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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Rosa Jovanovic, Etc. v. Estate of David Ravin

New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: A-0049-24

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (107)

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Combined Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0049-24

ROSA JOVANOVIC AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE
ESTATE OF BOBAN
JOVANOVIC AND ROSA
JOVANOVIC,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ESTATE OF DAVID RAVIN,

Defendant,

and

ST. JOSEPH'S REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER AND
KATHERINE VLASICA, D.O.,

Defendants-Respondents.

---

Argued September 11, 2025 – Decided March 20, 2026

Before Judges Smith and Berdote Byrne.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-0012-18.
Michael Wiseberg argued the cause for appellant (The
Dratch Law Firm PC, attorneys; Brian M. Dratch, of
counsel and on the brief; Michael Wiseberg, on the
brief).

Beth A. Hardy argued the cause for respondents St.
Joseph's Regional Medical Center and Katherine
Vlasica, D.O. (Farkas & Donohue, LLC, attorneys;
Charles E. Murray, III, of counsel; Beth A. Hardy, on
the brief).

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff, Rosa Jovanovic, Administratrix of the Estate of Boban

Jovanovic, appeals the trial court's order barring plaintiff's expert and dismissing

her deceased husband's medical malpractice claim. We affirm for the reasons

which follow.

I.

On April 4, 2015, Boban Jovanovic was performing work at the property

of defendant David Ravin, when he fell and suffered a fractured leg. Boban

went to the emergency room at St. Joseph's Regional Medical Center, where he

was initially treated for pain with hydromorphone and Valium by Dr. Katherine

Vlascia. After being medicated, Boban became unresponsive. He suffered

respiratory failure and hypoxia but was stabilized when staff administered

Narcan. After the hypoxia episode, Boban had surgery to repair a fractured

femur. During surgery he suffered blood loss, requiring transfusions. He also

A-0049-24
2
suffered from a condition described as "post-operative confusion." Post-

surgery, Boban transferred to a rehabilitation center and was eventually

discharged. From 2016 until 2019, he developed progressive cognitive decline

which ultimately led to him being diagnosed with dementia.

Boban filed two complaints. First, he filed suit against David Ravin in

Essex County for damages arising from his fall. Second, Boban sued St.

Joseph's Hospital and Dr. Vlasica in Union County for medical malpractice. The

claims were consolidated in Essex County in December 2017. Boban died April

9, 2020, and his complaints were amended to include Rosa, administratrix of his

estate, as plaintiff. By this time Ravin had died as well, so both the Estate of

Ravin and the medical defendants answered the original and amended

complaints.1

Germaine to this appeal, plaintiff alleged claims of negligence against the

hospital and Dr. Vlasica for improper administration of narcotics, causing

transient hypoxia as well as causing or accelerating Boban's cognitive decline.

The medical defendants denied liability, asserting defenses. During extensive

discovery, the parties produced expert reports on plaintiff's theory of liability.

1
Plaintiff settled their claims against the Estate of Ravin in June 2024. A
stipulation of dismissal was then filed on July 31, 2024.
A-0049-24
3
Plaintiff's neurologist, Dr. Bernard Schanzer, was deposed twice, on January 29,

2020, and February 18, 2021. After discovery ended, defendants moved to bar

Dr. Schanzer as an expert at trial, and for summary judgment on all claims.

Plaintiff opposed. The trial court framed the dispositive question as:

Plaintiff would be entitled to get to the [j]ury with proof
that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, Dr.
Vlascia's negligence was a substantial contributing
factor in causing such injury. But this
acknowledgement does not free the [p]laintiff from his
burden of proving such fact[] via expert testimony
offered to a reasonable degree of medical probability.
Put differently, to prove proximate cause as to a
physician's deviation, even in the context of multiple
causative events, the [p]laintiff must still present an
expert who opines to the required standard that the
deviation was a substantial contributing factor.

The trial court then found plaintiff's expert failed to present such an opinion.

The court quoted Dr. Schanzer's primary report in its statement of reasons:

The events of the fall on April 4, 2015 and during the
subsequent event [sic] in the ER hospitalization may
have unmasked an underlying dementing process.
However, this dramatically [] precipitated the patient's
deterioration. Remotely[sic] and unproven[,] but to be
considered would be a very atypical delayed post-
hypoxic encephalopathy.

[Emphasis added.]

The trial court found that plaintiff's expert's statements "certainly do not

establish a viable theory of causation." The court further found that Dr.

A-0049-24
4
Schanzer failed to show how Boban's traumatic ER incidents, including his

hypoxia, operated singly or in combination with other events to cause his

deterioration. Reviewing Dr. Schanzer's deposition testimony, the court further

found that the doctor "testified – more than once – that he was unable to state

the degree of medical probability that the incident of brief hypoxia in the

[e]mergency [r]oom was a cause of the [p]laintiff's neurocognitive dementia."

The court found next:

[T]here is simply no question that, in his extensive
deposition testimony, Dr. Schanzer explicitly
acknowledged the lack of a basis on which to conclude
with the requisite certainty that medical negligence by
Dr. Vlasica was either the or a cause of the [p]laintiff's
injury. He expressly disclaimed any ability to render
an opinion that such negligence was a proximate cause
of the [p]laintiff's dementia. It is not possible to read
his testimony and conclude otherwise.

Even granting that Dr. Schanzer intended in the
brief testimony quoted above to state an opinion as to
the collective impact of the accident, the [e]mergency
[r]oom event and surgical procedure on the
[p]laintiff . . . any such testimony, insofar as it relates
to Dr. Vlascia, is wholly undermined and recanted by
his extensive, repeated and far more focused statements
concerning the possibility only of post-anoxic
encephalopathy. Because Dr. Schanzer specifically
disclaimed an opinion to a reasonable degree of medical
probability as to a causal link between the hypoxic
event in the [e]mergency [r]oom and the [p]laintiff's
neurocognitive deficit, Dr. Schanzer fails to support the
claim of proximate cause as to Dr. Vlascia.

A-0049-24
5
Guided by our decision in Ritondo by Ritondo v. Pekala, 275 N.J. Super 109

(App. Div. 1994), the trial court determined that Dr. Schanzer abandoned his

opinion on the issue of causation during his deposition, and that permitting

plaintiff to elicit his testimony at trial, on this record, would invite jury

speculation. After barring Dr. Schanzer's testimony, the court then dismissed

plaintiff's claims against defendants.

Plaintiff appeals, contending that the trial court's order barring Dr.

Schanzer's report and dismissing all claims was error, because the doctor did not

abandon his opinion on causation during his deposition.

II.

We consider the relevant standards of review, as well as the sequence in

which we apply them to the record before us.

When "a trial court is 'confronted with an evidence determination

precedent to ruling on a summary judgment motion,' it 'squarely must address

the evidence decision first.'" Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 53 (2015)

(quoting Est. of Hanges v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384-85

(2010)). "Appellate review . . . proceeds in the same sequence, with the

evidentiary issue resolved first, followed by the summary judgment

determination of the trial court." Ibid.

A-0049-24
6
A.

In reviewing a trial court's decision on admission of expert testimony in a

civil action, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. In re Accutane Litig.,

234 N.J. 340, 392 (2018). The trial court's ruling should be reversed "only if it

was so wide off the mark that a manifest denial of justice resulted." Rodriguez

v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 237 N.J. 36, 57 (2019) (quoting Griffin v. City of E.

Orange, 225 N.J. 400, 413 (2016)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

B.

Our review of a trial court's summary judgment decision is de novo.

DeSimone v. Springpoint Senior Living, Inc., 256 N.J. 172, 180 (2024); see also

R. 4:46-2(c). "The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine

the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for

trial.'" Rios v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). "To decide whether

a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must draw[] all legitimate

inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party." Ibid. (alteration in

original) (quoting Friedman v. Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020)) (internal

quotation marks omitted); see also R. 4:46-1 to - 6. To rule on summary

judgment, courts must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient

A-0049-24
7
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that

one party must prevail as a matter of law." Vizzoni v. B.M.D., 459 N.J. Super.

554, 567 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Nowell

Amoroso, P.A., 189 N.J. 436, 445-46 (2007)). "Summary judgment should be

granted 'if the discovery and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a

judgment or order as a matter of law.'" DeSimone, 256 N.J. at 180-81 (quoting

Perez v. Professionally Green, LLC, 215 N.J. 388, 405 (2013)) (internal

quotation marks omitted).

III.

A.

To establish a claim of medical malpractice, "a plaintiff must present

expert testimony establishing: the applicable standard of care; (2) a

deviation from that standard of care; and (3) that the deviation proximately

caused the injury." Nicholas v. Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013) (quoting

Gardner v. Pawliw, 150 N.J. 359, 375 (1997)). The burden of proof on all

elements of an ordinary or medical negligence claim—which includes that the

defendant's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's injury—is normally on

the plaintiff. See Komlodi v. Picciano, 217 N.J. 387, 409 (2014).

A-0049-24
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In a medical malpractice action, generally "the causation element . . . is

the most complex." Verdicchio v. Ricca, 179 N.J. 1, 23 (2004). However,

"[w]hen a patient is treated for a preexisting condition and a physician's

negligence worsens that condition, it may be difficult to identify and prove the

precise injury caused by the physician." Komlodi, 217 N.J. at 414 (citing Evers

v. Dollinger, 95 N.J. 399, 413 (1983)). Our Supreme Court has created a two-

pronged test to address such a scenario: "a jury must decide whether any

'negligent treatment increased the risk of harm posed by a preexistent condition'

and, if so, 'whether the increased risk was a substantial factor in producing the

ultimate result.'" Ibid. (quoting Scafidi v. Seiler, 119 N.J. 93, 108 (1990)). "In

the typical Scafidi case, the plaintiff seeks treatment for a preexisting condition,

and the physician, through negligence, either fails to diagnose or improperly

treats the condition, causing it to worsen and sometimes causing the plainti ff to

lose the opportunity to make a recovery." Id. at 415.

B.

We address the dispositive issue on appeal, the trial court's order barring

the plaintiff's expert.

Plaintiff's core argument is that the trial court neglected to consider certain

deposition testimony by Dr. Schanzer, in which the doctor stated that his opinion

A-0049-24
9
was grounded in a reasonable degree of medical probability. Plaintiff further

contends that this testimony presents a genuine issue of material fact on

causation which defeats summary judgment. We are unconvinced.

The conflicts in Dr. Schanzer's written report and his deposition are the

heart of the matter. The trial court found that, to the extent Dr. Schanzer had

issued an opinion linking Boban's emergency room incidents to his progressive

dementia, he abandoned it during his deposition. As one example of his

abandonment of plaintiff's causation theory, we recite this cross-examination

colloquy during Dr. Schanzer's January 29, 2020 deposition:

Q. It is not your opinion that Mr. Jovanovic's condition
was caused by hypoxic or anoxic encephalopathy as a
probability. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Fair. And nowhere in these reports do you indicate
more likely than not Plaintiff's cognitive complaints
were caused by a brief period of respiratory depression
on April 4th, 2015. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. And you do not have an opinion more likely than not
that Plaintiff suffered a permanent post-hypoxic
encephalopathy. Correct? I know I'm restating things,
but correct?

A. Correct.

A-0049-24
10
Ritondo is instructive here. The plaintiff parents in that case filed an

action against the obstetrician who attended their child's birth, claiming that the

defendant deviated from accepted standards of care during delivery. Ritondo,

275 N.J. Super. at 111-12. The plaintiffs had one expert witness to testify on

issues of liability. Id. at 112. At trial, the plaintiffs' expert admitted during

cross-examination that certain actions taken by the defendant during delivery

were reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 112-13. On motion by the

defendant, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 115 n. 3. We

affirmed, stating:

[Plaintiffs' expert] completely abandoned his original
opinions concerning [defendant's] deviation from the
medically accepted standard of care. His negation of his
direct testimony was a clear and unequivocal
withdrawal of his opinion. As a result, the [plaintiffs]
were left without proof of any deviation of the standard
of care, a necessary element of their claim. Therefore
the judge correctly granted the motion for involuntary
dismissal.

[Id. at 116 (citations omitted).]

Our careful review of the entire record, including his two depositions,

reveals that Dr. Schanzer abandoned any opinion he had that Boban's ER

respiratory incidents were a proximate cause of his progressive dementia. We

are unpersuaded by plaintiff's argument that Dr. Schanzer's conflicting

A-0049-24
11
testimony is enough to present a genuine issue of material fact. Plaintiff was

left without sufficient proof on causation, and we see no reason to depart from

our analysis in Ritondo.

To the extent plaintiff argues for application of the modified causation

standard employed in Gardner, we simply note plaintiff has offered no proof of

a preexisiting condition of dementia which would support such a claim, hence

Gardner does not apply. See 150 N.J. at 376. We discern no error in the trial

court's order barring plaintiff's expert from testifying at trial.

Having concluded that that trial court did not abuse its discretion in

barring plaintiff's expert, on this record, it follows that plaintiff's medical

malpractice claims against defendants must fail on de novo review.

Affirmed.

A-0049-24
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