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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Keefe

Idaho Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 51849

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (20.6K)

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Combined Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 51849

STATE OF IDAHO, )
) Filed: March 27, 2026
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk
v. )
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED
CRYSTAL KEEFE, ) OPINION AND SHALL NOT
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Ada
County. Hon. Peter G. Barton, District Judge.

Judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia, affirmed.

Nevin, Benjamin & McKay, LLP; Dennis Benjamin, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Raúl R. Labrador, Attorney General; Kenneth Jorgensen, Deputy Attorney
General, Boise, for respondent.

TRIBE, Chief Judge
Crystal Keefe appeals from her judgment of conviction for trafficking in methamphetamine
and possession of drug paraphernalia. We affirm.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Officer Merz, a certified Drug Recognition Expert (DRE), observed a male driver slumped
over the steering wheel of a parked vehicle with the engine running. Officer Merz approached the
vehicle as Deputy Vail and Deputy Cuellar arrived at the scene. Keefe was sleeping in the back
seat. As Officer Merz neared the passenger’s side, he observed a handheld torch--an item
consistent with the use of controlled substances--on the center console.
Upon contact, Officer Merz noted that the male driver showed multiple signs of
methamphetamine use. Based on his training and experience, Officer Merz concluded that the
male driver appeared to be under the influence of a controlled substance. Officer Merz initiated a

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driving under the influence (DUI) investigation. Officer McGee, a certified K-9 handler, arrived
to assist the investigation with his K-9 partner, Astrid. Keefe was informed by Officer McGee that
he intended to have Astrid conduct a free-air sniff around the vehicle and asked Keefe for consent
if Astrid “came in contact” with the vehicle during the sniff. Keefe responded, “Do what you got
to do” and affirmed when Officer McGee sought clarification. The officers ultimately identified
Keefe as the owner of the vehicle.
Officer McGee then deployed Astrid while Officer Merz continued the DUI investigation.
Officer McGee and Astrid were certified as a team by the Idaho Peace Officer Standards and
Training (POST) in the detection of methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine. Officer McGee
testified that, based on his training and experience, Astrid exhibited behavior consistent with the
detection of the odor of narcotics--closing her mouth, sniffing intensely around the seam on the
passenger’s side, moving underneath the vehicle, and her “tail change[d] from a wag back and
forth to like a little rotor on a helicopter, it kind of [spun] a little bit.” Astrid ultimately touched
her paws to the rear bumper and sat, signaling her final trained alert.
Based on Astrid’s alert, officers conducted a search of the vehicle. Officer McGee later
testified that he did not obtain consent to search the vehicle from either Keefe or the male driver.
During the search, Officer McGee located a glass pipe in the backseat where Keefe had been. He
also discovered a safe in the rear cargo area containing a white crystalline substance resembling
methamphetamine, along with drug paraphernalia. The State charged Keefe with trafficking in
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia.
Keefe filed a motion to suppress, arguing that she did not consent to the search of the
vehicle and that Astrid’s alert occurred only after the K-9 made physical contact with the rear
bumper. Following the hearing on the motion to suppress, the district court denied Keefe’s motion.
The matter proceeded to trial. Keefe attempted to admit a certified copy of the minute entry from
her initial appearance (Exhibit 200). The State objected based upon concerns of unfair prejudice,
and the district court sustained the objection. Keefe objected to testimony indicating that
the quantity of methamphetamine seized exceeded amounts typical for personal use.
The district court overruled Keefe’s objection. Following deliberations that extended into the
evening hours, the jury found Keefe guilty of trafficking in methamphetamine (Idaho Code

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§§ 37-2732B(a)(4)(A), 18-204) and possession of drug paraphernalia (I.C. § 37-2734A). Keefe
appeals.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a motion
to suppress is challenged, we accept the trial court’s findings of fact that are supported by
substantial evidence, but we freely review the application of constitutional principles to the facts
as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). At a
suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts,
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina,
127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Schevers, 132 Idaho 786, 789, 979 P.2d
659, 662 (Ct. App. 1999).
The appellate courts generally review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence
under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Rambo, 173 Idaho 272, 278, 540 P.3d 974, 980
(2023). However, whether evidence is relevant is a question of law and is subject to de novo
review. Id. When a trial court’s discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court
conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the trial court: (1) correctly perceived the
issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the boundaries of such discretion; (3) acted consistently
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (4) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason. State v. Herrera, 164 Idaho 261, 270, 429 P.3d 149, 158 (2018).
III.
ANALYSIS
Keefe argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying her motion to suppress,
excluding Exhibit 200 from evidence, overruling her objection to irrelevant evidence, and
requiring jury deliberations to begin after 5:00 p.m. Keefe also argues she is entitled to relief based
on the cumulative error doctrine. The State responds that the district court correctly denied Keefe’s
motion to suppress and that the district court’s evidentiary rulings were correct. The State also
argues Keefe’s challenge to jury deliberations is not preserved and that, even if Keefe had raised
a claim of fundamental error in relation thereto, any such claim would fail. Finally, the State
argues that, even if the district court erred, any evidentiary error is harmless, and that Keefe has

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failed to show cumulative error because she has failed to show multiple errors. Keefe responds
that her jury deliberation claim is preserved and that the State has failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the alleged errors are harmless and that, even if the individual errors are
harmless, the cumulation of errors warrants a new trial.
A. Motion to Suppress
Keefe argues the district court erred in denying her motion to suppress because she did not
consent to a search and Astrid’s contact with her vehicle constituted an unlawful search because it
was the result of a trespass. She also asserts that this Court should abrogate State v. Ricks, 173
Idaho 74, 539 P.3d 190 (Ct. App. 2023) and adopt a bright-line rule requiring a reliable
drug-detection dog to give a final trained alert in order to establish probable cause. Keefe further
contends that the officer’s testimony describing Astrid’s behavior is insufficient because the final
indication is not affirmatively shown on video.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures. Warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable and therefore violative of the
Fourth Amendment. State v. Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995). The State
may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a
well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the
circumstances. Id. The scope of consent under the Fourth Amendment is evaluated under an
objective standard--what a typical reasonable person would have understood from the exchange
between the officer and the suspect. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991).
Here, the record supports the district court’s determination that Keefe consented to the drug
dog sniff. Officer McGee asked Keefe whether Astrid could sniff around Keefe’s vehicle and
advised that the sniff might involve Astrid coming in contact with the vehicle. Keefe responded,
“to do whatever” Officer McGee “had to do with [Astrid].” When Officer McGee sought
clarification--asking whether that was acceptable--Keefe again indicated agreement while making
a circular motion with her hand. Officer McGee clarified if it would be okay if Astrid touched the
vehicle, to which Keefe responded that it would be okay.
Based on this exchange, the district court determined that Keefe provided clear and
unconditional consent for Astrid to conduct a free-air sniff around the vehicle, including the
possibility that Astrid might make contact with the exterior of the vehicle. The district court further

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found that Keefe’s circular hand motion, viewed in the context of the conversation, indicated
consent for Astrid to circle the vehicle. Because Keefe agreed to a drug dog sniff after being
informed Astrid might come into contact with the vehicle, the district court concluded that such
contact did not exceed the scope of Keefe’s consent.
On appeal, Keefe argues the evidence shows she only consented to Astrid circling her
vehicle--not to Astrid touching it. Keefe maintains that neither her circular hand motion nor her
statement to “Do what you got to do” authorized physical contact with the vehicle. Keefe’s
argument overlooks a key factual finding by the district court. Officer McGee specifically
requested permission for a drug dog sniff that ultimately occurred. Although Keefe’s response did
not expressly mention Astrid touching the vehicle, it permitted the type of sniff Officer McGee
described--one that could involve Astrid making contact with the exterior of the vehicle.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Keefe’s motion to suppress.
B. Admission of Exhibit and Testimony
Evidence that is relevant to a material and disputed issue concerning the crime charged is
generally admissible. State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho 661, 670-71, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134-35 (2020).
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. Idaho Rule of Evidence 401; Garcia, 166 Idaho at 670, 462 P.3d at 1134. Whether a
fact is of consequence or material is determined by its relationship to the legal theories presented
by the parties. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 671, 227 P.3d 918, 925 (2010). Even relevant
evidence, if unfairly prejudicial, can be excluded. State v. McCabe, 174 Idaho 653, 655, 559 P.3d
311, 333 (Ct. App. 2024); see I.R.E. 403.
1. Admission of exhibit
Keefe argues that the district court erred by denying admission of Exhibit 200 because it
was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. Keefe further contends that any prejudicial portions of
Exhibit 200 could have been redacted.
At trial, the State introduced evidence of a jail call between Keefe and her mother the day
after Keefe’s arrest. The call included the following discussion:
Mother: So, what’s, so what’s happening?
Keefe: (tearfully) Drug trafficking.
Mother: I can’t understand what you’re saying.

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Keefe: Drug trafficking (unintelligible).
Mother: How did you get that?
Keefe: ‘cause I have 200 grams of meth.
Mother: I thought you kept it all in a safe.
Keefe: I did but it wasn’t fu[**]ing locked. Oh, God.
Keefe asserted that her comment, “I have 200 grams of meth,” was referring to the criminal
charges, not an admission to possessing that quantity of methamphetamine. To corroborate this
assertion, Keefe sought to admit Exhibit 200 (the minute entry from her initial appearance) to show
that, prior to the jail call, she had been advised of the trafficking charges. Exhibit 200 contained
boxes checked showing that Keefe was present, she was in custody, she was advised of charges
and rights, a public defender was appointed, there was a pre-trial release order, and bond was set
at $75,000. Pursuant to I.R.E. 403, the State objected to the admission of Exhibit 200, arguing
concerns about unfair prejudice because the exhibit indicated that the public defender was
appointed to represent Keefe, which could engender sympathy for her from the jury. Keefe
subsequently offered to redact the portion referencing the public defender. Before denying
admission of Exhibit 200, the district court responded, “I think there’s that, there’s bail, and here.
There’s that over here and five spots. . . . You’ve already lost.” The district court did not further
consider whether additional redactions could have cured the prejudice claimed by the State.
On appeal, the State contends that Keefe only preserved the limited issue of redacting the
public defender reference, such that any broader argument regarding additional redactions is not
preserved. We disagree. Once the district court made a definitive ruling on the State’s I.R.E. 403
objection and denied admission of Exhibit 200, Keefe was not required to renew her offer of
redaction to preserve the issue for appellate review. See I.R.E. 103(b). Because the district court
directly addressed the State’s objection and ruled on the record, the issue is properly preserved for
appellate consideration.
Turning to the merits of whether the district court erred in declining Keefe’s request to
admit Exhibit 200, the relevant question is whether the district court reasonably accepted the
State’s concern that the exhibit could create unfair prejudice. At trial, the State argued that the
exhibit revealed that Keefe was in custody, that she had been appointed a public defender, and that
these references could improperly influence the jury. The district court accepted the State’s
concern that the exhibit could create unfair prejudice because it revealed that Keefe was in custody
and had been appointed a public defender. Keefe argues on appeal that the jury would not have

6
suspected she was in custody or represented by the public defender because she “was not in jail
garb during the trial.”
Keefe next argues the prejudice “did not substantially outweigh the probative value” of the
exhibit because “the jail call was the single strongest piece of evidence” that she “knowingly
possessed the methamphetamine and was aware of the weight.” The exhibit showed that a public
defender had been appointed and should be contacted, that Keefe was in custody, and that she
would be released on $75,000 bond and a pretrial release order. Because the exhibit revealed that
Keefe was in custody and had been appointed a public defender, the district court excluded the
exhibit.
Finally, Keefe argues the prejudice could have been cured by redaction. After initially
resisting redaction, Keefe offered to redact “the portion that indicates ‘PD appointed, contact with
the public defender’s office.’” Keefe did not propose redacting the remaining portions indicating
that she was in custody and subject to bond and pretrial release conditions. Because those
references remained, the district court excluded the exhibit even with the proposed redaction.
We need not determine if the district erred in excluding Exhibit 200 because, even if the
district court erred, the error was harmless. Error is not reversible unless it is prejudicial. State v.
Stell, 162 Idaho 827, 830, 405 P.3d 612, 615 (Ct. App. 2017). Where a criminal defendant shows
an error based on a contemporaneously objected-to, nonconstitutional violation, the State then has
the burden of demonstrating to the appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt the error did not
contribute to the jury’s verdict. State v. Montgomery, 163 Idaho 40, 46, 408 P.3d 38, 44 (2017).
Thus, we examine whether the alleged error complained of in the present case was harmless. See
id. Harmless error is error unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the
issue in question, as revealed in the record. Garcia, 166 at 674, 462 P.3d at 1138. This standard
requires weighing the probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the erroneous
evidence and at the same time comparing it against the probative force of the error. Id. If the
error’s effect is minimal compared to the probative force of the record establishing guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt without the error, then the error did not contribute to the verdict rendered and is
harmless. Id. The reviewing court must take into account what effect the error had, or reasonably
may have had, on the jury in the context of the total setting and in relation to all else that happened,

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which necessarily includes the evidence presented. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764
(1946).
Exhibit 200 did not bear directly on any statutory element of trafficking, such as
possession, knowledge, or quantity. See I.C. § 37-2732B(a)(4)(A). Instead, the exhibit was
offered to rebut the inference of guilt drawn from Keefe’s statements during the jail call. While
this offered purpose made the exhibit marginally probative of her state of mind, the exhibit’s
exclusion did not meaningfully affect the outcome of her case considering the overwhelming
independent evidence, which included: the officers discovered more than 140 grams of
methamphetamine in a safe located in the rear cargo area of Keefe’s vehicle, along with drug
paraphernalia in the area where she was found when contacted by law enforcement; and the vehicle
was registered in Keefe’s name.
The jury also heard testimony that Keefe and the male driver were living in the vehicle,
which, while offering an alternative explanation for shared access to the contraband, nonetheless
reinforced that she exercised control over the space where the drugs and paraphernalia were found.
The jury also heard testimony that the quantity of methamphetamine exceeded amounts typical for
personal use. Considering this combination of physical and contextual evidence, the inclusion of
Exhibit 200 would not have affected the jury’s verdict. Thus, even if the district court erred by
declining to consider whether broader redaction of the exhibit could have mitigated prejudice, such
error was harmless.
2. Admission of testimony
Keefe argues the district court erred by overruling her objection to testimony suggesting
that the quantity of methamphetamine seized exceeded amounts typical for personal use. She
asserts that this testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. At trial, the State called Officer
Louwsma, a narcotics detection expert, as a witness. Officer Louwsma testified that the quantity
of methamphetamine recovered in this case was greater than typical quantities possessed for
personal use.
Testimony that the quantity of methamphetamine exceeded amounts typical for personal
use was relevant to prove that both Keefe and the male driver possessed the substance and to negate
any inference that only the male driver, who admitted to recent use, was in possession. Moreover,
any potential prejudice was minimal. Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is

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damaging to a defendant’s case; rather, evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it suggests decision
on an improper basis. State v. Floyd, 125 Idaho 651, 654, 873 P.2d 905, 908 (Ct. App. 1994); see
I.R.E. 403. Here, the testimony regarding the quantity of methamphetamine seized did not invite
an emotional response or encourage the jury to decide the case on an improper basis. Instead, the
testimony directly related to whether the quantity of methamphetamine exceeded amounts typical
for personal use--an element inherent in the charged trafficking offense. Accordingly, the district
court did not err in admitting the testimony.
C. Jury Deliberation
Keefe argues that the district court erred by permitting the jury to deliberate after 5:00 p.m.
without first obtaining the consent of the jurors or confirming the presence of unique circumstances
as required by Idaho Court Administrative Rule 66(b). The State responds that Keefe’s claim is
raised for the first time on appeal and was not preserved below. We agree with the State. The
record is devoid of any mention of I.C.A.R. 66(b) and Keefe failed to raise any claim that the
consent of the jury was lacking. Because Keefe did not raise any issue under I.C.A.R. 66(b) and
did not take the position that the jury’s consent should be obtained prior to commencing
deliberations at the trial level, her claim of error under I.C.A.R. 66(b) is unpreserved. Keefe does
not argue fundamental error in her opening brief, and we therefore need not review the claim on
that basis. Even if we were to consider the issue, Keefe would not prevail.
When a defendant alleges that a constitutional error occurred at trial and the alleged error
was not followed by a contemporaneous objection, the claim of error must be reviewed under the
fundamental error doctrine. State v. Miller, 165 Idaho 115, 119, 443 P.3d 129, 133 (2019). In
order to obtain relief under the fundamental error doctrine, the defendant must demonstrate three
things. First, the defendant must show that one or more of the defendant’s unwaived constitutional
rights were violated. Id. Second, the error must be clear and obvious, meaning the record must
demonstrate evidence of the error and evidence as to whether or not trial counsel made a tactical
decision in failing to object. Id. Third, the defendant must demonstrate that the error affected the
defendant’s substantial rights, which means the error identified in the first and second prongs of
the test actually affected the outcome of the trial. Id. at 119-20, 443 P.3d at 133-34. Keefe has
failed to satisfy any of these requirements. Keefe has not demonstrated that the alleged violation
of I.C.A.R. 66(b) implicates a constitutional right. Idaho Court Administrative Rule 66(b) is an

9
administrative rule governing jury procedure and does not create or protect a constitutional right
belonging to a criminal defendant. Nothing in the rule suggests that a defendant has a
constitutional right to require express jury consent before deliberations can occur outside regular
business hours. Rather, the rule is directed toward the administration of jury service and the jurors’
participation in late-hour deliberations. Because Keefe did not raise fundamental error in her
opening brief and has not demonstrated a violation of an unwaived constitutional right, the claim
fails under the fundamental error doctrine.
D. Cumulative Error Doctrine
Keefe also contends that the cumulative error doctrine applies here, necessitating a reversal
of her conviction. Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors (harmless in and of
themselves) may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho
445, 483, 272 P.3d 417, 455 (2012). However, a necessary predicate to the application of the
doctrine is a finding of more than one error. Id. Keefe has failed to demonstrate at least two errors,
a necessary predicate to the application of the cumulative error doctrine.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Keefe has failed to meet her burden that the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress, overruling her objection to admission of testimony, or permitting the jury to deliberate
after 5:00 p.m. Even if the district court erred in excluding Exhibit 200, any error was harmless.
Because Keefe has failed to show more than one error, she is not entitled to relief based on the
cumulative error doctrine. Accordingly, Keefe’s judgment of conviction for trafficking in
methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia is affirmed.
Judge GRATTON and Judge LORELLO, CONCUR.

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