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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Sartipi v. Travis Credit Union CA1/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A174058

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (32.7K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/20/26 Sartipi v. Travis Credit Union CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE

ALI SARTIPI,
Plaintiff and Appellant, A174058
v.
TRAVIS CREDIT UNION, (Solano County Super. Ct.
No. FCS057314)
Defendant and Respondent.

Ali Sartipi sued Travis Credit Union (Travis) for gender discrimination
under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), alleging it fired him
because he is male. (Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.) The trial court granted
Travis’s motion for summary judgment. Sartipi appeals from that order and
from the denial of his request for a continuance of the summary judgment
hearing. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Travis is a nonprofit cooperative offering various financial products and
services. Many of its employees have personal member accounts at the
cooperative. The employee handbook governs access to those accounts.
It acknowledges employees “ ‘may need access to member information
throughout the workday for [Travis] business.’ ” (Italics added.) It
emphasizes the importance of “ ‘maintaining the security and confidentiality

1
of member information.’ ” It also warns that Travis “ ‘reviews and monitors
the activities for all member accounts, including employee-member
accounts,’ ” and that its auditors and employees, such as tellers and loan
officers, may review personal information associated with the accounts “ ‘in
the normal course of business.’ ” Employees are required to sign a statement
that “ ‘failure to adhere to the employee handbook may result in disciplinary
action, up to and including termination of employment.’ ” And the handbook
notes that employment at Travis is at-will — that it may terminate
employment “ ‘any time, with or without a reason and with or without
notice’ ” and without cause.
Travis hired Sartipi in 2010, and he later became the Veranda branch
manager in 2018 or 2019. In that role, he supervised approximately five to
10 employees while Mark Castro, the regional manager, in turn supervised
him. Sartipi acknowledged receiving the employee handbook and that
accessing a member’s financial information was only authorized for business
purposes. He also understood the importance of maintaining the security of
confidential member information.
In June 2021, Travis received an anonymous complaint requesting an
investigation of the departure and subsequent resignation of a former
Veranda branch supervisor, Jocelyn Gutierrez. The complaint speculated
that she resigned due to a confrontation with Sartipi regarding an ongoing
issue. Based on the complaint, two Travis human resources
representatives — both female — initiated an investigation. One
investigator learned about an allegation that Sartipi showed Giovanni
Chamberlain, a subordinate employee, an explicit photo of another female
Travis employee. But during human resources interviews, Chamberlain
stated variously that he did not recall being shown any explicit photo or that

2
it absolutely did not happen. The human resources representatives
ultimately concluded Chamberlain was being dishonest and it was more
likely than not that Sartipi showed the photo to him.
Human resources uncovered an additional allegation that Sartipi
accessed certain employees’ personal financial accounts without permission
or a business purpose. Data logs revealed he accessed the accounts of four
women, including Gutierrez and Vicki Vasquez, a financial services
representative. From September 2020 through July 2021, he accessed
Gutierrez’s account once, Vasquez’s account 37 times, another woman’s
account 29 times, and the last woman’s account six times. Gutierrez was
particularly upset, stressed, and angry that he looked at her account.
Sartipi admitted improperly accessing Gutierrez’s account without her
permission in 2020. He explained he simply checked her confidential
financial information to verify she was taking a sick day rather than vacation
time. Upon learning of this, Castro warned that accessing employee accounts
in the absence of a business purpose was grounds for termination. Regarding
Vasquez’s account, Sartipi testified Castro asked him to monitor the account
because the compliance department discovered she was overdrafting and not
properly managing her account. But Sartipi also admitted it was a mistake
to access her account so often.
Travis formally terminated Sartipi for accessing employee account
information without authorization or a justified purpose — Gutierrez’s
account once, Vasquez’s account 14 times, and the other two women 12 and
three times, respectively. In October 2021, Sartipi filed a complaint against
Travis, alleging it violated FEHA by using his gender as a substantial factor

3
in his termination.1 In a deposition, a former employee — the one of which
Sartipi allegedly had an explicit photo — testified she never had nude photos
of herself, that Sartipi never accessed her phone and would not have found
any nude photos, and she never had any personal, social or romantic
relationship with him.
During his deposition, Sartipi admitted that he did not observe any
discriminatory treatment in the human resources investigation or corrective
action process. Rather, he believed that Travis treated him differently than
all other employees, male and female. Others, for instance, were first given a
documented, formal warning and then a final warning before being
terminated. But he also acknowledged being given a verbal warning
regarding accessing employees’ accounts. And he further conceded employees
could be immediately terminated in the absence of any formal termination
process. Notably, Travis had previously terminated a female employee for
accessing a member’s account information without permission or a legitimate
business purpose.
In November 2024, Travis moved for summary judgment in the three
consolidated cases. The following month, and as discussed further below,
Sartipi unsuccessfully sought an ex parte order to continue the hearing to
accommodate, among other things, an appointment for counsel’s necessary
medical procedure, additional time for opposing the three summary judgment
motions, and time for opposing Travis’s two motions to disqualify counsel and
for evidentiary sanctions. While the trial court denied the motion to
continue, it ultimately continued the hearing for three weeks to February 20,

1 Castro and Chamberlain were also terminated and, represented by

Sartipi’s counsel, initiated separate lawsuits against Travis. His counsel
stipulated to consolidating those cases for “all purposes, including trial.”

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2025. Later, the court granted Travis’s motion for summary judgment after
concluding it terminated Sartipi for the legitimate reason of his improperly
accessing member accounts, and that he failed to respond with substantial
evidence raising a triable issue of pretext or gender discrimination.
DISCUSSION
I.
Sartipi contends the trial court erroneously granted Travis’s motion for
summary judgment. He argues he established a prima facie case of gender
discrimination — that the two female human resources representatives
developed a discriminatory animus against him because he is male and
allegedly showed a subordinate employee an explicit photo of a female
employee. He insists the proffered reason for his termination — improper
access of employee member financial accounts — is false or a pretext for
gender discrimination.
A trial court must grant summary judgment if the moving party shows
there are no triable issues of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. (Duffey v. Tender Heart Home Care Agency, LLC (2019)
31 Cal.App.5th 232, 240–241; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subds. (a), (c),
undesignated statutory references are to this code.) A defendant may show
entitlement to summary judgment by demonstrating the plaintiff cannot
establish one or more elements of the claim, or there is a complete defense.
(§ 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826,
853.) Upon making this showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff who must
present evidence reflecting a triable issue of material fact — evidence that
allows a “reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the
party opposing the motion.” (Aguilar, at p. 850, fn. omitted; § 437c,
subd. (p)(2).) We independently and liberally view “all the evidence set forth

5
in the moving and opposition papers in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” (Heskel v. City of San Diego (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 313,
318; Hampton v. County of San Diego (2015) 62 Cal.4th 340, 347.)
FEHA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a “person in
compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” based on
gender. (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a).) To state a prima facie case of
discrimination under FEHA, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he is a
member of a protected class, he was competently performing in the position
he held, he suffered an adverse employment action, and there is a causal link
between his membership in the protected class and adverse action. (Guz v.
Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 355 (Guz); Avila v. Continental
Airlines, Inc. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1237, 1247.) An employer moving for
summary judgment on a FEHA claim must demonstrate either that the
plaintiff cannot establish an element or there was a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. (Avila,
at p. 1247.) The burden then shifts to the plaintiff, who must “attack the
employer’s proffered reasons as pretexts for discrimination” — to present
evidence the decision was motivated in part by prohibited discrimination.
(Guz, at p. 356; Featherstone v. Southern California Permanente Medical
Group (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1150, 1158–1159.) “The ultimate burden of
persuasion on the issue of actual discrimination remains with the plaintiff,”
who must identify evidence “supporting a rational inference that intentional
discrimination, on grounds prohibited by the statute, was the true cause of
the employer’s actions.” (Guz, at pp. 356, 361, italics omitted.)
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sartipi, we discern
no error in the trial court’s decision. At the outset, we question whether
Sartipi presented even the minimal evidence necessary to establish a prima

6
facie case of gender discrimination. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 354–355
[burden at prima facie stage is not onerous].) He points to evidence
undermining the allegation that he showed an explicit photo to a subordinate
employee — the former employee disavowed any possibility that Sartipi could
have a nude photo of her. Human resources personnel, he speculates, then
engaged in dogged efforts to terminate his employment. But the evidence
demonstrates that investigators responded to an anonymous complaint
regarding his conduct. Their investigation revealed allegations that he had
shown an inappropriate picture to a subordinate employee — an allegation
Sartipi acknowledged an employer must investigate — and accessed the
personal financial accounts of current and former employees without
permission. Critically, rather than alleging Travis treated him, as a male,
differently than women, he complained that the cooperative treated him
differently compared to other female and male employees. Other employees,
he asserted, received documented, formal warnings followed by a final
warning before termination. Indeed, he conceded that he did not observe any
discriminatory treatment or impropriety in Travis’s investigation or
corrective action process.
Even assuming Sartipi satisfied this low burden, Travis presented
undisputed evidence of its legitimate reason — unrelated to gender — for
terminating his employment. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 355.) Sartipi’s
data logs revealed he repeatedly accessed employee member accounts without
permission and without a legitimate business purpose. Though he initially
attempted to justify accessing Gutierrez’s account to verify whether she was
properly taking a sick day, he admitted that accessing the account without
her permission was improper. His supervisor warned him that accessing
employee accounts in the absence of a business purpose was grounds for

7
termination. But between September 2020 through July 2021, he accessed
Gutierrez’s account once, Vasquez’s account 37 times, another woman’s
account 29 times, and the last woman’s account six times. Travis thus
determined Sartipi violated its confidentiality policy by repeatedly accessing
employee account information without a business purpose, and it terminated
his employment on that basis. Critically, it terminated a female employee in
2018 for similar reasons — accessing a member’s account without a valid
business reason. Thus, Travis demonstrated that it terminated Sartipi for a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. (Wills v. Superior Court (2011)
195 Cal.App.4th 143, 160.)
Sartipi failed to offer substantial evidence that this purported reason
was untrue or pretextual, “such that a reasonable trier of fact could conclude
[Travis] engaged in intentional discrimination.” (Hersant v. Department of
Social Services (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 997, 1004–1005.) He lists justifications
for his accessing the employee member accounts — that Castro asked him to
monitor Vasquez’s account for money management issues, employees
regularly ask branch managers to transact business in their accounts, and
Castro believed the evidence presented insufficient grounds to terminate
him.2 This evidence, he argues, demonstrates “ ‘such weaknesses,
implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the

2 Sartipi’s failure to support these references to the record “by a

citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears” does not comply with court rules and stymies our ability to review
his arguments. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) We are not
“ ‘required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search
of error or grounds to support the judgment.’ ” (Guthrey v. State of California
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1115.) Counsel must refer us to the portion of
the record supporting its contentions on appeal, otherwise we may treat them
as forfeited. (Ibid.)

8
employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable
factfinder could rationally find them “unworthy of credence.” ’ ” (Hersant,
sat p. 1005, italics omitted.) But even if Travis lied about its reasons for
terminating Sartipi’s employment, an “inference of intentional discrimination
cannot be drawn solely from evidence, if any,” of that lie, contrary to Sartipi’s
suggestions. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 360.) That Travis’s “proffered
reasons are unworthy of credence may ‘considerably assist’ a circumstantial
case of discrimination, because it suggests the employer had cause to hide its
true reasons.” (Id. at p. 361.) But “there must be evidence supporting a
rational inference that intentional discrimination, on grounds prohibited by
the statute, was the true cause of the employer’s actions.” (Ibid., italics
omitted.) Sartipi merely states Travis’s human resources personnel had
discriminatory animus toward him. This fails to demonstrate by
“nonspeculative evidence, ‘an actual causal link between prohibited
motivation’ ” — gender discrimination — “ ‘and termination.’ ” (Featherstone
v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1159.) In sum, the trial court properly granted Travis’s motion for
summary judgment.
II.
Sartipi contends the trial court was required to continue the summary
judgment hearing under section 437c, subdivision (h). He argues there were
facts essential to opposing the motion but for identified reasons could not be
presented to the court at that time. He further contends his counsel had an
overwhelming amount of work and a scheduled surgery — both constituting
good cause to continue the hearing. We disagree.
Sartipi deposed Michael Levy, Travis’s general counsel, in August 2024.
But Levy declined to answer several questions regarding his alleged

9
preparation of Sartipi’s termination summary — to be filed by Castro —
based on attorney-client and attorney work product privilege. Sartipi
subsequently filed a motion to compel Levy to respond to certain deposition
questions, arguing he waived any privilege by preparing the summary. The
trial court set a hearing on the motion for January 30, 2025.
In November 2024, Sartipi moved ex parte to advance the hearing on
the motion to compel so he could complete essential discovery to oppose any
motions for summary judgment Travis might file. Shortly after, Travis
moved for summary judgment against all three plaintiffs — which was also
set for a hearing on January 30, 2025, the same day as the hearing for
Sartipi’s motion to compel. The trial court denied Sartipi’s motion to advance
the hearing on the motion to compel, explaining he had ample time to
conduct discovery since the case was filed more than three years prior. In
addition, the court noted, Sartipi took Levy’s deposition in August 2024, yet
he did not move to compel additional responses for another 10 weeks.
Towards the end of November, Travis moved for evidentiary sanctions
and to disqualify Sartipi’s counsel, and both were scheduled for a hearing on
January 8, 2025. The next month, Sartipi moved ex parte to continue the
summary judgment hearing, arguing facts might exist to support his
opposition to the motion — conclusively stating “Levy is also a central
witness to the termination[] of Plaintiff[] Sartipi” and pressuring Castro to
terminate him. Counsel also complained Travis’s motions for sanctions and
disqualification diverted his attention from opposing the summary judgment
motion, and he was unavailable in January 2025 due to a scheduled surgery.
He also argued continuance was necessary because he had to postpone, but
needed, depositions of additional Travis employees who were significant
participants in the decision to terminate Sartipi’s employment. The trial

10
court denied the motion after questioning counsel’s diligence in conducting
discovery and finding there was no good cause to continue either the trial or
motion for summary judgment. Later, it nonetheless sua sponte continued
the motion for summary judgment for three weeks — to February 20, 2025.
Section 437c, subdivision (h) allows continuing a summary judgment
hearing if “facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot, for
stated reasons, be presented.” Generally, we review a ruling on a request for
a section 437c, subdivision (h) continuance for an abuse of discretion.
(Rodriguez v. Oto (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1020, 1038.) But continuances
under this provision are “ ‘ “virtually mandated” ’ ” if the party makes a good
faith showing the continuance is necessary to obtain facts essential for
opposing the summary judgment motion. (Chavez v. 24 Hour Fitness USA,
Inc. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 632, 643.) To demonstrate good faith, the party
must show “(1) the facts to be obtained are essential to opposing the motion,
(2) there is reason to believe such facts may exist, and (3) the reasons why
additional time is needed to obtain these facts.” (Ibid.)
No continuance was required here because Sartipi made no showing
the deposition testimony was material to the dispute. (Chavez v. 24 Hour
Fitness USA, Inc., supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 643.) As a preliminary
matter, Sartipi failed to identify the facts the two additional Travis
employees might provide or explain why they might be essential to establish
that the reasons for his employment termination were pretextual. (Johnson
v. Alameda County Medical Center (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 521, 532
[requiring “ ‘[f]acts establishing a likelihood that controverting evidence may
exist’ ”].) And although he suggests Levy was a witness to the decision to
terminate his employment, he fails to explain how Levy’s additional

11
testimony would provide essential insight into Travis’s purported reasons for
that decision.
Indeed, those facts were already presented. In his deposition testimony
regarding a meeting to discuss Sartipi’s termination, Levy stated that
everyone agreed that his use of official Travis data about members, including
subordinate or former employees, was unacceptable. He explained “there was
no question that his access to the accounts was impermissible, and the
volume of access to other peoples’ accounts was unjustifiable” — an
assessment with which everyone at the meeting agreed. A declaration by
Castro already documented his opposition to terminating Sartipi based on the
alleged explicit photo and accessing employee accounts. He noted his feeling
pressured to terminate Sartipi based on the account access issues. To the
extent Sartipi argues Levy’s testimony was essential to disclose
inconsistencies in the reason for terminating his employment, the record
already reflects as much. More importantly, this did not provide critical
evidence of gender discrimination. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 361.)
Sartipi’s argument that good cause nonetheless supported a
continuance fares no better. If a continuance is not mandatory under section
437c, subdivision (h), courts must determine “whether the party requesting
the continuance has nonetheless established good cause therefor.” (Lerma v.
County of Orange (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 709, 716.) We review the court’s
decision for an abuse of discretion and find none here. (Ibid.) First, the trial
court found counsel was dilatory in conducting discovery. (Id. at p. 718.) It
noted Sartipi had ample time to conduct discovery since the case was filed
three years prior, and he failed to move to compel Levy to answer deposition
questions in a timely manner. Second, while an attorney’s scheduled medical
procedure may establish good cause for a continuance, Sartipi’s counsel was

12
scheduled for surgery several months after the summary judgment motion
was filed. (Ibid.) As Sartipi notes, any summary judgment opposition was
due two days after the scheduled surgery. Counsel had ample time to
prepare an opposition in advance of the surgery.
Finally, we reject Sartipi’s complaint that former section 437c’s 75-day
timeline for conducting discovery and fully responding to a motion for
summary judgment was insufficient. (Former § 437c, subd. (a)(2); Stats.
2024, ch. 99, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2025 [changing § 437c, subd. (a)(2) to allow a
party to file motion for summary judgment at least 81 days before a
hearing].) Such complaints are better directed to the Legislature. And in
any event, the record reflects Sartipi’s counsel filed an 11-page unsuccessful
motion on December 30, 2024, with nearly 150 pages of exhibits seeking to
disqualify the trial judge for alleged bias. The hours spent on this motion
could have been devoted to other litigation tasks, such as opposing Travis’s
motions for sanctions and disqualification of counsel — both of which
Sartipi’s counsel insisted it needed to address — and its summary judgment
motion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Travis is entitled to recover its costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

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RODRÍGUEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

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TUCHER, P. J.

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FUJISAKI, J.

A174709; Sartipi v. Travis Credit Union

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