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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re Menchaca CA4/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: G064371

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/19/26 In re Menchaca CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re STEPHEN MENCHACA, G064371

on Habeas Corpus. (Super. Ct. No. 93SF0230)

OPINION

Original proceedings; petition for writ of habeas corpus after a
judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Jonathan S. Fish, Judge.
Petition denied.
Stephen Menchaca, in pro. per.; and James R. Bostick, Jr., under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Sara J. Romano, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda J. Murray and Rachael A. Campbell, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Respondent.
In 1994, a jury found Stephen Menchaca guilty of the attempted
premeditated and deliberate murder of his spouse and further found
Menchaca caused great bodily injury in the commission of that offense. In
2023, for the eighth time since his conviction, Menchaca appeared before a
panel of the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) for a parole suitability
hearing. The Board found Menchaca continued to pose an unreasonable risk
of danger to public safety and on that basis concluded Menchaca was not
suitable for parole.
Menchaca filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court,
later supplemented, challenging the Board’s determination. In such
challenges we must apply the highly deferential “‘some evidence’” standard
(In re Shaputis (2011) 53 Cal.4th 192, 198–199 (Shaputis)) as to our review of
the Board’s decision. We conclude the Board did not err by finding Menchaca
posed an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. We therefore deny the
petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.
MENCHACA IS CONVICTED OF ATTEMPTED MURDER AND SENTENCED TO AN
INDETERMINATE PRISON TERM OF LIFE WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE
In 1994, a jury found Menchaca guilty of committing the
premeditated and deliberate attempted murder of his wife, Stacey Haden.
(Pen. Code, §§ 664, 187.) The jury found true the allegation Menchaca caused
his wife to suffer great bodily injury in the commission of that offense. (Id.,
§ 12022.7, subd. (a).) Menchaca was sentenced to an indeterminate term of
life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive term of
three years.

2
A panel of this court affirmed the judgment of conviction,
rejecting Menchaca’s contentions of evidentiary and instructional error at
trial. (People v. Menchaca (Feb. 14, 1996, G016248) [nonpub. opn.].) In its
opinion, the panel summarized evidence presented at trial as follows:
“Despite their $100,000 annual income, Stephen and Stacey were
over $50,000 in debt in the fall of 1992. At that time, Stacey took over the
finances and implemented a strict family budget. Money was tight and their
relationship strained, but the Menchacas slowly began reducing their debt.
“However, when tax time rolled around the following year,
Stephen became uncooperative. On the evening of April 6, 1993, an argument
erupted over Stephen’s failure to document certain withdrawals. When
Stacey went to bed that evening, Stephen stayed on the couch.
“At 5:15 the next morning, Stephen abruptly awoke Stacey and
said he needed help in the garage fixing a washing machine leak. He said the
leak had shorted out the garage light and he needed her to hold a flashlight
for him. Upon entering the garage, Stephen positioned Stacey by the washer,
but she did not notice any water around the hoses. Moments later, she felt a
‘tremendous blow’ to the back of her head and ended up on her back with
Stephen on top of her.
“Stephen gagged Stacey with towels and thrice slammed her
head against the cement floor. She struggled and begged him to stop, but he
instead tried smothering her with a blanket. When that failed, Stacey asked
Stephen to think about the children. He replied, ‘But, Stacey, we’re in so
much debt’ and continued slamming her head into the floor.
“At one point, Stephen told Stacey to be quiet because he heard
someone outside. He also examined her head, eyes and pulse during the
ordeal. When Stacey suggested he flee to Mexico, Stephen opened a van in

3
the garage and looked inside. He then resumed banging Stacey’s head into
the floor before finally leaving at 7 a.m.
“Stacey made it to a neighbor’s house and was taken to a
hospital. She had a depressed skull fracture and lacerations on the side and
back of her head. The skull indentation was semi-circular and consistent with
having been caused by a hammer. At the time of the incident, Stephen was
the beneficiary of life insurance policies on Stacey totaling $360,000.
“Stephen testified he was depressed and suicidal during 1992,
because he felt he had let his family down. He often had trouble sleeping, and
on the morning in question, he awoke at 2:30 with ‘uncontrollable energy.’ He
did some laundry and noticed the washer was leaking. The garage light was
out, so he got a flashlight and awakened Stacey.
“Stacey was upset over the situation and became angrier upon
stubbing her toe near the washer. She cursed and began walking towards
Stephen. Unsure what she was going to do, Stephen punched her in the head,
causing her to fall. As Stephen reached for the flashlight, she dug her nails
into his penis. He then grabbed her hair and smashed her head into the floor.
He also may have put a towel over her face to quiet her. He contemplated
going to Mexico but instead went in the house and took a shower.
“Later that morning, Stephen told police he had been upset over
the finances and struck Stacey with a hammer, not his fist. He never
mentioned anything about her grabbing his crotch. Psychiatrist Paul Blair
testified Stephen suffered from dysthymia, a depression-related ailment. He
said the disorder may have culminated in a psychotic break inside the
garage, causing Stephen to lose touch with reality and experience confused
and disorganized thinking.”

4
The California Supreme Court denied Menchaca’s petition for
review.
II.
THE BOARD REPEATEDLY FINDS MENCHACA UNSUITABLE FOR PAROLE
Menchaca thereafter had seven parole hearings but was not
released on parole. Following the seventh parole suitability hearing in
November 2019, the Board denied Menchaca parole after finding he posed an
unreasonable risk to public safety. The Board acknowledged there “were
many facts that mitigated [his] risk,” including the then most recent
comprehensive risk assessment which rated Menchaca as a low risk for
violence. The Board, however, “disagreed with that rating” because, inter
alia, the psychologist therein made a statement that Menchaca “had difficulty
reaching out to others during times of struggle” and his “ability to effectively
cope with stressful situations in the community . . . remain[ed] uncertain.”
The Board noted “the life crime was all about . . . how [he] dealt with this
economic stress” and therefore, “this is a material aspect in which [the
psychologist] did not rate [Menchaca] low.”
The Board acknowledged Menchaca’s lack of criminal history and
behavior in prison constituted mitigating factors, as were his involvement in
various self-help programs in prison, acceptable proposed release plan, and
“elderly parole status” (he was then 69 years old). The Board also
acknowledged the length of his incarceration up to that point (26 years) and
his “somewhat” diminished physical condition.
The Board, however, acknowledged the horrific and prolonged,
albeit static, circumstances of the life crime and the significant trauma it
caused for the trivial objective of financial gain. The Board explained
Menchaca continued to lack remorse for what he did. The Board observed

5
Menchaca was “very matter-of-fact when talking about . . . the crime, talking
about the effect of the crime on victims,” and “very flat” with no emotion even
when Haden and her “next of kin” gave their statements at the hearing.
The Board also noted that Menchaca does not appear to have
changed with respect to the issue that brought him to prison—living beyond
his means to manage others’ favorable impression of him. Specifically, the
Board was “really deeply concerned” Menchaca donated his then current
wife’s money instead of using it for its intended purpose of serving as canteen
money. This suggested to the Board Menchaca had an ongoing problem with
impression management in that he “want[s] to be seen as an individual that
helps, supports other causes, . . . but in the end of it, . . . [he is] still playing
with money” and “spending beyond [his means].” The Board further noted
Menchaca’s statements reflected he did not trust himself with money.
Finally, the Board observed Menchaca still had trouble
understanding that his narcissistic personality disorder contributed to the
commission of the life crime. Menchaca commented he had not really thought
about it much, which concerned the Board.
The Board determined Menchaca’s next parole suitability hearing
should be set in five years’ time.
III.
THE BOARD AGAIN DENIES PAROLE FOLLOWING THE
2023 PAROLE SUITABILITY HEARING
On June 7, 2023, the Board conducted its eighth, and most
recent, parole suitability hearing for Menchaca. The Board questioned
Menchaca, inter alia, on his most recent risk assessment in which the
psychologist raised Menchaca’s risk level of dangerousness to a moderate
(lower moderate) risk level. The psychologist had observed Menchaca

6
“demonstrated partial self-awareness into [his] vulnerabilities for future
violence but did not have a clear plan for ongoing domestic violence
prevention or overspending management.” The psychologist stated, “there
remained room for growth regarding [Menchaca’s] understanding of the
factors that have contributed to his violent behavior and the importance of
continuing to address such issues in order to maintain healthy relationship
upon parole.”
The psychologist further stated Menchaca’s “lack of transparency
regarding his problematic spending in the community warrant[ed] concern as
it contributed to his life crime.” The psychologist also stated: “Given [his]
history of engaging in violence in an intimate relationship, relational
stressors such as feelings of insecurity or financial strain, could potentially be
destabilizing for him.” In addition, the psychologist stated Menchaca had
“some personality traits that result in him putting his wants before others
and make him vulnerable to the exploitation of others.” Those traits include
“deceitfulness, recklessness, and lack of empathy.” Further, the psychologist
stated Menchaca’s “triggers for violence include financial gain/profit.”
At the hearing, when the Board’s presiding commissioner asked
Menchaca whether he had any other comments or concerns about the
psychologist’s assessment, Menchaca responded, “No, sir.” Menchaca did not
otherwise comment on the concerns the psychologist expressed in assessing
Menchaca’s level of risk.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board stated it had reviewed
and considered precommitment and postcommitment factors in the case as
well as the proposed parole plan; considered all the evidence, including
Menchaca’s central file, all documents contained in the 10-day and master
file, the psychologist’s comprehensive risk assessment, and additional

7
documents submitted during the hearing; and considered Menchaca’s
testimony as well as the input provided at the hearing by Menchaca’s
attorney, the Orange County District Attorney’s representative, Haden, and
Haden’s representative.
The Board explained that after considering pertinent mitigating
and aggravating factors, it found Menchaca posed an unreasonable risk to
public safety and was therefore unsuitable for parole. The Board stated the
next parole suitability hearing would be held in five years, which amount of
time the Board felt was necessary for Menchaca to address the factors that
continue to aggravate his risk.
IV.
MENCHACA PETITIONS FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Menchaca initially filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the
trial court in which he challenged the Board’s latest parole suitability
decision. The trial court denied the petition.
In July 2024, Menchaca filed, in propria persona, the instant
petition for writ of habeas corpus (the petition). In the petition, Menchaca
argued his continued incarceration constituted cruel and/or unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 17 of the California Constitution.
In August 2024, we issued an order directing Appellate
Defenders, Inc. to recommend the appointment of counsel to represent
Menchaca in this proceeding. In our order, we stated we reject the petition’s
contention Menchaca’s continued incarceration constitutes cruel and/or
unusual punishment under the state and federal constitutions. We invited
counsel upon appointment, however, to supplement the petition with

8
additional grounds counsel deemed viable after reviewing relevant
materials.1
In October 2024, we appointed counsel for Menchaca and, in
December 2024, we granted his counsel’s motion to augment the record with
exhibits Menchaca had filed in connection with the petition for writ of habeas
corpus he filed in the superior court.
In January 2025, Menchaca filed a supplemental petition for writ
of habeas corpus (the supplemental petition). The following month, the
Attorney General filed an informal response and Menchaca filed a reply.
In April 2025, we issued an order to show cause why a writ of
habeas corpus should not issue and invited the Attorney General to file a
return; the Attorney General did so and Menchaca thereafter filed a traverse.
DISCUSSION
I.
GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARDS
“Parole suitability decisions are governed by Penal Code
section 3041 and title 15, section 2402 of the California Code of Regulations.[2]
The regulations provide that, ‘Regardless of the length of time served, a life
prisoner shall be found unsuitable for and denied parole if in the judgment of

1 In the supplemental petition for writ of habeas corpus later filed

by appointed counsel, counsel reiterates Menchaca’s argument that his
continued incarceration following the Board’s denial of parole constitutes
cruel and/or unusual punishment under the federal and state constitutions.
As discussed ante, we already summarily rejected that basis of the petition in
our August 19, 2024 order but invited counsel to assert any additional
grounds in a supplemental petition. We therefore do not consider that
argument further in this opinion.
2 “Subsequent references to ‘Regs.’ are to the California Code of

Regulations.”

9
the [parole authority] the prisoner will pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
society if released from prison.’ (Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (a).) Section 3041
states the parole authority ‘shall grant parole to an inmate unless it
determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the
timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such
that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of
incarceration for this individual.’ (§ 3041, subd. (b)(1).) As a result, inmates in
California have a due process liberty interest and ‘an expectation that they
will be granted parole unless the [parole authority] finds, in the exercise of its
discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances
specified by statute and by regulation.’ (In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th
616, 654 (Rosenkrantz); see [In re] Lawrence [(2008)] 44 Cal.4th [1181], 1191.)
“The regulations specify the circumstances relevant to an
inmate’s suitability and unsuitability for parole that are to be considered by
the parole authority. (Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subds. (c)–(d).) The ‘circumstances
tending to establish unsuitability for parole are that the prisoner
(1) committed the offense in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel
manner; (2) possesses a previous record of violence; (3) has an unstable social
history; (4) previously has sexually assaulted another individual in a sadistic
manner; (5) has a lengthy history of severe mental problems related to the
offense; and (6) has engaged in serious misconduct while in prison.’
(Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 653–654, fn. omitted, citing Regs.,
tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (c).)
“The ‘circumstances tending to establish suitability for parole are
that the prisoner: (1) does not possess a record of violent crime committed
while a juvenile; (2) has a stable social history; (3) has shown signs of
remorse; (4) committed the crime as the result of significant stress in his life,

10
especially if the stress has built over a long period of time; (5) committed the
criminal offense as a result of battered woman syndrome; (6) lacks any
significant history of violent crime; (7) is of an age that reduces the
probability of recidivism; (8) has made realistic plans for release or has
developed marketable skills that can be put to use upon release; and (9) has
engaged in institutional activities that indicate an enhanced ability to
function within the law upon release.’ (Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at
p. 654, citing Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subd. (d).)
“The Penal Code imposes additional considerations when the
parole authority is determining parole for . . . elderly inmates (those who are
50 years or older) who have served a minimum of 20 years on their current
sentence. ([Pen. Code,] §§ 3055, 4801.) . . . With ‘elderly’ inmates, the parole
authority ‘shall give special consideration to whether age, time served, and
diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the elderly inmate’s risk
for future violence.’ ([Pen. Code,] § 3055, subd. (c).)
“Relevant here, an inmate’s insight into his or [her] commitment
offense and other antisocial behavior is also a proper consideration in
determining parole suitability. (Shaputis [], supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 219.) As
the California Supreme Court explained in Shaputis [], ‘the regulations do
not use the term “insight,” but they direct the [parole authority] to consider
the inmate’s “past and present attitude toward the crime” [citation] and “the
presence of remorse,” expressly including indications that the inmate
“understands the nature and magnitude of the offense,”’ making ‘[t]hese
factors fit comfortably within the descriptive category of “insight.”’ (Id. at
p. 218.)
“Lastly, the regulations provide that the relevant circumstances
‘are set forth as general guidelines; the importance attached to any

11
circumstance or combination of circumstances in a particular case is left to
the judgment of the [parole authority].’ (Regs., tit. 15, § 2402, subds. (c), (d).)
‘Circumstances which taken alone may not firmly establish unsuitability for
parole may contribute to a pattern which results in a finding of unsuitability.’
(Id., subd. (b).)” (In re Rogowski (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 8, 52–54.)
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Whether to grant parole to an inmate serving an indeterminate
sentence is a decision vested in the executive branch, under our state
Constitution and statutes.” (Shaputis, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 198–199.) Our
review, however, is “highly deferential.” (In re Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at
p. 1204.)
In Shaputis, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pages 220–221, the Supreme
Court summarized the key considerations for courts reviewing parole-
suitability determinations by the Board in relevant part as follows: “1. The
essential question in deciding whether to grant parole is whether the inmate
currently poses a threat to public safety. [¶] 2. That question is posed first to
the Board and then to the Governor, who draw their answers from the entire
record, including the facts of the offense, the inmate’s progress during
incarceration, and the insight he or she has achieved into past behavior.
[¶] . . . [¶] 4. Judicial review is conducted under the highly deferential ‘some
evidence’ standard. The executive decision of the Board or the Governor is
upheld unless it is arbitrary or procedurally flawed. The court reviews the
entire record to determine whether a modicum of evidence[3] supports the

The California Supreme Court has further explained: “Only a
3

modicum of evidence is required. Resolution of any conflicts in the evidence
and the weight to be given the evidence are matters within the authority of

12
parole suitability decision. [¶] 5. The reviewing court does not ask whether
the inmate is currently dangerous. That question is reserved for the executive
branch. Rather, the court considers whether there is a rational nexus
between the evidence and the ultimate determination of current
dangerousness. The court is not empowered to reweigh the evidence.”
“The ‘some evidence’ standard . . . is meant to serve the [inmate’s]
interests of due process by guarding against arbitrary or capricious parole
decisions, without overriding or controlling the exercise of executive
discretion.” (Shaputis, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 199.) Judicial review of parole
suitability decisions “is limited, and narrower in scope” (id. at p. 215); it is
“more deferential than substantial evidence review, and may be satisfied by a
lesser evidentiary showing” (id. at p. 210). “Any relevant evidence that
supports the parole authority’s determination is sufficient to satisfy the ‘some
evidence’ standard.” (Id. at p. 214.)

the Governor [or the Board]. As with the discretion exercised by the Board in
making its decision, the precise manner in which the specified factors
relevant to parole suitability are considered and balanced lies within the
discretion of the Governor [or the Board], but the decision must reflect an
individualized consideration of the specified criteria and cannot be arbitrary
or capricious. It is irrelevant that a court might determine that evidence in
the record tending to establish suitability for parole far outweighs evidence
demonstrating unsuitability for parole. As long as the Governor’s [or the
Board’s] decision reflects due consideration of the specified factors as applied
to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards, the
court’s review is limited to ascertaining whether there is some evidence in the
record that supports the Governor’s [or the Board’s] decision.” (In re
Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677.)

13
III.
A MODICUM OF EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE BOARD’S FINDING MENCHACA WAS
NOT SUITABLE FOR PAROLE
In the supplemental petition, Menchaca does not contend the
Board failed to consider all the evidence in the record or failed to evaluate all
circumstances pertinent to the determination of Menchaca’s suitability for
parole. Instead, Menchaca argues the record before this court shows the
Board denied him parole “for reasons having little to do with his current
dangerousness to the community” and failed to otherwise “identify ‘some
evidence’ supporting a conclusion that Menchaca is unsuitable because he is
currently dangerous.” He argues, “[t]he 2023 panel like the one in 2014 relied
for its conclusion primarily on the egregiousness of [Menchaca’s] commitment
offense. But after 28 years of imprisonment and extensive programming
[Menchaca] was no longer the same individual he was going in.”
Like the Board, we acknowledge the record shows the existence of
mitigating factors which include Menchaca’s age, participation in programs,
adequate plans for release, acceptance to transitional housing, support from
family and members of the community, and submission of relapse prevention
plans addressing his risk factors. The record also shows he has not received a
single serious rules violation report during his incarceration and had no prior
arrest history. Nevertheless, applying the governing standard of review, we
must conclude a modicum of evidence supports the Board’s decision.
At the conclusion of the 2023 parole hearing, the Board provided
a lengthy explanation for denying parole at that time. In its statement, the
Board stated it found Menchaca’s actions in committing the life offense to
have been heinous, brutal, and deplorable and to have demonstrated a
callous disregard for Haden’s life and suffering. The Board, however,

14
acknowledged those findings constituted static factors which, pursuant to
California Supreme Court authority, “may no longer indicate a risk of current
danger to society in light of a lengthy period of rehabilitative programming.”
This acknowledgement by the Board shows it was not laboring under any
misapprehension of the governing legal standards. Instead, the Board stated
that in determining Menchaca’s level of dangerousness, it considered whether
“something current [has made] these static factors remain relevant.”
The Board stated it found that during the most recent hearing
Menchaca continued to express views demonstrating he had not yet
sufficiently changed and had not made much progress, “if any,” since the
2019 hearing with respect to his gaining understanding as to what triggers
him and what helps him healthfully cope so as to avoid re-offending in the
future. The Board’s findings are directly supported by the most recent
comprehensive risk assessment prepared by a psychologist who concluded
Menchaca demonstrated only partial self-awareness of his vulnerabilities for
future violence and lacked a “clear plan for ongoing domestic violence
prevention or overspending management.” The psychologist ultimately
assessed Menchaca as posing a moderate risk of dangerousness. Menchaca’s
two prior comprehensive risk assessments reflected he posed a low risk of
dangerousness. The Board expressed its concern Menchaca seemed to be
“going backwards.”
The Board also stated it found Menchaca still grappled with
“impression management” issues, evidenced by Menchaca making statements
at the most recent hearing to make him look better to the Board, even though
such statements conflicted with his prior statements and other evidence in
the record. For example, and as acknowledged in the supplemental petition,
Menchaca told the Board at the 2023 hearing that after he stopped the

15
assault of Haden, he planned to take a shower to clean himself and then take
Haden to the hospital. He previously stated, however, that while he was
assaulting her, he thought about taking her to the hospital, but then thought
about how doing so would make him look to others. The Board asked
Menchaca about the inconsistency, but Menchaca had no answer.
Further, at the most recent hearing, Menchaca denied prior
planning of the attempted murder of Haden, or, in so doing, disabling the
light bulb in the garage. He also offered a long explanation regarding the
existence of leaked water from the washing machine in the garage. All such
statements conflict with the long established record.
In addition, at the 2019 parole hearing, Menchaca had stated he
received money from his then current wife for canteen use but that he
donated that money to cancer research. At the 2023 parole hearing,
Menchaca arguably sanitized his story by explaining that the money he
received from his current wife was not hers but his own, as he had received
an inheritance she collected and forwarded to him. Menchaca had not
previously disclosed he had received any such inheritance. When asked by
the Board why he had failed to mention his inheritance to the prior panel or
to the psychologist during the comprehensive risk assessment process,
Menchaca had no answer.
In In re Rogowski, supra, 112 Cal.App.5th at page 67, the
appellate court, in affirming the Governor’s decision to deny the inmate
parole, observed in part: “[T]he record reveals [the inmate] has a history of
lying about a range of topics, including when he believes it will serve his
interests. And there is reason to think this tendency was on display during
the 2022 parole hearing.” In that case, the inmate thereafter denied changing
his story and ultimately became combative when confronted with evidence of

16
his inconsistency. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded: “On this record, the
Governor could reasonably question [the inmate]’s credibility during the 2022
parole hearing . . . about other matters on which he was testifying in favor of
his release.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, the appellate court concluded the inmate’s
inconsistencies “bear on our conclusion that the record supports the
Governor’s parole unsuitability decision, including the Governor’s
determination [the inmate] possessed a materially deficient level of insight.”
(Id. at p. 18; see In re Mims (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 478, 488 [holding the
inmate’s inconsistent reports of rapes and physical abuse were properly
interpreted as “an evolving effort to mitigate [the inmate’s] own culpability”
and as such, constituted some evidence of the inmate’s lack of insight into the
cause of the crime].)
Similarly, in the instant case, Menchaca’s inconsistent
statements support the Board’s findings he lacked credibility and possessed a
materially deficient level of insight.
In sum, after reviewing the record before us, we conclude the
Board’s decision reflects due consideration of the appropriate factors as
applied to Menchaca in accordance with applicable legal standards. As a
modicum of evidence in the record supports the Board’s ultimate finding
Menchaca poses a current threat to public safety and concomitant decision to
deny parole, we must deny Menchaca’s petition seeking to overturn that
decision.

17
DISPOSITION
The petition for habeas corpus is denied.

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, J.

DELANEY, J.

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