Jump To

Top Caption Syllabus Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Fields

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 867
• Docket Number: 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042

• Judges: Hanni

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.9K)

• PDF

Syllabus

Motion to suppress; Fourth Amendment; protective sweep; reasonable, articulable suspicion; jointly recommended sentence

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Fields, 2026-Ohio-867.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
BELMONT COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

DAJUAN D. FIELDS,

Defendant-Appellant.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042

Criminal Appeal from the
Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio
Case No. 24 CR 236

BEFORE:
Mark A. Hanni, Carol Ann Robb, Katelyn Dickey, Judges.

JUDGMENT:
Affirmed.

Atty. J. Kevin Flanagan, Belmont County Prosecutor, and Atty. Jacob A. Manning,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. Edward F. Borkowski, Jr., for Defendant-Appellant.

Dated: March 13, 2026
–2–

HANNI, J.

{¶1} Defendant-Appellant, DaJuan D. Fields, appeals a Belmont County
Common Pleas Court judgment sentencing him to 24 to 29.5 years in prison. Appellant
entered a no contest plea to first-degree felony drug possession with a major drug
offender specification (MDO) and a guilty plea to second-degree felonious assault with a
repeat violent offender specification (RVO). Appellant’s counsel and Appellant pro se
filed notices of appeal, which we consolidated into 25 BE 0038.
{¶2} Appellant asserts the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress
evidence found by law enforcement as they executed a search warrant at Appellant’s
house to locate and arrest him on the basis of an active arrest warrant. He contends
police immediately located and placed him into custody on the main floor of his home, yet
continued to search the home, even venturing upstairs and forcing open locked doors.
Appellant further asserts that the trial court erred by sentencing him to 8 years in prison
for felonious assault when the parties agreed to a recommended two-year sentence. He
contends his guilty plea was unknowingly made because the trial court failed to offer him
a chance to withdraw the plea after imposing this sentence.
{¶3} For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to
suppress. While the trial court erroneously concluded that Officer Kubat’s room sweep
on the main floor was not a protective sweep, we affirm its decision denying the motion
to suppress because a protective sweep of the main floor and upstairs was justified. Law
enforcement officers were executing a high-risk search warrant of Appellant’s home to
locate him and effectuate his arrest on the basis of an arrest warrant for a serious
felonious assault. They knew Appellant’s violent criminal history, he was identified in an
active drug investigation, and he had an active arrest warrant for felonious assault that
caused serious bodily harm and involved other participants and possibly firearms.
Officers also observed a juvenile run from the house immediately prior to execution of the
warrant, and other individuals were found in the house.
{¶4} After breaching the front door of Appellant’s home, officers split to the left
and right of the stairway to locate Appellant. While officers arrested Appellant in the living

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
–3–

room, Officer Kubat advanced to an opposite room and encountered four individuals. He
also observed a baggie of illegal drugs lying in plain view on the floor. Officer Kubat
performed a justified protective sweep of this room because he knew Appellant’s criminal
history, knew the arrest warrant issued for Appellant involved a violent felonious assault
with other individuals who may have firearms, and he observed a juvenile run from
Appellant’s house before law enforcement entered the home to execute the warrant.
Officer Kubat also believed he saw movement in this room upon breaching the front door.
{¶5} In addition, officers were justified in conducting a protective sweep of the
upstairs of the home, which recovered a large bag of marijuana lying on a bed. The threat
to the safety of the officers persisted even after they had arrested Appellant and
conducted a protective sweep of the main floor of the house. Law enforcement had not
looked upstairs and individuals could have descended from upstairs to inflict harm.
Officers heard people yelling and screaming as Appellant was arrested and heard
someone say that a person had run out of the back of the house. Officers had already
apprehended a juvenile running from the home, they found and detained others on the
main floor, and they knew Appellant had a violent criminal history, was identified in a drug
investigation, and had an active arrest warrant for the felonious assault that involved other
participants and possibly firearms.
{¶6} Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Appellant
to a longer term of imprisonment than that agreed to by the parties. The trial court was
not required to accept the joint recommendation of 2 years and the court warned Appellant
three separate times during his plea hearing that it was not bound by the
recommendation. The trial court also ordered a presentence investigation report and did
not immediately proceed to sentencing. The court explained its reasons for the
sentencing, noting Appellant’s criminal history, his prior unamenability to supervision, and
his repeated commission of crimes, including violent crimes.
{¶7} On November 7, 2024, the Belmont County Grand Jury indicted Appellant
on two counts of felony-one drug possession with MDO specifications, two felony-one
drug trafficking with MDO specifications, one felony-three having weapons while under
disability, and a second-degree felony felonious assault with a RVO specification.
Appellant was arraigned and pled not guilty.

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
–4–

{¶8} On December 5, 2024, the Belmont County Grand Jury issued an 11-count
superseding indictment charging Appellant with: 5 felony drug possession charges with
one MDO specification; 4 felony drug trafficking offenses with one MDO specification and
three specifications of trafficking in the vicinity of a juvenile; a second-degree felonious
assault with a RVO specification; and a felony having weapons while under disability
charge. The drug offenses involved fentanyl or a fentanyl-related compound, as well as
methamphetamine. Appellant was arraigned and pled not guilty.
{¶9} On December 2, 2024, Appellant filed an amended motion to suppress. He
asserted law enforcement executed an arrest warrant allowing them to enter his home in
Barnesville, Ohio to search for and arrest him. He contended that although officers
immediately located and secured him and others on the main floor of his home, they
continued to search the remainder of his house, including its upstairs, which well
exceeded the scope of their warrant.
{¶10} The trial court held a suppression hearing on February 14, 2025. Defense
counsel framed the issue as the following:

Essentially, the first search warrant that was executed was the location of
my client’s person, and that the officers in the case went beyond that in their
initial search, which led them to secure a second search warrant to properly
get the things that they had already acquired, in my view.

(Supp. Hg. Tr. 4). The validity of the first search warrant was not challenged and is not
challenged on appeal. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 4). Appellant’s counsel requested that the court
suppress the second warrant and fruit of the poisonous tree seized, including photos,
videos, and statements. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 4).
{¶11} At the suppression hearing, Detective Dustin Hilderbrand of the Criminal
Interdiction Unit of the Belmont County Sheriff’s Office testified for the prosecution. He
indicated that police received information that Appellant was selling drugs in Belmont
County and they conducted a controlled purchase from him in Bellaire, Ohio. (Supp. Hg.
Tr. 8). Detective Hilderbrand indicated that a criminal charge was filed and he drafted a
warrant for Appellant’s arrest at his residence in Barnesville, Ohio. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 9-10).
He explained they learned of this residence from the person who had identified Appellant

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
–5–

as involved in an investigation into a felonious assault where the victim was seriously
beaten and flown to a hospital. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 12-13).
{¶12} Detective Hilderbrand testified the sheriff’s department enlisted the aid of
the Special Operations Branch (SOB) in executing the nighttime arrest warrant, which
was essentially a SWAT team. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 10). He explained SOB was called
because they were executing a high-risk warrant due to Appellant’s prior attempted
murder and felonious assault offenses, along with the current felonious assault with two
other men who were in possession of firearms at that time. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 11-12).
{¶13} Detective Hilderbrand recalled he was supposed to remain outside of
Appellant’s house until the house was breached, but a juvenile from inside of the house
ran outside and they had to chase him back into the residence. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 16). He
explained he and members of the SOB team then entered the residence and within 10
seconds, he made contact with Appellant. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 16-17). He stayed with
Appellant while the SOB completed sweeping the house. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 17). He took
pictures of the drugs found by officers in the main floor bedroom and upstairs on a bed
and he was told they were found in plain view. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 17-19). He noted that the
windows of the house had wooden shutters over the windows. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 48).
{¶14} Barnesville Police Department Officer and SOB team member Kubat
testified for the State. He participated in the search and was advised that Appellant and
others may be present in the house. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 70-71). He explained that an officer
breached the door and upon entry, he observed individuals located to the left upon entry
and he advanced to a room on the right while Chief Arbenz went to the left. (Supp. Hg.
Tr. 71-72). Upon entry into the room on the right, Officer Kubat observed a male and two
children, and a female coming from the bathroom area. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 72-74). The lights
were on and he noticed a baggie lying on the ground in front of him with what appeared
to be narcotics inside. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 74). He explained that upon initial entry, the first
step of the search, SOB located the person sought for arrest and then a secondary search
is conducted for other people in the home. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 77-78). He stayed in the room
to the right until the secondary search was completed. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 79).
{¶15} On cross-examination, Officer Kubat testified that even though high-risk
warrants could involve danger, SOB teams do not wear body cameras. (Supp. Hg. Tr.

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
–6–

81-82). He described that upon entry into Appellant’s home, he observed stairs in the
middle, a room to the left and a hallway on the right leading to a second room. (Supp.
Hg. Tr. 85-86). He noted Appellant was apprehended in the room to the left and he
encountered four individuals in the room to the right. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 86). Officer Kubat
chose to proceed to the right upon entry because Chief Arbenz went to the left and he
thought he saw someone move in the room to the right. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 87). He did not
notice the baggie of drugs in the room to the right until he had the male lie on the ground
because he was focused on the individuals in the room. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 87).
{¶16} Chief Matthew Arbenz of the St. Clairsville Police Department and SOB
team leader also testified for the prosecution. He explained that anytime the SOB is
called, it usually involves a high-risk situation and they conduct a protective sweep to
protect themselves. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 94-95). He recalled that his team commander
informed him that an arrest warrant was issued for Appellant and officers requested SOB
assistance in executing the warrant at his residence. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 96). He testified he
was also advised the reason for the arrest was that Appellant was one of several involved
in injuring an individual fighting for his life in the hospital. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 96).
{¶17} Chief Arbenz explained that the SOB does not typically search for evidence
of crimes as their job is to search for people. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 99). He indicated that SOB
is usually looking only to secure the person who is the subject of the arrest warrant, but
they typically secure everyone in the house until they identify who is part of the warrant
process. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 100). He recalled that upon gaining entry into Appellant’s home,
he heard Office Kubat state he had people on the left, so he also went to the left, where
they found Appellant, an adult female, and a juvenile male. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 100). He
ordered Appellant to get on the ground and held cover while another officer placed him
into custody. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 101). He saw Appellant’s son crying, so he patted him on
the head and said no one was going to get hurt. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 101). He then heard
yelling and someone say, “One ran, one ran out the back.” (Supp. Hg. Tr. 101). He noted
that “[w]e still had an upstairs.” (Supp. Hg. Tr. 101).
{¶18} Chief Arbenz continued that once he knew Appellant was detained, he
proceeded upstairs with other officers behind him. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 101). He moved down
the hallway and entered a bedroom on the right, checked under the bed, and as he stood

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
–7–

up, he saw others flowing through other areas of the upstairs. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 102). He
testified he did not find any other individuals, but he observed a large bag on top of the
bed that contained a large bag of marijuana inside. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 102). He testified he
did not open any doors to get into the bedroom and he did not have to kick, ram, or
shoulder any doors to enter. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 103). He also indicated no other SOB
member had to force open any door in the house, except for the front door. (Supp. Hg.
Tr. 103-104). He affirmed that the photo showed to him by the prosecution reflected the
room he entered and no damage to the door frame. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 105).
{¶19} On cross-examination, Chief Arbenz testified he was notified about
participating in the SOB job at Appellant’s house. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 109). He was informed
about the possibility of the presence of firearms, but he did not encounter any in his search
for individuals. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 110). He did not read the warrant, but was told they were
there to aid with an arrest warrant and to make sure the house was secure. (Supp. Hg.
Tr. 110).
{¶20} Chief Arbenz explained that he proceeded upstairs because he saw that the
stairs had no SOB members on it and a threat was therefore posed because the area
was not cleared. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 114). He indicated that the SOB’s job was to look for
people that could pose a threat or things that could pose a threat, such as a bomb. (Supp.
Hg. Tr. 115). He said the number one threat in securing an area is a human being, but if
he saw something else posing a threat, he would let everyone else know about it. (Supp.
Hg. Tr. 115-116).
{¶21} On redirect examination, Chief Arbenz testified that a person attempting to
flee the scene where the SOB is about to enter signals a potential threat and knowing
one of the subjects to the search is a suspect in a serious violent felony offense means a
potential for violence against him and his team members. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 117-118). He
explained that this would result in the temporary detention of anyone in the home until the
officer in charge of the warrant identifies whether that person is the subject of the warrant.
(Supp. Hg. Tr. 118). He further testified that if a house has a number of people inside
who are unknown and are not the person they are searching for, this signifies that the
SOB continues to search. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 118).

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
–8–

{¶22} Defense counsel called Detective Jason Schwarck of the Belmont County
Sheriff’s Office to testify. He explained that when the SOB is called to assist, they enter
the house first and then the Belmont County deputies after the SOB has cleared the
residence and performed a secondary clearance. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 130). He stated that
when he entered Appellant’s residence, he saw a large amount of money in plain view
and what appeared to be drugs in a bag on the first floor. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 132). He also
testified that he did not personally unlock any bedroom doors upstairs, but he heard
someone mention it when he was downstairs. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 134).
{¶23} A body camera video was played to Detective Schwarck and he
acknowledged that Detective Grant stated “upstairs locked,” on the video and “[t]hey
basically busted it open.” (Supp. Hg. Tr. 142).
{¶24} On March 17, 2025, the trial court issued its decision denying Appellant’s
amended motion to suppress. The court made findings of fact. It then held that Officer
Kubat entered the bedroom on the right on the main floor at the same time the other
officers were securing Appellant in a room to the left on the main floor. The court held
that “Kubat’s conduct was clearly not a protective sweep but conduct undertaken to arrest
the Defendant pursuant to the first search warrant.” (3/17/25 Journal Entry). The court
continued that Officer Kubat’s conduct was lawful “and pursuant to a search warrant for
the Defendant’s arrest.” (3/17/25 Journal Entry). The court found that the illegal drugs
Officer Kubat discovered in the bedroom to the right were in plain view and therefore not
the product of an illegal search and seizure.
{¶25} The court further found that the marijuana found in the upstairs bedroom
would have been found via inevitable discovery from the second search warrant since it
was found in plain view upstairs in the bedroom. Nevertheless, the trial court held that
the SOB conducted a lawful protective sweep of the entire home based on Maryland v.
Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), permitting the sweep of areas adjoining the place of arrest.
The trial court also found that Appellant presented a high risk of danger to law
enforcement safety due to his prior violent convictions and allegations that firearms may
be present in the house.
{¶26} On June 30, 2025, the trial court held a hearing and Appellant entered a no
contest plea to Count 1 drug possession as to possession of a fentanyl-related

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
–9–

compound, a felony of the first degree, with the MDO specification. He also entered a
guilty plea to Count 9 felonious assault, a second-degree felony, with a RVO offender
specification. The court journalized the pleas in a thorough entry on July 7, 2025.
{¶27} On July 14, 2025, the court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced
Appellant to: 11 years in prison for the Count 1 drug possession conviction; 5 years in
prison on the MDO specification, to be served consecutively to the sentence for drug
possession; and 8 years in prison for felonious assault, to be served consecutively to the
other two sentences. Thus, the court sentenced Appellant to a mandatory minimum term
of 24 years in prison, with a maximum term of 29.5 years possible. The court issued its
sentencing entry on July 17, 2025.
{¶28} Both Appellant pro se and defense counsel filed a notice of appeal. We
issued two separate appellate case numbers, but then consolidated them into 25 BE
0038.
{¶29} In his first assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY DENYING APPELLANT’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.

{¶30} Appellant asserts the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress
because police lacked justification to conduct a protective sweep of his house beyond the
area within his reach. He contends officers placed him in custody on the main floor of his
home within 10 seconds of entering and had secured the main floor within 30 seconds.
He estimates that in under one minute, he was arrested and others were detained in the
house. He asserts no evidence existed showing others were in his house and a further
protective sweep was therefore not justified. He quotes Chief Arbenz’s hearing testimony
that he continued to sweep the house because it was “uncleared,” and he had no “specific
incident of anything happening that would need to tell me that I need to keep doing my
protective sweep.” (Supp. Hg. Tr. 121-122). He also quotes Chief Arbenz’s additional
testimony that he was looking for “anything that could cause physical harm to us or
whoever is going to be conducting a search of that house later.” (Supp. Tr. 115).
{¶31} Appellant further asserts that even if a protective sweep was justified, law
enforcement exceeded the scope of that sweep by searching upstairs and forcing open
locked doors. He concedes a sweep may be conducted after an arrest, but only if a

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 10 –

“reasonable possibility” exists that others may be on the property and they pose a danger
to law enforcement. He contends no such danger existed in his case. He also contends
that officers forced open locked doors in order to find evidence.
{¶32} Appellant also maintains the trial court erred by finding the officers’
testimony credible because they knew the warrant involved drugs and “it is safe to
assume that they were looking for drugs while they were there.” (Appellant’s Br. 14). He
cites Detective Hilderbrand’s testimony that he assumed the drugs he took pictures of
were in plain view and those discovering the drugs merely alerted him to the presence of
the drugs. He also emphasizes Officer Kubat was not wearing a body camera and was
alone in the room in which he found drugs merely lying on the floor even though he had
secured a male in that room within seconds, but it took him three minutes to find the
baggie in plain view and radio the team.
{¶33} Appellant also notes the prosecution did not call Officer Schwarck to testify
as he stated at the hearing that officers “basically busted it open” when testifying about
an officer searching a locked room upstairs. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 142-143). Appellant also
cites Officer Schwarck’s testimony about finding a large amount of money in the living
room where Appellant was arrested, but no one else testified about the money.
{¶34} We affirm the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to suppress. Our
review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress “presents a mixed question of law
and fact.” State v. Chuppa, 2025-Ohio-3117, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.), quoting State v. Burnside,
2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we must determine
whether competent, credible evidence supports the trial court's findings. State v.
Williams, 2024-Ohio-943, ¶ 43 (7th Dist.). This standard of review is appropriate as, “[i]n
a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
fact and is in the best position to resolve questions of fact and evaluate the credibility of
witnesses.” Id., quoting State v. Venham, 96 Ohio App.3d 649, 653 (4th Dist. 1994).
{¶35} An appellate court accepts the trial court's factual findings and relies upon
its ability to assess witness credibility, but we independently determine, without deference
to the trial court, whether the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard to the facts.
Williams at ¶ 43, citing State v. Rice, 129 Ohio App.3d 91, 94 (7th Dist. 1998). We will
not disturb a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress when supported by substantial

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 11 –

credible evidence. Id. Once we determine whether the record supports the trial court's
factual findings, we then conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the
law to those facts. Chuppa at ¶ 14, citing State v. Eggleston, 2015-Ohio-958, ¶ 18 (11th
Dist.) (citations omitted).
{¶36} The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14,
Article 1 of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from unconstitutional
searches and seizures, such as searches performed without a warrant. Evidence is not
admissible when it is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 654 (1961). Warrantless searches violate the Fourth Amendment unless they
fall within specific, well-established exceptions. State v. Kessler, 53 Ohio St.2d 204, 207,
(1978), quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-455 (1971).
{¶37} The Fourth Amendment allows law enforcement officers to perform a
protective sweep of the premises where an individual is arrested in order to protect officer
safety. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 327 (1990). A protective sweep is “a quick and
limited search of premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of
police officers or others.” Id. Law enforcement may conduct this sweep without probable
cause or reasonable suspicion, but it is restricted to a “cursory visual inspection of those
places in which a person might be hiding.” Id. This is because the arrest of a defendant
in his home “puts the officer at the disadvantage of being on his adversary’s ‘turf.’” Id. at
333.
{¶38} The United States Supreme Court in Buie clarifies:

We also hold that as an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a
precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion,
look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest
from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however,
we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the
rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent
officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a
danger to those on the arrest scene.

Id. at 334. The Court emphasized that a protective sweep is only a cursory search of
areas where a person may be found and not an entire search of the property. Id. at 335.

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 12 –

It further cautioned that the sweep should take no longer than necessary to relieve an
officer of this reasonable suspicion of danger and it should be no longer than the time it
takes to complete the arrest of the defendant and leave the property. Id.
{¶39} Here, Appellant conceded at the suppression hearing that the initial warrant
to search his home to locate and arrest him was legitimate. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 4). However,
he asserts the protective sweep of his house was not justified because law enforcement
immediately found and arrested him on the first floor.
{¶40} The record establishes that Appellant was quickly arrested. While the trial
court found that Officer Kubat’s “conduct was clearly not a protective sweep,” we hold
that it was. The Buie Court identified two types of protective sweeps. The first is a
precautionary, cursory search incident to arrest done to protect officers from threats from
others that may be inside the house. Buie, 494 U.S. at 327. This sweep does not require
reasonable suspicion or probable cause. Id.
{¶41} Officer Kubat swept the area adjacent to where Appellant was found to
ensure the safety of the officers. He testified that upon SOB breaching the front door,
Chief Arbenz proceeded left to the living room while he advanced to a room on the right
because he thought he saw movement there. It is reasonable for Officer Kubat to do so
as it was unknown if Chief Arbenz had yet identified Appellant as the subject of the arrest
warrant in the other room and thus one of the other individuals Officer Kubat encountered
could have been Appellant or posed a threat to him and the officers on that floor.
Moreover, Officer Kubat and the other officers knew Appellant’s violent criminal history,
they knew an arrest warrant was issued for him for drug trafficking, and they knew he was
a suspect in a felonious assault with two other individuals who had firearms. In addition,
Officer Kubat observed a juvenile run out of the house as officers were beginning to
execute the search warrant and Officer Kubat thought he observed movement in the room
to the right. Even if it Officer Kubat’s sweep occurred briefly after Appellant’s arrest, Buie
permits officers to enter rooms at this point when they have not previously been swept for
safety measures. Buie at 333-334. The drugs he found in this room were in plain view
in a baggie lying on the floor. Thus, they were properly seized.
{¶42} Officer Kubat’s protective sweep also meets the second type of protective
sweep identified in Buie, that is, one with “articulable facts, which taken together with the

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 13 –

rational inference from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing
that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
scene.” Buie, 494 U.S. at 334. Officer Kubat knew the search for and arrest of Appellant
was high risk based on Appellant’s prior violent convictions and the fact he was suspected
in a felonious assault that seriously injured someone and involved other individuals and
firearms. Officer Kubat was informed before entry that other people may be found in
Appellant’s house, as well as illegal drugs. Law enforcement additionally observed a
juvenile run from Appellant’s house upon their entry into the house. These circumstances
constitute reasonable suspicion to warrant a prudent officer in believing that individuals
may be present in the home that posed a threat to the safety of the officers at the scene.
{¶43} The protective sweep of the upstairs is also justified by either type of the
protective sweep identified in Buie. While Appellant had already been apprehended,
Officer Kubat located other individuals present on the main floor, and a threat to the safety
of law enforcement remained from an unsecured upstairs. Alternatively, articulable facts,
taken together with the rational inference from those facts, warranted a reasonably
prudent officer in believing that the upstairs harbored individuals posing a danger to those
in Appellant’s house. Again, law enforcement knew they were executing a high-risk
warrant for an individual with a violent history and they knew he was a suspect in the drug
trafficking investigation and a felonious assault that seriously injured the victim. They
also knew other individuals were suspected in the felonious assault and firearms may
have been involved as well. They heard screaming and yelling upon Appellant’s arrest
and heard someone state that an individual ran out of the house.
{¶44} As to forcing open a locked bedroom door upstairs, the trial court
acknowledged uncertainty as to whether officers breached a locked bedroom door in
which the bag of marijuana was found. However, the trial court made no further findings
or conclusions concerning this issue. Appellant notes the prosecution did not call
Detective Schwarck to testify because he stated at the suppression hearing that officers
“basically busted it open” when testifying about another officer searching a locked room
upstairs. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 142-143).
{¶45} The record indicates Detective Schwarck did not state that officers broke
open a locked bedroom door upstairs. Rather, he was played the video from Detective

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 14 –

Hilderbrand’s body camera in which a person he identifies as Detective Grant is heard
stating, “[y]eah, upstairs locked.” (Supp. Hg. Tr. 141-142). He then states, “I think he
said, ‘they basically busted it open.’” (Supp. Hg. Tr. 142). This is the bedroom in which
the bag of marijuana was found.
{¶46} However, Detective Hilderbrand testified that even though Appellant stated
he kept a room upstairs locked, none of the officers told him that any door was locked.
(Supp. Hg. Tr. 53-54). He further testified that when he went upstairs, he observed the
door of the bedroom was open and no signs indicated the door had been breached.
(Supp. Hg. Tr. 54-56). He also testified that three doors accessed the bedroom and he
was not told which door was locked. (Supp. Hg. Tr. 60-61). He indicated that if two of
the doors were locked, one could still access the bedroom through the other door. (Supp.
Hg. Tr. 60-61). Appellant presented no evidence that any of the upstairs doors were
broken into by police.
{¶47} Further, no evidence supports Appellant’s assertion that police searched
upstairs and breached locked doors because they were searching for illegal drugs. The
testimony established that officers searched the home to protect themselves from others
who may be in the house and pose a threat to their safety. They were informed of
Appellant’s criminal history and the arrest warrant for drug trafficking and possible
participation in a serious felonious assault with two other individuals and firearms. A
juvenile ran from Appellant’s house upon their entry and others were found in the home.
The testimony also established that the illegal drugs found both in the bedroom on the
main floor and in the upstairs bedroom were in plain view.
{¶48} Accordingly, we find no merit to Appellant’s first assignment of error and it
is overruled.
{¶49} In his second assignment of error, Appellant asserts:

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY IMPOSING A
SENTENCE WELL IN EXCESS OF THE PARTIES’ RECOMMENDATION,

OR

APPELLANT’S PLEA OF GUILTY WAS NOT KNOWINGLY MADE WHEN
THE TRIAL COURT IMPOSED A SENTENCE WELL IN EXCESS OF THE

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 15 –

PARTIES’ RECOMMENDED SENTENCE WITHOUT GIVING APPELLANT
AN OPPORTUNITY TO WITHDRAW HIS GUILTY PLEA.

{¶50} Appellant contends that although the court advised him it was not required
to accept the parties’ joint recommendation of 2 years in prison for the felonious assault,
he had every reason to expect the court to impose that sentence. He asserts the court’s
imposition of the 8-year maximum sentence was not justified. He also argues his guilty
plea was unknowingly made because the trial court failed to allow him the opportunity to
withdraw his plea after imposing the excessive sentence. He cites Justice Donnelly’s
dissent in State v. Leasure, 2024-Ohio-476, ¶ 5 and the Eighth District’s decision in State
v. Jordan, 2025-Ohio-5859 (8th Dist.).
{¶51} We find no merit to this assignment of error. The United States and the
Ohio Constitutions require a defendant’s plea to be made knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969); State v. Engle, 74 Ohio St.3d
525, 527 (1996). Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires the trial court in felony cases to personally
address the defendant and determine that he understands delineated constitutional and
non-constitutional rights and their waiver before accepting a guilty plea. This includes the
non-constitutional right to receive notice of the maximum penalty for the offenses to which
he is pleading guilty. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). A defendant seeking to invalidate his plea
based on the trial court’s failure to fully inform him of non-constitutional rights must show
prejudice resulting from this failure. State v. Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509, ¶ 22. Prejudice is
established by showing that the plea would not have otherwise been made. State v.
Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 16.
{¶52} A trial court is not bound by a jointly recommended sentence. State v.
Underwood, 124 Ohio St.3d 365 (2010). A court may deviate from the recommended
sentence and impose a greater sentence than recommended. Id.; State v. Frye, 2025-
Ohio-569, ¶ 21 (7th Dist.). However, before imposing a longer prison sentence than
recommended, the court must inform the defendant of the applicable penalties and the
possibility of imposing a sentence greater than that recommended. State v. Jordan, 2024-
Ohio-2361, ¶ 23 (8th Dist.).
{¶53} At the beginning of Appellant’s plea hearing, the trial court explained that
the plea agreement “has you pleading guilty to Count IX Felonious Assault; that’s a felony

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 16 –

of the second degree, which means the maximum sentence that can be imposed is eight
years in prison.” (Plea Tr. 3). The trial court also noted Exhibit A was attached to the
plea petition, which was the joint recommendation of the parties that Appellant serve two
years in prison for that offense. (Plea Tr. 3). The trial court stated on the record:

THE COURT: All right. Do you understand, one: That that is a
recommendation of this Court; that the Court is not required to follow that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

(Plea Tr. 3). The court also set forth the parties’ agreement for the drug possession
offense and its maximum sentence. (Plea Tr. 4-5). Appellant indicated he understood
the charges and the maximum sentences. (Plea Tr. 4-6). Thus, the court informed
Appellant of his maximum potential sentence and that it was not bound by any agreed-
upon lesser sentence between Appellant and the prosecution.
{¶54} The trial court informed Appellant again of the potential eight-year sentence
after he entered his guilty plea. (Plea Tr. 16). Appellant stated he still desired to enter a
guilty plea. (Plea Tr. 16). The court reiterated that Appellant made a guilty plea to
“Felonious Assault . . . where he faces up to eight years in prison.” (Plea Tr. 16). The
court indicated it had informed Appellant of all possible penalties. (Plea Tr. 16).
{¶55} While Appellant cites to the dissenting opinion in State v. Leasure, 2024-
Ohio-476, the majority of the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept the jurisdictional
appeal. Further, Justice Kennedy wrote a concurrence specifically to address Justice
Donnelly’s dissent. Leasure at ¶ 1 (Kennedy, C.J., concurring). Justice Kennedy
explained that they could not address jointly recommended sentences and why they may
be illusory in plea agreements because the propositions of law concerned the
ineffectiveness of counsel when the trial court granted the defendant’s motion to withdraw
his guilty plea at the same time that it denied his counsel’s motion to withdraw from
representation. Id. at ¶ 2. Justice Kennedy also concluded that contrary to Justice
Donnelly’s assertion, Leasure was not the “perfect example” of the illusory promises of a
jointly recommended sentence in a plea agreement because Leasure acknowledged he
understood the trial court was not required to impose the jointly recommended sentence.
Id. at ¶ 3.

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 17 –

{¶56} The case cited by Appellant, State v. Jordan, 2024-Ohio-2361 (8th Dist.) is
also dissimilar to his case. There, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 32 years in
prison, which was double the jointly recommended sentence. Id. at 17. The appellate
court acknowledged a trial court does not err when it forewarns a defendant of the
penalties and the fact that it may impose a greater sentence than that which formed the
inducement for his guilty plea. Id. at ¶ 23. However, the appellate court held the trial
court erred in imposing a sentence that was double the jointly recommended sentence
when it created a reasonable expectation in the defendant that it was going to sentence
him to the jointly recommended sentence. Id. at ¶ 29. The appellate court further held
that the trial court’s desire to proceed directly to sentencing without a presentence
investigation report reinforced the defendant’s reasonable expectation that he was going
to receive the jointly recommended sentence. Id. The Jordan Court cautioned that trial
courts should avoid the appearance of a “bait and switch” when deviations from a jointly
recommended sentence occur when a defendant has a reasonable expectation that the
court will impose that sentence. Id. at ¶ 32.
{¶57} In the instant case, the trial court informed Appellant three times that he
faced up to 8 years in prison and explained it was not bound by agreed-upon sentencing
recommendations. (Plea Tr. 4-6, 16). The trial court also ordered a presentence
investigation report and a victim impact statement. (Plea Tr. 18). The court did not
proceed directly to sentencing, as in Jordan.
{¶58} At Appellant’s sentencing, the court referred to the presentence
investigation report, Appellant’s criminal history, which included violent crimes, and three
of four times where Appellant was placed on community control and it was terminated
due to violations by Appellant. (Sent. Tr. 5, 8-9). The court noted the fourth community
control placement was pending termination based on the current crimes to which he pled
no contest and guilty. (Sent. Tr. 8). The court found Appellant would continue to commit
violent crimes and it could not see how it “could impose the minimum sentence on yet
another felonious assault, including your background of attempted murder.” (Sent. Tr. 6).
The court stated it had applied the proper sentencing factors and it was not accepting the
2-year sentencing recommendation. These circumstances are not similar to those in
Jordan. They also do not constitute a “bait and switch” by the trial court.

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 18 –

{¶59} We also find no merit to Appellant’s assertion that the trial court should have
given him an opportunity to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing him to the maximum
sentence for felonious assault. The trial court did not proceed directly to sentencing and
had informed Appellant that it was not bound by the sentencing recommendation and
Appellant faced up to 8 years in prison for the felonious assault offense.
{¶60} Accordingly, we find that Appellant’s second assignment of error lacks merit
and is overruled.
{¶61} In sum, we find the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion to
suppress evidence discovered by law enforcement when they entered Appellant’s home.
Law enforcement were justified in performing a protective sweep of the main floor and
upstairs. As to the main floor, law enforcement knew Appellant had a violent criminal
history, he had an arrest warrant outstanding for involvement in a serious felonious
assault with other individuals and possibly firearms, and a juvenile ran out of the house
immediately preceding law enforcement executing the warrant. Upon breaching the front
door, Officer Kubat also believed that he observed movement in the room that he entered.
He encountered individuals and observed drugs in plain view on the floor.
{¶62} Law enforcement was also justified in performing a protective sweep of the
upstairs. While the protective sweep occurred on a separate floor from where Appellant
was detained and arrested, danger persisted to law enforcement from someone possibly
hiding upstairs. Officer Kubat found others on the main floor and law enforcement knew
Appellant had an outstanding warrant for felonious assault which caused serious physical
injury and involved others and possibly firearms. They also knew Appellant had a violent
criminal history and they had observed a juvenile running from the house immediately
before executing the warrant.
{¶63} In addition, the court did not commit error by rejecting the parties’ agreed
sentencing recommendation. The court informed Appellant three times of the maximum
term he faced and informed him it was not bound by the recommendation. The court also
ordered a presentence investigation report and did not proceed directly into sentencing
after the plea hearing.

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
– 19 –

{¶64} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Robb, J., concurs.

Dickey, J., concurs.

Case Nos. 25 BE 0038, 25 BE 0042
[Cite as State v. Fields, 2026-Ohio-867.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas of Belmont County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.