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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Wilson

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 927
• Docket Number: 114998

• Judges: E.A. Gallagher

• Opinion

• Authorities (22)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (24.1K)

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Syllabus

R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c) substantial impairment rape; Fifth Amendment Right against self-incrimination; right to remain silent prearrest and pre-Miranda rights being read; prosecutorial misconduct; cross-examination of defendant; direct examination of police officer; State's closing argument; failure to object; plain error; exclusion of irrelevant evidence; abuse of discretion. Appellant-defendant appealed the trial court's various rulings regarding prosecutorial questions and comments as well as rulings regarding the admissibility and use of various exhibits at trial. The first assignment of error concerned prosecutorial misconduct regarding questions asked during the direct examination of a police officer, the cross-examination of the defendant and during the State's closing argument. We find that there were only three objected-to questions by the prosecutor during the defendant's cross-examination that while they were improper questions they did not substantially prejudice defendant's right to a fair trial. As to the remaining questions asked by the prosecutor during cross-examination of the defendant, the State's direct examination of the arresting police officer and the comments made during State's closing argument these were not objected to and were therefore reviewed under the plain-error analysis. But for their admission it is not clear beyond a reasonable doubt the trial outcome would have been different and therefore no plain error was found. First assignment of error is overruled. The second assignment of error concerned the exclusion of three demonstrative exhibits. Upon review we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these exhibits because they were not relevant to the issue in this case. Second assignment of error is overruled.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2026-Ohio-927.]

COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO, :

Plaintiff-Appellee, :
No. 114998
v. :

ARBIE WILSON, :

Defendant-Appellant. :

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: March 19, 2026

Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
Case No. CR-22-676894-A

Appearances:

Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
Attorney, and Alicia Paolucci and Margaret Graham,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee.

Paul B. Daiker, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.:

Appellant Arbie Wilson (“Wilson”) appeals the trial court’s various

rulings regarding prosecutorial questions and comments as well as rulings regarding

the admissibility and use of various exhibits at trial. For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.
Facts and Procedural History

Wilson and D.E. met in Atlanta, Georgia on November 15, 2022.

Wilson came to Cleveland and flew D.E. with him. They stayed at an area Airbnb.

In the early morning hours of December 12, 2022, D.E. went to a club to see a friend

where she consumed “A lot. I don’t know. If I had to say, I would say, like, like half

a bottle of alcohol . . . and then I was still drinking shots, probably like five or six

shots in the section with the basketball players. We drank a lot.” Ultimately, she

took an Uber to the Airbnb where they were staying and she and Wilson talked and

they were drinking. D.E. claims she then fell asleep on the couch and at some point

while she was in and out of sleep, D.E. realized Wilson was on top of her and

penetrating her vagina. At that point, D.E. grabbed her phone and began recording

Wilson, threw liquids at him and eventually she called the police. Wilson claims

after D.E. came home from the club she gave him a massage and the two engaged in

consensual sexual acts that did not include penetration. He then fell asleep on the

couch and was awakened when D.E. was throwing liquids on him and accusing him

of raping her. The police arrived at the property, questioned both parties and

arrested Wilson.

On December 20, 2022, Wilson was indicted by a grand jury for one

count of rape of a substantially impaired victim, D.E., in violation of R.C.

2907.02(A)(1)(c).

On February 24, 2025, a jury trial commenced. The issue at trial was

consent, as it was undisputed that a sexual act occurred. The State presented
testimony from D.E., three police officers, the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner

(“SANE”) nurse that examined D.E. at the hospital and a DNA analyst. Defendant

testified during his case-in-chief.

The defendant was found guilty as indicted. Wilson was sentenced to

an aggregate term of 10-15 years in prison.

Wilson appeals raising two assignments of error for our review:

Assignment of Error One

The Appellant’s rights to due process and a fair trial were violated
when, during cross-examination of the Appellant, direct examination
of a state’s witness, and in closing argument, the prosecution used
Appellant’s arrest and post-arrest, post-miranda silence to impeach the
Appellant’s testimony.

Assignment of Error Two

The trial court violated the Appellant’s rights to due process and a fair
trial when it precluded relevant evidence from being properly
presented to the jury.

Wilson’s First Assignment of Error

In his first assignment of error, Wilson alleges the prosecutor engaged

in misconduct by making improper comments in three specific incidents during the

trial on Wilson’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent: during the direct

examination of City of Cleveland Police Officer David Borden (“Borden”), during the

cross-examination of Wilson and during the State’s closing argument. We address

these statements out of order, beginning with the prosecutor’s questions to Wilson

during cross-examination.
“The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that

no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.

This provision applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.’” State v.

Nieves, 2022-Ohio-3040, ¶ 21 (8th Dist.), quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6

(1964). As stated in Nieves:

In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, (1966), the United States
Supreme Court held that statements by defendants obtained in
response to questioning by law enforcement officers while the
defendants are in custody are presumed involuntary, and therefore
inadmissible, unless proper procedural safeguards have been taken to
protect the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 478-479. The
court detailed those procedural safeguards in the Miranda warnings,
which include a warning that the defendant has the right to remain
silent.

The U.S. Supreme Court found in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976),

that the State’s use of a defendant’s post-Miranda silence to impeach his or her trial

testimony violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Subsequently, the U.S. Supreme Court found that when the record does not indicate

that the defendant had “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which

he remained silent immediately after his arrest[,]” it was not a violation of due

process for the State to cross-examine the defendant as to his post-arrest silence

when the defendant chooses to take the stand. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605,

607 (1982). “The Ohio Supreme Court recognized Fletcher’s holding that a

defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence could be used to impeach his version

of events if he took the stand and testified in State v. Leach, 102 Ohio St.3d 135,

2004-Ohio-2147, 807 N.E.2d 335, ¶ 23.” Nieves at ¶ 31.
The Ohio Supreme Court held in State v. Leach “that use of a

defendant’s prearrest silence as substantive evidence of guilt violates the Fifth

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” State v. Leach, 2004-Ohio-2147,

¶ 38; accord Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 285 (6th Cir. 2000).

We note that, while no party disputes that Wilson, when questioned by

the police in the early morning of December 12, 2022, was in custody, there appears

to be a dispute as to whether he had been provided his Miranda rights or had been

arrested when talking with the police. In Wilson’s brief he argues the prosecution

used his silence “at the time of his arrest and after his Miranda rights had been read

to challenge [his] testimony.” The State argues that when Wilson was talking to the

police it was prior to any Miranda warnings being given.

Upon review of the record, we find no evidence as to when Wilson was

read his Miranda rights. Pursuant to Borden’s testimony the statements Wilson

made to the police and about which he was questioned under cross-examination

were made prior to his official arrest by Borden. We believe Leach applies to this

situation as the statements were made prearrest. Wilson’s prearrest silence cannot

be used as substantive evidence of guilt without violating his Fifth Amendment

right. Leach at ¶ 38.

Wilson draws our attention to the following questions asked by the

prosecutor during cross-examination:

Q. So when you’re talking to the police on the early morning of
December 12, 2022, you never mentioned to them that you previously
had sex with her, right?
A. They never asked me.

Q. Well, they asked you what your relationship is to her, right?

A. Possibly, yes.

Q. And do you recall when they asked what that relationship was you
said that you were homies?

A. That’s true.

...

Q. But you never said, Hey, we’ve had a prior sexual relationship
before?

A. I did not.

Q. So we don’t tell that to the police. You also testified that D.E. offered
to give you a message [sic] when she got back from the club that night?

A. Yes, ma’am.

Q. This is the first time that we’ve heard that, correct?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.

PROSECUTOR:

Q. You never told the police that?

THE COURT: Overruled.

A. Well, the police said I have the right to remain silent, so I don’t have
to say anything.

PROSECUTOR:

Q. That is absolutely correct. You do have the right to remain silent and
you absolutely have the right to exercise that. But you were talking to
the police that night, and they were asking you questions and you were
responding to those questions, correct?

A. Yes.
Q. So that’s what I’m talking about, what your responses were. So you
never told them anything about D.E. and you engaging in a massage?

A. No.

Q. You never told them, Hey, I had a condom on, right?

A. Why would I say that?

Q. Well, your defense attorney just asked you questions about how you
rode all the way to the police station with a condom on?

A. They never asked.

...

Q. You never mentioned that to the police?

A. Once again, why would I offer?

...

Q. And you never mentioned to the police, Hey, that we were fooling
around when the police said, Why would she be alleging that you raped
her, you never said, Hey, we were fooling around, I don’t know why she
would be saying that?

A. Once again, it was not for me to tell them anything.

Q. And that’s the third time that we heard that today in front of the
jury?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

...

Q. And you never once, when the police were asking you questions
about what happened that night, you didn’t tell them that you fell
asleep during any sexual encounter?

A. I fell asleep right then. I told them I was woken up by water on my
face which is true.

...
Q. But when the police were asking you questions about why she would
be making these statements, you did not tell them that any sexual
encounter occurred at all?

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.

DEFENSE COUNSEL: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

A. They didn’t ask me.

“A prosecutor cannot critically comment on a defendant’s exercise of

his right to remain silent.” State v. Belcher, 2013-Ohio-3142, ¶ 30 (8th Dist.), citing

State v. Hough, 2011-Ohio-2656, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.). “The test regarding prosecutorial

misconduct is whether the actions or remarks were improper, and, if so, whether

they prejudicially affected the substantial rights of the defendant.” Hough at ¶ 7,

citing State v. Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14 (1984). This ‘“must be considered in the

light of the whole case.”’ Id., quoting State v. Maurer, 15 Ohio St.3d 239, 266 (1984).

“A prosecutor may strike hard blows, but he [or she] may not strike foul ones[,]”

which include the defendant’s exercise of his or her right to remain silent. Id., citing

Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

Any improper actions or comments by a prosecutor should be
examined by four factors: (1) the likelihood that the remarks tended to
mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; (2) whether the remarks
were isolated or extensive; (3) whether the remarks were deliberately
or accidently made; and (4) the total strength of the evidence against
the defendant.

Id., citing Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 647 (6th Cir. 2005).

“If we conclude that the remarks were improper, we next ask whether

the remarks prejudicially affected the defendant’s substantial rights such that the
defendant’s trial was unfair.” Belcher at ¶ 29, citing State v. Powell, 2012-Ohio-

2577, ¶ 149; see also Powell at ¶ 162 (finding prosecutor’s improper argument

constituted harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt); State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio

St.3d 1, 4 (1987) (acknowledging that a violation of a defendant’s constitutional right

against self-incrimination is subject to harmless-error review). “[I]f it is ‘clear

beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent the prosecutor’s comments, the jury would

have found the defendant guilty,’ then the defendant’s conviction need not be

reversed.” State v. Thompson, 33 Ohio St.3d 1, 4 (1987), quoting State v. Smith, 14

Ohio St.3d 13, 15, (1984). This requires us to examine the offending comment in the

broader context of the entire case and “our inquiry is guided by concern for the

fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.” (Cleaned up.) Belcher at

¶ 29. In other words, our task is to determine if any error found is harmless or

prejudicial.

There were objections to only three of these questions asked by the

prosecutor. No continuing objection was made by defense counsel. Failure to object

waives all but plain error. Nieves, 2022-Ohio-3040, at ¶ 28. “An alleged error is

plain error only if the error is ‘obvious,’ and ‘but for the error, the outcome of the

trial clearly would have been otherwise.’” State v. Price, 2013-Ohio-1542, ¶ 8 (8th

Dist.), citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27 (2002), quoting State v. Long, 53

Ohio St.2d 91 (1978), paragraph two of the syllabus. “We take notice of ‘plain error’

with the ‘utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice.’” Id., quoting Long at paragraph three of the

syllabus.

As such, we review the three objected-to questions under the

prosecutorial misconduct standard and the remaining questions under the plain-

error standard.

The first question from the prosecutor to which there was an objection

was, “This is the first time that we’ve heard that, correct?” Wilson did not answer

the question before the prosecutor asked another question, which he also did

answer. This question concerned the fact that Wilson never told the police he had a

prior sexual relationship with D.E. and it was only during the trial that Wilson

provided that information. The second objected-to question by the prosecutor was,

“And that’s the third time that we heard that today in front of the jury?” Based on

the preceding questions and answers this appears to be in reference to the fact that

this was the third time that Wilson said it was not for him to tell the police anything.

Wilson did not answer this question because there was a side bar after the objection

and the prosecutor then asked another question. The last objected-to question

asked by the prosecutor was, “But when the police were asking you questions about

why she would be making these statements, you did not tell them that any sexual

encounter occurred at all?” Wilson answered with, “They didn’t ask me.” All three

statements concern Wilson’s prearrest silence.

Here, all three questions by the prosecutor clearly commented on

Wilson’s exercise of his right to remain silent. Examining the four factors for
prosecutorial misconduct we find that there is some likelihood that the remarks

tended to prejudice Wilson because the jury could infer guilt from Wilson’s silence.

While the objected-to remarks regarding his prearrest silence to the police were

isolated, the remarks could be considered extensive when factoring in the

unobjected-to questions noted above regarding his prearrest silence. There is no

indication the remarks were accidental, so we assume they were deliberate. Last,

this is a he-said-she-said rape allegation as to whether there was a consensual sexual

act between Wilson and D.E., so Wilson’s testimony and statements are important.

However, we note that there was additional evidence outside D.E.’s testimony,

including that of a SANE nurse and a DNA analyst. Based on the foregoing, we agree

with Wilson that these remarks on his prearrest silence were improper.

We must then look to see whether the remarks prejudicially affected

Wilson’s substantial rights such that his trial was unfair. Belcher, 2013-Ohio-3142,

at ¶ 29. Looking at these offending remarks in the broader context of the entire case

we cannot say that Wilson’s trial was unfair. There is no evidence in the record that

these questions would have overcome the testimony from D.E., Borden, the SANE

nurse, the DNA analyst or evidence via photographs and videos. Furthermore, it is

not clear, beyond a reasonable doubt that, absent these questions, the jury would

have found Wilson not guilty. As such, we find that the improper remarks did not

prejudicially affect Wilson’s substantial rights and that his trial was fair.

Now we return to the remaining questions by the prosecutor to which

Wilson failed during his cross-examination. Again, these questions are reviewed
under the plain-error standard. Upon review of the questions, we find that the

prosecutor did ask Wilson several questions outside the ones objected to that were

detailed above regarding why he did not tell the police he had prior sexual relations

with D.E. or that D.E. had given him a massage that evening prior to the alleged

rape, essentially commenting on his prearrest silence.

Assuming without deciding that any of these statements were obvious

errors, we cannot say, based on our analysis above, that the outcome of the trial

clearly would have been different without these statements, and this is not one of

those exceptional circumstances nor is a reversal necessary to prevent a manifest

miscarriage of justice. Price, 2013-Ohio-1542, at ¶ 8, citing Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d

at 27, quoting Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, paragraph two of the syllabus. As such any

alleged errors here do not qualify as plain errors.

Next, we turn to the remaining statements at issue under this

assignment of error which occurred during the direct examination of Borden and

during the State’s closing argument. During Borden’s direct examination, the

following exchange occurred between the prosecutor and the officer:

Q. Did you have an opportunity to ask him for an explanation of what
happened?

A. I did.

Q. And did you – do you know if you asked him while you were on the
scene that night, do you know how many times you asked him that
question?

A. I asked him several times for an explanation.

Q. And did he give you an explanation?
A. He did not.

...

Q. When you were asking him these questions was he engaged? Was he
speaking with you?

A. He was.

During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor made the following comment:

Now the other thing that I want to address is defense counsel says, oh,
how dare the State make a point that the defendant exercised his right
not to talk to the police. That is not evidence. What is in evidence is that
the police were asking him questions, and he engaged. He responded
with what he wanted the narrative to be at that time.

And I would argue that the reason he didn’t tell them anything about
any sexual encounter that night; no massage, no massage, — no — he
doesn’t tell them anything about why he would have a condom on his
penis. Because he doesn’t know that [D.E.] has that video when he talks
to the police.

Now after sitting through all of the evidence in this case and seeing
what the evidence is, the DNA, the video, now he’s got to explain it all.

There were no objections to these questions and comments by the

prosecutor and, therefore, Wilson has waived all but plain error. Price at ¶ 7 (Failure

to object to a detective’s testimony reciting a defendant’s statements waives all but

plain error.); Powell, 2012-Ohio-2577, at ¶ 151, citing State v. Childs, 14 Ohio St.2d

56 (1968), paragraph three of the syllabus (Trial counsel’s failure to object to a

prosecutor’s alleged improper comments during closing arguments waives all but

plain error.).

Again, assuming without deciding that any of these statements were

obvious errors, we cannot say that the outcome of the trial clearly would have been
different without these statements, and this is not one of those exceptional

circumstances nor is reversal necessary to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice.

These alleged errors do not qualify as plain errors.

Wilson’s first assignment of error is overruled.

Wilson’s Second Assignment of Error

For Wilson’s second assignment of error, he alleges that his rights to

due process and a fair trial were violated when the trial court precluded relevant

evidence from being presented to the jury. Specifically, Wilson argues the court

erred by excluding Defendant’s Exhibits N, AAA, B and C, thus “hamstringing” his

defense.

At a November 27, 2024 hearing pursuant to R.C. 2907.02(E), which

is Ohio’s Rape Shield statute, Wilson presented numerous exhibits to the court to

get preliminary rulings regarding their admissibility at the upcoming trial. Relevant

to this appeal, Wilson presented Defendant’s Exhibits N, AAA, B and C. Exhibit N

is a screenshot of a direct message from D.E. to the rapper Christopher Bridges a.k.a.

Ludacris (“Bridges”), a friend of Wilson’s, on June 28, 2023, via Instagram. The

message is as follows:

I still have to deal with this mentally & emotionally. Fate has messaged
me on Instagram multiple times saying he “misses” me, he’s tried
calling me, & he’s subscribed on my onlyfans, sending me tips
continuously. This is a serious matter, I AM SERIOUS, & he’s trying to
manipulate the situation. He’s digging himself a deeper whole [sic].
Either he can email me or we can go to trial. I don’t care at this point.
He deserves to go to prison.[1]

The court ruled preliminary that Exhibit N appeared irrelevant to the alleged rape.

Exhibit AAA is a screenshot of a message from June 26, 2023, on the

adult website OnlyFans, that was from D.E. to Wilson. The message says, “I don’t

discuss business over OnlyFans, can you consult with me over email please?” The

court deferred ruling on this exhibit until trial.

Last, Exhibits B and C were presented to the court, which are two clips

from a Ring security camera showing footage of D.E. entering and leaving Wilson’s

mother’s house on the early morning of November 15, 2022. The court ruled the

video footage was not relevant to the allegation of rape on December 12, 2022 and

the issue of whether D.E. stayed at Wilson’s house on November 15, 2022, was not

in dispute but stated it may become relevant for impeachment at trial.

During a pretrial hearing prior to impaneling the jury, the

admissibility of the three exhibits above was revisited by the court. Regarding

Exhibit N, the court ruled that the defense could ask D.E. about the direct message

she sent to Bridges and could use the exhibits to impeach D.E. if her testimony was

materially inconsistent. Regarding Exhibit AAA, the court ruled that the jury should

not hear anything about OnlyFans but that the message could be used if defense

counsel could show it is relevant, probative, or an inconsistent prior statement and

that the court would consider ruling on it during trial. Regarding Exhibits B and C,

1 Wilson’s stage name is Lil’ Fate.
the court also reserved ruling on admissibility until presented at trial depending on

whether D.E.’s testimony was materially inconsistent.

During D.E.’s testimony she testified consistently with Exhibit N, that

she had reached out to Bridges and told him to tell Wilson to email her. Wilson was

able to cross-examine her regarding this message, such that Wilson never used

Exhibit N to impeach her testimony. Similarly, D.E. testified consistently with

Exhibit AAA and Wilson cross-examined her regarding the OnlyFans message, so

the exhibit was never used to impeach her testimony. Last, Exhibits B and C were

not used at trial because D.E. testified consistently with the video footage that she

arrived at Wilson’s house in the very early morning of November 15, 2022, and left

that same morning several hours later and Wilson cross-examined her on this topic.

We note that Wilson did not attempt to admit into evidence any of

these demonstrative exhibits at the end of trial and they were not proffered, which

makes it difficult for this court to review. However, Wilson has transcribed Exhibits

N and AAA, which were not disputed by the State, and sufficiently described the

contents of Exhibits B and C for our review.

“The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence rests within the

sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Yapp, 2015-Ohio-1654, ¶ 22 (8th Dist.),

quoting State v. Sage, 31 Ohio St.3d 173 (1987), paragraph two of the syllabus. We

review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission of evidence for an abuse of

discretion. (Cleaned up.) Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when a court exercises
its judgment in an unwarranted way regarding a matter over which it has

discretionary authority. Johnson v. Abdullah, 2021-Ohio-3304, ¶ 35.

Evid.R. 401 states that relevant evidence is “evidence having any

tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the

determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without

the evidence.” Irrelevant evidence is not admissible at trial. Evid.R. 402.

Wilson was convicted of violating R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c), substantial

impairment rape, which

occurs when a person “engage[s] in sexual conduct with another”
whose “ability to resist or consent is substantially impaired because of
a mental or physical condition . . . and the offender knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the other person’s ability to resist or
consent is substantially impaired because of a mental or physical
condition . . . .” R.C. 2907.02(A)(1)(c).

State v. Morgan, 2025-Ohio-5510, ¶ 50 (8th Dist.).

We cannot say, upon review of the exhibits, that the trial court abused

its discretion in finding them irrelevant and excluding them at trial. None of the

exhibits have any temporal proximity to the day of the alleged offense. Exhibits N

and AAA are from June 2023, seven months after the incident in question and

Exhibits B and C are from November 15, 2022, one month before the incident.

Furthermore, none of the exhibits make the existence of any fact of consequence

more or less probable. None of the exhibits go to the issue of consent on

December 12, 2022, which was the material fact at issue in this case, since it was not

disputed that sexual conduct occurred. Last, the exclusion was not error because
the trial court properly permitted Wilson to cross-examine D.E. regarding the

contents of each exhibit and merely excluded the exhibits themselves from being

introduced, so the jury was aware of their existence and what they substantially

stated.

Wilson argued these exhibits were evidence that the alleged rape was

“faked” and that D.E. was trying to shakedown Wilson for money for her to drop the

rape allegation. We disagree. The exhibits do not reflect D.E. asking Wilson for any

kind of financial compensation and there was no evidence that D.E. ever received

any kind of financial compensation by Wilson to drop the rape allegations. These

exhibits do not support such an inference.

As such, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding

these irrelevant exhibits.

Wilson’s second assignment of error is overruled.

Judgment affirmed.

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s

convictions having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated.
A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

---

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, P.J., CONCURS;
DEENA R. CALABRESE, J., CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY