569.5, subdivision(1) . . . .” Moreover, Prairie contends the trial court misconstrued the reasonableness prong to mean that any CEQA error at all is “unreasonable per se for fee purposes.” These arguments lack merit. The trial court did not discuss whether the City’s action furthered the HAA’s objectives, but that does not mean it failed to give these considerations their due weight. There is no statutory requirement that the trial court expressly discuss these factors, and we presume the trial court followed the law absent any indication to the contrary. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; Peake v. Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 447; Keep Our Mountains Quiet, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at 737 [a fee award under Section 1021.5 is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and “‘“‘the reviewing court will infer all findings necessary to support the judgment’”’”].) There is no such indication in the record, so we proceed on the understanding that the court understood the City’s approval actions advanced HAA objectives but believed some award of fees was still warranted because the unreasonableness of the City’s approval outweighed those policy considerations. Contrary to Prairie’s argument, there is no reason to think the trial court believed the City’s unreasonableness was established by the mere

16
fact of any CEQA violation. Rather, the trial court appears to
have concluded this was a particularly egregious CEQA
violation.10 (Coalition of Pacificans for an Updated Plan v. City
Council of the City of Pacifica (2025) 117 Cal.App.5th 647, 672-
673 [“a trial court may properly find a local agency acted
unreasonably, for purposes of the fee inquiry under section
65589.5, subdivision (p)(1), if it approved a housing development
project without conducting adequate review of its environmental
impacts” and explaining “[t]his does not mean . . . that ‘any
CEQA error’ will establish that a local agency acted
unreasonably”].)
There is adequate record support for the trial court’s
discretionary determination of unreasonableness that justified
some award of attorney fees. SAFER submitted evidence that an
EIR was required to consider several of the Project’s potential
impacts, its counsel raised these issues again at the public
hearing, and there is nothing in the administrative record to
suggest the City gave any consideration to this input. Though
Prairie casts the City’s CEQA error as a “technical fault rather
than a wholesale failure of reason” because “the City prepared an
IS/MND, solicited and responded to public comments, . . . [and]
held a noticed hearing before approving the Project,” Prairie still
cannot point to anything suggesting the City actually engaged
with the documents SAFER provided, or that the City had good

10
As we have already mentioned, neither Prairie nor the City
opposed SAFER’s petition for a writ of mandate on the merits.

17
reason to ignore them.11 The trial court could reasonably
determine that soliciting community feedback on an IS/MND but
then failing to consider it was unreasonable even in the light of
the Legislative guidance provided in the HAA.

B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Determining the Financial Burden of Enforcement
Made a Fee Award Appropriate Regardless of Any
Relationship Between SAFER and Unions
1. Legal framework
Section 1021.5’s requirement that “the necessity and
financial burden of private enforcement . . . are such as to make
the award appropriate” involves two issues: “‘“whether private
enforcement was necessary and whether the financial burden of
private enforcement warrants subsidizing the successful party’s
attorneys.”’ [Citations.]” (Conservatorship of Whitley (2010) 50
Cal.4th 1206, 1214-1215.) Prairie’s contentions concern the latter
of these issues.
“In determining the financial burden on litigants, courts
have quite logically focused not only on the costs of the litigation
but also any offsetting financial benefits that the litigation yields
or reasonably could have been expected to yield. ‘“An award on
the ‘private attorney general’ theory is appropriate when the cost
of the claimant’s legal victory transcends his personal interest,
that is, when the necessity for pursuing the lawsuit placed a
burden on the plaintiff ‘out of proportion to his individual stake

11
Prairie does not claim the City was free to disregard
SAFER’s December 2022 letter because it was submitted after
the close of the public comment period.

18
in the matter.’ [Citation.]”’ [Citation.] ‘This requirement focuses
on the financial burdens and incentives involved in bringing the
lawsuit.’ [Citation.]”12 (Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th at 1215.)
Although a party’s eligibility for attorney fees under
Section 1021.5 is a binary question—whether litigation costs
transcend personal financial interest—the amount of a fee award
is not. Courts have held that where a “plaintiff[’]s[ ] potential
benefit was such that individuals in their position could
reasonably have been expected to incur attorney fees if the
amount of the fee bore a more reasonable relation to such benefit,
the trial court, in awarding fees under [S]ection 1021.5, may
deduct from the total reasonable attorney fee an amount
reflecting the fee that [the] plaintiff[ ] could reasonably have been

12
A plaintiff’s financial interest is not limited to monetary
relief sought in the litigation. (Heron Bay Homeowners Assn. v.
City of San Leandro (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 376, 390-391.)
Relevant financial interests also are not limited to those of the
named plaintiff. (Torres v. City of Montebello (2015) 234
Cal.App.4th 382, 405 [“the court may consider evidence that the
named plaintiff is litigating the action primarily for the benefit of
nonlitigants with a financial interest in the outcome”].) At the
same time, a plaintiff is not “‘cut off from the benefits of [S]ection
1021.5 whenever they pursue litigation that might someday help
them further or secure their property interests.’” (Keep Our
Mountains Quiet, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at 740; see also
Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v. Julian Union Elementary
School Dist. (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 970, 992 [“No abuse in
awarding fees can be found where the facts show ‘that the
plaintiff’s “future money advantage . . . is speculative” [citation],
or that the plaintiff’s[ ] “‘pecuniary benefit will be indirect and
uncertain’”’”].)

19
expected to bear themselves.” (Woodland Hills Residential Assn.,
Inc. v. City Council (1979) 23 Cal.3d 917, 942, fn. 13.) In Galante
Vineyards v. Monterey Peninsula Water Management Dist. (1997)
60 Cal.App.4th 1109, for instance, it was a “close” question of
“whether the cost of [the plaintiffs’] legal victory transcend[ed]
their personal interests” because, they were “probably the
greatest beneficiaries” of the judgment they obtained but they
received “no direct pecuniary benefit . . . in the judgment” and
“any future money advantage . . . [was] speculative.” (Id. at
1127-1128.) The Court of Appeal found “no abuse of discretion in
the trial court solving this problem by doing what the [defendant]
suggested in its opposition to [plaintiffs’] motion for attorney’s
fees; i.e., reducing fees to reflect the financial interest of [some of
the plaintiffs].” (Id. at 1128.) The Court of Appeal did not decide,
however, whether it was improper for the trial court to make a
fees award without first finding the cost of litigation “was out of
proportion to [the plaintiffs’] individual stake in the action”
because the defendant invited the error. (Id. at 1126, 1128.)
In its opposition to SAFER’s motion for attorney fees,
Prairie cited Galante and asked the trial court to reduce any
award by 50 percent. The trial court did that (though for stated
reasons unrelated to SAFER’s financial interest in the litigation,
see ante at 11-12 & fn. 8)—applying a 0.5 negative multiplier in
calculating the amount of fees to be awarded. As we have
already mentioned, Prairie does not argue the trial court abused
its discretion by not further reducing the award—the amount of
fees is unchallenged. Rather, Prairie advances only an all or
nothing argument: whether SAFER is ineligible for fees at all
because the costs of litigation did not transcend the financial
benefits of the litigation to its asserted union backers.

20
2. Analysis
Prairie argues SAFER did not carry its burden to show the
financial burden of its enforcement of CEQA warrants
subsidizing its attorneys with a fee award because SAFER
provided no evidence concerning whether and to what extent the
litigation did benefit its asserted trade union backers. It was
sufficient, however, for SAFER to detail its litigation costs and
show that it received no reasonably certain financial benefit from
an order requiring the City to prepare an EIR in order for the
project to proceed. (Heron Bay, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 397.)
While Prairie believes SAFER should have also “provide[d]
evidence showing that there was no connection between SAFER
and the unions” or the trial court should have taken judicial
notice of documents offered to prove such a connection or
permitted Prairie to conduct limited discovery, these arguments
can succeed only if such a connection would establish that
SAFER or its backers could expect a financial benefit that would
have prompted litigation even without the prospect of an attorney
fees award.
In Prairie’s view, the documents included in its request for
judicial notice show SAFER “had an undisclosed financial
interest more than sufficient to justify incurring attorneys’ fees in
this case” because construction projects (like the ultimately
abandoned project here) “can potentially provide hundreds of
union jobs and millions of dollars in additional wages and other
financial benefits. CEQA lawsuits can aid unions in their pursuit
of these financial benefits by increasing their bargaining power
with project owners, leaving project proponents with the Hobson’s
Choice of either paying millions more in wages and benefits or
delaying the project for three more years . . . .”

21
The trial court, however, correctly emphasized the lack of
evidence that any party proposed to settle this case with a project
labor agreement—notwithstanding what it characterized as
SAFER’s “concerning ties” to trade unions. Nor is there any
evidence suggesting SAFER was in a position to determine the
probability of such a settlement when it challenged the City’s
actions. Calculating “‘the probability of success at the time the
vital litigation decisions were made’” (Whitley, supra, 50 Cal.4th
at 1215) was not simply a matter of assessing the merits of the
CEQA action. Rather, SAFER and its asserted backers’ financial
incentives at the outset of this case depended on their appraisal
of Prairie’s interest in settling, fighting, or walking away. It was
accordingly within the trial court’s discretion to (impliedly) reject
as speculative the argument that SAFER and its claimed backers
had sufficient incentive to pursue the case in the absence of a fee
award. (See Heron Bay, supra, 19 Cal.App.5th at 395 [holding
that “[a]ny benefit [the plaintiff homeowners association and its
members] received in the form of avoiding a loss in property
values” in lawsuit challenging the defendant city’s adoption of an
MND in approving a wind turbine “was at least once removed
from the results of the litigation” because litigation success did
“not guarantee” the project would be altered or abandoned; “[t]he
amount of any monetary advantage, therefore, was speculative”];
Keep Our Mountains Quiet, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at 740
[affirming fee award to association of homeowners who prevailed
in lawsuit challenging the defendant city’s adoption of an MND
in approving permit for wedding venue because the amount of
any avoided loss in property value was speculative and there was
no guarantee that requiring an EIR would change the project].)

22
Further, we can assume for the sake of argument that the
analysis is not limited to SAFER and its asserted backers’
interests with respect to a single project, but to their bargaining
position with Prairie and analogous developers more generally.
Courts applying Section 1021.5 must, after all, “‘realistically
assess the litigation’” and adopt a “‘practical perspective.’”
(Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 142.) Here again, though,
the value of this incremental benefit is speculative. It is
determined by a host of factors, including interest rates, material
costs, labor supply, the rental market, and the requirements of
CEQA itself. It was thus still well within the trial court’s
discretion to conclude that any financial benefit from challenging
the City’s failure to prepare an EIR was too speculative to
preclude an award of attorney fees, and that neither the
documents included in Prairie’s request for judicial notice nor any
potential discovery would alter that conclusion.13

13
To the extent Prairie contends the trial court lacked
discretion to deny its request for judicial notice because Evidence
Code section 453 requires a court to grant such a request under
certain circumstances, the argument lacks merit. The trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining that taking judicial
notice of these documents was unnecessary to the resolution of
the issues before it. (Licudine v. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 881, 902 [even where Evidence Code section
453 is satisfied, “the trial court retains its usual discretion not to
take judicial notice of matters that are irrelevant”].) In any case,
Prairie was not prejudiced by any abuse of discretion with respect
to its request for judicial notice for the reasons we have
discussed.

23
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s attorney fees order is affirmed. SAFER is
awarded costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MOOR, J.

KIM (D.), J.

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