Robertson v Wallace - Cohabitation Property Division

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  Claire Louise Robertson against Gordie Wallace (Sheriff Court Civil) [2026] SCAIR 42 (27 March 2026)

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SHERIFFDOM OF SOUTH STRATHCLYDE, DUMFRIES AND GALLOWAY AT AIRDRIE **** [2026] SC AIR 42 AIR-F7-25 JUDGMENT OF SUMMARY SHERIFF W M D MERCER in the cause CLAIRE LOUISE ROBERTSON Pursuer against GORDIE WALLACE Defender Pursuer: Thomas; Scullion Law Defender: Party AIRDRIE, 27 March 2026 The sheriff, having resumed consideration of the cause, Finds in fact 1. The pursuer and defender were cohabitants as defined by section 25 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006. 2. Cohabitation commenced in February 2015 and ended on 15 September 2023. Parties have no children. 3. The pursuer has a Reward Account with Royal Bank of Scotland. 5/13 to 5/16 inclusive of process, 5/25 to 5/27 inclusive of process and 5/29 of process are hard copy statements from that account. She also has a savings account. 2 4. The defender has an account with Starling Bank. 7/2 of process is a copy statements from that account. He also has a Classic Vantage account with Bank of Scotland. 7/3 of process is a copy statements from that account. 5. Parties have a joint account with Royal Bank of Scotland. 5/28 of process is hard copy statements from that account. The defender closed that account in August 2025. Both have separate PayPal accounts. 6. Prior to purchasing their first property parties cohabited in several rented properties. These included the pursuer's late great aunt's flat (possibly 29 Cordner Place) where the defender paid the majority of the bills and the defender contributed to the council tax; 18 Laurel Gardens, Aberdeen, AB22 8YY where rent and bills came out of the pursuer's account but the defender paid her 50% and 29 Cromwell Place where bills were split equally although the defender contributed more for shopping etc. No details of the contributions involved were led in evidence. 7. On 8 March 2019 parties purchased and moved into a four-bedroom property at 85 Whinpark Circle, Portlethen, AB12 4SS ("85 WPC"). 8. In advance of that purchase the pursuer's grandmother gifted her ?19,000. 9. The pursuer contributed that ?19,000 as a deposit for 85 WPC. 10. The defender made no contribution to the deposit for 85 WPC. 11. The balance was paid by standard security. 12. Title was taken in joint names. 13. At this stage both parties worked, and the pursuer was also a student. No details of their income were led in evidence. 14. Parties paid all mortgage, utility and running costs of 85 WPC on a 50:50 basis throughout their ownership of it. 3 15. This amounted to approximately ?650 to ?700 each per month. The mortgage payment was ?619 per month. 16. During the cohabitation in 85 WPC the pursuer's work commitments took her increasingly to the central belt. She required to pay either hotel bills or rent rooms. 17. The defender lived at 85 WPC from its purchase until April/May 2023 when it was put on the market. 18. 85 WPC was sold in December 2023. The free proceeds of sale were ?35,154.63 from which was deducted ?1,814.63 to clear the overdraft on parties' joint account leaving a total for distribution of ?33,340. The pursuer received ?19,840 and the defender ?13,500. 19. In June 2022 parties purchased a one-bed property at 55C Main Street, Chapelhall, Airdrie ("55C"). 20. The purchase price was ?65,000. 21. The pursuer's grandmother provided her with ?15,000 of which ?11,500 was used as a deposit and the balance went towards the Additional Dwelling Supplement, which she paid in full. 22. The defender contributed nothing to the deposit or Additional Dwelling Supplement. 23. The balance was paid by standard security with National Westminster Bank. 24. Title was taken in joint names solely to obtain mortgage funds. The pursuer had intended that title be in her sole name. However, her income was insufficient to fund a second mortgage. The defender's income was used on the mortgage application. 25. For some months only the pursuer used 55C as a base, depending on where she was working. The defender moved in in April or May 2023, remaining there until the pursuer asked him to leave on 20 April 2024. 4 26. Parties agreed that once 85 WPC was sold and the free proceeds distributed, that the defender would convey, without consideration, his one-half pro indiviso share of 55C back to the pursuer. 27. The value of 55C in September 2023 was ?67,500. The current market value is ?72,500. 28. The pursuer paid all mortgage, utilities and running costs of 55C as it was always to be considered her property, notwithstanding title in parties joint names. 29. She made 15 mortgage payments totalling ?3,240 during the cohabitation in respect of 55C. 30. The pursuer also funded renovations of 55C at a total cost of ?21,133, ?5,848 of which was contributed during the cohabitation. 31. The defender contributed nothing to these renovations. 32. The defender lent the pursuer ?2,400 towards renovations, which was repaid from the sale proceeds from 85 WPC. This was a loan and did not represent a contribution towards the work. 33. Both parties provided non-financial support to the other, for example during periods of study, of illness, unemployment or suspension. Finds in fact and law 1. The defender has derived economic advantage of ?37,240 from the contributions made by the pursuer in relation to her half share of 55C Main Street, Chapelhall, Airdrie, ML6 8SB, which is only partially offset by the disadvantage she has suffered in the interests of the pursuer. 5 2. Having regard to the matters in sections 28(3), (5) and (6) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 the court makes an order in terms of section 28(2)(a) requiring the defender to pay a capital sum in the amount of TEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR POUNDS (?10,424) STERLING to the pursuer. 3. The pursuer has not derived economic advantage from the contributions by the defender in relation to his half share of said property. THEREFORE Sustains the pursuer's first and second pleas-in-law and repels the defender's first, second and third pleas-in-law; DISMISSES the defender's counterclaim; thereafter MAKES an order in terms of section 28(2)(a) of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 requiring the defender to pay a capital sum of TEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR POUNDS (?10,424) STERLING to the pursuer with interest thereon at the rate of 8% per annum from decree until payment; MAKES an order directing that the free proceeds of sale of 55C Main Street, Chapelhall, Airdrie shall, after the deductions specified in the court's order of 17 November 2025, be divided equally between parties; finding and declaring that the sum of TEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY FOUR POUNDS (?10,424) STERLING shall then be paid to the pursuer from the defender's net proceeds of sale; thereafter directing that the resulting balances be distributed to parties. 6 NOTE Introduction and background [1] In this action the pursuer craves a capital sum of ?25,000; together with an order for the division and sale of a property at 55C Main Street, Chapelhall, Airdrie. The defender craves a capital sum of ?20,000; together with an order ordaining the pursuer to transfer her whole right, title and interest in it to him. The evidence [2] The court heard evidence and submissions in person over 3 days. Preliminary proof on the restricted issue of date of separation was floated in a previous interlocutor however I decided to hear evidence at large so all issues can be determined in a single judgement. The pursuer gave evidence and led further evidence from Mr John Hand (a neighbour) and Mrs Fiona Penny (her mother). The defender gave evidence. All swore affidavits or an Apostille which were adopted and expanded upon in oral evidence. A brief joint minute of admissions was lodged. Both parties lodged various inventories of productions to which reference was made, thereafter lengthy written submissions. On 17 November 2025 the court, on joint motion, granted an order for division and sale in terms of parts (i) to (vi)(b) inclusive of the defender's second crave. The court made avizandum. [3] One very brief passage of evidence was heard under reservation as to its admissibility. The defender sought to lead evidence of a minute of agreement. This was objected to on the basis that there were no averments on record about it. I sustain the objection. 7 Scope of the action, hence this judgement [4] Section 28 of the 2006 Act relates to financial provision where cohabitation ends otherwise than by way of death. It is agreed that it started in February 2015, but the end date is disputed. For the reasons explained below I determine that is 15 September 2023. The focus is on that 103-month period. What lies beyond that is of limited relevance. So, several matters aired at proof are not dealt with because they are irrelevant: whether 5/9 and 5/10 of process are forged; the defender's previous conviction and vet bills dating from June 2024. Others are beyond the scope of the dispute as framed within the pleadings. Furthermore, I decline to determine distribution of individual pieces of property about which parties cannot agree. The witnesses [5] John Hand (74, retired) gave brief evidence in a clear and concise manner. He principally to spoke to the defender telling him, around March 2024, that parties had "split up." He was challenged in cross-examination on matters of detail and his evidence criticised as unfounded and hearsay. I consider none of the defender's criticisms of his evidence to be well-founded. I accept the pursuer's submission that he is credible and reliable. [6] Mrs Fiona Penny (57, stewardship consultant) came across well. She was measured in her evidence which was supportive of the pursuer. Indeed, the defender himself described her as a person of decency and honesty. Although it is likely that the pursuer may not have confided everything in her, I was deeply unimpressed by the examples the defender sought to use to illustrate this point, which included the pursuer being the complainer in a serious crime. His submission as regards hearsay carries more weight and 8 likely explains Mrs Penny quoting word for word the phrase "It's over, it's done.", said by the defender to be suspicious. I conclude that she is credible and reliable. [7] The pursuer Claire Robertson (32, commercial manager) came across as a calm, organised and businesslike person. She was able to vouch much of what she said by cross-referencing the productions. The defender criticised her case as containing parts not backed up by "physical evidence." She remained passive throughout, despite some provocative behaviour by the defender. Repeated allegations of greed and dishonesty were unfair. She acknowledged that the defender had made some payments and explained what these related to. She was candid in accepting that she still had feelings post-separation for the defender and that she wanted to help him. That provides an explanation for their remaining under the same roof after their relationship ended. I do not consider allegations of her infidelity relevant. It was inappropriate for sexual matters to be put to her, and they were rightly objected to, but she remained dignified when asked. I find her credible and reliable. [8] The defender Gordie Wallace (42, employed but states that he does not wish the nature of his employment to be disclosed to the pursuer) represented himself, something that always presents challenges, especially when opposing an experienced family lawyer. The court allowed him considerable latitude, and he took more still. He came across as an intense man living and breathing this action in granular detail. His manner could be unfortunate. At times he was combative, which I put down to nerves and inexperience. He was also unhappy with the court. He made an oral motion mid-proof for the court to contact Police Scotland to request witness statements, which was opposed and which I refused. His immediate riposte was that the motion would have been granted had Ms Thomas made it. On another occasion he declared the court "unprofessional". He made 9 several personal attacks on the pursuer's character. Some of the subject matter he attempted to introduce was sexual in nature. [9] What undermined his case was a lack of financial vouching for many of the positions he advanced. For example, there was no vouching of his alleged ?7,000 credit card debt. Yet at the same time he criticised the pursuer's case - itself much fuller in terms of records - as lacking "physical evidence". A frequent theme was that the figures only provide part of a much wider picture. [10] As regards the parties I conclude that the pursuer is the better witness and where there is dispute between her and the defender I prefer her evidence. Her evidence is better vouched and is consistent with the productions lodged on her behalf. Her evidence was internally consistent, despite a testing cross-examination. Her evidence was consistent with her previous affidavit. She is generally the more convincing witness. Her demeanour was by far the better of the two. Principal disputed matters relevant to the court's decision [11] I restrict my observations to those disputed issues which have assisted me in determining the issues in dispute. Logically the first matter to determine is the date the cohabitation ended. Date of end of the cohabitation [12] The pursuer's evidence was that there were longstanding issues in parties' relationship which they discussed on 15 September 2023. She said to him "is that us done then?" to which he replied "yes". Her impression was that he dumped her. She agreed to have a conversation in 6 months' time but did so on the basis that they were henceforth 10 single. As she said "Our separation became permanent, but we'll see how feel in six months. We never reconciled." They still had to communicate about the dogs and 85 WPC which was still on the market. On 9 May 2024 the pursuer asked if they could reconcile. She said no. Reference was made to 5/19 of process, messages between parties between 25 September 2023 and 3 May 2024, where the defender used phrases such as "We aren't together", "being together was making us miserable", "when we were together ...", "We were together 9 years" and referring to "but when we were together". There also was reference to a TikTok post by the defender which was said to be an acknowledgement he was seeing another woman. [13] John Hand, parties' neighbour, gave evidence that he had noticed a girl coming to and from 55C around the beginning of March 2024. The defender told him parties had split up but that he was staying in the flat until he could find a place of his own. Fiona Penny gave evidence that parties had not been getting on around August/September 2023. The defender came off Facebook and when he returned his status was single. Contemporaneous messages from 15 September 2023 (5/22 of process) support the conclusion that parties had separated. The pursuer told her she had asked the defender if they were done and he said "yeah". She let him stay in the flat. [14] The defender did not dispute that parties had a discussion on 15 September 2023 but explained that they remained within a relationship for a further 6 months. They had a follow-up discussion on 9 May 2024 at which the pursuer confirmed she did not wish to resume the relationship. That, he said, was the date of separation. Between these two dates parties remained cohabited at 55C. He described this period as a "temporary break" explaining that the pursuer was dating other men in Belfast and there were tensions in such a small flat. 11 [15] I prefer the evidence of the pursuer supported by her mother and the independent evidence of John Hand. I accept as accurate the pursuer's analysis of arrangements post-separation on 15 September 2023 as being simply "a mechanism for him to have somewhere to stay" and that they were no longer cohabitants in terms of section 25 of the 2006 Act. [16] I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that the date of parties' separation, thus the end of the cohabitation, is 15 September 2023. Parties' contributions whilst living at 85 WPC [17] The pursuer's case is that parties paid all mortgage, utilities and running costs of 85 WPC on a 50:50 basis throughout the cohabitation. She explained, by reference to 5/25 and 5/28 of process, that she would transfer money from her personal account to parties' joint account from which payments would be made. This very roughly amounted to between ?650 and ?700 per month each. The mortgage payment alone was ?619 per month. The defender gave evidence that he paid 50% until the time which the pursuer started working more in the central belt; thereafter he paid 100% himself and the pursuer contributed nothing. I prefer the pursuer's evidence. She was the more compelling witness. She identified relevant entries in statements. There is no mention of the defender paying 100% on record. No particular start date was offered. I am persuaded, on a balance of probabilities, that parties paid all mortgage, utilities and running costs of 85 WPC on a 50:50 basis. 12 Title and mortgage of 55C [18] It is not disputed that title to 55C was taken in joint names, and that that was because the pursuer was unable to secure mortgage approval on the strength of her income alone. The defender's income was included in the successful application, so he had to be on the title. The defender alleged that his signature was forged on a Disposition and Waiver (5/9 and 5/10 of process) but this happened after cohabitation had ended. I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that title to 55C was taken in joint names solely to obtain mortgage funds. Improvements to 55C [19] The pursuer's case is that she solely funded improvements to 55C totalling ?21,133, namely ?11,387 on a new kitchen, ?5,768 on a new bathroom and ?3,978 on other renovations. These figures are vouched but, as is made clear by the pursuer's spreadsheet 5/11 of process, only certain improvements were paid for during the cohabitation. Specifically, these are the bathroom upgrade and ?80 for roof cleaning, totalling ?5,848. The remaining payments were made between 18 January 2024 and 11 March 2024. The defender's evidence is that he funded 50% of all the improvements, but that is not borne out by the figures. He did transfer ?2,400 into the pursuer's account on 16 June 2023 but I do not accept his evidence that this is a contribution, not a loan. The pursuer forwarded it to the plumber later that day and I accept that this sum was later repaid from the proceeds of sale of 85 WPC. I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that during the cohabitation the pursuer funded improvements to 55C in the reduced sum of ?5,848. 13 Parties' contributions to 55C [20] The pursuer's evidence was that she was solely responsible for all mortgage, utilities and running costs of 55C. The rationale was that it was always intended to be her property, despite title being in joint names. It was bought to assist her career. She illustrated this by reference to various productions. The defender's evidence was that he paid 50% of the bills for 55C from its purchase until he left on 20 April 2024. Regular payments came from his personal account to the joint account for his 50% share. The pursuer would tell him what to pay then he paid it. There was no particular regular sum. Again, I prefer the pursuer's evidence. I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities that parties owned 55C for 22 months during cohabitation and during this period the pursuer made 22 monthly payments of ?216 totalling ?4,753. There was scant evidence about utilities and running costs during this period which makes assessing the pursuer's overall contribution difficult. Submissions [21] Both parties lodged extensive written submissions, expanded upon briefly orally. These submissions are lodged in process, so I do not narrate their terms which I have considered fully. The applicable law [22] This action is brought in terms of section 28 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006, the terms of which are as follows: **** " 28 Financial provision where cohabitation ends otherwise than by death (1) Subsection (2) applies where cohabitants cease to cohabit otherwise than by reason of the death of one (or both) of them. 14 (2) On the application of a cohabitant (the applicant'), the appropriate court may, after having regard to the matters mentioned in subsection (3)-- (a) make an order requiring the other cohabitant (thedefender') to pay a capital sum of an amount specified in the order to the applicant; (b) make an order requiring the defender to pay such amount as may be specified in the order in respect of any economic burden of caring, after the end of the cohabitation, for a child of whom the cohabitants are the parents; (c) make such interim order as it thinks fit. (3) Those matters are-- (a) whether (and, if so, to what extent) the defender has derived economic advantage from contributions made by the applicant; and (b) whether (and, if so, to what extent) the applicant has suffered economic disadvantage in the interests of-- (i) the defender; or (ii) any relevant child. (4) In considering whether to make an order under subsection (2)(a), the appropriate court shall have regard to the matters mentioned in subsections (5) and (6). (5) The first matter is the extent to which any economic advantage derived by the defender from contributions made by the applicant is offset by any economic disadvantage suffered by the defender in the interests of-- (a) the applicant; or (b) any relevant child. (6) The second matter is the extent to which any economic disadvantage suffered by the applicant in the interests of-- (a) the defender; or (b) any relevant child, is offset by any economic advantage the applicant has derived from contributions made by the defender. (7) In making an order under paragraph (a) or (b) of subsection (2), the appropriate court may specify that the amount shall be payable-- (a) on such date as may be specified; (b) in instalments. (8) An [y] 1 application under this section shall be made not later than one year after the day on which the cohabitants cease to cohabit. (9) In this section-- `appropriate court' means-- (a) where the cohabitants are a man and a woman, the court which would have jurisdiction to hear an action of divorce in relation to them if they were married to each other; (b) where the cohabitants are of the same sex, the court which would have jurisdiction to hear an action for the dissolution of the civil partnership if they were civil partners of each other; `child' means a person under 16 years of age; 15 `contributions' includes indirect and non-financial contributions (and, in particular, any such contribution made by looking after any relevant child or any house in which they cohabited); and `economic advantage' includes gains in-- (a) capital; (b) income; and (c) earning capacity; and 'economic disadvantage' shall be construed accordingly. (10) For the purposes of this section, a child is relevant' if the child is-- (a) a child of whom the cohabitants are the parents; (b) a child who is or was accepted by the cohabitants as a child of the family." **Applying that law to the facts** [23] Recent guidance from the Sheriff Appeal Court on section 28(2)(a) claims is found in *PC (AP)* v *MS ***** [[2024] SAC (Civ) 37](https://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotSAC/Civ/2024/2024sacciv37.html): "[32] In section 28(2)(a) claims only, subsection (4) also requires the court to consider what we shall call theoffsetting provisions' in subsections (5) and (6). They require that the court, in terms of subsection (5), shall have regard to the extent to which any economic advantage derived by the defender from contributions made by the applicant is offset by any economic disadvantage suffered by the defender in the interests of the applicant or any relevant child. Subsection (6) requires the court to have regard to the extent to which any economic disadvantage suffered by the applicant in the interests of the defender or any relevant child is offset by any economic advantage derived by the applicant from contributions made by the defender. Thus, the exercise that the court requires to undertake in section 28(2)(a) cases involves assessing either or both of the net economic advantage derived by the defender and the net economic disadvantage suffered by the applicant. The court is given no further guidance as to what is to be done once it is established that a net economic advantage has been derived by the defender or a net economic disadvantage has been suffered by the applicant. Gow v Grant [33] The leading authority on section 28 is Gow v Grant 2013 SC (UKSC) 1. The pursuer's claim was based on economic disadvantage said to have been suffered by her as a result of the relationship; so it relied solely on section 28(2)(a). The court held that the principle that lies at the heart of the award' made under section 28 isfairness to both parties' (Lord Hope of Craighead at para [31]). He added (at para [33]): 16 what sec 28 seeks to achieve is fairness in the assessment of compensation for contributions made or economic disadvantages suffered in the interests of the relationship.' [34] The court also observed that it is impracticable for people in intimate relationships to work out who has paid for what, and who enjoyed what benefits in kind during the relationship. Instead, when applying the fairness principle, regard should be had to where parties were at the beginning and at the end of their relationship:It is much more practicable to consider where they were at the beginning of their cohabitation and where they are at the end, and then to ask whether either the defender has derived a net economic advantage from the contributions of the applicant or the applicant has suffered a net economic disadvantage in the interests of the defender or any relevant child. There is nothing in the Scottish legislation to preclude such an approach, as the court is bound to be assessing the respective economic advantage and disadvantage at the end of their relationship.' (Lady Hale, para [54], with whom Lord Hope agreed, para [40])." [24] I shall follow the approach taken by the sheriff in PC v MS. One significant issue I have encountered in drafting this judgement is gaps in financial information. I have made such findings as I am able to on the evidence. Courts are afforded a degree of latitude in actions such as this but there are aspects which I cannot quantify, even on a rough and ready approach. To make an assessment would be what Sheriff Dean once described as "a pure guess and justice is not done by guess work." George v George 1991 SLT (Sh Ct) 8. Parties' positions at the start (February 2015) and end (15 September 2023) of the cohabitation [25] In February 2015 the pursuer was both working with a precision engineering contractor and studying. There was no evidence of her salary, having any savings or investments or owning any property. There was no evidence of the defender's income at that date although he did describe himself shortly thereafter as the "main earner". There 17 was no evidence of his having any savings or investments or owning any property. I proceed on the basis that at the start of the cohabitation neither party had any assets. [26] At 15 September 2023 each party owned a one-half pro indiviso share of both 85 WPC and 55C. The pursuer's contributions had resulted in her incurring significant credit card debt. The defender had been living in 55C for 4 or 5 months without making any contributions. 85 WPC was on the market. The pursuer was also living at 55C but attempting to stay elsewhere on business to avoid awkwardness. Net economic advantage and disadvantage [27] The next stage is to determine whether there has been a net economic advantage or disadvantage at the end of the cohabitation. Again, this exercise has proved problematic, and it has not been possible to calculate exactly many of the figures. That said, the cohabitation can conveniently be divided into three periods. From February 2015 to March 2019 [28] During this first 49-month period parties cohabited at a series of rented properties. The defender was 10 years older than the defender who, for some part at least, appears to have been studying either part or full time. It appeared that contributions were roughly equal throughout and there was no attempt to quantify them. From March 2019 to June 2022 [29] This 39-month period begins with the purchase of 85 WPC in March 2019 and ends with the purchase of 55C in June 2022. 18 [30] The pursuer made a capital contribution of ?19,000 for the deposit, gifted to her by her grandmother. Thereafter she made payments of, roughly, ?650 per month to mortgage, utilities and running costs. For this period her contribution can be calculated at ?19,000 + (39 x ?650) totalling ?44,350. [31] The defender made no capital contribution but throughout contributed the same as the pursuer. His contribution can be calculated at 39 x ?650 totalling ?25,350. From June 2022 to end of the cohabitation (15 September 2023) [32] This final 15-month period of cohabitation begins with the purchase of 55C and ends on 15 September 2023. Throughout, parties each owned a one-half pro indiviso share of both properties. [33] I have found that in addition to paying her one-half share for 85 WPC the pursuer also solely funded 55C. So far as can be ascertained, her contribution for this period amounts to (a) 15 x ?650 per month in respect of 85 WPC = ?9,750, (b) the capital from her grandmother = ?15,000 and (c) 15 x ?216 per month in respect of 55C mortgage = ?3,240. Her total contribution during this period is therefore ?27,990. [34] I have found that the defender did not make any contributions towards 55C for this period. I rejected his evidence that he was solely responsible for 85 WPC for some of this period. He paid half throughout. His contribution is 15 x ?650 = ?9,750. [35] The total monetary contributions, as far as they can be determined on the evidence, during the cohabitation are as follows: 19 Pursuer Defender February 2015 to March 2019 Unascertainable Unascertainable March 2019 to June 2022?44,350?25,350 June 2022 to September 2023?27,990?9,750 Total during cohabitation ?72,340 ?35,100 [36] Overall, the pursuer contributed roughly twice what the defender did during cohabitation made up principally of the two deposits. His economic advantage amounts to ?37,240. Non-monetary contributions [37] There was some evidence of non-monetary contributions such as support the defender provided to the pursuer; that he ran down his business to move to 55C with her; that he gave up his studies at RGU after second year; and that he moved from a spacious four-bedroom house to a one-bedroom flat. Equally the pursuer supported the defender during periods of poor mental health, unemployment and suspension from work. My sense was that his employment was the more fluid of the two throughout cohabitation. Ultimately whilst acknowledging both parties made non-economic contributions these cannot be quantified with anything approaching accuracy. Ascertaining economic advantage and disadvantage [38] Each case presents individual factors to consider when determining the economic advantage and disadvantage of each party. The factors in this case include the following: parties' contributions prior to purchasing 85 WPC were roughly equal and for present 20 purposes can be offset; the pursuer provided a significant deposit for 85 WPC; the defender provided no capital; the pursuer saved money on hotel bills and room rent by purchasing 55C but in doing so incurred significant mortgage, utilities and running costs; the pursuer's contributions to upgrade of 55C offset by any (admittedly minor) increase in its value and the enjoyment of the renovated bathroom; the defender loaned the pursuer ?2,400 which she subsequently repaid; the pursuer providing a second significant deposit for 55C; the defender again not providing any capital; the defender allowing his income to be used when funding purchase of 55C but in return getting a one half pro indiviso share it; and the defender contributing nothing towards 55C. [39] I conclude that the defender has enjoyed a net economic advantage as a result of the cohabitation. The pursuer is at a disadvantage at the end of the cohabitation, principally having provided significant deposits for both properties. Offsetting [40] The court next requires to consider to what extent any advantage or disadvantage should be offset. Parties' contributions in respect of (a) the cohabitation prior to purchasing 85 WPC and (b) parties' contributions to the mortgage, utilities and running costs of 85 WPC can be offset as roughly equal. However, I consider that offsetting does not fairly account for the disadvantage suffered by the pursuer and that an award should be made in her favour. Determining the amount of the award [41] The pursuer's submissions explain her claim for ?25,000 is based upon her ?15,000 contribution towards 55C together with the ?21,133 she paid for renovations. 21 [42] What came out in evidence was that approximately 3 months after cohabitation ended 85 WPC was sold and the free proceeds of sale (?35,154.63) were distributed as follows: ?1,814.63 went to clear the overdraft on parties' joint account; ?19,840 to the pursuer and ?13,500 to the defender. I accept the pursuer's evidence that defender's figure reflected the fact that (a) the pursuer had 55C to fall back on, (b) he was to be repaid the ?2,400 loan and (c) he would be able to move earlier the more money he had. Had these factors been disregarded he would have received ?3,930 less. [43] That leaves the deposit for 55C and the renovations paid for during the cohabitation of ?5,848. The total is ?20,848, a one-half share of which amounts to ?10,424. I think a straightforward award of one half is justified and appropriate. Orders made [44] I shall make an order requiring the defender to pay the pursuer a capital sum of ?10,424 together with interest at 8% per annum from decree until payment; thereafter orders for the appropriate division and distribution of the proceeds of sale of 55C. [45] No motions for expenses were made. I shall allow 14 days for any motions, together with written submissions thereon, which I will consider in chambers and determine.

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