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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Oden CA2/5

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B341857

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/20/26 P. v. Oden CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B341857

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. NA048461)

TERRELL ODEN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Laura L. Laesecke, Judge. Dismissed.
Micah Reyner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Terrell Oden (defendant) was convicted of first
degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder more than 20
years ago. In 2006, on appeal from the judgment, this Court
reversed a sentencing enhancement and remanded for the trial
court to make specified amendments to the abstract of judgment.
Later, in 2024, defendant filed a freestanding “Motion for an
Order Awarding Additional Custody Credits” that argued the
trial court should recalculate his presentence custody credits.
The trial court denied that motion and we consider whether we
have jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from that ruling when
the trial court had no jurisdiction to decide the motion in the first
place.

I. BACKGROUND
A. Conviction and Sentencing1
Defendant was charged with three counts of murder, one
count of conspiracy to commit murder, and two counts of
attempted murder. As to all but the conspiracy count, it was
alleged the crimes were committed for the benefit of a criminal
street gang (Pen. Code, § 186.22, subd. (b)) and a principal used a
firearm in the commission of the offense (Pen. Code, § 12022.53,
subds. (b), (e)(1)).2
Following an initial mistrial where the jury was
deadlocked, the jury at defendant’s second trial found him guilty

1
We grant defendant’s request for judicial notice of this
Court’s prior opinion in People v. Oden (May 1, 2006, B180024)
[nonpub. opn.].
2
Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

2
of one count of first degree murder and of conspiracy to commit
murder; the jury also found the gang and firearm enhancements
true. (The jury did not reach a verdict on the remaining counts.)
In December 2004, the trial court sentenced defendant to
75 years to life in prison: 25 years to life on the murder count,
doubled due to a prior “strike” conviction, plus 25 years to life for
the firearm enhancement. The trial court imposed and stayed
sentences on the conspiracy count and the gang enhancement.
Defendant was awarded 1,484 days of presentence custody credit.
In April 2005, defendant resolved the remaining counts by
pleading no contest to one count of assault with a firearm. The
trial court sentenced him to an additional four years in state
prison, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed a few
months earlier. He was awarded 1,615 days of presentence
custody credit.

B. Direct Appeal and Proceedings on Remand
In May 2006, this Court “reverse[d] the section 186.22,
subdivision (b) enhancement imposed and stayed by the trial
court” and “remand[ed] the matter to the trial court to amend the
abstract of judgment to delete the section 186.22 enhancement
and to impose instead a minimum parole term of 15 years
pursuant to section 186.22, subdivision (b).” (People v. Oden,
supra, B180024.) The judgment was affirmed in all other
respects. (Ibid.)
On remand, the trial court ordered the abstract of
judgment amended at a hearing at which defendant was
represented by counsel, but not personally present. As stated in
the trial court’s minute order, “Enhancement per section 186.22
is ordered deleted and instead a minimum parole term of 15

3
years per section 186.22(b) is ordered to run consecutive [sic].”
The amended abstract of judgment relating to the murder and
conspiracy convictions reflects a 15-year “enhancement” under
section 186.22, subdivision (b)(1), however.
The trial court did not recalculate defendant’s custody
credits at this hearing. The abstract of judgment relating to the
murder and conspiracy convictions reflects the 1,484 days of
credit awarded at sentencing in December 2004, and the abstract
of judgment relating to assault with a firearm reflects the 1,615
days awarded in April 2005.

C. The Motion for Additional Custody Credits at Issue in
This Appeal
In October 2024, defendant filed a “Motion for an Order
Awarding Additional Custody Credits.” He argued the trial court
“failed to award” him “any presentence custody credits for the
time served prior to” what he characterized as his “resentencing”
on remand in 2006.
The trial court denied the motion without holding a
hearing. The court’s minute order explains: “In its affirmation of
the judgment [in 2006], the Court of Appeal did not direct the
court to amend the custody credits. This court will not do so
now.”

II. DISCUSSION
Where the trial court lacks jurisdiction to entertain a
motion, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from
the denial of that motion. (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
629, 633-634.) As we explain, that is the scenario we confront
here.

4
The general rule is that trial courts lack jurisdiction to
make non-clerical changes to a defendant’s sentence once the
conviction is final and execution of the sentence has commenced.
(See, e.g., People v. Burgess (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 375, 382; King,
supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at 634.) Defendant, however, argues the
trial court did have jurisdiction to rule on his freestanding motion
to recalculate presentence custody credits because he believes the
credits issue amounts to an unauthorized sentence. The Courts
of Appeal are divided on that question, i.e., whether a trial court
has jurisdiction to rule on a freestanding motion asserting an
unauthorized sentence after a conviction is final. (Compare
People v. Boyd (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 56, 62 [“when a case is
final, the mere fact that a sentence is unauthorized does not
confer jurisdiction on a trial court to vacate that sentence or on a
reviewing court to entertain an appeal based on a claim the
sentence was unauthorized”]; People v. Garcia (2025) 114
Cal.App.5th 139, 144-146 [same]; King, supra, at 633-634 [same]
with People v. Codinha (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 993 [“an
unauthorized sentence is a void judgment that may be vacated or
corrected whenever it is brought to the trial court’s attention,
even after execution of the invalid sentence has begun or the
judgment has become final”]; People v. Cervantes (2025) 115
Cal.App.5th 825, 829-831 [“Trial courts have the inherent
authority to correct unauthorized sentences at any time the issue
is presented to the court”].)
Some time ago, our Supreme Court issued opinions with
language that does suggest trial courts have jurisdiction to
correct an unauthorized sentence even after a conviction is final
(People v. Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 338; People v.
Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1044-1045), but the high

5
court has more recently explained the unauthorized sentence rule
does not confer jurisdiction and instead amounts to merely an
exception to the waiver doctrine (In re G.C. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 1119,
1129-1130 [“to invoke [the unauthorized sentence] rule the court
must have jurisdiction over the judgment”]). It would be better if
the law in this area were clearer, but absent greater clarity, we
believe the best course is to follow our Supreme Court’s most
recent word on the matter in In re G.C. and hold the trial court
accordingly lacked jurisdiction to entertain defendant’s motion.3
As already mentioned, that means we lack jurisdiction to decide
this appeal.
We do have discretion to treat defendant’s appeal as a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, but this appeal does not raise
“purely legal” questions warranting such treatment. (Boyd,
supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at 71-72.) Indeed, defendant
acknowledges in his opening brief that the “existing record” does
not reflect his “true arrest date,” and that means there remains a
factual question concerning the specific number of days for which
he is entitled to presentence custody credit.

3
To the extent defendant characterizes the trial court’s
failure to recalculate presentence custody credits as a clerical
error, the argument lacks merit. (Boyd, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th
at 63 [no clerical error where “[w]hat the trial court ordered was
properly recorded in judicial records”].) The abstract of judgment
does include a different clerical error, however—one that the trial
court can correct at any time. (See, e.g., People v. Jones (2012) 54
Cal.4th 1, 89.) The abstract of judgment for the murder and
conspiracy convictions still reflects imposition of a 15-year
enhancement despite this court’s earlier direction to delete the
section 186.22 enhancement and instead impose a minimum
parole eligibility period of 15 years.

6
DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

BAKER, J.

We concur:

HOFFSTADT, P. J.

MOOR, J.

7