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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State of Louisiana v. Sammy Cheatham

Louisiana Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: KA-0025-0629

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (18.6K)

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Combined Opinion

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

25-629

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

SAMMY CHEATHAM

---

APPEAL FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 2023-CR-1114
HONORABLE KEITH RAYNE JULES COMEAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

---

WILBUR L. STILES
JUDGE

---

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Jonathan W. Perry, and Wilbur L. Stiles,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.
Joshua S. Guillory
Attorney at Law
203 West Brentwood Boulevard, Suite 3
Lafayette, LA 70506
(337) 233-1303
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Sammy Cheatham

M. Michael Haik, III
District Attorney
16th Judicial District
David H. Pipes
Assistant District Attorney
300 Iberia Street, Suite 200
New Iberia, LA 70560
(337) 369-4420
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana
STILES, Judge.

Defendant Sammy Cheatham was charged on December 1, 2023, by bill of

information with seven counts of principal to attempted first degree murder, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:27 and La.R.S. 14:30(A)(1). He was further charged with

one count of illegal use of weapons or dangerous instrumentalities, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:94(A), and one count of illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:95.8(A). On February 18, 2025, Defendant pled guilty to

seven counts of the amended charge of attempted second degree murder, in violation

of La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. The other two charges were dismissed. On May 20,

2025, Defendant was sentenced to serve thirty years on each count, without benefit

of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The sentences were ordered to run

concurrently with each other. Defendant now appeals his sentences.

FACTS

On the night of July 15, 2023, the New Iberia Police Department responded

to a call regarding a shooting on School Street in New Iberia. A three-year-old girl

had been shot in the head while playing inside of her home by someone driving by

in a vehicle. The child was rushed to the hospital, where she underwent surgery on

her brain. There were six other people inside the house at the time of the shooting.

The investigation revealed that Defendant had been riding around in a vehicle that

night with two friends. Defendant, who was in the backseat of the vehicle, was

identified as the shooter. Videos retrieved from Defendant’s cell phone during the

investigation showed approximately six shots being fired at the house on School

Street through the open window of the vehicle as it drove by. It further showed

Defendant shooting at the house a second time after the vehicle had turned around

at the dead end and was leaving the neighborhood. Through the videos and text
messages retrieved from the participants’ phones, it was made clear that the house

with the three-year-old child inside was not the intended target. Instead, Defendant

and his friends had intended to shoot up the house of someone named “Pop.”

As there were seven people inside of the house at the time Defendant fired the

shots, he was charged with seven counts of principal to attempted first degree murder,

as well as the two weapons charges. The attempted first degree murder charges were

later reduced to seven counts of attempted second degree murder, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:27 and La. R.S. 14:30.1, to which Defendant pled guilty on February 18,

1. The two weapons charges were dismissed as part of Defendant’s plea

agreement. On May 20, 2025, the trial court sentenced Defendant to thirty years at

hard labor on each of the seven counts of attempted second degree murder. Those

sentences were ordered to be served without parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence, and were further ordered to run concurrently with each other.

Defendant has appealed his sentences.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

On appeal, Defendant asserts two assignments of error:

1. The trial court imposed a sentence that is constitutionally excessive
   in violation of La.Const. art. I, § 20 and the Eighth Amendment to
   the United States Constitution.

2. The trial court failed to give adequate consideration to the
   defendant’s youth, mental-health background, and capacity for
   rehabilitation as required by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012),
   Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, and related Louisiana
   jurisprudence.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed by this

court for errors parent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we have

2
found one error patent. Defendant was not fully informed by the trial court of the

time period for filing an application for post-conviction relief.

At the guilty plea proceeding, the trial court advised Defendant:

The law requires that I tell you there’s a two-year limitation to
file for post-conviction relief if you think any State or Federal or
constitutional right has been violated. You have two years to complain
about it. I’ll explain more after I sentence you because it doesn’t take
effect until after sentencing. Okay?

However, there is no indication in the sentencing transcript that this was further

discussed.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.8 states, in pertinent part,

“No application for post conviction relief, including applications which seek an out-

of-time appeal, shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after the

judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the provisions of

Article 914 or 922[.]” Recently, in State v. Terry, 25-170, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/19/25), 425 So.3d 188, 191, this court discussed its adoption of a new procedure,

allowing the opinion of an appellate court to provide a defendant with notice of the

correct time period for filing an application for post-conviction relief:

Recently, a majority of this court’s judges have chosen to allow
the appellate opinion to serve as notice of the time limitation for filing
an application for post conviction relief. See State v. King, 24-367
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/19/25), 405 So.3d 1162, writ denied, 25-381 (La.
5/20/25), 409 So.3d 223; State v. Washington, 24-308 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/12/25), 406 So.3d 579; State v. Mason, 24-407 (La.App. 3 Cir.
2/5/25), 407 So.3d 822, writ denied, 25-270 (La. 4/29/25), 407 So.3d
620.

In Washington, 406 So.3d at 583 (alterations in original), this
court stated:

We agree with the first, second, and fifth circuits
who have allowed their opinions to serve as notice to
Defendant of the correct time limitation for filing an
application for post-conviction relief:

3
Finally, after the trial court imposed
the sentences herein, it failed to advise the
defendant of the applicable time period to file
an application for post-conviction relief….
At the time of sentencing, the trial court shall
inform the defendant of the prescriptive
period for applying for post-conviction relief.
State v. LeBoeuf, 2006-0153 (La.App. 1st
Cir. 9/15/06), 943 So.2d 1134, 1142, writ
denied, 2006-2621 (La. 8/15/07), 961 So.2d
1158. Its failure to do so, however, has no
bearing on the sentence and is not grounds to
reverse the sentence or remand for
resentencing. Further, the Article does not
provide a remedy for an individual defendant
who is not told of the limitations period. Id.
at 1142-43.

Out of an abundance of caution and in
the interest of judicial economy, we advise
the defendant that La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8
generally provides that no application for
post-conviction relief, including applications
which seek an out-of-time appeal, shall be
considered if filed more than two years after
the judgment of conviction and sentence has
become final under the provisions of La.Code
Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922. Id. at 1143.

State v. Folse, 23-1299, p. 11 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/20/24),
405 So.3d 645, 654. Accordingly, Defendant is advised
that pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application
for post-conviction relief, including applications seeking
an out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more
than two years after the judgment of conviction and
sentence has become final under La.Code Crim.P. arts.
914 or 922.

Thus, this opinion will serve as notice to Defendant of the proper
time period for filing post conviction relief.

Accordingly, we advise Defendant that no application for post-conviction

relief, including applications for out-of-time appeal, shall be considered if filed more

than two years after the judgment of his convictions and sentences have become final

under La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922.

4
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR NUMBERS ONE AND TWO

In Defendant’s first assignment of error, he argues, “The trial court imposed

a sentence that is constitutionally excessive in violation of [Louisiana Constitution

Article] I, §20 and the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.” In his

second assignment of error, Defendant argues, “The trial court failed to give

adequate consideration to Defendant’s youth, mental-health background, and

capacity for rehabilitation as required by Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 [, 132 S.Ct.

2455 ] (2012), Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 141 S.Ct. 1307), and

Louisiana jurisprudence.” Defendant asserts that his first assignment of error

addresses the proportionality of his sentences, while his second assignment of error

concerns a separate constitutional error in the sentencing process itself.

As noted by the State in its brief, Defendant did not file a motion for

reconsideration of his sentence or object to his sentence at the sentencing hearing.

Ordinarily, the failure to file a motion to reconsider sentence precludes review of the

sentence on appeal. La.Code Crim.P. art. 881.1(E). However, this court has chosen

to review sentencing claims for bare excessiveness when no motion to reconsider

was filed. See State v. Thomas, 08-1358 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/09), 18 So.3d 127. Thus,

we will review Defendant’s arguments as a bare claim of excessiveness.

In State v. Doyle, 23-696, pp. 42–43 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/22/24), 388 So.3d 1226,

1252 (alterations in original), this court laid out guidelines regarding excessive

sentence review:

The standard of review for excessive-sentence claims was
addressed in State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d
331. There, this court explained:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”

5
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that
the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than
a needless imposition of pain and suffering. The trial court
has wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within
the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside
as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate.

Id. at 1042 (citations omitted).

In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846
So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, we
further explained:

In deciding whether a sentence is shocking or makes
no meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, an
appellate court may consider several factors including the
nature of the offense, the circumstances of the offender,
the legislative purpose behind the punishment and a
comparison of the sentences imposed for similar crimes.
State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La. 7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501. While
a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must
be individualized to the particular offender and to the
particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d
1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). Additionally, it is within the
purview of the trial court to particularize the sentence
because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances
presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure 881.4(D) states that “[t]he
appellate court shall not set aside a sentence for excessiveness if the
record supports the sentence imposed.” To this end, La.Code Crim.P.
art. 894.1 enumerates aggravating and mitigating factors to be
considered by the trial court in imposing a sentence. In relevant part, it
provides that the trial court “shall state for the record the considerations
taken into account and the factual basis therefor in imposing sentence.”
La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1(C). “While the judge need not articulate
every aggravating and mitigating circumstance outlined in [La.Code
Crim.P.] art. 894.1, the record must reflect that he adequately
considered these guidelines in particularizing the sentence to the
defendant.” State v. Smith, 433 So.2d 688, 698 (La.1983).

6
The penalty for second degree murder is provided in La.R.S. 14:30.1(B):

“Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life

imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of

sentence.” The pertinent penalty provision for attempt provides, “If the offense so

attempted is punishable by death or life imprisonment, he shall be imprisoned at hard

labor for not less than ten nor more than fifty years without benefit of parole,

probation, or suspension of sentence.” La.R.S. 14:27(D)(1)(a). Thus, Defendant

faced a sentence between ten and fifty years at hard labor for each conviction.

The trial court gave lengthy reasons when sentencing Defendant, noting that

it “is governed by Article 894 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in this matter as to

the sentencing guidelines that the Court has to used [sic] in determining the

appropriate sentence.” When addressing those sentencing guidelines, the trial court

first discussed those “which favor the Defendant.”

The first thing that the Court notes is Mr. Cheatham was seventeen
years old at the time of the offense. He suffered from ADHD and has
initially been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, but the doctor in her
report indicates that he doesn’t suffer from a bipolar disorder but only
ADHD and some drug use. 1 Let’s see how Dr. Deland describes it.
Diagnostic impressions are attention deficit hyperactive disorder,
unspecified mood disorder, rule out bipolar disorder, rule out disruptive
mood dysregulation disorder, anxiolytic use disorder and [cannabis]
use disorder. So he had known drug use and he had ADHD, and he had
another disorder that was described by Dr. Deland, unspecified mood
disorder. He was raised in a home and had several problems with his
mother and would bounce around by different - - according to Dr.
Deland was moved several times based on problems he may have had
either with - - within the family unit or outside of the family unit.
Additionally, he went to the Youth Challenge Program, a program this
Court is familiar with having done juveniles, and graduated from that
program but did not receive his GED as a result of that program because
of alleged fights within the program.

1
Defendant’s trial attorney requested an evaluation of Defendant’s mental health history,
which was conducted by Dr. Sarah DeLand prior to sentencing. A report dated May 20, 2025, was
filed into the record at the sentencing hearing.

7
Next, the trial court noted Defendant’s previous criminal history as a juvenile,

as provided in the pre-sentence investigation report.

The Court finds that he has a previous criminal history as a juvenile. It
has been provided in the pre-sentence investigation, and it shows that
Mr. Cheatham was previously convicted - - pled guilty to unauthorized
entry of an inhabited dwelling in New Iberia City Court, which is a
felony, on January 5th of 2021. Additionally, he was also - - pled guilty
to aggravated assault with a firearm on December 1st of 2023. So those
are two previous criminal offenses that the child - - the young man
committed while he was a juvenile. And he was placed on probation.
And then, I think, referred to the Youth Challenge Program.

The trial court then stated that “[t]he other significant factors are all

aggravating circumstances,” and that there were “no other mitigating circumstances

which would apply in this case.”

As pointed out by the prosecutor[,] the Court is mindful of the
aggravating circumstances and finds the following[:] the offenders [sic]
conduct manifested cruelty to the victim. She was shot in the head and
had to undergo brain surgery, and the Court does not have a whole lot
of information on her condition today but significant brain surgery
where fragments of the bond and/or the bullet were removed from her
brain. The offender knew or should have known that the victim was
particularly vulnerable and incapable of resistance because of extreme
youth. I mean, she is a three year-old, you know. You don’t shoot into
a home of people and expect nothing bad to happen. The offender
offered or had been offered or given anything of value. That’s not
applicable. Knowingly created the risk of death or great bodily harm to
more than one person. He pled guilty to seven counts. There were seven
people in that home. All seven of them could have been injured or killed
but for the grace of God no one died. Otherwise, you might be facing a
first degree murder charge and possible death penalty. He was
seventeen at the time. He wouldn’t have gotten the death penalty, but
he would have been looking at life imprisonment without benefit of
probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. He used - - the offender
used threats of or actual violence in the commission of the offense. He
shot a firearm as I counted four or five the first time and once the second
time. The offense resulted in a significant permanent injury or a
significant economic loss to the victim or his family.

In order to demonstrate how much of an emotional and economic impact this

shooting made on the family of the three-year-old child, the trial court read directly

8
from a statement given by the child’s father and recorded in the pre-sentence

investigation report.

Your honor, thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak. My life
changed forever the day my three year-old daughter was shot in the
head. That moment shattered our world. We were told she might not
survive, and for weeks we lived minute by minute terrified of what the
next moment would bring. She underwent brain surgery and had to
relearn how to walk, talk and perform even the most basic tasks.
Watching my baby suffer through that, kind of, pain and struggle is
something I wouldn’t wish on anyone. No parent should ever have to
witness their child endure that. I had to leave my job for several months
to care for her full-time. I stayed by her side in the hospital, took her to
every therapy session, and helped her relearn everything she had
already learned in her short life. The emotional and financial strain was
unimaginable, but nothing mattered more than helping her heal. By the
grace of God she survived. She is doing well now, and I am beyond
grateful for that. But we are not the same. She is not the same. She still
carries the trauma of what happened even at such a young age. Loud
noises scare her. She has nightmares. She clings to me in ways she
never used to. I worry every day about how this trauma will affect her
as she grows; her confidence, her education, and her ability to feel safe
in the world. Every time we leave the house I am anxious. I find myself
replaying the day it happened wondering if I would have done anything
differently. I struggle with guilt and the weight of knowing how close I
came to losing her. Parenting after this has meant living in survival
mode. Financially we are still trying to recover. I lost months of income.
Therapy costs and all of the expenses that come from caring for a
recovering child have added up quickly. I may need to step away from
work again in the future depending on how her healing continues.
Anytime she goes back to the hospital we have to travel to Baton Rouge
and pay for a hotel while taking off of work. This past month, April,
she has had two seizures. She had them a lot since the accident. What
happened to us was not just an accident. It was a devastating, life
altering event. And while she may have recovered for the most part
emotionally we are still healing. I ask that you take into account
everything my daughter and our family has endured because of this. We
are still living the consequences every day. I hope that whatever
sentence is given reflects the seriousness of what happened and brings
a sense of justice not just for my daughter but for all families who have
been affected by violence like this. Thank you for hearing my story and
for considering the impact this has had on our lives.

The trial court then concluded his reasons by turning back to the guidelines of

La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1:

9
I’m in agreement with the State of Louisiana that the seriousness of this
offense is outlined in the first three paragraphs of Article 894.1 that
there’s an [undue] risk that during the period of a suspended sentence
of probation the Defendant will commit another crime. It’s very clear
that since the age of approximately sixteen he’s committed crimes, and
but for the fact that he was either in some, type of, custody or some,
type of, program he has not stopped committing crimes. The Defendant
is in need of correctional treatment and/or a custodial environment that
can be provided most effectively by the commitment to an institution
and a lesser sentence would [deprecate] the seriousness of Defendant’s
conduct. The Court has considered all of these factors and on each of
the counts of Attempted Second Degree Murder the Court will impose
a thirty year sentence. Those sentences are to run concurrently with
each other and the Defendant will be given credit for all time served.
The Defendant is remanded to the custody of the Sheriff for the
execution of said sentence.

After reviewing the record, we agree with the trial court’s reasons for

sentencing Defendant to thirty years at hard labor on each count of attempted second

degree murder. The trial court noted Defendant’s prior juvenile convictions of

unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling in 2021 and aggravated assault with a

firearm in 2023, both of which are felonies. Although Defendant graduated from a

youth challenge program, he did not obtain a GED because he kept getting in trouble

for fighting and missed too many classes. Defendant’s age, seventeen at the time of

the offense, documented ADHD, and troubled home life were the only mitigating

factors. Simply put, Defendant is a menace. Since the age of sixteen, Defendant has

continuously committed crimes when he was not already in custody. Multiple shots

were fired into a home occupied by seven people because Defendant mistakenly

thought it was someone else’s home with whom he was angry. The victim, a three-

year-old child, was shot in the head and had to undergo brain surgery. She has had

to relearn how to walk and talk and now has seizures.

The maximum sentence Defendant faced for each conviction of attempted

second degree murder was fifty years. La.R.S. 14:27 and 14:30.1. Instead, the trial

10
court sentenced Defendant to thirty years for each of the seven counts, to run

concurrently with each other. His sentence is exactly in the middle of the sentencing

range. As Defendant could have been sentenced to fifty years on just one conviction,

we find that a total of thirty years for seven convictions is in no way shocking. The

sentences lean more toward lenient given the facts of the case and Defendant’s

criminal history. Thus, we find that the trial court did not abuse its broad sentencing

discretion and Defendant’s sentences are not excessive.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Defendant’s sentences. We further

advise Defendant that in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8, no application

for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two years after

the judgment of conviction and sentence become final under the provisions of

La.Code Crim.P. art. 914 or 922.

AFFIRMED.

11