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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Maurice Cline v. City of Paterson

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-1428-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (29)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (88.9K)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1428-24

MAURICE CLINE,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

CITY OF PATERSON
and TIMOTHY MUNGO,

Defendants-Respondents.

---

Argued March 2, 2026 – Decided March 25, 2026

Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1475-22.

Fredrick L. Rubenstein argued the cause for appellant
(Shah & Rubenstein, LLC, attorneys; Fredrick L.
Rubenstein, on the briefs).

Christopher K. Harriott argued the cause for
respondents (Florio Kenny Raval LLP, attorneys;
Christopher K. Harriott, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Maurice Cline appeals from a December 10, 2024 order granting

summary judgment in favor of the City of Paterson (the City) and Timothy

Mungo (Mungo) (collectively defendants). Cline's complaint alleged hostile

work environment and retaliation claims against defendants pursuant to the New

Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, and the

Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm.

I.

We begin by reviewing the facts in the summary judgment record, viewed

in the light most favorable to Cline as the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

Cline began working for the City in 2020 as a building maintenance and

repair worker in the facilities department. From the outset, Cline was supervised

by and reported to both Louis Guzman, Director of Facilities and senior

supervisor, and Mungo, a junior supervisor. During this period, Cline claimed

to have overheard an offensive statement made by Guzman about Jamaicans.

Cline, however, did not file a complaint regarding Guzman's comment, but was

subsequently interviewed about the incident by the City's Law Department in

connection with another employee's complaint concerning the same remark.

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Several months later, on February 8, 2021, Cline was injured at work

while moving a filing cabinet under Mungo's supervision. Cline was out of work

for approximately six months, during which time he filed a workers'

compensation claim. Cline returned to work in August 2021 with restrictions

against heavy lifting. Despite these restrictions, Cline claims Mungo asked him

to lift heavy objects. Cline complained to the City and sought a transfer to a

less physically demanding position, which he claims prompted Guzman and

William Rodriguez, the Director of Public Works, to give him a "hard time."

According to Cline, approximately two months later, Mungo directed him

to pick up paint and a large bucket of spackle. Cline carried the paint but left

the spackle and immediately complained of sharp back pain. The next day, Cline

received a write-up for incompetency and insubordination, and was informed

that he would need a fitness for duty exam if he refused to perform his duties.

Despite this write-up, however, Cline was never formally disciplined.

In another incident, at "some point in 'late 2021,'" Cline was present when

Juan Hernandez, a co-worker, "came driving real fast through the park," nearly

striking Cline and another co-worker. When asked about the reason for his

reckless driving, Hernandez allegedly responded, "he [drove] like that so he

A-1428-24
3
could kill Jamaicans." At the time, Cline did not formally complain about

Hernandez's statement.

On November 3, 2021, Cline filed a workplace harassment complaint

against Mungo, asserting he was unfairly asked to lift heavy objects following

his return from workers' compensation leave despite his medical restrictions.

The following month, Cline filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Mungo

wore a body camera and recorded him while he performed his duties, and that

Mungo interrupted his assignments even when Cline was not under his direct

supervision, causing him emotional distress. The City commenced a workplace

investigation and interviewed Cline and several other employees.

The investigator issued her finding on April 25, 2022, concluding that

Cline "was disciplined because he failed to complete his work assignments, not

because of his membership [in] a protected class" based on any characteristic in

the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual or the LAD. The

investigator further concluded no harassment occurred. Cline was subsequently

transferred to another position within the facilities department where he was no

longer supervised by Mungo.

In June 2022, Cline filed a three-count discrimination complaint in the

Law Division, alleging violations of the LAD and CEPA. A period of discovery

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ensued wherein Cline was deposed. Regarding the incident involving Guzman,

Cline stated:

I can't tell you what initiated the conversation because
I really wasn't paying attention to it initially. . . . [O]nce
he made the comment, I turned around and was like,
you know, you got three Jamaicans standing in front of
you. And he went further on about saying how he didn't
like both Jamaicans and Dominicans. And my remark
was, but you're Dominican, and he went to go explain,
and I kind of walked off because I was – you know, I
just didn't want to hear it anymore.

Guzman's comments were allegedly made in Cline's presence, although

they were not directed at him. Two other employees were also in the vicinity at

the time and one of them filed a complaint against Guzman and named Cline as

a witness. The record does not contain any additional deposition testimony from

any other party or witness related to this incident.

On August 30, 2024, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing

Cline could not establish a disability-based hostile work environment claim, the

alleged remarks were neither severe nor pervasive, and that Cline suffered no

adverse employment action or retaliation.

On December 10, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favor

of defendants, dismissing Cline's complaint with prejudice. The motion judge

concluded that there was "[in]sufficient evidence at this stage to support an

A-1428-24
5
adverse employment action," and, thus, Cline failed to meet the prerequisites for

either of his LAD or CEPA claims. The court reasoned that Cline was never

formally disciplined and "a worker[s'] compensation claim in and of itself is not

a protected characteristic" for purposes of raising a claim under LAD. The court

found that the two alleged anti-Jamaican remarks made by different individuals

roughly a year apart were, at most, "offensive, perhaps rude," but not severe and

pervasive, particularly where no adverse employment action resulted. This

appeal followed.

II.

We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment to

defendants. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (citing

Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015)). In considering a summary

judgment motion, "both trial and appellate courts must view the facts in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party." Bauer v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601, 604

n.1 (2009). That standard compels the grant of summary judgment "if the

pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or

order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).

A-1428-24
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In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "the motion

judge must 'consider whether the competent evidential materials presented,

when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient

to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of

the non-moving party.'" Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019)

(citing Brill, 142 N.J. at 540). However, this court owes "no deference to the

motion judge's conclusions on issues of law." Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J.

Super. 123, 138 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Our review of an order

granting summary judgment requires consideration of "the competent evidential

materials submitted by the parties to identify whether there are genuine issues

of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary

judgment as a matter of law." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).

A.

We first address Cline's argument that the court erred in granting summary

judgment on his hostile work environment claim brought under the LAD.

To establish a cause of action for a hostile work environment under the

LAD, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that the

complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for the employee's

A-1428-24
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protected status, and was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3)

reasonable person believe that (4) the conditions of employment have been

altered and that the working environment is hostile or abusive." Shepherd v.

Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 24 (2002) (citing Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,

132 N.J. 587, 603-04 (1993)). The principal inquiry in determining severe or

pervasive conduct is whether a reasonable person would believe the conditions

of his or her employment are altered and the working environment is hostile.

Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 24; Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 604.

The LAD is not intended to be a general workplace civility code. The

reasonable person standard views the conduct objectively and does not allow

"claims based on the idiosyncratic response of a hypersensitive plaintiff to

conduct that is not objectively harassing." Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 613. "[T]he

required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies

inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct." Id. at 607

(alteration in original) (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir.

1991)). The burden of proving discrimination "remains with the employee at all

times." Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 450 (2005).

Cline alleges that the remarks made by Mungo and Hernandez

demonstrate animosity based on Jamaican ethnicity and support a hostile work

A-1428-24
8
environment claim. Specifically, he contends that his supervisor Guzman's

comment about "not liking Jamaicans," Hernandez's statement that he "drives

like that so he could kill Jamaicans," and the City's handling of his workplace

restrictions and assignments, taken together, create an objectively hostile work

environment. We are unpersuaded.

We note that Cline's claim is predicated on two isolated comments made

over the course of more than a year apart from each other by different

individuals, only one of whom—Guzman—was Cline's supervisor. As the court

acknowledges, these comments may be "offensive, perhaps rude," but they are

not otherwise indicative of a pattern of harassment or hostile conduct in the

workplace. Although made in his presence, neither comment was directed at

Cline. Moreover, the remarks did not materially alter the terms or conditions of

Cline's employment or his working environment. Mere offhanded comments

and isolated incidents are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment

claim, unless it becomes "so severe as to pollute the work environment,

rendering it irretrievably hostile." Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419, 432 (2008)

(citing Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 495, 499, 502 (1998)). These remarks,

though inappropriate in the workplace, do not satisfy the LAD standard, which

requires "an outrageous and offensive statement made by a supervisor directly

A-1428-24
9
to the complaining subordinate." El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's University Hosp., 382

N.J. Super. 145, 179 (App. Div. 2005).

Further, to the extent Cline contends that being required to lift heavy items

contributed to a hostile work environment, the City's investigation concluded he

was disciplined for failing to complete work assignments, not for his

membership in a protected class. Protected activity, when based on a complaint,

must concern discrimination. Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters,

437 N.J. Super. 366, 377 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Reyes v. McDonald Pontiac-

GMC Truck, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 614, 619 (D.N.J. 1998)) (finding complaints

stemming from "outbursts and name-calling" not sexual in nature not to suffice).

We further conclude requesting plaintiff to perform tasks required by his job

were insufficient to create genuine factual issues that the alleged conduct was

"severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable person believe that the

conditions of employment have been altered and that the working environment

is hostile or abusive." Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 24.

Accordingly, the record does not support Cline's contention that the City's

handling of his work assignments was motivated by discriminatory animus or

contributed to an objectively hostile work environment within the meaning of

the LAD.

A-1428-24
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B.

Similarly, Cline claims he was subjected to retaliation under the LAD and

CEPA after engaging in protected activity. The prima facie elements of a

retaliation claim require Cline to demonstrate that: (1) he was in a protected

class; (2) he engaged in protected activity known to the employer; (3) he was

thereafter subjected to an adverse employment consequence; and (4) that there

is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment

consequence. Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010) (citing Woods-Pirozzi

v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996)).

As the motion judge found, Cline's initial complaint only raised a workers'

compensation claim for the injuries he sustained and did not raise any other basis

for Mungo's actions. Cline points to Mungo's issuance of a disciplinary write-

up as an adverse employment action. Even considering the alleged adverse

employment action in the aggregate, this conduct did not result in any change to

Cline's compensation, rank, or employment status. Cline further fails to show a

causal connection between the alleged adverse employment action and protected

activity as required under the fourth prong of the LAD. He does not identify

any adverse employment action tied to his alleged protected activity, as he

remained employed by the City and was never subjected to formal discipline or

A-1428-24
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any material change in the terms or conditions of his employment. Thus, even

when viewing the evidence most favorable to Cline, no rational jury could find

that he established a prima facie case for retaliation under the LAD.

Cline's CEPA claim fails for the same reason: he cannot establish an

adverse employment action, protected whistleblower activity, or a causal

connection between his November 2021 complaint and any alleged retaliatory

conduct.

Under the CEPA, Cline must show:

1. That [he] reasonably believes that [his] employer's
   conduct was violating either a law, or regulation
   promulgated pursuant to law;

2. [T]hat [he] performed a 'whistle-blowing' activity
   described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a);

3. [T]hat an adverse employment action was taken
   against [him]; and

4. [T]hat a causal connection exists between the
   whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment
   action.

[Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003) (citing
Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 476 (App. Div.
1999)).]

Cline asserts that his complaints and cooperation in his co-worker's

discrimination investigation constituted "whistle-blowing" activity protected

A-1428-24
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under CEPA. In pertinent part, CEPA defines whistle-blowing activity as

"[d]isclos[ing], or threaten[ing] to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body

an activity, policy or practice of the employer . . . that the employee reasonably

believes" violates the law, a rule, or a regulation, or is "fraudulent or criminal"

in nature. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1) to (2). Even if Cline established that his

internal harassment complaints about Guzman and Mungo and his participation

as a witness constitutes protected whistleblowing activity, he fails to satisfy the

remaining CEPA factors.

Retaliatory conduct under CEPA refers to "the discharge, suspension or

demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an

employee in the terms and conditions of employment." N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e).

Our court requires such actions either impact on the employee's "compensation

or rank" or be "virtually equivalent to discharge" in order to give rise to the level

of a retaliatory action required for a CEPA claim. Klein v. Univ. of Med. and

Dentistry of N.J., 377 N.J. Super. 28, 46 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Hancock v.

Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 360 (App. Div. 2002)).

Again, Cline does not point to any suspension, demotion, termination,

reduction in pay, or other material alteration of employment following his

alleged whistleblower activity. Additionally, after his October 2021 write-up,

A-1428-24
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Cline received no formal discipline, and the City took remedial action by

transferring him, at his request, to a different supervisor in a position that did

not require heavy lifting. We are satisfied neither the reassignment nor the

friction or "hard time" Cline encountered with management constitutes an

adverse employment action under CEPA. See Hancock, 347 N.J. Super. at 360

("Not every employment action that makes an employee unhappy constitutes an

actionable adverse action under CEPA").

Because Cline cannot show an adverse employment action, he likewise

cannot establish a causal connection to any alleged whistleblowing activity. The

record is devoid of any evidence connecting Cline's supervisors' actions to

retaliatory animus in response to the alleged protected activity. Temporal

proximity alone, unsupported by evidence of a material employment detriment

or circumstances permitting a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive, is

insufficient to establish causation. See Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J.

221, 237 (2006); Dickson v. Community Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522,

533 (App. Div. 2019).

C.

Cline next argues that Mungo should be individually liable under the

LAD's "aiding and abetting" provision, asserting that as a supervisor, he was

A-1428-24
14
involved in some "affirmative acts of discrimination." Cline further contends

that Mungo may be liable for aiding and abetting "because Mungo had

supervisory authority over [him] and Guzman directly engaged in acts [that]

discriminated against and harassed [him] on the basis of his race."

The LAD makes it "unlawful '[f]or any person, whether an employer or an

employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the

acts forbidden [under the LAD],' N.J.S.A. 10:5-12[(e)], and such conduct may

result in personal liability." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70,

83 (2004).

To establish a prima facie case for aiding and abetting under the LAD, a

plaintiff must prove:

(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a
wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant
must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall
illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides
the assistance; and the defendant must knowingly
and substantially assist the principal violation.

[Id. at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting Hurley v. Atl.
City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)).]

Individual aiding and abetting liability is limited only to supervisors. See,

e.g., Herman v. Coastal Corp., 348 N.J. Super. 1, 28 (App. Div. 2002). However,

supervisory status alone is insufficient to establish liability. Here, Cline

A-1428-24
15
attempts to tie Mungo's liability to Guzman's alleged discriminatory remarks

about Jamaicans. The record, however, does not support the contention that

Mungo "aided and abetted" any such conduct undertaken by Guzman. To hold

a supervisor liable for aiding and abetting, there must be "active and purposeful

conduct." See Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff's Office, 194 N.J. 563, 594

(2008); see also Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 198 N.J. 557, 576 (2009).

The record before us, however, is devoid of any evidence that Mungo engaged

in active and purposeful conduct or knowingly and substantially assisted another

in violating the LAD. Thus, Cline fails to establish any underlying violation of

the LAD by defendants. See Tarr, 181 N.J. at 84 (requiring proof that "the party

whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury ").

Moreover, even if Cline could establish a viable LAD claim against

defendants, the discrete acts he identifies do not show that Mungo knowingly

participated in or substantially assisted any unlawful discrimination. At best,

Cline seeks to impose individual liability based on Mungo's supervisory status,

which does not satisfy the requirements for aiding and abetting liability under

N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e). See Cicchetti, 194 N.J. at 594-95.

Accordingly, we conclude the motion judge properly granted summary

judgment because Cline failed to establish the elements of his LAD and CEPA

A-1428-24
16
claims and presented no genuine issue of material fact in opposition to the

motion. See Branch, 244 N.J. at 582; Green, 237 N.J. at 529.

To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

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