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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Sisters of Charity of Saint Elizabeth v. Township of Morris

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-3175-23

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (71.8K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3175-23

SISTERS OF CHARITY OF
SAINT ELIZABETH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

TOWNSHIP OF MORRIS and
THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE
OF THE TOWNSHIP OF MORRIS,
THE BOROUGH OF FLORHAM
PARK, THE VILLA AT FLORHAM
PARK, INC., and MORRIS COUNTY
GOLF CLUB, INC.,

Defendants-Respondents.

---

TOWNSHIP OF MORRIS and
THE TOWNSHIP COMMITTEE
OF THE TOWNSHIP OF MORRIS,

Third-Party Plaintiffs,

v.

THE BOROUGH OF FLORHAM
PARK,
Third-Party Defendant.

---

FLORHAM PARK PROPERTY, LLC,
as successor in interest to the VILLA
AT FLORHAM PARK, INC.,

Appellant.

---

Argued November 17, 2025 – Decided March 25, 2026

Before Judges Natali, Walcott-Henderson, and
Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Morris County, Docket No. L-0975-20.

Steven W. Griegel argued the cause for appellant
(Roselli Griegel Lozier, PC, attorneys; Mark Roselli
and Steven W. Griegel, on the briefs).

Thomas F. Carroll, III, argued the cause for respondent
Sisters of Charity of Saint Elizabeth (Hill Wallack LLP,
attorneys; Aileen M. Brennan and Thomas F. Carroll,
III, on the brief).

Joseph J. Bell, IV, argued the cause for respondent
Borough of Florham Park (Bell, Shivas & Bell, PC,
attorneys; Joseph J. Bell, IV, of counsel and on the
brief).

John M. Mills, III, argued the cause for respondent
Township of Morris (Mills & Mills PC, attorneys; John
M. Mills, III, on the brief).

A-3175-23
2
Calli Law LLC, attorneys for respondent Morris
County Golf Club (Simone Calli and Lawrence Calli,
on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Florham Park Property, LLC (FPP), successor in interest to defendant the

Villa at Florham Park (the Villa), appeals from certain October 13, 2023 orders

which granted summary judgment in favor of the Borough of Florham Park

(Florham Park), the Sisters of Charity of Saint Elizabeth (the Sisters), and

Morris Township (Morris), and dismissed all of FPP's claims. FPP also appeals

from a May 2, 2024 consent order, which marked settled and dismissed the

matter based upon a settlement agreement entered into by plaintiffs, the Sisters,

and defendants, Morris, Florham Park, and Morris County Golf Club (the Golf

Club). We affirm.

I.

The Sisters own a parcel of land located in both Morris and Florham Park

which contains their academic campus, Motherhouse, and their privately-owned

sewage pump station and force main. The Sisters sought to sell a portion of their

campus for development, which included affordable housing. FPP owns an

adjacent property which is served by the pump station and force main. FPP

objected to the sale and alleged the proposed development will utilize sewage

A-3175-23
3
capacity such that FPP will be unable to expand or develop their property in the

future.

The Sisters initiated the litigation below against Morris to settle ownership

of the pump station and force main, and to obtain sewer service for the ir new

development. The matter proceeded to this court, resulting in an unpublished

decision which directed a remand regarding ownership of the facilities, but

confirmed that Morris would provide sewer service to the new development.

Sisters of Charity of Saint Elizabeth v. Twp. of Morris and the Twp. Comm. of

the Twp. of Morris, No. A-226-20 (App. Div. June 24, 2021) (slip op. at 24).

On remand, the Sisters named the Villa and Morris County Golf Club (the

Golf Club) as interested parties because they shared use of the pump station and

force main. The Villa, and later FPP by substitution after it purchased the

property in the spring of 2023, asserted counterclaims and crossclaims seeking

to preserve its ability to expand its use of the pump station and force main, and

these claims were dismissed on summary judgment after the trial court found

that they were not yet ripe. After the Villa's and FPP's counterclaims were

dismissed on summary judgment, and the Sisters' claims against the Villa and

FPP were also dismissed, the Sisters, Morris, Florham Park, and the Golf Club

A-3175-23
4
entered into a settlement agreement allowing the development to proceed, which

the court formalized in a consent order in May 2024.

Background and the 1981 Agreement

Since 1860, the Sisters have owned approximately 150 acres of property

including roughly 50 acres in Morris and 100 in Florham Park. The property

includes a Motherhouse, the Academy of Saint Elizabeth, and Saint Elizabeth

University. Until 2016, the Sisters also owned an adjacent parcel in Florham

Park containing a skilled nursing facility, which was sold to the Villa and later

to FPP. The Sisters' presence predated municipal utilities and therefore these

properties processed their own sewage, initially by way of a private sewage

treatment plant.

In 1981, the Sisters sought to connect their properties, including both the

150 acres in Morris and Florham Park as well as the skilled nursing facility , to

Morris' municipal sewer system. On July 28, 1981, the Sisters, Morris, Florham

Park, and the Florham Park Sewerage Authority entered into a written agreement

(the 1981 Agreement), permitting the Sisters to connect these properties to the

Morris system after constructing a pump station and force main on their campus.

A-3175-23
5
The 1981 Agreement expressly provided that the Sisters' sewage could be

connected to the Morris system while traveling over part of the Florham Park

system. The Sisters constructed and undertook maintenance of their pump

station and force main. The 1981 Agreement provided that the total maximum

average flow from all of the Sisters' properties, including the skilled nursing

facility now owned by FPP, was to be 95,000 gallons per day. It required that

the Sisters' pump station and force main be made available to other users whose

properties were "practicably within reach" of these facilities.

In a 1997 agreement, the Sisters and Morris permitted the Golf Club to

connect to the pump station and force main, consistent with the 1981 Agreement.

As a result, the Sisters' pump station and force main presently serve the Sisters'

campus, as well as the Golf Club and FPP's skilled nursing facility. The pump

station and force main deliver this sewage into the Morris system for treatment

at Morris' wastewater plant.

The 2016 Sale From the Sisters to the Villa

In 2016, the Sisters sold the skilled nursing facility to the Villa. The sale

agreement included:

(m) the right to convey sanitary sewer and waste water
flow from the [Villa] Land and Facility, as now exists
to the public sewage disposal system owned and
maintained by [Morris], through the intervening

A-3175-23
6
sewage disposal and related improvements owned and
maintained by the [Sisters] to the extent such right is
held by the [Sisters] pursuant to a sanitary sewer
agreement . . . and all other rights of [the Sisters]
transferrable pursuant to the Sanitary Sewer
Agreement, which shall be executed at the Closing by
all of the Parties and all other parties to the Sanitary
Sewer Agreement as indicated therein. [The Sisters]
shall consent to [the Villa's] increased usage, provided,
however, that in the event the Facility is expanded, the
cost to expand or upgrade the private sewer
improvements, if necessary, shall be paid by the party
seeking such increase in sewer flow and the party
generating the increased flow shall be responsible for
any increased percentage of the maintenance costs as in
proportion to the increased percentage of overall flow
generated by said party. In no case shall any rights
referenced under this paragraph be deemed to include
rights which [the Villa] may also require to be issued
from [Morris], [Florham Park], or the Florham Park
Sewerage Authority, it being the intention of the parties
hereto that the rights referenced under this paragraph
relate only to the [Sisters'] rights in the private sewer
improvements which are now owned by [the Sisters].

A comprehensive Sanitary Sewer Agreement between the Sisters and the

Villa, annexed to the sale agreement, provided that the Sisters granted the Villa

an easement necessary to use the sewer system, and provided additional terms

about the parties' arrangement. Morris, Florham Park, and the Golf Club were

A-3175-23
7
not parties to the Sanitary Sewer Agreement. 1 The 2016 Sanitary Sewer

Agreement did not establish a specific gallonage limitation for the Villa, but

nonetheless provided for the possibility of expansion of the Villa's then-existing

sewer capacity:

1. The [Sisters] agree that the [Sisters] shall not prevent [the Villa] from seeking to expand the conveyance capacity of the portion of the [Sisters'] System that conveys or pumps flow from [the Villa property] so as to convey additional flow from the Villa property, and the [Sisters] agree to reasonably assist in that regard at no cost to the [Sisters], provided that the following conditions are met:

This section then included several prerequisites to any attempts to expand

the Villa's sewage capacity:

a. The engineering plans for the modification of the
facility to address the Expansion shall be prepared by
New Jersey licensed professionals in accordance with
applicable state regulations and statutes and shall be
reviewed and approved by [the Sisters], such approval
not to be unreasonably withheld, conditioned, or
delayed. [The Villa] will provide certified copies of the
as-built plan, upon completion of the work. All work
and added equipment will be warranted by [the Villa]
for one year;

1
We note that Morris was originally listed as a party to this agreement but did
not execute it.

A-3175-23
8
b. [The Villa] shall obtain all required governmental
and regulatory approvals for the modification of [the
Sisters'] System as well as approvals for the
conveyance of additional sanitary sewer flow through
[Morris'] system and into the ultimate treatment facility
including, but not limited to approval from [Morris],
with copies of same provided to [the Sisters]. The
parties expressly acknowledge that [the Sisters] cannot
approve the treatment of additional sewer flow [from
the Villa] by the [Morris] sewer treatment plant, the
allocation of capacity for same, or the right to convey
additional flow within the [Morris]
owned sewer system and that any agreement by [the
Sisters] as to an Expansion is exclusive of such
additional authority or approvals that must be obtained
by [the Villa].

c. [The Villa] shall cause the modification of the
sanitary sewer system to be completed in a proper,
workman like manner so as to minimize disruption to
any and all users of [the Sisters'] system and on
reasonable advance notice to all parties; and

d. [The Villa] shall be responsible for the payment of
all costs of the design, planning, approval, and
construction of all improvements to affect the
modification of this system for the Expansion.

As relevant here, the Sanitary Sewer Agreement further provided:

1. The parties hereto shall have equal rights and responsibilities regarding any unused by reserved sewer capacity associated with the pump station and, as indicated above, shall share in the cost of maintaining same based on a percentage of sewer flow.

The Current Property Sale and This Litigation

A-3175-23
9
After owning the property since 2016, the Villa entered a contract to sell

its interests to FPP in 2022, and the sale occurred in 2023. As noted, the Sisters

plan to sell approximately twenty-two acres of their property located in both

Morris and Florham Park for residential development, consistent with

New Jersey's affordable housing laws. The Sisters intend to increase the

capacity of the pump station from 95,000 gallons per day to 142,550 gallons per

day to accommodate the additional flow from the new development.

In conjunction with the sale of the twenty-two acres, the Sisters, Morris,

and Florham Park reached a tentative agreement whereby Morris would accept

the sewage flow for treatment and Florham Park would operate the pump station

and force main. FPP objected to these changes citing the 2016 documents and

sought approximately 30,000 gallons per day of sewage capacity in the hope of

expanding its facility. FPP alleged that the pump station had a then-existing

excess capacity of 31,500 gallons per day and that they were entitled to half that

amount, or 15,570 gallons per day in addition to its then existing need, pursuant

to Paragraph 28 of the Sanitary Sewer Agreement.

The Sisters commissioned a report by Robert Gill from Menlo

Engineering Associates, which indicated that the FPP property, as then-existing,

required 8,100 gallons of sewer capacity per day. The report further provided

A-3175-23
10
that, even if FPP expanded to its full potential under its then-existing license,

the "maximum bed count would be 126 [a]ssisted [l]iving beds," requiring a flow

rate of 12,600 gallons per day. Morris agreed to continue to provide sewer

service sufficient to serve the existing operation at FPP as it has done in the past.

The Settlement Agreement

A settlement agreement was executed by the Sisters, Morris, Florham

Park, and the Golf Club on April 25, 2024, which provided that Morris would

accept the sewage produced by the new development, together with the sewage

flows "currently connected" to the pump station. It further provided that

Florham Park would accept ownership and operation of the pump station and

force main after upgrades made by the Sisters. The settlement agreement

expressly provided that FPP "shall maintain whatever rights it may have,

pursuant to contract or otherwise . . . ."

Specifically, the settlement agreement stated that the "95,000 gallons per

day . . . set forth in Paragraph 10 of the 1981 Agreement shall be increased to

an average daily flow of 142,550 GPD . . . ." The 142,550 gallons per day are

allocated as follows: 123,950 gallons per day for the Sisters' property, including

the new development; 8,100 gallons per day for FPP's property; and 10,500

gallons per day for the Golf Club property.

A-3175-23
11
The Sisters, Morris, and Florham Park moved for summary judgment and

sought dismissal of all claims raised by the Villa and FPP. In its oral opinion,

the court concluded that any claims against Morris and Florham Park were not

ripe for adjudication, and any decision by the court would accordingly constitute

an improper advisory opinion. The court determined that Morris and Florham

Park had "done nothing wrong" and would continue to provide sewer service to

FPP's facility as required. The court concluded that "[n]othing has happened

which takes away from FPP anything that it [is] entitled to contractually." The

court noted FPP's counsel "acknowledge[d] . . . there [is] no showing [FPP]

made an application . . . consistent with the provisions of [Paragraph 22] to

[show] they [have] been denied anything."

With respect to Paragraph 28 of the 2016 Sanitary Sewer Agreement, the

court further found that any claim regarding a breach of that provision was

"premature . . . [and] [t]he plaintiff's rights have to be violated and capacity not

given . . . before it [is] ripe for adjudication." Accordingly, the court entered

the October 13, 2023 orders which granted summary judgment in favor of

Florham Park, the Sisters, and Morris, and dismissed all of FPP's claims.

Thereafter, pursuant to the April 25, 2024 settlement agreement, the court

entered the May 2024 consent order and the matter was dismissed.

A-3175-23
12
This appeal followed in which FPP argues the court erred by (1) granting

summary judgment and dismissing the counterclaims against the Sisters; (2)

dismissing its tortious interference crossclaims against Morris and Florham

Park; and (3) entering the consent order. We are not persuaded by any of FPP's

arguments. We find no error in the court's dismissal of FPP's counterclaims and

entering summary judgment in favor of the Sisters because FPP's claims were

not ripe for adjudication. We also find no error in the court's dismissal of FPP's

crossclaims for tortious interference against Morris and Florham Park because

at the time the court granted summary judgment, there had been no action by

Morris or Florham Park remotely adverse to FPP's position. We similarly find

the court did not err in entering the consent order without FPP's involvement as

FPP had been dismissed from this litigation at the time of the May 2024 consent

order.

II.

An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, using

the same standard that governed the trial court's decision. Samolyk v. Berthe,

251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). Summary judgment will be granted when "the competent

evidential materials submitted by the parties," viewed in the light most favorable

to the non-moving party, show that there are no "'genuine issues of material fact

A-3175-23
13
and . . . the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. '"

Grande v. Saint Clare's Health Sys., 230 N.J. 1, 23-24 (2017) (quoting Bhagat

v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014)); accord R. 4:46-2(c).

A.

We first address FPP's contentions that the court erred in dismissing on

summary judgment its counterclaims against the Sisters. FPP argues the court

failed to recognize that the Sisters breached the 2016 Sanitary Sewer Agreement

due to the Sisters' increase of their allowable sewer flow and total capacity of

the system.

In our jurisprudence, "it is well settled that we [do] not render advisory

opinions or function in the abstract." Indep. Realty Co. v. Twp. of North Bergen,

376 N.J. Super. 295, 301 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Crescent Park Tenants Ass'n

v. Realty Equities Corp., 58 N.J. 98, 107 (1971)). Rather, litigation is restricted

"to those situations where the litigant's concern with the subject matter

evidenced a sufficient stake and real adverseness." Ibid. (internal citation and

quotation marks omitted). The ripeness doctrine prevents "premature

adjudication" or "entangl[ement] . . . in abstract disagreements." House of Fire

Christian Church v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Clifton, 379 N.J. Super.

526, 547 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm'n,

A-3175-23
14
402 F.3d 342, 347 (2d Cir. 2005)). Claims are ripe for adjudication "only when

there is an actual controversy, meaning that the facts present 'concrete contested

issues conclusively affecting' the parties' adverse interests." Matter of Firemen's

Ass'n Oblig., 230 N.J. 258, 275 (2017) (citing N.J. Turnpike Auth. v. Parsons, 3

N.J. 235, 241 (1949)).

Further, to prevail on a claim of breach of contract:

[o]ur law imposes on a plaintiff the burden to prove
four elements: first, that "the parties entered into a
contract containing certain terms"; second, that
"plaintiffs did what the contract required them to do";
third, that "defendants did not do what the contract
required them to do," defined as a "breach of the
contract"; and fourth, that "defendants’ breach, or
failure to do what the contract required, caused a loss
to the plaintiffs."

[Goldfarb v. Solimine, 245 N.J. 326, 338 (2021)
(quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 482
(2016)).]

There was no breach of Paragraph 28 of the Sanitary Sewer Agreement at

the time the court granted summary judgment. Even if we were to interpret the

language "equal rights and responsibilities regarding any unused by reserved

sewer capacity" to mean, as FPP argues, that is was entitled to half the unused

sewer capacity, FPP has not yet been denied such capacity at the time of the

order, or at present based on the record before us. Indeed, the record is devoid

A-3175-23
15
of evidence reflecting a justiciable controversy on the issue. FPP has not been

denied any capacity in response to any request tied to a concrete development

plan. We accordingly are convinced the court properly granted summary

judgment as FPP's claims are ultimately not ripe for adjudication as its interest

has not been adversely impacted pursuant to the Sanitary Sewer Agreement or

otherwise. See Indep. Realty Co., 376 N.J. Super. at 301; see also Matter of

Firemen's Ass'n Oblig., 230 N.J. at 275.

Stated differently, no breach with respect to FPP's right to seek expansion

was present at the time of the order because FPP had not yet sought to exercise

its right to expand under Paragraph 22. The evidence on summary judgment

indicated that FPP provided no engineering plans and did not submit any

governmental and regulatory applications as mandated under Paragraph 22. In

fact, counsel for FPP admitted at the motion hearing that "some of this may be

premature . . . until [the Sisters] take action that adversely impacts the rights of

. . . FPP", and that FPP's damages were "unknown." FPP of course remains free

to expand consistent with the Sanitary Sewer Agreement and all justiciable

disputes can be addressed by the parties, and the court if necessary, when and if

they arise.

A-3175-23
16
For similar reasons, we are satisfied the court properly granted summary

judgment with respect to FPP's counterclaims for restitution, indemnity,

contribution, and apportionment against the Sisters because FPP incurred no

losses.

We also reject FPP's argument that summary judgment was inappropriate

because the settlement agreement breached the Sanitary Sewer Agreement by

purportedly giving all excess sewer capacity to plaintiff. First, we note that the

settlement agreement arose only after summary judgment was granted and

second, as noted, FPP retains its rights in law to claim any additional sewer

capacity that it is purportedly owed pursuant to the Sanitary Sewer Agreement.

If FPP requests additional capacity and is improperly denied contrary to the

relevant agreements, at that time the issue can be properly addressed by the court

where a factual background and a concrete, as opposed to a hypothetical, dispute

can be resolved.

Finally, we reject FPP's contention that the court erred in finding sections

a. through d. of Paragraph 22 were conditions precedent to its right to seek

expansion. The court never expressly made this finding and instead merely

found that FPP had taken no action whatsoever to seek any expansion of its

sewer use, a fact that remains undisputed.

A-3175-23
17
B.

Next, we address FPP's argument the court erred in dismissing its

crossclaims for tortious interference against Morris and Florham Park. FPP

asserts that Morris and Florham Park "intentionally interfered with [FPP's]

known rights" by negotiating with the Sisters to resolve this matter. We reject

FPP's claims of error.

"The tort of interference with a business relation or contract contains four

elements: (1) a protected interest; (2) malice—that is, defendant's intentional

interference without justification; (3) a reasonable likelihood that the

interference caused the loss of the prospective gain; and (4) resulting damages."

DiMaria Const., Inc. v. Interarch, 351 N.J. Super. 558, 567 (App. Div. 2001),

aff'd o.b., 172 N.J. 182 (2002). Here, the court properly found that the claim for

tortious interference was not yet ripe. At the time the court entered the order

granting summary judgment, there had been no action by Morris or Florham

Park which was even remotely adverse to FPP's position. Indeed, Morris and

Florham Park continued to provide sewer service to FPP's property consistent

with their municipal obligations and were willing to consider requests for

expanded service. Based on the motion record, the municipalities negotiated in

good faith with the Sisters and the Villa, but did not reach any final agreement

A-3175-23
18
affecting the Villa or FPP. Thus, FPP suffered no damages to establish a claim

for tortious interference, a point counsel for FPP apparently conceded at oral

argument when he stated "until [Morris and Florham Park] enter into a formal

settlement agreement . . . which impacts the existing rights of FPP, there may

not be any [tortious] interference." We are satisfied the court appropriately

found any claims for tortious interference to be not yet ripe.

C.

Finally, we turn to FPP's contention that the court erred in entering the

consent order without its involvement because, even after its claims were

dismissed on summary judgment, it remained a party with a right to participate

in that process. FPP further argues it remained a party after the dismissal of its

claims on summary judgment because the Villa was named as an interested party

defendant in the Sisters' amended complaint.

As noted, the Sisters named the Villa in their amended complaint "as

interested party defendants herein so that they will have an opportunity to

provide this [c]ourt with input as to the requested relief, and so that they will be

bound by the [o]rders to be entered in this matter" and FPP was substituted into

A-3175-23
19
that role. The Villa's counterclaims, and thus FPP's claims, were dismissed on

summary judgment, but these orders did not expressly dismiss FPP from this

litigation. A subsequent order did, however, state that FPP had been dismissed

from this matter. The consent order and settlement agreement were

subsequently entered without FPP's involvement. 2

Rule 4:42-1(b) provides, in relevant part:

. . . no judgment or order shall be signed by the court
unless the form thereof has been settled on motion on
notice to all parties affected thereby who are not in
default for failure to appear, or unless the written
approval of such attorneys or parties to the form thereof
is endorsed thereon.

"'Our review of the meaning or scope of a court rule is de novo; we do not

defer to the interpretations of the trial court . . . unless we are persuaded by [its]

reasoning.'" In re Protest of Contract for Retail Pharmacy Design, 257 N.J. 425,

436 (2024) (quoting State v. Tier, 228 N.J. 555, 561 (2017)). Appellate courts

must consider a Rule's plain language "'and 'ascribe to the [words of the rule]

their ordinary meaning and significance . . . and read them in context with related

2
We note that while FPP asserts it did not receive advance notice of the consent
order, the Sisters contend that FPP received such notice via eCourts and FPP did
not object.
A-3175-23
20
provisions so as to give sense to the [court rules] as a whole.'" DiFiore v. Pezic,

254 N.J. 212, 228 (2023) (quoting Wiese v. Dedhia, 188 N.J. 587, 592 (2006)).

Here, FPP had been dismissed from this litigation at the time of the May

2024 consent order such that notice was not required. As we discussed above,

by that time, all of FPP's affirmative claims had been properly dismissed on

summary judgment. While those orders did not expressly dismiss FPP from the

litigation, the court's handwritten note on the November 17, 2023 order stated

that FPP "ha[d] been dismissed from [this] matter."

To the extent FPP may have remained a party despite this language, such

status was based only upon the Sisters' amended complaint, which provided that

the Villa, and thus FPP, "will have an opportunity to provide this [c]ourt with

input as to the requested relief, and so that they will be bound by the [o]rders to

be entered in this matter."

Even if we regard FPP as a party at the time of the consent order, the court

nonetheless properly entered the order even without notice to FPP because,

consistent with Rule 4:42-1(b), FPP was not "affected thereby." The order and

accompanying settlement agreement did not diminish FPP's then-afforded

sewage allocation or its right to expand. Significantly, the settlement agreement

A-3175-23
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provided that FPP "shall maintain whatever rights it may have, pursuant to

contract or otherwise . . . ."

To the extent FPP argues it had contractual rights affected by the consent

order and settlement agreement because Paragraph 28 purported to grant it half

of the excess sewer capacity, we reject this claim based on the current record

and particularly considering the lack of a justiciable controversy upon which the

issue can be properly addressed. Matters that are dismissed based upon ripeness,

as the claims here, can be refiled at the appropriate time as they become

justiciable based upon a showing of real harm. See Matter of Firemen's Ass'n

Oblig., 230 N.J. at 275 (providing that an actual controversy exists when the

facts conclusively present issues affecting the parties' adverse interests).

Accordingly, for the reasons provided, we find no error in the court's dismissal

of FPP's counterclaims and crossclaims or in entering summary judgment and

the consent order.

Affirmed.

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