Jump To

Top Caption Lead Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Stearns

Washington Supreme Court

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 103,908-5

• Opinion

• Authorities (19)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (53.4K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

FILE THIS OPINION WAS FILED
FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
MARCH 26, 2026
IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
MARCH 26, 2026 SARAH R. PENDLETON
SUPREME COURT CLERK

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 103908-5
Petitioner, )
) En Banc
v. )
) Filed: March 26, 2026
JOHN RAY STEARNS, )
)
Respondent. )
)

MUNGIA, J.—As noted in a learned treatise, ER 404(b) has two core principles.

The first core principle of ER 404(b) is that the defendant’s other misconduct is

inadmissible to show the defendant’s propensity to engage in criminal activities. Because

the State has the burden to prove that the current offense occurred beyond a reasonable

doubt, the law is uncomfortable with the notion that “once a criminal, always a criminal.”

5D ELIZABETH A. TURNER & KARL B. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE, COURTROOM

HANDBOOK ON WASHINGTON EVIDENCE § 404:8, at 192 (2025-2026 ed.).

But the second core principle is that a defendant’s other misconduct is potentially

admissible for other, more limited purposes. Id.
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

There is not, however, a “bright line [that] separates what is forbidden from what

is allowed.” Id. In determining what is allowed and what is not allowed, a trial court

must exercise its sound discretion, and we will reverse a trial court’s decision only if it

has abused that discretion.

This appeal allows us to provide further guidance to trial courts when exercising

that discretion in determining whether other wrongful acts are admissible to show a

common scheme or plan. We have held that to show a common scheme or plan, the State

must show “ʻmarkedly similar acts of misconduct against similar victims under similar

circumstances.ʼ” State v. DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d 11, 19, 74 P.3d 119 (2003) (internal

quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Lough, 125 Wn.2d 847, 856, 889 P.2d 487

(1995)).

We now clarify that this test does not require markedly similar victims. Here, the

victims shared only broad similarities—they were all women and were all attacked in the

same neighborhood. These shared characteristics are sufficiently similar to uphold the

trial court’s discretionary ruling to admit the evidence under ER 404(b) when considered

with the similarity of the misconduct and circumstances of the other wrongful conduct.

Here, the trial court considered the similarities of the defendant’s other wrongful

conduct and concluded that they showed a common scheme or plan. The Court of

Appeals reversed, ruling that the trial court abused its discretion. We disagree. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of other wrongful conduct

2
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

under the common scheme or plan exception. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of

Appeals and affirm the trial court’s ruling.

I
FACTUAL HISTORY

In 1998, Crystal Williams, a 33-year-old Black woman, was found dead in Lavizzo

Park in Seattle’s Central District. Ms. Williams worked as a sex worker. She was last seen

in the early morning hours, walking in the direction of the park with a man. Ms. Williams’

autopsy showed that she had been strangled and died from a fractured skull. She was found

with her pants pulled down, exposing her genitals, and her shirt pulled up, exposing her bra.

She had no defensive wounds, suggesting that she was not conscious when she was raped.

Semen was found in her vagina, and more semen was found in a discarded condom near her

body. The pockets of her jacket had been turned inside out.

The police identified several suspects. However, none matched the DNA evidence.

The case then went cold. Six years later, Mr. Stearns’ DNA matched the DNA in the semen

found in Ms. Williams’ vagina and in the discarded condom. Police interviewed

Mr. Stearns, who was then serving time in prison for another crime. The prosecutor

determined there was probable cause to charge Mr. Stearns with Ms. Williams’ murder but

failed to bring charges until 12 years later.

II
PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The State charged Mr. Stearns with felony murder in the first degree, based on first-

and second-degree rape, with sexual motivation. The case went to trial and resulted in a

3
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

hung jury. On retrial, the jury found Mr. Stearns guilty. Mr. Stearns made several

assignments of error on appeal to Division One of the Court of Appeals: (1) his due process

rights were violated by the 12-year preaccusatorial delay, (2) the trial court erred in

introducing evidence of other wrongful acts, (3) the trial court violated CrR 6.15 by telling

jurors they could “ʻtune outʼ” during oral instructions, and (4) the prosecutor committed

misconduct requiring reversal. Br. of Appellant at 2-3 (Wash. Ct. App. No. 82125-3-I

(2021)).

The Court of Appeals reversed Mr. Stearns’ conviction on the preaccusatorial delay

issue only, holding that Mr. Stearns’ due process rights were violated. State v. Stearns, 23

Wn. App. 2d 580, 517 P.3d 467 (2022). This court granted review and reversed, remanding

back to the Court of Appeals. State v. Stearns, 2 Wn.2d 869, 545 P.3d 320 (2024).

On remand, the Court of Appeals considered the remaining issues. The court

affirmed the trial court’s ruling in part but reversed in part. The court concluded that the

trial court erred in admitting evidence of other wrongful acts. State v. Stearns, No. 82125-3-

I (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2025) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/821253.pdf.

ER 404(b) Ruling

At trial, the State offered, and the court admitted over Mr. Stearns’ objection,

evidence of two of Mr. Stearns’ prior rape convictions.1

1
The trial court denied the admission of a third prior rape conviction that the State sought to
introduce.
4
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

The first conviction was based on Mr. Stearns’ guilty plea to raping BG in 1981. BG

was a 20-year-old woman whom Mr. Stearns knew through her brother. Mr. Stearns

knocked on BG’s door around midnight, saying he was being chased by someone. BG let

him in, and they watched television together. Mr. Stearns hit BG on the head with a

whiskey bottle. He then vaginally raped her three times. After being raped, BG tried to

escape. Mr. Stearns hit her on the head again and strangled her. BG pretended to lose

consciousness and then pretended to wake up with no memory of the rape. Mr. Stearns left,

returning a few minutes later saying he had forgotten his radio. He then took BG’s

television and left the apartment.

The second conviction was based on Mr. Stearns’ guilty plea to robbery and

attempted rape of DH in 1989. DH was a 41-year-old woman who did not know

Mr. Stearns. Around 5:00 p.m. she took the bus home from work. As she left the bus, she

passed Mr. Stearns, who was lying in the gutter on the side of the street. DH walked into

the street to give Mr. Stearns a wide berth. Mr. Stearns got up and attacked her from

behind. Mr. Stearns hit DH on the head with his fist, strangled her, threw her down on the

street, and attempted to digitally penetrate her vagina. Mr. Stearns was dragging DH away

from the road when his brother intervened, allowing DH to escape. Mr. Stearns was later

found with some of DH’s belongings.

The State sought to admit these prior acts under the common scheme or plan

exception to ER 404(b) to establish forcible compulsion and to rebut the defense of consent.

Defense counsel objected, arguing that the other wrongful acts were not part of a common

5
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

scheme or plan and that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. The trial court overruled the

objection, concluding that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudice and

that the court would give a limiting instruction to the jury about the purpose of the admitted

evidence. The trial court stated that the ER 404(b) evidence’s relevance to prove forcible

compulsion and rebut Mr. Stearns’ claim of consent was “critical” to its ruling. 2 Verbatim

Rep. of Proc. (Jan. 15, 2020) (VRP) at 150. The trial court stated:

I think it’s clear that the probative value in the 1981 case, and in the 1989 case
far outweigh the prejudicial effect assuming there will be a limiting
instruction given to the jury. I disagree with defense that juries do not listen
to limiting instructions. In fact, I think juries are exceptionally careful in King
County. I have sat as a visiting judge in other counties, and, frankly, I think
we have a very fair population or they are not big fans of the police. They are
not big fans of the prosecutor’s office, and they are quick to hold the State
accountable, and I also believe that they do follow the law when they are
given a limiting instruction.

Id. at 152.

BG and DH both testified at trial. The trial court gave the following limiting

instruction:

Certain evidence has been admitted in this case for only a limited purpose.
This evidence consists of:

1) The testimony of [BG] regarding Mr. Stearns 1981 Rape in the Second
Degree Conviction and the stipulation regarding that conviction; and

2) The testimony of [DH] regarding Mr. Stearns 1989 Attempted Rape in
the Second Degree and Robbery in the First Degree convictions and
stipulation regarding that conviction.

This evidence may be considered by you only for the purpose of whether the
defendant’s prior conduct establishes a common scheme or plan, or to
establish forcible compulsion, with respect to conduct charged by the State in

6
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

this case. You may not consider it for any other purpose. Any discussion of
the evidence during your deliberations must be consistent with this limitation.

Clerk’s Papers at 369.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

evidence of the prior rapes under the common scheme or plan exception to ER 404(b). The

Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court incorrectly interpreted the case law around

the ER 404(b) common scheme or plan exception, and that the court made improper

considerations as to prejudice.

We reverse the Court of Appeals. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

admitting evidence of the prior rapes under ER 404(b) to establish forcible compulsion and

to rebut the defense of consent.

III
WE REVIEW FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY
ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF OTHER WRONGFUL ACTS

We review de novo whether a court has correctly interpreted an evidentiary rule.

DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d at 17. If a rule has been correctly interpreted, we review a trial

court’s application of the rule for abuse of discretion. Id. “A trial court abuses its discretion

when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for

untenable reasons.” State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 283-84, 165 P.3d 1251 (2007).

Alternatively, a court abuses its discretion when no reasonable judge would rule as the trial

court did. State v. Vy Thang, 145 Wn.2d 630, 642, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002).

7
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

Under ER 404(b), a trial court may admit the defendant’s other wrongful acts to

show a common plan or scheme if the other wrongful acts are

(1) proved by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) admitted for the purpose
of proving a common plan or scheme, (3) relevant to prove an element of the
crime charged or to rebut a defense, and (4) more probative than prejudicial.

Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 852.

A court may not admit evidence of a defendant’s other wrongful acts to show that the

defendant has a propensity for criminal behavior. ER 404(b). The reason for this

prohibition is the risk that the jury will simply punish a defendant for their other wrongful

acts or will assume they committed the current alleged criminal act. As stated in Bowen:

First, such evidence is highly prejudicial because the possibility exists
that the jury “will vote to convict, not because they find the defendant guilty
of the charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt, but because they believe the
defendant deserves to be punished for a series of immoral actions.” Second,
the jury may place undue weight or “overestimate” the probative value of the
other prior acts. Overestimation problems are especially acute where the
prior acts are similar to the charged crime. Finally, introduction of other acts
of misconduct inevitably shifts the jury’s attention to the defendant’s general
propensity for criminality, the forbidden inference; thus, the normal
“presumption of innocenceˮ is stripped away.

State v. Bowen, 48 Wn. App. 187, 195-96, 738 P.2d 316 (1987) (citations omitted) (quoting

ROBERT O. LEMPERT & STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE

218, 219 (1982)), abrogated on other grounds by Lough, 125 Wn.2d 847.

Thus, we remind trial courts that in determining whether to admit evidence of other

wrongful acts under ER 404(b), trial courts must start with the presumption that other

wrongful acts are inadmissible. DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d at 17. Evidence of a defendant’s

prior sexual assault is particularly prejudicial. State v. Saltarelli, 98 Wn.2d 358, 363, 655
8
State v. Stearns, No. 103908- 5

P.2d 697 (1982). If there is a doubt as to whether other wrongful acts should be admitted,

that doubt should be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Smith, 106 Wn.2d 772,

776, 725 P.2d 951 (1986).

Mr. Stearns argues that the acts were admitted for an improper purpose and that they

do not meet the ER 404(b) exception for common scheme or plan. He claims that prong

two of the analysis is not satisfied: the State failed to establish that the prior two convictions

showed a common scheme or plan. Mr. Stearns also argues the court abused its discretion

in analyzing the “prejudice prong,ˮ prong four. He argues that the probative value of the

other wrongful conduct was outweighed by the unfair prejudice of admitting that evidence.

IV
TO ANALYZE COMMON SCHEME OR PLAN, COURTS MUST CONSIDER THE ACTS, THE
VICTIMS, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CRIMES

Mr. Stearns challenges the second prong of the ER 404(b) test: whether the acts

sought to be admitted show a common scheme or plan. Evidence may be admitted under

this exception when a person uses one plan to repeatedly commit separate but very similar

crimes. Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 855. The separate crimes do not have to be identical, but we

have previously said they must be “ʻmarkedly similar acts of misconduct against similar

victims under similar circumstances.ʼ” DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d at 19 (internal quotation

marks omitted) (quoting Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 856). Further, the acts must have “ʻsuch a

concurrence of common featuresʼ” that they are naturally explained as being part of a

common plan. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 856).

9
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

Neither the acts nor the plan needs to be particularly unique. Id. The leading cases

discussing the common scheme or plan exception are illustrative:

In Lough, prior sexual assaults were admitted as evidence under the common

scheme or plan exception to ER 404(b). Mr. Lough was a paramedic who was accused of

drugging and raping P.A. Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 849. Mr. Lough befriended P.A. at an

emergency medicine class he taught. Id. They went on a date at her home, where he

mixed a drink for her. Id. Shortly after drinking it she became dizzy, disoriented, and

suffered memory loss. Id. She testified that she had moments of lucidity where she

recalled her sweatpants were pulled down and Mr. Lough’s genitals were in her hands

and by her face. Id. When she woke up Mr. Lough was gone, and she was naked from

the waist down. Id. Mr. Lough denied drugging P.A. and claimed that they had

consensual sex. Id.

The trial court admitted evidence that Mr. Lough drugged and raped four other

women in a similar manner. Each incident involved a woman with whom Mr. Lough was

in a romantic relationship. Id. at 850-51. In each incident he offered the woman a drink

or medicine, and they woke up later with amnesia, in pain, and often bleeding vaginally

and anally. Id. We held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting these

prior acts under ER 404(b). Id. at 861. Each act showed Mr. Lough’s common plan to

use his expertise as a paramedic to administer drugs and then rape women with whom he

was in a dating relationship. Id.

10
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

State v. Yates is also instructive. 161 Wn.2d 714, 750, 168 P.3d 359 (2007). Yates

is a capital case in which evidence of a common scheme or plan was used to support an

aggravated first-degree murder conviction. Mr. Yates was accused of murdering two

women who worked as sex workers. Id. at 728-29. Each woman had been shot in the

head, their heads were encased in several plastic bags, they had been robbed, and their

bodies had been dumped in remote areas. Id. The trial court admitted evidence of ten

prior murders to which Yates had pleaded guilty. The women Mr. Yates had previously

murdered were all sex workers who had been shot in the head, their heads were encased

in plastic bags, they had been robbed, and their bodies had been dumped. Id. at 753.

The legal test at issue in Yates is not identical to the ER 404(b) test for admitting

evidence of other wrongful acts. When common scheme or plan is charged as an

aggravator, the jury—not the court—decides whether acts were committed as part of a

common plan. However, in Yates, the jury found there was a common scheme or plan

connecting the murders, and this court held that sufficient evidence supported the verdict.

Id. All the acts in that case were markedly similar, committed against similar victims,

and involved similar circumstances.

State v. Williams is a Court of Appeals case factually similar to this case. 156 Wn.

App 482, 234 P.3d 1174 (2010). Mr. Williams was charged with raping two women in a

similar manner. Id. at 488-89. He befriended each woman after meeting them on the

street, he offered them drugs, they accompanied him to a secluded place, he strangled

them to unconsciousness, and he raped them. Id. One of the victims was a new

11
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

acquaintance of Mr. Williams, while another described him as “her best friend.” Id. at

1. In one of the incidents, Mr. Williams subdued the woman by grabbing her from

behind and putting his forearm across her throat. Id. The Court of Appeals held that the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the details of Mr. Williams’ prior rape

conviction under ER 404(b). Id. at 492. The prior act was sufficiently similar to the

present offenses: Mr. Williams had offered a woman cannabis, grabbed her from behind,

put his forearm across her throat, and strangled her to unconsciousness four times while

he raped her. Id. at 489-90.

As these cases illustrate, trial courts must consider the nature of the prior acts, the

victims, and the circumstances to determine whether the other acts can be admitted to

show a common scheme or plan. In determining whether the trial court here abused its

discretion by admitting the evidence of other acts, we consider those three elements.

V
BECAUSE MR. STEARNS’ OTHER ACTS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT WERE SUFFICIENTLY
SIMILAR TO THE PRESENT CASE, IT WAS WITHIN THE TRIAL COURT’S DISCRETION TO
ADMIT THAT EVIDENCE UNDER ER 404(B)

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the prior rapes

and the current offense met the requirements under ER 404(b) for a common scheme or

plan. In cases involving sexual assault, ER 404(b) evidence of a common scheme or plan

may be admitted to prove forcible compulsion and rebut a consent defense. See State v.

Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 571, 574, 940 P.2d 546 (1997); see also State v. Knapp, 197

Wn.2d 579, 588, 486 P.3d 113 (2021) (“the issue of consent inherently exists within the

12
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

element of forcible compulsion” (citing State v. W.R., 181 Wn.2d 757, 767 n.3, 336 P.3d

1134 (2014))).

First, our case law has emphasized that a similarity between the acts is the most

important of the three elements. The acts must be “ʻmarkedly similarʼ” while the victims

and circumstances must only be “ʻsimilar.ʼ” DeVincentis, 150 Wn.2d at 19 (emphasis

added) (quoting Lough, 125 Wn.2d at 856). Mr. Stearns contends the Court of Appeals

correctly concluded the similarities between the cases involving BG, DH, and Ms. Williams

are “‘too tenuous to constitute a common scheme or plan.’” Suppl. Br. of Resp’t at 19

(quoting Stearns, No. 82125-3-I, slip op. at 20). We disagree.2 The other wrongful acts

committed by Mr. Stearns were markedly similar to the acts here: he hit each victim on

the head, strangled them, and sexually assaulted them, and there is evidence that all three

victims were robbed. This factor weighs strongly toward showing a common plan.

Second, many of our cases note some similarities between the victims, if only in

that they have a similar relationship to the defendant. However, we take this opportunity

to clarify that prior wrongful acts can show a common scheme or plan even if the victims

share few common characteristics. Not all crimes are committed with a specific victim in

mind. A person can form a plan to commit a seemingly random act of violence; for

2
We note that the State contends the Court of Appeals “erred by citing harmful rape myths as
evidence that Stearns’ crimes are generic and commonplace.” Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 32. For
support, the State provides statistics showing that in 2023 the majority of “sex offenses were
reported to have been committed with no weapons or force at all.” Pet. for Rev. at 29 (citing
National Incident-Based Reporting System “Type Weapon” Table 2023, FBI CRIME DATA
EXPLORER, https://cde.ucr.cjis.gov/LATEST/webapp/#); see also Suppl. Br. of Pet’r at 31
(“studies show that strangulation during rape is rare”).
13
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

example, one could hide in a bush in a public park and attack the first person who walks

by. The fact that the victims of these attacks would likely share few characteristics would

not preclude a court from finding a common scheme or plan.

Here, Mr. Stearns emphasizes that the victims of the crimes had different

demographic characteristics and had a different relationship with Mr. Stearns. BG was

an unemployed, 19-year-old white woman who knew Mr. Stearns casually through her

brother. DH was a 41-year-old white woman who worked at an insurance firm and was a

total stranger to Mr. Stearns. Crystal Williams was a 33-year-old Black woman who

worked as a sex worker, and it is unknown whether she knew Mr. Stearns. However, the

dissimilarities between the victims do not weigh heavily in this case. Each woman was a

victim of a seemingly random act of violence, who was attacked in Seattle’s Central

District in a similar manner. These similarities between the victims are sufficient.

Finally, the circumstances of the crimes in this case were similar in that

Mr. Stearns was able to attack each victim by tricking them. Mr. Stearns entered BG’s

home around midnight with a ruse, telling her someone was chasing him. Mr. Stearns

attacked DH from behind after appearing to be passed out and lying in the gutter. While

many details of Crystal Williams’ death are unknown, based on the circumstances it is

likely the killer approached Ms. Williams under the guise of offering drugs or money for

sex.

14
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

Reviewing the trial court’s decision to admit the evidence for abuse of discretion,

we conclude that Mr. Stearns’ other wrongful acts were sufficiently similar to show that

he had engaged in a common scheme or plan to assault women.

VI
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION WHEN CONDUCTING THE PREJUDICE
ANALYSIS

Mr. Stearns next argues that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that the

evidence was more probative than prejudicial under the fourth prong of the ER 404(b)

test. This prong incorporates the prejudice test from ER 403. State v. Gresham, 173

Wn.2d 405, 421, 269 P.3d 207 (2012).

Here, the trial court balanced the prejudice resulting from the other wrongful acts

with their probative value on the record. The judge concluded that the other wrongful acts

would not be prejudicial so long as a limiting instruction was given. As part of this

analysis, the judge reasoned:

[J]uries are exceptionally careful in King County. I have sat as a visiting
judge in other counties, and, frankly, I think we have a very fair population
or they are not big fans of the police. They are not big fans of the
prosecutor’s office, and they are quick to hold the State accountable, and I
also believe that they do follow the law when they are given a limiting
instruction.

2 VRP at 152.

A judge’s subjective impression of jurors’ attitudes toward the police based on the

venue of the trial is not a relevant consideration for the ER 404(b) analysis. However,

this statement by the judge does not show that she based her prejudice analysis on

“untenable grounds.” Instead, the judge concluded that the jury was likely to listen to the
15
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

court’s instruction, in this case a liming instruction, which is a well-established

presumption. See, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Hill, 115 Wn.2d 184, 187, 796 P.2d 416 (1990)

(“A jury is presumed to follow the court’s instructions and that presumption will prevail

until it is overcome by a showing otherwise.”). The judge’s subjective impressions aside,

there is no reason to believe that the jury disregarded the limiting instruction in this case.

Although trial courts should refrain from speculating on the characteristics of

jurors in any specific venue, this comment did not show that the trial court abused its

discretion in finding the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

VII
CONCLUSION

We reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate Mr. Stearns’ conviction. The trial

court did not abuse its discretion. It did not base its decision on untenable grounds, and a

reasonable judge could conclude that other wrongful acts were part of a common scheme or

plan where, as here, the acts were markedly similar and the victims and circumstances had

sufficient similarities. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in conducting the

prejudice analysis. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

16
State v. Stearns, No. 103908-5

---

WE CONCUR:

---

---

---

---

Yu, J.P.T.

17