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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. King

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 873
• Docket Number: 2024CA0034-M

• Judges: Stevenson

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.1K)

• PDF

Syllabus

felonious assault, community control, consecutive jail sentence, moot, effective assistance of counsel, prejudice, expert

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. King, 2026-Ohio-873.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF MEDINA )

STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 2024CA0034-M

Appellee

v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
DARREN D. KING COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF MEDINA, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 2023-CR-0621

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: March 16, 2026

STEVENSON, Judge.

{¶1} Appellant Darren King appeals from his conviction in the Medina County Court of

Common Pleas, challenging the trial court’s imposition of a consecutive jail term as part of

community control and asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This Court affirms.

I.

{¶2} Mr. King was charged with two counts of felonious assault in violation of R.C.

2903.11(A)(2)/(D)(1)(a), felonies of the second degree. The indictment alleged two victims, J.M.

and K.G. The State alleged that J.M. and K.G. were on or about to get on a motorcycle when Mr.

King knowingly hit the motorcycle with his 2002 Chevy Avalanche (“the truck”). Mr. King

pleaded not guilty to the charges, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial.

{¶3} The State first called J.M. to testify at trial and the trial court granted its motion to

have J.M. declared a hostile witness. J.M. testified that he was in the parking lot of The Family

Tavern bar (“the bar”) on August 8, 2023, when he got on his motorcycle with K.G. He testified
2

that Mr. King did not hit his motorcycle. J.M.’s trial testimony was inconsistent with what he had

reported to the police. Videos from the officers’ body worn cameras were played at trial and

admitted into evidence. J.M. is seen and heard in the videos saying that Mr. King was “aiming”

for K.G., that Mr. King hit the motorcycle, and that his motorcycle was damaged in the incident.

{¶4} K.G., a former girlfriend of Mr. King, testified that she went to the bar on August

8, 2023, with J.M. and two other individuals. Mr. King started texting K.G. while she was at the

bar and he told her in one text that he was in the bar’s parking lot. K.G. shut the bar’s blinds and

locked the doors to prevent Mr. King from entering the bar.

{¶5} K.G. saw Mr. King’s truck in the parking lot when she exited the bar. She testified

that Mr. King started his truck and “drove toward us head-on” after she got on the motorcycle with

J.M. She testified that Mr. King hit the motorcycle with the front end of his truck and that pieces

of the motorcycle fell to the ground. She also testified that fluid was leaking from the motorcycle

after it was struck. K.G. recalled seeing damage to J.M.’s shirt after the incident. Although she did

not sustain a physical injury, K.G. described the incident as “a traumatic experience.” She texted

Mr. King after the incident stating, “you just tried to kill me!!!!!!” Mr. King sped out of the parking

lot after hitting the motorcycle. K.G. testified that Mr. King later asked her to recant the incident

statement she had given to the police.

{¶6} The bartender testified that she went to the parking lot for safety reasons before

closing the bar on the night of the incident. It was not unusual for the bartender to conduct a safety

check of the parking lot before closing. The bartender testified that Mr. King’s truck was in the

parking lot when she went out for the safety check. The bartender casually knew K.G. and she was

aware that K.G. had previously been in a relationship with Mr. King. The bartender told Mr. King

that the bar was closing and that he needed to leave. The bartender then went back into the bar.
3

{¶7} The bartender exited the bar with K.G., J.M., and three other bar patrons. She

noticed upon exiting that Mr. King had moved his truck and she again approached the truck to

speak to Mr. King. She testified that Mr. King drove his truck around her as she was approaching

and that he “struck the motorcycle” that K.G. and J.M. were standing next to and about to get on.

Mr. King did not stop after hitting the motorcycle and he sped out of the parking lot.

{¶8} The bartender testified that J.M.’s shirt was torn in the incident and that “he was

bleeding from his arm.” She did not observe any physical injuries to K.G., but testified that K.G.

“was very upset, visibly shaken up.” The bartender testified that the motorcycle was damaged in

the incident and that motorcycle parts were “laying in the parking lot[.]” She also testified that a

piece of the truck was left in the parking lot after it struck the motorcycle.

{¶9} Brunswick Hills Police Officer Zachary Getto responded to a 911 call reporting the

incident in the bar parking lot. He observed that K.G. was “pretty visibly shook up, emotional” at

the scene. Officer Getto testified that he observed damage to the motorcycle. Officer Getto also

observed a piece of a front bumper laying in the parking lot and he testified that the bumper piece

“was laying . . . just south of where the bike that had been struck[.]” Officer Getto concluded that,

based on his investigation, “a vehicle had struck the motorcycle and left the parking lot.” He was

unable to locate Mr. King after the incident.

{¶10} Mr. King testified in his defense at trial. He testified that K.G. asked him to pick

her up from the bar on August 8, 2023. He was in the parking lot when the bartender informed him

that it was “last call” and that he needed to leave. Mr. King was not there for “last call” and did

not leave.

{¶11} Mr. King talked to K.G. on the phone after “last call.” He told K.G. that it was

getting late and that she needed to hurry up. Mr. King testified that he pulled closer to the bar’s
4

front door “so [K.G.] could walk out and get right in and make things fast[.]” He claimed that

people started yelling at him when they came out of the bar, that motorcycles started revving, and

that he “just wanted to leave the scene.” Mr. King just “[p]ull[ed] out and le[ft][.]” He denied

hitting the motorcycle. He testified that K.G. had lied in the statement she gave police and that he

asked her to tell the truth. Mr. King sold his truck after the August 8, 2023, incident without it

being examined or inspected.

{¶12} During a break in Mr. King’s testimony, defense counsel expressed her intent to

have a mechanic testify at trial. She wanted a mechanic to testify about bumpers on a 2002

Chevrolet Avalanche and “explain what kind of damage would be caused to a motorcycle” that is

hit by an Avalanche. Counsel acknowledged that she had identified the mechanic the day before

and that she did not have a written report from the mechanic. She argued that the mechanic’s

testimony was necessary in light of K.G.’s testimony that Mr. King hit the motorcycle head-on

with his truck and the bartender’s testimony that Mr. King had spun around her in the parking lot.

Counsel argued that such testimony had only “unfolded during trial” and that she “could not

possibly have prepared for” said testimony. She acknowledged that the mechanic was not an

accident reconstructionist.

{¶13} The State objected to the mechanic’s testimony and argued that it would be

prejudicial to allow expert witness testimony without a report. The trial court allowed the mechanic

to testify, but it limited the testimony to whether the automotive piece found in the bar parking lot

came from a 2002 Chevrolet Avalanche.

{¶14} The mechanic testified that “[f]rom the picture it does not seem like [the piece of

bumper] came from an Avalanche.” He acknowledged on cross-examination that his opinion

would change based on the trim model of Mr. King’s truck and that he had never seen the truck.
5

{¶15} Mr. King also called S.G. to testify at trial. S.G., who was not present at the time

of the incident, testified that Mr. King’s truck was not missing any part of its bumper nor was it

damaged after the incident. She testified on cross-examination that Mr. King’s truck “got fixed

and . . . sold” after the incident. She did not elaborate on what got fixed, stating that “I wasn’t there

so. . . I don’t want to say what got fixed or didn’t get fixed.” S.G. also testified on cross-

examination that Mr. King sold the truck to J.M. after the incident.

{¶16} Mr. King had also called a records custodian for the Brunswick Hills Police

Department to testify at trial and to authenticate police records and documents. Exhibits including

the officers’ body worn camera videos, text messages between Mr. King and K.G., jail phone calls,

and photographs were introduced at trial and admitted into evidence.

{¶17} The jury found Mr. King guilty of both counts of felonious assault. The trial court

accepted the jury’s findings and sentenced Mr. King to five years of community control, with 180

days on each count to be served in the Medina County Jail, to be served consecutively, with credit

for time served. The court ordered that Mr. King have no contact with K.G. and it lifted a prior no

contact order related to J.M. Mr. King appeals his conviction and sentence raising two assignments

of error for this Court’s review.

I.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE

WHETHER THE IMPOSITION OF CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES WAS
CONTRARY TO LAW DUE TO THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL COURT
TO MAKE STATUTORILY ENUMERATED FINDINGS AT THE
SENTENCING HEARING[.]

{¶18} Mr. King argues in his first assignment of error that the imposition of consecutive

sentences was contrary to law where the trial court failed to make the required statutory findings
6

at sentencing. This Court finds that Mr. King’s assignment of error is moot and declines to address

it.

{¶19} The trial court sentenced Mr. King to “five (5) years of community control[.]” A

condition of community control was that Mr. King “serve 180 days in the Medina County Jail on

each count, to be served consecutively to one another, with credit for 34 days served[.]” The

argument presented in Mr. King’s first assignment of error is limited to the community control

condition that he serve 180 days in jail on each count, to be served consecutively.

{¶20} Mr. King challenges his sentence as a decision by the trial court to impose jail time.

The trial court, however, placed Mr. King on community control and it imposed jail sentences as

terms of community control. Thus, we must consider whether the trial court erred in imposing jail

sentences as conditions of community control.

{¶21} As a general rule, courts will not resolve issues that are moot. Miner v. Witt, 82

Ohio St. 237 (1910), syllabus. “‘The duty of this court, as of every other judicial tribunal, is to

decide actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not . . . to declare

principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.’” Id. at 238,

quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895). In particular, “‘[i]f an individual has already

served his sentence and is only questioning whether or not the sentence was correct, there is no

remedy that can be applied that would have any effect in the absence of a reversal of the underlying

conviction.’” State v. Bellomy, 2013-Ohio-3187, ¶ 23 (9th Dist.), quoting Columbus v. Duff, 2005-

Ohio-2299, ¶ 12 (10th Dist.). Bellomy involved a felony conviction where the appellant’s challenge

on appeal was limited to the imposed length of his served sentence. Bellomy at ¶ 21.

{¶22} At oral argument counsel agreed that Mr. King has satisfied the condition of

community control requiring him to serve 180 days in jail on each count consecutively with credit
7

for time served. In his appellant brief, Mr. King asked for his sentence to be reversed, and his case

remanded for resentencing. Because he has already served the two periods in jail as part of his

community control sanctions, we could provide him with no relief even if the trial court had erred

in imposing a consecutive jail term as part of his community control. See State v. Stevens, 2012-

Ohio-4095, ¶ 28 (9th Dist.) (defendant “provided no compelling argument as to why we should

address [the issue of whether the trial court erred in imposing the maximum sentence] when we

could provide him with no relief, even assuming the trial court erred in fashioning this sentence”

when he had already completed the sentence). Following the rationale of Bellomy in this matter,

no remedy we apply would affect the fact that Mr. King completed his local jail sentence

community control sanction.

{¶23} While In re S.J.K, 2007-Ohio-2621 and its progeny caution us that we must be

careful not to consider an appeal of an entire conviction moot when collateral disability or loss of

civil rights may flow from that conviction, those concerns are not present here. We are not

concluding that Mr. King’s entire appeal is moot as he is still serving his community control

sentence, which is a collateral consequence of his conviction; we will therefore address the merits

of his second assignment of error challenging his conviction. We are concluding, rather, that Mr.

King’s challenge to one of his community control sanctions is moot as he has already completed

that sanction and nothing we can order now can provide him with any relief for the time he has

served.

{¶24} Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, this Court finds that Mr. King’s first

assignment of error is moot.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO

APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
WHEN THE EXPERT TESTIMONY OF HIS MECHANIC WAS
8

PRECLUDED DUE TO THE FAILURE OF TRIAL COUNSEL TO TIMELY
DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE OF THE EXPERT AND PROVIDE HIS
REPORT TO THE STATE[.]

{¶25} Mr. King argues in his second assignment of error that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel when the expert testimony of his mechanic was precluded due to the failure

of trial counsel to timely disclose the expert and provide his report to the State. We disagree.

{¶26} To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. King must establish

(1) his counsel's performance was deficient to the extent that “counsel was not functioning as the

‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) but for his counsel’s

deficient performance, the result of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient performance is one that “fall[s] below an objective standard

of reasonable representation.” State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the

syllabus. A court, however, “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within

the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the

presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial

strategy.’” Strickland at 689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). In addition,

to establish prejudice, Mr. King must show that there existed “a reasonable probability that, but

for his counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceeding would have been different.” State v. Sowell,

2016-Ohio-8025, ¶ 138.

{¶27} Both prongs under Strickland must be established to support an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim. Strickland at 687. “An error by counsel, even if professionally

unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had

no effect on the judgment.” Id. at 691.
9

{¶28} Mr. King presents a limited deficiency argument on appeal. He argues that trial

counsel was deficient for her failure to timely identify the mechanic as an expert witness. He relies

upon State v. Gough, 2004-Ohio-4550, ¶ 46 (5th Dist.) to support his position that the failure to

file a notice of alibi constitutes deficient performance. The State points out that Gough is

distinguishable as trial counsel in that case admitted negligence in not timely submitting a notice

of alibi. Gough at ¶ 48. It points out that the trial court still allowed the mechanic to testify as to

whether the piece of bumper found in the parking lot could have been from Mr. King’s truck.

{¶29} This Court concludes that the deficiency component of the Strickland framework

is dispositive in this case. Accordingly, we will address only that aspect of Mr. King’s ineffective

assistance claim. See State v. Clifford, 2002-Ohio-4531, ¶ 45 (9th Dist.).

{¶30} This Court has consistently recognized that “‘[s]peculation regarding the

prejudicial effects of counsel’s performance will not establish ineffective assistance of counsel.’”

State v. Buzek, 2015-Ohio-4416, ¶7 (9th Dist.), quoting State v. Zupancic, 2013-Ohio-3072, ¶ 4

(9th Dist.). As previously set forth, Mr. King sets forth a limited deficiency argument. He seems

to assume that the failure of counsel to timely identify a mechanic, alone, was deficient without

setting forth any argument as to why counsel should have known earlier that the mechanic’s

testimony would be necessary. Unlike in Gough, trial counsel explained to the court that the

mechanic’s testimony had become necessary in light of the trial testimony of K.G. and the

bartender that Mr. King hit the motorcycle head-on and that he had spun around in the parking lot.

Counsel argued that the need for the mechanic’s testimony had only “unfolded during trial” and

that she “could not possibly have prepared for” said testimony.

{¶31} Mr. King sets forth no argument as to why counsel should have known earlier that

a mechanic’s testimony would be necessary. He fails to argue or establish how the failure to
10

identify the mechanic earlier is tantamount to ineffective legal representation and this Court

declines to construct such an argument on his behalf. See State v. Carter, 2017-Ohio-8847, ¶ 38

(9th Dist.), citing Cardone v. Cardone, 1998 WL 224934, *8 (9th Dist. May 6, 1998). Mr. King’s

second assignment of error is, accordingly, overruled.

III.

{¶32} For the reasons stated above, we decline to address Mr. King’s first assignment of

error on the basis that it is moot. Mr. King’s second assignment of error is overruled. The judgment

of the Medina County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Medina, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

Costs taxed to Appellant.

SCOT STEVENSON
FOR THE COURT
11

SUTTON, J.
CONCURS.

FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J.
CONCURRING.

{¶33} I concur with the majority’s decision. I write separately to clarify that the trial court

had authority to impose a jail term as part of King’s community control sanction in this case.

{¶34} In State v. Anderson, the Ohio Supreme Court made clear that prison terms and

community control sanctions are alternative sanctions for purposes of felony sentencing. State v.

Anderson, 2015-Ohio-2089, ¶ 28. More specifically, it held that “as a general rule, when a prison

term and community control are possible sentences for a particular felony offense, absent an

express exception, the court must impose either a prison term or a community-control sanction or

sanctions.” Id. at ¶ 31; State v. Paige, 2018-Ohio-813, ¶ 6 (same). The Ohio Supreme Court later

characterized felony sentences that include a prison term and a community control sanction as

“[s]plit sentences” and reiterated that they are “prohibited in Ohio.” Paige at ¶ 6.

{¶35} The rule set forth in Anderson expressly applies to prison terms for felony offenses,

not jail terms, which are not the same. See Anderson at ¶ 31; R.C. 2929.01(R) (defining “[j]ail);

R.C. 2929.01(A)(A) (defining “[p]rison”); State v. Woods, 2026-Ohio-351, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.)

(acknowledging that prison and jail are not “synonymous.”). Notwithstanding, courts have

conflated prison terms and jail terms, concluding that Anderson stands for the proposition that a

trial court cannot impose “incarceration” and a community control sanction for the same offense.

See., e.g., State v. Beauchamp, 2022-Ohio-738, ¶ 2, 17 (1st Dist.) (addressing a misdemeanor

offense and relying on Anderson to conclude that a “trial court can either impose community
12

control or incarceration.”); State v. James, 2022-Ohio-3019, ¶ 25 (1st Dist.) (citing Anderson and

stating that a “trial court is authorized to impose either a prison or jail term, or community control

for a particular offense.”). That is a misinterpretation of the law.

{¶36} By statute, a trial court is authorized to impose “a term of up to six months in a jail”

as part of a community control sanction if a prison term is not required for the underlying felony

offense. R.C. 2929.15(A)(1); R.C. 2929.16(A)(2); see R.C. 2929.01(E) (defining “[c]ommunity

control sanction” to include community residential sanctions under R.C. 2929.16). This does not

conflict with Anderson, which was limited to prison terms for felony offenses, not jail terms. See

Woods at ¶ 4-8 (distinguishing jail from prison, and rejecting the defendant’s argument that the

trial court violated Anderson by imposing a split sentence when it sentenced her to both community

control and a jail term). Because the trial court sentenced King to jail, not prison, its sentence does

not violate Anderson’s prohibition against split sentences for felony offenses.

{¶37} Having clarified that the trial court was authorized to impose a jail term as part of

King’s community control sanction in this case, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this

Court can provide King with no relief regarding the trial court’s imposition of consecutive jail

terms because King has completed his jail sentence. See State v. Stevens, 2012-Ohio-4095, ¶ 28

(9th Dist.). I also agree with the majority’s decision to overrule King’s second assignment of error.

Thus, I concur with the majority’s decision.

APPEARANCES:

ROBERT T. MCDOWALL, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

S. FORREST THOMPSON, Prosecuting Attorney, and STEFANIE H. ZARANEC, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.