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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Vance

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 876
• Docket Number: 2025-L-087

• Judges: Eklund

• Opinion

• Authorities (26)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.4K)

• PDF

Syllabus

CRIMINAL - Aggravated Possession of Drugs; motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment; probable cause; reasonable suspicion; traffic stop; vehicle search; totality of the circumstances; scope of stop.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Vance, 2026-Ohio-876.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO, CASE NO. 2025-L-087

Plaintiff-Appellee,
Criminal Appeal from the
- vs - Court of Common Pleas

DEVON M. VANCE,
Trial Court No. 2024 CR 001117
Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Decided: March 16, 2026
Judgment: Affirmed

Charles E. Coulson, Lake County Prosecutor, and Kristi L. Winner, Assistant Prosecutor,
Lake County Administration Building, 105 Main Street, P.O. Box 490, Painesville, OH
44077 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Cory R. Hinton, Hanahan & Hinton, L.L.C., 7351 Center Street, Suite 1, Mentor, OH
44060 (For Defendant-Appellant).

JOHN J. EKLUND, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Devon M. Vance, appeals the judgment of conviction from the

Lake County Court of Common Pleas after her plea of no contest to one count of

Aggravated Possession of Drugs and one count of Possession of Drugs. Appellant argues

that the trial court erred by denying her Motion to Suppress evidence seized from her

person and her vehicle during a traffic stop. She argued a lack of reasonable suspicion

to stop her vehicle and a lack of probable cause to search her vehicle for contraband.

{¶2} Having reviewed the record and the applicable caselaw, we find Appellant’s

assignment of error to be without merit. First, the officer witnessed Appellant commit two
traffic violations, which created not only reasonable suspicion, but probable cause,

necessary to justify stopping her vehicle. Second, during the course of the traffic stop, the

officer learned that Appellant’s passenger had an active warrant, and the officer placed

the passenger under arrest, this provided reasonable suspicion to extend the duration of

the traffic stop. During this time, the officer observed Appellant attempting to take items

from her purse and conceal them in the back seat of the car. He then discovered that she

had attempted to conceal a digital scale from her purse and found the scale to have

suspected drug residue on it. Upon discovering this, the officer had probable cause to

arrest Appellant, and the remaining contraband was discovered on her person during a

lawful arrest.

{¶3} Therefore, the judgment of the Lake County Court of Common Pleas is

affirmed.

Substantive and Procedural History

{¶4} On November 22, 2024, the Lake County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on

one count of Aggravated Possession of Drugs (Methamphetamine), a second-degree

felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), and one count of Possession of Drugs (Naloxone),

a fifth-degree felony in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A). Appellant pled not guilty.

{¶5} On January 21, 2025, Appellant filed a Motion to Suppress, arguing: one,

the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop and detain her; and two,

the officer lacked probable cause to search her vehicle and her person. Appellant further

argued that the “scale” recovered from her vehicle was not a digital scale used for

weighing contraband but was instead a bathroom-style scale meant to weigh a person.

On January 31, 2025, the State responded to the Motion to Suppress.

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Case No. 2025-L-087
{¶6} The trial court held a suppression hearing on March 27, 2025. The State

called Detective Don Swindell of the Mentor Police Department as its sole witness. The

State did not play any dash camera or body camera videos during the hearing. Appellant

did not call any witnesses.

{¶7} Detective Swindell testified he had been promoted to Detective after the

events leading to Appellant’s arrest but before the suppression hearing. On September

9, 2024, Detective Swindell said that he was assigned to traffic patrol duties. He said that

he saw a gray Chevy at the eastbound exit ramp for State Route 2 at State Route 306 in

Mentor, Ohio. He watched the vehicle make a right turn on red “into the left straight only

lane. In that area there’s a clearly marked traffic control device, a sign that says that you’re

only allowed to make a right turn on red in the curb lane only.” Detective Swindell said

that there are two southbound turning lanes and that the gray Chevy did not make the

right turn on red from the curbside lane. He also said the vehicle “made a wide turn,

crossing over the double yellow line into the marked hazard zone, both driver side tires.

It reentered that left straight lane and then it made a left turn into” the Suburban Inn

located at 7677 Reynolds. Detective Swindell noted that the location and its surrounding

area are known for numerous calls for police service.

{¶8} Detective Swindell said that upon observing a Traffic Control Device

violation and a Marked Lanes violation, he effected a traffic stop of the vehicle in the

Suburban Inn parking lot. On cross-examination, Detective Swindell confirmed that he

was within a “couple hundred feet” of Appellant’s vehicle when he saw the traffic

violations.

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Case No. 2025-L-087
{¶9} Detective Swindell identified the driver as Appellant and the lone passenger

as Appellant’s husband. Detective Swindell said that he knew Appellant through prior

involvements with the Mentor Police Department. After conducting the stop and

identifying the occupants of the vehicle, Detective Swindell confirmed that the passenger

had an active warrant for his arrest. Detective Swindell had the passenger exit the vehicle

and detained him.

{¶10} As Detective Swindell was placing the passenger in the rear of his police

cruiser, he “observed” Appellant “inside the vehicle attempting to hide items.” He saw her

“digging items out of her purse and putting them on the floor in the front passenger area

and then trying to put them behind the front seat . . . .” He said that his police cruiser was

parked alongside her vehicle at a “forty-five degree angle . . . the way her vehicle was

parked . . . would be . . . the side view of her vehicle.” On cross-examination, he specified

that he was approximately ten feet away from Appellant’s vehicle. The stop occurred

during the night, but the parking lot was well-lit, and Detective Swindell testified that the

lights from his cruiser illuminated Appellant’s vehicle.

{¶11} After seeing Appellant engage in these movements, he confronted her

about them and had her exit the vehicle. He said that Appellant “openly stated that she

was hiding a scale behind the front seat.” Detective Swindell testified that he did not think

Appellant was talking about a bathroom scale but rather a “scale to weigh narcotics.” He

said that Appellant’s purse was not large enough to hold a bathroom style scale. Based

on her statement, Detective Swindell detained Appellant in the rear of his partner’s patrol

vehicle and then recovered a digital scale with what he believed was methamphetamine

PAGE 4 OF 17

Case No. 2025-L-087
residue on it located behind the passenger seat. He then searched Appellant’s purse and

found a methamphetamine pipe in the purse.

{¶12} Detective Swindell then contacted a female officer to respond to the scene

in order to conduct a search of Appellant’s person. He said that the responding officer

searched Appellant and that a “large baggie of methamphetamine was located in her bra

along with prescription pills, a hundred sixty dollars in currency and a Samsung

cellphone.”

{¶13} Detective Swindell testified that Appellant said that she had driven to

Cleveland to pick up methamphetamine and that she was going to the Suburban Inn to

give the drugs to a dealer staying at the hotel. When asked whether there were any

recordings of the events he described, Detective Swindell explained that his vehicle is

equipped with a dash camera but that it did not capture video of Appellant’s traffic

infraction or the subsequent search and arrest. In addition, the dash camera does not

record sound. Finally, he said that there was no body camera footage of the arrest

because the unit was not working.

{¶14} The State rested and, after a brief recess, the trial court issued an oral ruling

from the bench. The trial court stated the following findings on the record:

In this particular matter [Appellant] has raised two specific issues. One, she’s
challenged the stop of the vehicle and two she is challenging the search of the
vehicle.

In regards to the stop of the vehicle, the Defense’s contention is that there
were no grounds to stop the motor vehicle. There was no evidence of any
traffic violations, infractions. [Appellant’s] position that there was none that
were committed by [Appellant].

But the evidence showed differently.

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Case No. 2025-L-087
{¶15} The trial court concluded that Appellant made “an illegal turn” by making a

right turn on red when she was not in the curb lane and that she committed a “marked

lanes violation” during that turn because “her tires went outside the marked lines.”

{¶16} The trial court said that there was:

no evidence to the contrary. Defense argues that they were in the curb lane
and turned into the curb lane. There’s no evidence of that; none. The only
evidence presented is what I just indicated and that’s clearly a traffic
violation and gave the officer . . . grounds to pull the vehicle over.

So [in] regards to the first issue raised by Defense regarding the stop of the
vehicle, the Court finds that argument is without merit.

{¶17} Turning to the search of the vehicle, the trial court determined that the

evidence supported the conclusion that Detective Swindell observed Appellant removing

items from her purse, which

in and of itself could support, provide reasonable suspicion, which would
allow the officer to search the vehicle. But there is more here; a lot more. It
should also be noted that the officer knows [Appellant], has prior knowledge
of [Appellant] and [Appellant’s] history involving drug violations and
involvement in this area.

But when he observed that and he approached the car and asked her what
she was doing and she said she was hiding a scale. Defense wants to make
an argument that it was a scale used to weigh herself on. Again, there’s no
evidence of that at all presented at this hearing. And it’s certainly reasonable
for the officer to believe that when she says she’s hiding a scale which she
removed from her purse, a common-size purse, that is a scale that is not
used to stand on and weigh yourself, but a scale that is used to weigh drugs.
And that’s certainly a reasonable inference to make. She said she had a
scale, it came from her purse. It’s not Mary Poppins here pulling stuff out of
a big bag. The conduct that was observed is inconsistent with a scale that’s
used to weigh people.

{¶18} The trial court concluded that Detective Swindell finding the scale and

residue on it

certainly allowed the officer to then go further with the search. It was enough
to place her under arrest for possessing drug paraphernalia, to search her,

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Case No. 2025-L-087
to arrest her. There’s nothing here which indicates the officer committed any
Fourth Amendment violation. . . . [E]ven if she meant a regular scale, he
doesn’t have to accept that or believe that. Not under these circumstances
where scales are often found.
{¶19} The trial court therefore found that Appellant’s Motion to Suppress lacked

merit and denied it. The trial court issued a judgment entry incorporating its findings stated

on the record and denying Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.

{¶20} On May 30, 2025, Appellant pled no contest to both counts of the

indictment.

{¶21} On June 23, 2025, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an indefinite prison

sentence of three to four-and-a-half years on the second-degree-felony Aggravated

Possession of Drugs count and eight months on the fifth-degree-felony Possession of

Drugs count. The trial court ordered the sentences to run concurrently.

{¶22} Appellant timely appealed raising one assignment of error.

Assignment of Error and Analysis

{¶23} Appellant’s sole assignment of error states: “The Trial Court Erred when it

denied Defendant-Appellant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.”

{¶24} Appellant has raised two issues in her argument on appeal: First, Appellant

argues that Detective Swindell lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop

because Detective Swindell’s testimony was impeached during cross-examination and

he was not credible and because evidence of the violation was “unclear based on review

of the dash camera footage.” In essence, Appellant argues that the lack of the dash

camera footage renders the traffic stop unreasonable and in violation of the Fourth

Amendment.

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Case No. 2025-L-087
{¶25} Second, Appellant argues that even if the traffic stop was justified, the

search of Appellant’s person and vehicle was unconstitutional because Detective

Swindell lacked probable cause to expand the scope of the stop. In particular, she argues

that her reference to a “scale” was referring to a “traditional ‘scale’ that a person would

weigh themselves on, not a scale which would be considered contraband.”

{¶26} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law

and fact.” State v. Burnside, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At a hearing on a motion to suppress,

the trial court, as the trier of fact, is in the best position to weigh the evidence by resolving

factual questions and evaluating the credibility of witnesses. Id.; State v. Mills, 62 Ohio

St.3d 357, 366 (1992). As a result, an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings

of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence. Id. An appellate court

reviews the trial court’s application of the law to its factual findings de novo. State v.

Belton, 2016-Ohio-1581, ¶ 100. Accepting the facts as true, the reviewing court then must

independently determine, without deference to the trial court, whether the trial court

properly applied the substantive law to the facts of the case. Burnside at ¶ 8.

{¶27} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees “[t]he

right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. Const., amend. IV. The language of

Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution is virtually identical and affords the same

protections. State v. Hoffman, 2014-Ohio-4795, ¶ 11. “The touchstone of both is

reasonableness.” State v. Brown, 2020-Ohio-5140, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.).

{¶28} “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval

by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject

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Case No. 2025-L-087
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Footnote omitted.)

Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “When a defendant moves to suppress

evidence recovered during a warrantless search, the state has the burden of showing that

the search fits within one of the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant

requirement.” State v. Banks-Harvey, 2018-Ohio-201, ¶ 18.

{¶29} “Courts must exclude evidence obtained by searches and seizures that

violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Adams, 2015-Ohio-3954, ¶ 181, citing Mapp v.

Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (extending the exclusionary rule to the states). “‘The primary

purpose of the exclusionary rule is to remove incentive from the police to violate the

Fourth Amendment.’” State v. Eggleston, 2015-Ohio-958, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), quoting State

v. Casey, 2014-Ohio-2586, ¶ 29 (12th Dist.).

{¶30} The constitutionality of a traffic stop should be assessed in a manner similar

to that of a brief detention under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), rather than a formal

arrest. State v. Dunlap, 2024-Ohio-4821, ¶ 16. “[P]ursuant to Terry . . . , a police officer

may, under limited circumstances, detain an individual and conduct a brief investigative

stop.” State v. Gray, 2000 WL 973411, *2 (11th Dist. July 14, 2000). As with a Terry stop,

to initiate or continue a traffic stop, an officer must have at least a reasonable articulable

suspicion of criminal activity based on “articulable facts that give rise to a reasonable

suspicion that the individual is currently engaged in or is about to engage in criminal

activity.” Id.

{¶31} The Supreme Court has held that whether an officer had a reasonable

suspicion to justify the investigative stop “must be viewed in light of the totality of the

surrounding circumstances.” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177 (1988), paragraph one of

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Case No. 2025-L-087
the syllabus. It is not possible to precisely define the reasonable suspicion necessary to

initiate a stop, and the standard cannot be “reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Illinois v.

Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983); see Maumee v. Weisner, 1999-Ohio-68, ¶ 14.

Reasonable suspicion is less than probable cause but “something more than an ‘inchoate

and unparticularized suspicion or “hunch.”’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7

(1989), quoting Terry at 27. Relevant factors in determining whether an officer possessed

reasonable suspicion to justify a brief detention include: the location of the stop being in

a high crime area, whether the officer was aware of recent criminal activity in the area,

the time of the stop, suspicious conduct, and the officer’s training and experience. State

v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291, 295 (1980).

{¶32} Once an officer has initiated a lawful traffic stop based on reasonable

suspicion, the officer may not extend the scope of the stop beyond the initial “‘mission’”

of the seizure. Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 354-355 (2015). This typically

means that an officer may only delay a motorist for the time necessary to issue a ticket

or a warning. State v. Batchili, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 12. “Beyond determining whether to

issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s mission includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic]

stop.’” Rodriguez at 355, quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005). “Typically

such inquiries involve checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are

outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and

proof of insurance.” Id. An officer taking actions outside of this mission would render a

traffic stop unlawful if the “‘unrelated inquiries . . . measurably extend the duration of the

stop.’” Id., quoting Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). Courts consider the

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Case No. 2025-L-087
totality of the circumstances when considering whether an officer diligently completed the

original purpose of the stop within a reasonable length of time. Batchili at ¶ 12.

{¶33} However, an officer may extend the duration of a traffic stop where the

officer obtains additional facts that give rise to a reasonable articulable suspicion of

criminal activity warranting additional investigation. State v. Robinette, 1997-Ohio-343, ¶

27. The order to step out of the vehicle requires no constitutional quantum of suspicion.

State v. Evans, 67 Ohio St.3d 405, 408 (1993). “[T]he circumstances surrounding the stop

must ‘be viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the

scene, guided by his experience and training.’” Bobo at 179, quoting United States v. Hall,

525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Whether the continued seizure was reasonable is

analyzed under the totality of the circumstances. Robinette at ¶ 30.

{¶34} “[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval

by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment — subject

only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” (Footnotes

omitted.) Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.

This requires a two-step analysis. First, there must be probable cause. If
probable cause exists, then a search warrant must be obtained unless an
exception to the warrant requirement applies. If the state fails to satisfy
either step, the evidence seized in the unreasonable search must be
suppressed State v. Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, ¶ 9.

{¶35} When a defendant is validly stopped for a traffic violation, “[t]o further detain

the defendant and to conduct a search,” an officer needs “probable cause.” Id. at ¶ 10.

“Probable cause means ‘more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where “the

facts and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably

PAGE 11 OF 17

Case No. 2025-L-087
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable

caution in the belief that” an offense has been or is being committed.’” State v. McCorvey,

2011-Ohio-3627, ¶ 18 (11th Dist.), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-

176 (1949), quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 161 (1925).

{¶36} “Probable cause must be based upon objective facts that would justify the

issuance of a warrant by a magistrate.” State v. Welch, 18 Ohio St.3d 88, 92 (1985)

“Probable cause can only be measured by objective facts known to a police officer prior

to a warrantless search.” (Emphasis in original.) McCorvey at ¶ 18. Whether an officer

had probable cause to conduct a search is determined from the totality of the

circumstances. State v. Hynde, 2005-Ohio-1416, ¶ 10 (11th Dist.).

Lawful basis to conduct the traffic stop:

{¶37} First, Appellant suggests that dash camera footage must corroborate a

traffic stop to ensure the stop is supported by reasonable articulable suspicion.

Specifically, Appellant’s argument asserts that in her case, “proof of the traffic violations

appear unclear based on the review of the dash camera footage. As a result thereof . . .

the stop was done so in a manner which was unreasonable and in violation of Fourth

Amendment Rights.”

{¶38} This assertion is not well-founded. The testimony of one witness “standing

alone” can be “sufficient to support a conviction.” In re Miller, 2002-Ohio-3360, ¶ 48 (11th

Dist.). “[I]t is well settled that ‘physical evidence is not required to establish a defendant’s

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-3669, ¶ 31 (8th Dist.),

quoting State v. Lopez, 2011-Ohio-182, ¶ 62 (8th Dist.). A “lack of physical evidence does

not mean that the evidence the [S]tate did present was insufficient to convict a defendant

PAGE 12 OF 17

Case No. 2025-L-087
of the offenses with which he or she was charged.” State v. Bradley, 2020-Ohio-3460, ¶

34 (8th Dist.).

{¶39} In this case, the State presented one witness with no supporting video

evidence to corroborate his testimony at a suppression hearing. Where a single witness,

if believed, can sustain a criminal conviction, then a single witness, if believed, can

establish a lawful basis to conduct a traffic stop, perform a probable cause search, and

effect an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. Detective Swindell also explained that his

dash camera would not have captured these violations because of the orientation of his

cruiser. The lack of video evidence to support his testimony does not render the stop

constitutionally unsound.

{¶40} Turning to the substance of the stop itself, the trial court’s factual

determinations reflect that it considered Detective Swindell’s testimony and believed it.

The trial court determined that he had “grounds to pull the vehicle over.” The trial court

emphasized that Detective Swindell’s testimony was uncontroverted. He directly

observed Appellant commit what he believed to be two traffic violations: the first, by

turning right on red from a lane other than the curb lane when a traffic control device

prohibited such action; the second, where both driver side tires crossed over the double

yellow line while making the illegal right turn. It is unclear whether the trial court found

that Detective Swindell had a “reasonable articulable suspicion” to justify an investigative

stop or “probable cause” to do so.

{¶41} Although a traffic stop may be supported by probable cause, it need only be

supported by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See Heien v. North

Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 61 (2014) (finding that reasonable suspicion to justify a traffic stop

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Case No. 2025-L-087
may be based on a reasonable mistake of law). As long as this low threshold is met, the

officer may lawfully detain the suspect to investigate. In this case, although the trial court

did not so determine, we conclude the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion and,

to the extent necessary, probable cause based on Detective Swindell’s testimony that he

directly observed Appellant commit two traffic violations.

Search of Appellant’s vehicle and person:

{¶42} Next, Appellant’s argument that officers lacked probable cause to search

Appellant’s vehicle and her person is not well taken.

{¶43} First, after conducting the stop, Detective Swindell discovered that the

passenger in Appellant’s vehicle, her husband, had an active warrant for his arrest.

Therefore, it was proper for Detective Swindell to extend the scope of the stop to

effectuate the passenger’s arrest. See Robinette, 1997-Ohio-343, at ¶ 27.

{¶44} While Detective Swindell was doing this, he observed Appellant engage in

what he regarded as suspicious behavior. The trial court found that Detective Swindell

observed Appellant removing items from her purse and attempting to hide them behind

the passenger seat of her vehicle. We must note that the trial court, issuing its ruling from

the bench, said that Appellant “removing items from her purse and attempting to hide

them behind the . . . the passenger seat. . . . quite frankly, that, in and of itself could

support, provide reasonable suspicion, which would allow the officer to search the

vehicle.”

{¶45} This was an incorrect statement of the law. An officer must have probable

cause to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle, not merely a reasonable suspicion.

See Moore, 2000-Ohio-10, at ¶ 6. However, this mistake of law is not a basis to reverse

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Case No. 2025-L-087
the trial court’s judgment because “reviewing courts affirm and reverse judgments, not

the reasons for the judgments.” Geneva v. Fende, 2009-Ohio-6380, ¶ 33 (11th Dist.).

{¶46} We find that, based on the totality of the circumstances, including the

location of the stop at a known location for criminal activity, the time of day, Detective

Swindell’s familiarity with Appellant, and Appellant’s suspicious behavior involving

removing items from her purse and hiding them behind the passenger seat, Detective

Swindell had a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity. This permitted him to

expand the scope of the traffic stop and further question Appellant about her conduct.

{¶47} When Detective Swindell questioned Appellant about removing items from

her purse and hiding them in the vehicle, she admitted that she removed a scale from her

purse. Appellant’s purse was a typical-sized purse and would not have been able to hold

a bathroom-style scale. Detective Swindell testified that he understood Appellant’s

reference to a scale to be to a small digital scale typically used for weighing narcotics

{¶48} At this point, given the totality of the circumstances already mentioned and

Appellant’s admission that she had removed a scale from her purse, which under the

circumstances Detective Swindell believed was a small digital scale used for weighing

narcotics, he had probable cause to justify a search of Appellant’s vehicle.

{¶49} After conducting the probable cause search, Detective Swindell discovered

a small digital scale with suspected drug residue on it and a methamphetamine pipe in

Appellant’s purse. At this time, Detective Swindell had probable cause to arrest Appellant

for possession of drug paraphernalia. Therefore, the search incident to arrest of

Appellant’s person was justified, and the discovery of the narcotics on her person did not

violate the Fourth Amendment.

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Case No. 2025-L-087
{¶50} Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit.

{¶51} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Lake County Court of

Common Pleas is affirmed.

MATT LYNCH, P.J.,

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.,

concur.

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Case No. 2025-L-087
JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, Appellant’s assignment of error

is without merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Lake

County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Costs to be taxed against Appellant.

JUDGE JOHN J. EKLUND

PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH,
concurs

JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI,
concurs

THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate
pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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Case No. 2025-L-087