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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

S.Y. v. E.C. (And a Companion Case).

Massachusetts Appeals Court

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-P-0813

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

25-P-813
25-P-814

S.Y.

vs.

E.C.
(and a companion case1).

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The defendant, E.C., appeals from the extension of two

harassment prevention orders issued in favor of the plaintiffs,

S.Y. and G.L., her brother and sister-in-law, respectively,

following a two-party hearing2 in the District Court. See G. L.

c. 258E, § 3. The defendant also appeals from two orders

denying her motions to recuse the hearing judge and to terminate

the orders. We affirm.

1 G.L. vs. E.C.

2Although S.Y.'s and G.L.'s cases were not formally
consolidated, the hearing judge paired the two-party hearing on
S.Y.'s order with the two-party hearing on G.L.'s order.
Background. On May 28, 2025, the plaintiffs each filed a

complaint for a harassment prevention order against the

defendant. A judge of the District Court issued the orders ex

parte. After the defendant was served with the orders, a

different judge of the District Court (hearing judge) held a

"two-party hearing" on both orders on June 11, 2025. All three

parties (S.Y., G.L., and E.C.) appeared at the hearing and

testified. The hearing judge found that the defendant poses "a

credible threat to the physical safety" of both plaintiffs.

Accordingly, the judge extended both orders for one year. The

defendant timely appealed.

After the two-party hearing, the defendant filed motions to

terminate the c. 258E orders and to recuse the hearing judge.

The hearing judge denied these motions. Again, the defendant

timely appealed.

Discussion. 1. Denial of due process. The defendant

asserts that she was deprived of due process at the two-party

hearing.3 Because the defendant did not raise this issue during

3 We note that the defendant is representing herself on
appeal. Nevertheless, self-represented litigants are
(1) required to abide by the Massachusetts Rules of Appellate
Procedure; and (2) held to the same standard as litigants
represented by counsel. See Maza v. Commonwealth, 423 Mass.
1006, 1006 (1996). See also Brossard v. West Roxbury Div. of
the Dist. Court Dep't, 417 Mass. 183, 184 (1994).

2
the hearing, it is waived. The usual rule is that a party who

"did not sufficiently raise [an] issue below . . . [is] barred

from raising it on appeal." Boss v. Leverett, 484 Mass. 553,

562 (2020). Both the opposing party and the judge must be

"fairly put on notice as to the substance of the issue."

Chelsea Hous. Auth. v. McLaughlin, 482 Mass. 579, 584 (2019),

quoting Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469 (2000).

"The reason for this fundamental rule of appellate practice is

well established: it is important that an appellate court have

before it an adequate record and findings concerning a claim to

permit it to resolve that claim properly" (quotation and

citation omitted). Boss, supra at 563. See Commonwealth v.

Bly, 444 Mass. 640, 650-651 (2005) (reviewing reasons for waiver

rule, including "the importance to an appellate court of having

the considered opinion of the trial judge on issues that have

not been preserved").

Even if we were to reach this issue, we note that the

defendant received adequate notice of the two-party hearing and

was represented by counsel at the hearing. Moreover, the

hearing judge allowed her to testify and present evidence. The

hearing judge also allowed her counsel to cross-examine the

plaintiffs. Finally, the hearing judge allowed the defendant's

counsel to make an argument opposing the extension of the

3
orders. This satisfied the requirements of due process. See

Frizado v. Frizado, 420 Mass. 592, 597-598 (1995); M.M. v.

Doucette, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 32, 34 (2017).4

1. Motions for recusal. We review a judge's decision on a

recusal motion for an abuse of discretion. See Parenteau v.

Jacobson, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 97, 99 (1992).

In deciding a motion for recusal, a judge must "consult

first [his] own emotions and conscience" to ascertain whether he

4 We note that entry of a harassment prevention order
requires a finding of harassment, defined in G. L. c. 258E, § 1,
as "[three] or more acts of willful and malicious conduct aimed
at a specific person committed with the intent to cause fear,
intimidation, abuse or damage to property and that does in fact
cause fear, intimidation, [or] abuse . . . ." Seney v. Morhy,
467 Mass. 58, 60 (2014). When an act consists solely of speech,
it "must be either a 'true threat' . . . or 'fighting words.'"
A.R. v. L.C., 93 Mass. App. Ct. 758, 760 (2018), quoting O'Brien
v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 425 (2012). True threats are
"direct threats of imminent physical harm" or "words or actions
that –- taking into account the context in which they arise -–
cause the victim to fear such [imminent physical] harm now or in
the future." O'Brien, supra.

After reviewing the limited hearing record before us (the
affidavits in support of the applications and the transcript),
we could not discern any evidence of the defendant's intent to
cause the plaintiffs fear of imminent physical harm. See Kareem
K. v. Ida I., 100 Mass. App. Ct. 902, 904 (2022) (none of
defendant's Facebook messages, telephone calls, and e-mail
messages to plaintiff "qualifie[d] as a true threat"). We are
mindful that the hearing included evidence that we do not have
on appeal. We do not address this issue further because the
defendant did not raise it in her appellate briefs. See Mass.
R. A. P. 16 (a) (9), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628 (2019);
Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019).

4
is subjectively free from bias. Commonwealth v. Morgan RV

Resorts, LLC, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 9 (2013), quoting Lena v.

Commonwealth, 369 Mass. 571, 575 (1976). If the judge

"subjectively believes [he] can rule impartially," he "must next

attempt an objective appraisal of whether . . . [his]

impartiality might reasonably be questioned" (quotation

omitted). Id., quoting Lena, supra.

There is no evidence in the record to suggest that the

judge erred in concluding he could remain impartial in these

cases. In his decision denying the motions, the judge made

clear that prior to the hearing on June 11, 2025, he had never

had any contact or communication with any party and based his

decision solely on the evidence presented to him.

In support of her assertion that the hearing judge was

biased, the defendant alleges that he denied her due process,

including the right to an "impartial tribunal" and to "cross-

examine [her] accusers." The record contradicts these claims.

As noted above, the hearing transcript reflects that the

defendant's counsel was given ample opportunity to cross-examine

the plaintiffs, conduct direct examinations of both the

defendant and the defendant's and S.Y.'s mother, and present

arguments as to why the orders should not be extended.

Accordingly, we see no basis to conclude that the judge abused

5
his discretion in denying the defendant's motions to recuse.

See Commonwealth v. Zine, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 130, 132 (2001).

1. Motions to terminate orders. We review the judge's

orders denying the defendant's motions to terminate for an abuse

of discretion. See L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185

n.27 (2014).

General Laws c. 258E, § 3 (e), allows a judge to modify or

terminate a harassment prevention order upon the request of

either party. The judge may modify or terminate such an order

prior to its expiration if the moving party demonstrates "a

significant change in circumstances since the entry of the order

that justifies termination of the order." MacDonald v. Caruso,

467 Mass. 382, 388 (2014). See also Tom T. v. Lewis L., 97

Mass. App. Ct. 698, 700 (2020) (appellate courts "have applied

essentially the same analysis for abuse prevention orders issued

pursuant to c. 209A and harassment prevention orders issued

pursuant to c. 258E since c. 258E was enacted, except in

instances where the language of the statutes themselves was

different"). Notably for this case, "[a] defendant's motion to

terminate an order is not a motion to reconsider the entry of a

final order and does not provide an opportunity for a defendant

to challenge the underlying basis for the order or to obtain

relief from errors correctable on appeal." Id.

6
We are unable to review the substance of the defendant's

claims of error regarding the denial of her motion to terminate

S.Y's harassment prevention order because that motion is not

part of the record. See Mass. R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in

481 Mass. 1637 (2019). However, in her motion to terminate the

order issued to G.L., the defendant essentially sought to

relitigate the two-party evidentiary hearing. Specifically, she

challenged the judge's credibility determinations and the

sufficiency of the evidence. Because a motion to terminate an

order "is not a motion to reconsider the entry of a final order,

and does not provide an opportunity for a defendant to challenge

the underlying basis for the order," MacDonald, 467 Mass. at 388,

the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the

7
defendant's motion.5

Extension orders dated June
11, 2025, affirmed.

Orders denying motions to
recuse and motions to
terminate affirmed.

By the Court (Singh,
Hershfang & Wood, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: March 24, 2026.

5 The appellant's remaining arguments do not rise to the
level of appellate argument and so we do not address them. See
Mass. R. A. P. 16 (a) (4), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1628
(2019).

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

8