Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Sheerer v. Panas

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: A171804

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.1K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 3/19/26
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ANNA SHEERER,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A171804
v.
THOMAS PANAS, (San Mateo County
Defendant and Respondent; Super. Ct. No. 19FAM02588A)

CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CHILD SUPPORT SERVICES,
Intervener and Respondent.

Appellant Anna Sheerer appeals a trial court order modifying the child
support payments owed by her ex-husband, respondent Thomas Panas. She
contends that the court failed to account for Panas’s bonus income in
determining child support. Relatedly, Sheerer argues the court violated her
due process rights by failing to hold an adequate hearing on her request to
account for Panas’s bonus income. Intervener California Department of
Child Support Services agrees with the former argument and does not take a

• Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts I, II.A, and III.
position on the latter. 1 In the unpublished portion of this opinion, we hold
the court erred on the merits and reverse the order.
Unfortunately, we must address another issue, which we do in the
published portion of this opinion. As an in propria persona litigant, Panas
submitted a respondent’s brief that attributes quotes to published cases in
which no such quote appears and to cases that do not exist, and Panas’s
nonmanufactured authorities do not discuss the topics for which they are
cited. His brief also does not conform to the California Rules of Court
(hereinafter Rules) regarding its contents, formatting, and directive to
provide support for factual assertions with citations to the record. (See Rule
8.204.) In a declaration submitted to this court, Panas explained the
fabrications were due to his use of a generative artificial intelligence (AI) tool
to write the brief.
Division Three of the Second District Court of Appeal recently
published an opinion “warning” that “no brief, pleading, motion, or any other
paper filed in any court should contain any citations—whether provided by
generative AI or any other source—that the attorney responsible for
submitting the pleading has not personally read and verified.” (Noland v.
Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 431 (Noland).) The court
emphasized that any attorney who fails to heed the warning faces sanctions
and potential discipline. (Id. at p. 445.) We partially publish this opinion to
extend that warning to in propria persona litigants.

1 The California Department of Child Support Services submitted its

brief on behalf of the public interest in accordance with a transfer of interest
from the San Mateo County Department of Child Support Services (the
DCSS).

2
I. BACKGROUND
Sheerer and Panas were a married couple that began dissolution
proceedings in 2019. The couple have two children from their marriage and
have joint physical custody of them on a 50/50 time share.
In 2020 and 2021, the trial court issued several child support orders
following hearings on the matter. Initially, in September 2020, the court
ordered Panas to pay child support of varying monthly amounts, which were
calculated as a function of the parties’ relative incomes each month. In
November 2020, the court entered a new order with additional findings
regarding Panas’s fluctuating income, and the court included a Smith-Ostler
provision, 2 ordering “additional income received by either party in excess of
the base income used in the initial support order” to be included in
calculating additional child support. In December 2021, the court entered
another new order, detailing the Smith-Ostler provision’s mechanics,
calculating retroactive payments, and reaffirming that the Smith-Ostler
provision would be prospectively “calculated on a monthly basis.”
In June 2023, Sheerer moved to modify the existing child support order
due to a change in both parties’ incomes and her employment status. At a
hearing in November 2023, the court stated that it would adopt the DCSS’s
guideline calculation that Panas pay $2,388 in monthly child support to
Sheerer, retroactive to July 1, 2023. Because of the retroactive nature of the
order, the court found Panas in arrears and ordered him to make monthly
payments until the balance was paid. DCSS raised the point that “there are
going to be other arrears in this case relating to a Smith Ostler calculation,”

2 A child support order that requires a percentage of bonus income to be

paid as additional child support is commonly referred to as a “Smith-Ostler
provision” because it is derived from In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith (1990)
223 Cal.App.3d 33, 41–42 (Smith-Ostler).)

3
and the court clarified that the arrears payments were only “towards the
order for child support that the Court just made today.”
The trial court’s subsequent written order filed November 15, 2023 was
substantively identical to what the court had stated at the hearing and
consequently lacked a Smith-Ostler provision. The accompanying DCSS
calculation did not include Panas’s bonus income, nor did it reference any
income from Panas’s restricted stock units (RSUs). Rather, it listed Panas’s
“Monthly Taxable & Non-Taxable Gross Income” as $19,640, which matched
the most recent monthly wage that Panas declared on his October 2023
income and expenses (I&E) declaration. Thus, the DCSS’s guideline
calculation excluded the $4,500 average monthly commission or bonus income
that Panas declared on his October 2023 I&E declaration.
The trial court held hearings in February 2024 and May 2024, each of
which focused on factual disputes regarding both parties’ financial
limitations and Sheerer’s difficulties in finding employment. The February
2024 hearing resulted in a formal seek work order directed at Sheerer, and
the court retained retroactive jurisdiction on child support and Panas’s
payment of arrears. At the May 2024 hearing, it was brought to the trial
court’s attention that the November 2023 order “did not include a Smith
Ostler provision” despite there being one “in the prior order.” After hearing
the parties’ arguments, the court found Sheerer in compliance with the seek
work order, reduced Panas’s monthly payments on arrears, and otherwise left
the November 2023 order in place, reserving jurisdiction “with regard to the
request for the Smith Ostler [provision].”
In the meantime, Panas filed an updated I&E declaration in March
2024 which listed his average monthly gross salary as $19,640 and his
average monthly commissions or bonuses as $25,925. The March 2024 I&E

4
declaration also appended three earnings statements from mid-March, two of
which revealed that Panas was compensated with RSUs valued at $8,387.26
and $45,918.74 on March 12 and March 14, respectively, bringing his total
year-to-date RSU compensation to $121,531.41. 3 In May 2024, Panas filed a
new I&E declaration that again listed his average monthly gross salary as
$19,640 but changed his average monthly commissions or bonuses to $2,160. 4
At the next hearing in July 2024, DCSS explained to the trial court
that Sheerer was still complying with the seek work order yet she remained
unemployed, preventing the recalculation of child support. Sheerer then
relayed her difficulties finding employment and again requested a new
calculation for child support that accounted for Panas’s bonus and RSU
compensation. In response, Panas asserted that Sheerer was not complying
with the seek work order, and he sought a reduction in child support
payments and clarity on a Smith-Ostler provision. The parties traded
accusations that the other was harming the children’s interests until the
court interjected.

3 The other statement showed that Panas was paid a salary of

$9,064.99 for 80 hours for the period from March 4 to March 17, 2024,
bringing his year-to-date salary earnings to $45,389.94. While the
statements did not list any bonuses earned in that period, they all showed
that Panas had received $25,925.87 in the year to date for “AIP Payout.”
4 We observe that $2,160 is mathematically equivalent to dividing

$25,925—the amount listed on Panas’s March I&E declaration as his average
monthly bonus (and the same amount listed on his March 2024 earnings
statements as his year-to-date “AIP Payout”)—by 12 months. The May 2025
I&E declaration also appended three earning statements for pay periods in
2024 from April 1 to April 14, April 15 to April 28, and April 29 to May 12.
Those statements revealed that Panas was paid $9,307.02 for each 80 hour
period, but he had not received any more earnings categorized as RSUs or
AIP Payout.

5
The trial court stated: “[T]his is obviously a very contentious situation.
What this court’s concern is . . . the support and the amount of time Ms.
Sheerer has been unemployed. Certainly if the tables were turned, Ms.
Sheerer, you would want Mr. Panas to be employed and contributing to the
children’s lives and financially contributing. [¶] So at this time, I’m going to
deny the request for a Smith-Osler. [¶] I’m going to deny the request to cut
support in half.” The court also increased Sheerer’s obligations under the
seek work order. The court did not mention Panas’s total compensation in
either its verbal or written order. Sheerer appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Trial Court Erred By Failing to Account for Panas’s Bonus
and RSU Compensation in the Child Support Calculations
The abuse of discretion standard applies to child support awards and a
trial court’s determination to grant or deny a request to modify child support.
(In re Marriage of Hein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 529.) The abuse of
discretion standard is not a unified standard. (Ibid.) In applying it,
appellate courts will uphold the trial court’s factual determinations that are
supported by substantial evidence, assess the trial court’s legal
interpretations de novo, and consider “whether the trial court reasonably
exercised its discretionary authority—that is, whether any judge reasonably
could have made such an order.” (Ibid.)
“California has a strong public policy that favors adequate child
support.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 283,
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in In re Marriage of
Morton (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1049; see Fam. Code, §§ 4050–4076 5.)
The Legislature expressed that policy through the uniform child support

5 Further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise

specified.

6
guideline. (Cheriton, at p. 283.; see § 4053, subd. (e) [“ ‘The guideline seeks to
place the interests of children as the state’s top priority’ ”].)
Guideline child support is calculated by applying a mathematical
formula to the relative incomes of the parents, and it “is presumed to be the
correct amount of child support to be ordered.” (§§ 4055, 4057; see § 4053,
subd. (c) [“The guideline takes into account each parent’s actual income and
level of responsibility for the children”].) Section 4053 further lays out
principles the trial court must adhere to, principles which emphasize that
each parent must prioritize and provide support commensurate with their
individual ability so that his or her children share in the standard of living of
both parents across two homes with relative parity.
Section 4058 broadly defines a parent’s “annual gross income” to mean
“income from whatever source derived” (other than child support payments
and income from public assistance programs based on need). (§ 4058,
subds. (a), (c).) The statute includes “bonuses” as income in a non-exhaustive
list of examples (id., subd. (a)(1)), and compensation in the form of stock
options is also treated as income for purposes of calculating child support
once there are no legal restrictions on the parent’s ability to exercise the
option and sell the shares. (In re Marriage of Macilwaine (2018) 26
Cal.App.5th 514, 530–532.) Each parent’s annual gross income is used to
compute their annual net disposable income (§ 4059), which in turn is used to
calculate each parent’s monthly net disposable income (§ 4060), which is the
key input to the guideline’s formula for determining the amount of child
support (§ 4055). However, if a parent’s monthly income fluctuates—such as
from discretionary bonuses—the court may adjust the child support order as
appropriate. (§§ 4060, 4064.) A court may accommodate unpredictable
income through a Smith-Ostler provision, but the method a court fashions to

7
account for such income is left to the court’s discretion so long as a parent’s
support obligations include all income that the parent actually receives. (In
re Marriage of Mosley (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1387.)
Here, the trial court erred because it failed to account for Panas’s bonus
income and RSUs in calculating child support. The November 2023 order
ended the Smith-Ostler provision that had been in place, and the court did
not implement another method for requiring Panas to pay support obligations
based on income that included any bonuses or RSUs that he received. The
court did not make any findings under subdivision (b) of section 4057 that
would permit the court to deviate from the presumptively correct statewide
uniform guideline formula amount, which must include all income. Nor did
the court state in writing or on the record the information required in
subdivision (a) of section 4056 to do so. The court’s stated concern regarding
the amount of time that Sheerer has been unemployed does not allow it to
exclude Panas’s bonus or RSU income from his annual gross income for the
purposes of child support obligations. For this reason, we reverse the trial
court’s order of September 9, 2024. 6
Because we reverse the trial court’s order on the merits, we need not
reach Sheerer’s contention that the court violated due process by depriving
her of a meaningful hearing. However, we disagree with Sheerer’s
characterization that the court “refused to engage” with her requests or with
the evidence. The record reveals that the court was patient in hearing each

6 Panas’s “extensive reliance on nonexistent legal authority” in his

respondent’s brief justifies disregarding the brief in toto, which we do.
(Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) We address this issue further
post section B. We acknowledge Panas’s admission that his respondent’s
brief contains fabrications as stated in his declaration submitted to the court.
We otherwise grant Sheerer’s motion to strike the remainder of the
declaration as an improper sur-reply. (See Rule 8.200(a)(4).)

8
party’s arguments and provided ample opportunity for Sheerer to be heard.
While it took several hearings over the course of half a year for the court to
rule on Sheerer’s request to reimpose a Smith-Ostler provision after the
November 2023 order, there is no basis for Sheerer’s assertion that the court
impeded her ability to develop the facts. Instead, the record shows that the
matter was continued several times for various reasons, none of which
suggest the court disregarded procedural safeguards. 7 The court merely
made an error, which we instruct it to correct on remand.
B. Panas’s Violations of the California Rules of Court
Despite his self-representation, we hold Panas to the same standard as
an attorney. (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543;
see also Keitel v. Heubel (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 324, 334–335 [“A party, no
less than his attorney, should not be permitted to escape the consequences of
his or her abusive litigation tactics”].) Over three decades ago, our high court
explained that “[a] doctrine generally requiring or permitting exceptional
treatment of parties who represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in
the trial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties to litigation.”

7 The first hearing on Sheerer’s request to modify child support in

August 2023 was continued because the parties and DCSS had failed to meet
and confer beforehand and because DCSS had not received information
regarding Sheerer’s unemployment benefits. At the February hearing,
Sheerer noted that Panas’s compensation included a “bonus and stock
options,” but she admitted that he had not submitted an updated I&E
declaration, stating: “so we don’t know what his current salary is.” Panas
submitted updated I&E declarations prior to the next hearing in May 2024,
and therefore Sheerer had the opportunity to argue that Panas had taken a
new job with a reduced salary but received “most of his income via RSUs and
bonus.” The court then allowed Panas and Sheerer to respond to each other’s
arguments before it addressed the seek work order and Panas’s payment on
arrears, and the court reserved retroactive jurisdiction on a Smith-Ostler
provision, which it ruled on at the next hearing.

9
(Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 985.) This statement has grown
truer in an age where litigants can access AI tools that purport to do
lawyering. “In the last two [and a half] years, many courts have confronted
briefs populated with fraudulent legal citations resulting from [parties’]
reliance on generative AI.” (Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 443.)
In his respondent’s brief, Panas cited at least two cases that do not
exist: “In re Marriage of Thomson (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 568, 578” and
“Marriage of Mendlowitz (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 990.” He further fabricated
quotes that appear nowhere in the (real) cases cited. In his declaration
“clarifying facts” filed in this Court after Sheerer filed a motion to strike
respondent’s brief, Panas explained that his “error” in providing fake
quotations and citing nonexistent case law was caused by his use of an AI
tool and his failure to verify his citations. He averred that he “did not
knowingly submit false information to the Court.” His lack of knowledge, of
course, is a direct result of his failure to verify citations, a requirement of all
attorneys and self-represented litigants responsible for briefs filed in this
Court. Respondent’s conduct in this regard is a patent violation of the Rules
of Court and alone, merits striking his brief. (See Noland, supra, 114
Cal.App.5th at pp. 442–443, and cases cited.)
But aside from Panas’s purported obliviousness to the falsity of his
legal citations and quotes, he also referenced hearings in the present case
that appear nowhere in the record but we will not expend judicial resources
verifying whether the hearings or their purported contents are AI
hallucinations too. Further, Panas failed to format the brief in accordance
with Rule 8.204 by omitting a table of authorities, page numbers, and
citations to the record for each reference to the proceedings below. (See Rule
8.204(a)(1)(A), (C), (b)(7).) Many of Panas’s (unsupported) factual assertions

10
are irrelevant, not least his allegations that the court sanctioned Sheerer and
that Sheerer failed to comply with court orders. He then had the temerity to
request this court to “[r]efer this matter to the trial court for consideration of
sanctions” against Sheerer.
“Our legal system, indeed the social compact of a civilized society, is
predicated upon respect for, and adherence to, the rule of law.” (People v.
Chong (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 232, 243.) The rule of law is founded upon the
principle that courts must impartially apply the law to facts. That
foundation is threatened when litigants falsify the truth, especially when
done by using technological innovations that can spin persuasive webs of
untruths and invent legal principles or authorities.
Thus, our warning to litigants is not merely an admonition to double-
check citations and otherwise fastidiously comply with the Rules of Court; it
is to be at all times truthful and to be responsible in crafting any written
arguments presented in this Court. (See People v. Alvarez (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 1115, 1119 [“ ‘Honesty in dealing with the courts is of paramount
importance, and misleading a judge is, regardless of motives, a serious
offense’ ”].) We further caution that our redress for false and missing
citations is not limited to disregarding a brief. “We may impose monetary
sanctions pursuant to our own motion for unreasonable violations of the rules
governing appeals.” (Keitel v. Heubel, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 340;
Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 442; Rule 8.276(a)(4).) However, given
Panas’s admission of his error and considering that it would not be in the
best interest of the children at the heart of the underlying proceedings, we
choose not to do so here.

11
III. DISPOSITION
The child support order of September 9, 2024 is reversed and we
remand with instructions to the trial court to reassess Panas’s child support
obligation based on a consideration of his full income, including bonuses and
RSU compensation. Sheerer is entitled to her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

12

---

Moorman, J. *

WE CONCUR:

---

Brown, P. J.

---

Streeter, J.

Sheerer v. Panas/A171804

• Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

13
Sheerer v. Panas (A171804)

Trial Court: San Mateo County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Hon. Cristina Mazzei

Attorneys:
Covington & Burling, Breanna Katherine Jones; Family Violence
Appellate Project, Cory Delfin Hernandez, Arati Vasan, Jennafer
Dorfman Wagner for Petitioner and Appellant.

Thomas Panas, in pro. per., for Defendant and Respondent.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Cheryl Lynn Feiner,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Maureen Chinyere Onyeagbako,
Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Pablo Nicholas Rossenblum, Deputy
Attorney General for Intervenor and Respondent.

14