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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

David Stanley v. Lafayette Police Department

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CA-0025-0590

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

25-590

DAVID STANLEY

VERSUS

LAFAYETTE POLICE DEPARTMENT, ET AL.

---

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 20236430
HONORABLE MICHELE S. BILLEAUD, DISTRICT JUDGE

---

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

---

Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, Candyce G. Perret, and Charles G.
Fitzgerald, Judges.

AFFIRMED.
James E. Sudduth, III
Kourtney L. Kech
Sudduth & Associates
1109 Pithon Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 480-0101
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
David Stanley

Kay A Theunissen
Mahtook & Lafleur
P. O. Box 3089
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 266-2189
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS/APPELLEES:
Lafayette Police Department
Scott Morgan
GREMILLION, Judge.

Plaintiff/appellant, David Stanley, appeals the judgment maintaining the

exception of res judicata filed by the Lafayette Police Department (LPD) and Scott

Morgan in his capacity as its chief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS

Stanley served as the president of the local police union. He asserts that he

made two social media posts to the union’s Facebook page that garnered unwanted

attention from his superiors. The first voiced the union’s opposition to a bill pending

before the Louisiana Legislature. The second was a post praising law enforcement

for the capture of high profile drug runners in a traffic stop. In both of these, Stanley

asserts, he was acting as president of the union.

In May 2020, he was notified that he was the subject of an Internal Affairs

investigation for violating LPD policies on social media, public relations, and “new

relations policies.” Stanley maintains that all of these posts were protected speech

as a member of the police union.

In August, Stanley’s commander informed him that he was being suspended

for fourteen days as discipline for his social media activities. He appealed his

suspension to the civil service board.

On August 20, 2020, Stanley filed a petition seeking injunctive relief against

his discipline. The trial court granted Stanley’s request for a temporary restraining

order. LPD sought writs of supervisory review of the grant of the TRO. While this

application was pending, Stanley was informed that he was being removed from K-

9 duty to what he maintains is “an objectively worse position, in terms of both

supervisory status, stature, and pay[.]”
This court denied LPD’s writ application, finding that the temporary

restraining order had expired by operation of La.Code Civ.P. art. 3604. Stanley v.

Lafayette City-Parish Consol. Gov’t, 20-475 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/21/20) (unpublished

writ).

In November 2020, Stanley filed a petition for preliminary injunction. LPD

responded with exceptions of prematurity and lack of subject matter jurisdiction,

given the proceedings before the civil service board. These exceptions were

maintained by the trial court.

Stanley’s appeal to the civil service board was heard in February 2022. His

suspension was reduced to three days, and his transfer was sustained. On June 14,

2022, Stanley filed a complaint with the United States District Court for the Western

District of Louisiana. He named LPD and Morgan as defendants in that suit.

Stanley’s complaint sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 for violating

his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Although Stanley did not

assert any claims based upon alleged violations of Louisiana law, his complaint did

posit that the federal court had jurisdiction pursuant to, among other provisions, 28

U.S.C.A. § 1367 (a), which governs “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims

that are so related to the claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that

they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States

Constitution.”

The defendants filed motions to dismiss Stanley’s complaint pursuant to Fed.

Rule Civ P. 12(b). These motions argued that Stanley’s constitutional claims were

prescribed, that Stanley had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,

and that the individual defendants enjoyed qualified immunity. The magistrate judge

recommended granting the motion on the issue of prescription. In his objection to

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the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, Stanley argued that his claim did

not accrue until the civil service board acted on his appeal or, alternatively, that

prescription was interrupted by the filing of his actions for injunctive relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit certified the following

question to the Louisiana Supreme Court in Kling v. Hebert, 60 F.4th 281, 288 (5th

Cir. 2023):

In Louisiana, under what circumstances, if any, does the
commencement of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue
interrupt prescription as to causes of action, understood as legal claims
rather than the facts giving rise to them, not asserted in that suit?

The U.S. District Court stayed resolution of Stanley’s case until the Louisiana

Supreme Court answered the Fifth Circuit’s question.

On November 13, 2023, Stanley filed the present matter in the Fifteenth

Judicial District Court. In this matter, Stanley named only LPD and Morgan as

defendants. LPD and Morgan responded with exceptions of lis pendens, no cause

of action, and res judicata. Resolution of these exceptions was held in abeyance to

await the supreme court’s decision in Kling.

After Kling was decided, the U.S. District Court took up the defendants’

motions and ruled that Stanley’s federal case was prescribed. Stanley v. Morgan,

No. 22-CV-1655 (W.D. La. 2/1/24) (2024 WL 396185) (unpublished opinion). The

Fifth Circuit affirmed. Stanley v. Morgan, 120 F.4th 467 (5th Cir. 2024). The United

States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Stanley v. Morgan, ___ U.S. ___, 145 S.Ct.

1314 (2025).

In May 2025, the trial court heard the exceptions in the present matter and

maintained the defendants’ exceptions of res judicata. This appeal followed.

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DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

At issue is the preclusive effect of the judgment of a federal district court in

related state court proceedings.

The courts of this state have repeatedly confirmed that federal
law is applicable to consideration of whether a federal court judgment
has res judicata effect. See Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, Inc. v. Placid Ref.
Co., 95-0654 (La.1/16/96), 666 So.2d 624; Reeder v. Succession of
Palmer, 623 So.2d 1268 (La.1993) [cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1165, 114
S.Ct. 1191 (1994)]; Bobby and Ray Williams P’ship, L.L.P. v.
Shreveport Louisiana Hayride Co., L.L.C., 38,866 (La.App. 2 Cir.
9/22/04), 882 So.2d 676, writ denied, 04-2636 (La.12/17/04), 888
So.2d 875; McCollough v. Dauzat, 98-1293 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/3/99),
736 So.2d 914. As explained in Terrebonne Fuel & Lube, 666 So.2d
at 633, federal res judicata law indicates that a judgment bars a
subsequent suit if the following requirements are satisfied: “1) both
cases involve the same parties; 2) the prior judgment was rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction; 3) the prior decision was a final
judgment on the merits; and 4) the same cause of action is at issue in
both cases.” There are, however, exceptions to the law of res judicata.
Id. Namely, the law of res judicata may be inapplicable if there is an
express reservation of a claim that the defendant acquiesces in or if the
court in the first action expressly reserves the plaintiff’s right to pursue
a subsequent action. Id.

Green v. Iberia Par. Sch. Bd., 06-1060, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/20/06), 945 So.2d

940, 943, writ denied, 07-111 (La. 3/16/07), 952 So.2d 697.

In the present matter, some elements that satisfy the federal criteria for res

judicata are unequivocally present: the parties are the same; the United States

District Court for the Western District of Louisiana was a court of competent

jurisdiction; the cause of action is the same, as both state and federal constitutionally

protected rights are allegedly at issue; and the judgment is final.

Stanley argues that Griffin v. BSFI Western E & P, Inc., 00-2122 (La.App. 1

Cir. 2/15/02), 812 So.2d 726, should inform our decision. The facts of that case

were:

On June 17, 1996, plaintiffs, Robert Griffin and Eugene Russell,
filed suit in state court against defendants, BSFI Western E & P, Inc.

4
(BSFI) and Joseph P. Brantley IV. The petition alleged claims of
breaches of fiduciary duty, detrimental reliance, and willful misconduct
or gross negligence arising from misrepresentations concerning a
purported sale or assignment of plaintiffs’ interests in an oil and gas
field. In October of 1996, plaintiffs, among others, filed a suit in federal
court asserting claims that arose from the same general transaction and
nucleus of operative facts. In January of 1999, a federal magistrate
judge issued an order, reasons, and judgment, which dismissed all
remaining counts of the federal complaint [without prejudice]. On June
15, 1999, plaintiffs filed an amended petition in state court. The
amended petition added the additional parties from the federal suit:
Linda A. Griffin, Sheila Russell, and Russell Resources, Inc. (Russell
Resources) as plaintiffs; and Southfork Investments, Inc. (Southfork)
as a defendant. The amended petition substantially fleshed out the
factual allegations, including a description of an operating agreement
entered into by various parties, including Mr. Brantley, BSFI, and
plaintiffs. The operating agreement covered leases and third party
contracts taken in the name of either BSFI or Southfork “for the benefit
of the working interest participants . . . .” The working interest
participants included Mr. Griffin, Southfork, and Russell Resources. In
the amended petition, plaintiffs asserted claims of breach of contract,
unfair trade practices, fraud, unjust enrichment, and gross negligence.

On September 27, 1999, defendants filed a peremptory exception
raising the objection of res judicata as to the claims asserted in the
amended petition. The objection of res judicata was submitted on briefs.
By judgment dated May 16, 2000, and subsequently designated a final
judgment, the state court sustained the exception and dismissed, with
prejudice, all claims alleged in the amended petition.

Id. at 729–30. The magistrate judge’s judgment was the result of a motion for

summary judgment based on prescription. While the plaintiffs had alleged that the

defendants had intentionally concealed their fraud, nothing in the record indicated

that the magistrate judge considered these allegations, which would have implicated

the doctrine of contra non valentem. The first circuit found, “the federal summary

judgment dismissal based on the expiration of a federal statute of limitations, which

differs in an essential manner from the state provisions, does not operate as a claim

preclusive judgment to the state fraud claims.” Id. at 735.

The first circuit stated that whether a dismissal based upon prescription

represents a judgment on the merits is less clear than one based on, for instance,

5
failing to state a claim on which relief may be granted. When a set of facts gives

rise to causes of action with potential state and federal remedies, each of which has

a different prescriptive period, Griffin indicates that the determination in federal

court that a case is barred by statute of limitations is not necessarily res judicata as

to the state action.

To prevail, then, Stanley needs to convince this Court that a Griffin analysis

is required and that under Griffin he would prevail. We agree with the first

proposition and will perform a Griffin analysis. However, we find that the issues of

prescription implicated by the state cause of action are identical to those presented

in the federal claim. Thus, we cannot say that Stanley was denied his day in court.

The prescriptive period of claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 are

borrowed from state law. Redburn v. City of Victoria, 898 F.3d 486 (5th Cir. 2018).

Actions under § 1983 are considered torts, and at all times pertinent to this case, the

prescriptive period for tort actions were governed by La.Civ.Code art. 3492, which

provided for a one-year prescriptive period. Stanley, 120 F.4th 467. Stanley argues,

though, that under Griffin, because he was required to exhaust his administrative

remedies before the civil service board, the prescriptive period for his state law

claims accrued differently than his federal claims under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983; thus,

the federal court’s judgment is not res judicata as to those state law claims. This

argument assumes that Stanley was required to exhaust his civil service remedies

before he could file suit for damages.

We note that Griffin can be distinguished from the present case because, as

stated by the magistrate judge, the fraud allegations asserted in the state proceedings

but not asserted in the federal court could not have been discovered until after the

applicable prescriptive period had lapsed. Further, the magistrate judge in Griffin

6
had declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over some of the claims. In the present

matter, the possibility of the U.S. District Court exercising pendent jurisdiction was

foreclosed because Stanley did not assert his state claims in that court. It is well

established that a plaintiff who fails to assert claims over which the federal court

would have pendent jurisdiction is prevented from asserting those claims in state

court unless he can demonstrate that “the federal court clearly would not have had

jurisdiction to entertain the omitted state claim, or, having jurisdiction, clearly would

have declined to exercise it[.]” Reeder, 623 So.2d at 1273.

Defendants cite this Court’s decision in McCain v. City of Lafayette, 98-1902

(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/99), 741 So.2d 720, writ denied, 99-1578 (La. 9/17/99), 747

So.2d 562, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1118, 120 S.Ct. 939 (2000), for the proposition

that subject matter jurisdiction was not divested from the state district court. McCain

filed suit for damages against the City of Lafayette and several of his supervisors up

to and including the mayor, claiming that his firing was the result of age

discrimination. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that

McCain had no cause of action against the supervisors and that the district court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The lower court granted summary judgment.

On appeal, after concluding that the applicable age-discrimination statutes do

not afford a cause of action against individual supervisors, this Court addressed the

issue of subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants had argued that McCain was

required to assert his claims before the civil service board. We noted that this

position poses two problems: 1) the civil service board is not empowered to hear

claims that arise in tort, such as McCain’s and 2) requiring a plaintiff to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing his tort suit could–as we see in the present

7
matter–“obviously continue past the applicable prescriptive period for causes of

action in tort.” Id. at 728.

Due to this civil service process, an employee could lose all damages
that could not be awarded by a civil service board, e.g. general damages,
simply because the cause of action had prescribed. We find nothing to
suggest that a city employee has any less right to assert entitlement to
damages for tortious conduct than one employed by a private
employer. . . . [T]he civil service board is powerless to award other
damages sought by the plaintiff, e.g. general damages and loss of
business reputation. In this regard, we conclude that the lower court
had subject matter jurisdiction over these issues.

Id.

We turn to the test enunciated in Griffin, 812 So.2d 726. Claims brought

pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A § 1983 are suits in tort. City of Monterrey v. Del Monte

Dunes at Monterrey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 119 S.Ct. 1624 (1999); Bank of New York

Mellon v. Smith, 11-60 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/29/11), 71 So.3d 1034, writ denied, 11-

2080 (la. 11/18/11), 75 So.3d 462. “Section 1983 claims brought in Louisiana

generally borrow the state’s one-year prescriptive period for delictual actions, as

well as Louisiana’s rules on interruption. Davis v. Louisiana State Univ., 876 F.2d

412, 413 (5th Cir. 1989).” Kling, 60 F.4th at 285. The issue, as framed by Stanley,

is whether the prescriptive periods applied by the state and federal courts are so

similar as to warrant application of res judicata without denying the plaintiff his day

in court.

Stanley maintains that they are not. McCain, 741 So.2d 720, indicates that

they are. Because the civil service board does not have subject matter jurisdiction

over Stanley’s damage claims for infringement on his freedom of speech or

expression, he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before

pursuing his federal or state damage claims.

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The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. All costs of this appeal are taxed

to plaintiff/appellant, David Stanley.

AFFIRMED.

9